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## THE REPRESENTATION OF THE TROJAN WAR IN AESCHYLUS' *AGAMEMNON*

"Descriptions of warfare in Greek tragedy" writes Page in discussing the second speech of the Herald in the *Agamemnon* "are as a rule conventional: this one is a notable exception."<sup>1</sup> The fact to which he refers, that this description of conditions at the siege of Troy contains a great deal of fifth-century realism, is generally agreed by the commentators; but there is considerably less agreement on what effect Aeschylus meant this speech to have on his audience and, more particularly, what relation it has to the meaning of the play as a whole. Indeed, anyone who wishes to go so far as to maintain that the speech is quite irrelevant can cite the distinguished support of Murray;<sup>2</sup> and even Fraenkel, though he avoids this extreme, comes near at one point to suggesting that the details of contemporary realism have been included primarily because Aeschylus felt obliged to afford his Athenian audience an opportunity for personal reminiscences.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. D. Denniston and D. L. Page, *Aeschylus' Agamemnon*, p. xxxiii.

<sup>2</sup> G. Murray, *Aeschylus, the Creator of Tragedy*, 214: "551-82: War Speech: splendid realism of detail . . . but no special dramatic service, except perhaps to suggest the false hope that already τὸ εὖ νενίκηκεν." (Italics mine.) On the suggestion of false optimism, see below, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, II, 293: "Supposing now the king entered without being preceded by the Herald, he would have been the only representative of the returning army. In that case it would have been almost inevitable that the common experience which was so near to the hearts of

That Aeschylus was capable of inserting into his plays passages on topics which either interested him personally or seemed to him likely to coincide with a current popular interest, without regard for strict relevance, may be accepted as a general principle of criticism;<sup>4</sup> but in any given case, the conclusion that we have to accept this explanation of a passage is legitimate only when we are left with no reasonably clear alternative. A closer examination therefore appears to be required before we dismiss the contemporary realism as interesting but irrelevant.

One point which immediately commands attention when we look for a further explanation is the emphasis which the commentators place on the "plain man" character of the Herald.<sup>5</sup> He is regarded by them as a typical home-coming soldier, garrulously and perhaps ungrammatically rambling on about what it was like at the front; and there is undoubtedly an element of truth in this view (though in fact it relies heavily on this second speech rather than an overall impression of the Herald's performance).<sup>6</sup> Some commentators indeed go so far as to stress this aspect exclusively, as if it were itself a sufficient explanation of why the Herald presents so realistic a picture of the War. But this is not enough. For, whereas it may be fairly

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Aeschylus and his countrymen . . . should at any rate find expression in the speeches of the first man to appear, the king." (*Italics mine.*) If this sort of thing was "almost inevitable," one may be tempted to wonder why descriptions of warfare in other Greek plays are, in Page's words, "as a rule conventional." Fraenkel does subsequently (II, 294) allow that Aeschylus keeps in mind the *olkovoulia* of his plot; but he continues to place the emphasis of his explanation on topical interest in descriptions of campaigning.

<sup>4</sup> R. D. Dawe, "Inconsistency of plot and character in Aeschylus," *PCPS*, NS 9 (1963) 21-62, though perhaps overstated, is a salutary warning against over-ingenious attempts to make every last detail of an Aeschylean play an integral part of the play structure.

<sup>5</sup> Fraenkel, II, 293; Denniston-Page, p. xxxiii; A. W. Verrall, *The Agamemnon of Aeschylus*, 68; R. Postgate, *The Agamemnon of Aeschylus*, 47, 96.

<sup>6</sup> There appears to be some doubt about how far Aeschylus has made the language of the Herald portray an individual character. The difference in tone between much of the first speech and that of the second can be explained on the basis of "So far my king and master, so much my office," but the style of much of the third speech is, despite some apparent oddities of syntax, much more like the elevated style customary in messenger speeches. Cf. U. von Wilamowitz, *Aeschylus-Interpretationen*, 170-71. See also below, n.27.



conceded that Aeschylus is capable of including in his plays passages which are interesting but not strictly relevant, the idea that he ever indulges in character drawing for its own sake rests on very slight evidence indeed;<sup>7</sup> and it is much more likely that such character as the Herald possesses is there to make credible what he says, than that his speech is intended to portray his character. And, more decisively, the note of contemporary realism is not confined to the report of the Herald but is to be found in several other passages in the play.

It will perhaps be useful to establish as a beginning precisely which these passages are, since some disagreement exists. The most obvious one is the second speech of Clytemnestra, with its imaginative portrayal of the sack of Troy. The realism of this is not seriously in doubt, though views on its appropriateness in the mouth of Clytemnestra vary widely.<sup>8</sup> More controversial is the third speech of the Herald, the storm narrative. Reference is commonly made to the fact that this theme is taken from the *Nostoi*,<sup>9</sup> and this is of course true. But all the main events in the *Agamemnon* have their roots somewhere in the epic tradition, and this has not prevented some of them being coloured with contemporary realism. The loss of the *Nostoi* makes it impossible to check adequately the Herald's description against the one which occurred in that poem; but there is perhaps some slight evidence that Aeschylus had a different picture in mind.<sup>10</sup> And what is striking about the Herald's account, with its alliance of "fire and sea" and the sea next morning "flowering" with corpses and wreckage<sup>11</sup> is its similarity to what the men who fought at Artemisium remembered and afterwards told Herodotus: "When darkness came on . . . there was unceasing

<sup>7</sup> The only possible case appears to be the Nurse in the *Choephoroe*; and on this cf. H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, (London 1961) 85.

<sup>8</sup> Contrast e.g. Wilamowitz, *Aesch. Int.* 168, and L. Golden, *In Praise of Prometheus*, 67.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. e.g. Fraenkel II, 294.

<sup>10</sup> It appears that in the *Nostoi*, as in the *Odyssey* (3).130ff. and 306ff.), Menelaus was represented as setting out from Troy separately from Agamemnon, and being involved in a separate storm; cf. G. L. Huxley, *Greek Epic Poetry*, 163-65.

<sup>11</sup> 650-52; 658-60.

rain throughout the night and crashing thunder from the direction of Pelion, and the corpses and wrecks were swept to Aphetae and swirled round the prows of the ships and impeded the oar-blades."<sup>12</sup>

The other main passage, which has also been the subject of some dispute, is that in the First Stasimon where the Chorus describe the reception of the urns containing the ashes of the fallen by their families at Argos: this raises the question whether we have here a deliberate reminder of the contemporary Athenian custom of bringing home the cremated remains of those killed in overseas campaigns for a public funeral. Jacoby<sup>13</sup> in his discussion of the Athenian public funerals regards it as self-evident that there is such a reminder, and though a contrary case has been argued by Gomme,<sup>14</sup> it is not convincing. His unsupported assertion "I do not believe that he (i.e. Aeschylus) was given to deliberate anachronism of this kind" is hard to square with the Areopagus scene of the *Eumenides*, not to mention the Herald's description of the siege. A more serious argument of his is that the Chorus refer to the sending of the remains to individual homes, not to a public ceremony; but even the public ceremony, as described by Thucydides,<sup>15</sup> allowed for private participation, and since we do not know what happened to the remains between their arrival at Athens (which presumably might occur at any stage in the campaigning season) and the public ceremony late in the year, we cannot be sure that they were *not* returned in the first instance to individual families.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Herod. 8.12.1. That the storm is described in contemporary terms is affirmed by K. Reinhardt, *Aischylos als Regisseur und Theologe*, 82. (Storms such as the Herald describes are of course far from uncommon in the Aegean: it is the wreck of a battle fleet in a storm that is distinctive.) For another possible link between Aeschylus and Artemisium cf. Fraenkel, II, 116, n.1.

<sup>13</sup> F. Jacoby, "Patrios Nomos: State Burial in Athens and the Public Cemetery in the Kerameikos," *JHS* 64 (1944) 44.

<sup>14</sup> A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 95. (The validity of Gomme's main arguments against Jacoby's dating of the first public funeral does not depend on his treatment of the present passage of Aeschylus.)

<sup>15</sup> II, 34: private participation, II, 34, 2-4; 46, 1.

<sup>16</sup> One might even argue, in our present lack of further detailed knowledge, that this passage should be considered as possible evidence that the remains were entrusted to relatives until the time of the public funeral.

But apart from the merits of individual arguments, it is hard to believe that a description of the cremated remains of soldiers killed overseas being brought back by ship, to the sorrow of their bereaved relations, could have failed to strike a chord in the experience of Aeschylus' audience, or that Aeschylus had not so intended.

There is thus a very considerable amount of material in the *Agamemnon* which bears the stamp of contemporary realism: what effect might Aeschylus expect it to have on his audience?

From the Persian Wars down to the contemporary expedition to Egypt the period had been filled with almost continuous campaigning, most of it overseas; and there could have been few in the first audience of the *Agamemnon* who had not come to know what warfare was like, either from first-hand experience or from the reports of kinsfolk and friends, or who had not waited anxiously at home for news from one of the many expeditions that sailed out from the Piraeus.

The details of the warfare given in the *Agamemnon* are clearly intended to evoke feelings associated with this experience. The likeness of the Herald's description of the storm to the scene at Artemisium has already been indicated, and other similarities can be traced. The siege of Troy itself is presented in terms totally unlike the epic picture of a Greek camp by the shore and sorties from camp and city to battle in the intervening plain: instead the Greek army is represented as investing the city walls closely, in conformity with fifth-century practice. The stress which the Herald places on the hardship which winter brought to the troops so stationed suggests conditions such as may have been endured at the siege of Eion, which seems to have lasted through the winter of 476/75 B.C.,<sup>17</sup> and perhaps at Sestos—only a few miles from Troy itself—where the Athenians stayed on into the winter to invest the city after the other

<sup>17</sup> Herod. 7.107.1; Thuc. 1.98; Plut. *Cim.* 7, 1-8, 2. That the siege lasted through the winter is an inference from the use of the word *ἄρτερον* in 1.3 of the first inscription cited by Plutarch (the variant *κατεργόν* appears in Aeschines' quotation of the same lines in 3, 183-85). This inference is however doubted by Jacoby, "Some Athenian epigrams from the Persian Wars," *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 211, n. 194.

Greeks had sailed home.<sup>18</sup> The grim business of occupying a captured city, visualized by Clytemnestra, must have been familiar to those who had been present at those sieges, or had participated in the taking of Scyrus, where the Athenians enslaved the population.<sup>19</sup> And the cramped conditions on ship-board, described by the Herald, must have been only too well-known by those who had rowed the fleets of those years.

Fraenkel writes of "the common experience which was so near to the hearts of Aeschylus and his countrymen, home-coming after a long absence, warfare in remote lands, sea voyage and so forth,"<sup>20</sup> which suggests that he pictured the Athenian audience as indulging in pleasurable reminiscence. If so, this is surely not borne out by the evidence. When the overall effect of the realism is examined, it appears that Aeschylus has deliberately used it to convey a mood of gloom. Clytemnestra's visionary description of the sack of Troy shows the victors with no sense of glory or exultation: they wander through the captured city, weary and hungry, in search of such food as it still contains, thankful to have the roof of a Trojan house over their heads instead of suffering frost and dew, and ready to regard a night's sleep unbroken by guard duty as sheer bliss.<sup>21</sup>

The same grey mood is evoked by the Chorus' reference to the funerals of the war dead. If one may judge from the extant funeral orations, the emotions proper to such occasions were pride and grief combined. Both appear here: but the pride in the men who died is frustrated and the grief embittered by a sense

<sup>18</sup> Herod. 9.114-18; Thuc. 1.98.2. The information kindly supplied by the Department of Turkish Geography, University of Istanbul, suggests that it is not practicable to trace any very exact relation between the general pattern of early winter conditions in this region and Aeschylus' description. The one clear point appears to be that the prevailing wind is from the direction of Mt. Ida; though snow when it comes is more likely to be brought by a north wind. The value of a comparison with the hardships suffered by British troops at the Dardanelles at the end of November 1915 is arguable; it was alleged that the conditions were the worst for the time of the year for 40 years, but similar blizzards in fact occurred in November of 1922 and 1928 (*Official History of the Great War: Gallipoli*, I, 433, n.1).

<sup>19</sup> Thuc. 1.98.2; Plut. *Cim.* 8.

<sup>20</sup> II, 293-94.

<sup>21</sup> 330-37.

that their lives were squandered for a worthless cause: "They grieve, and at the same time praise them, saying how this one was a skilled warrior, and that one fell nobly amid the slaughter—for the sake of another man's wife."<sup>22</sup> There is no sense here of that mysterious Helen of epic, for whom it was not unfitting that Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans should undergo long suffering:<sup>23</sup> here she is simply a woman, and another man's wife at that, assessed by the realistic standards of contemporary male-oriented society as not worth the lives of brave men.

And the same is also true of the Herald's realism, though there has been some dispute about this. The part of the Herald is sometimes regarded as a sort of optimistic interlude before the worst happens,<sup>24</sup> but this is, I believe, a wrong emphasis. There is certainly some optimism in the character of the Herald, but it does not sustain the tone of the episode as a whole. A better assessment is that of Lloyd-Jones:<sup>25</sup> "The description of the war's horrors is further amplified in the speeches of the Herald, all the more effectively because of his pathetic determination to look on the more cheerful aspects of the situation." His opening burst of joy at a safe return, sincere enough in itself, leads into the bland recital of the victory announcement enjoined on him by his commanding officer, which carries, as well as its notes of triumph and glory, sinister overtones of which the Herald himself seems unaware. Then his attempt to speak personally about the War leads him, whatever his original intention,<sup>26</sup> into a description of its unhappy side, out of which he struggles with

<sup>22</sup> 445-49.

<sup>23</sup> *Iliad*, 3.156-57.

<sup>24</sup> Denniston-Page, p. xxxiii: "The tension is heightened by his futile cheerfulness; we wish he would go away, that we might know the worst at once." Fraenkel (II, 293-94) describes the Herald as "the only character in the tragedy who displays an unqualified optimism": his interpretation of the mood of 573-74 seems to me too cheerful. Cf. also Murray as cited above, n.2.

<sup>25</sup> H. Lloyd-Jones: *Agamemnon by Aeschylus: a Translation with a Commentary*, 10.

<sup>26</sup> He seems to change into this sombre mood almost automatically, rather as the Watchman finds himself automatically lamenting the declining fortunes of the Royal House, 16-19.

an effort to a dutiful return to the public manner of his first speech,<sup>27</sup> calling on Argos to "put out more flags"; and finally, the news of the wreck of the fleet, dragged from him despite his unwillingness to mar a day of official rejoicing with unpleasant truths, brings the scene to an even darker conclusion. Having entered full of joy and thankfulness, the Herald seems to depart disillusioned, as it were, by his own admissions: a mood which makes wholly appropriate the sombre train of thought with which the Chorus now begin the Second Stasimon.

The cumulative effect of the contemporary realism in the play is thus to present the War in an antiheroic, disillusioned tone, which robs even victory of its glamour. To a modern audience, such an attitude to war might well seem unoriginal, even commonplace; but can we therefore assume that Aeschylus' audience would have thought the same?

I believe that we cannot. The hardships and sufferings of war were, as it has been stressed above, well-known to them; but it appears likely that they had become accustomed to regarding such things as outweighed by other factors. The prominence of Homer in the traditional education encouraged the idea of war as glorious; and more potent still must have been the psychological effect of the victory over Persia and the almost unbroken series of successes which had extended Athenian power throughout the Aegean. The spirit of ambitious enterprise which Thucydides was later to portray so graphically in the speech of the Corinthians at Sparta<sup>28</sup> was never more active than in the period from the Persian Wars to the production of the *Agamemnon*; and it carried with it an acceptance of the sufferings entailed by war. During this period the leadership of the Athenian people passed from Themistocles to Cimon and from Cimon to the democratic reformers; but despite these changes,

<sup>27</sup> Cf. G. Thomson, *Oresteia*<sup>2</sup> I, 24: "As he calls to mind the hardships of war and the comrades who have not returned, he rallies, falters and with an effort rallies again." The return to an "official" tone is accepted by Reinhardt, op. cit., 81. R. Lattimore's explanation (Introduction to translation of *Oresteia*, 22) that the change in tone occurs because a sense of achievement fills the Herald with "Agamemnon's fatal pride" is, I believe, a piece of oversubtle psychologizing, hard to reconcile with the Herald's overall performance.

<sup>28</sup> I. 70.

the avoidance of war never became an object of foreign policy. And finally, the relation between the glamour of epic warfare and current military policy had been deliberately exploited by the political propaganda of recent years.

The first instance of this is the monument commemorating the capture of Eion, which (in the interests of Cimon) explicitly invited a comparison of that achievement with the part played in the Trojan War by Menestheus, the leader of the Athenian contingent.<sup>29</sup> And an even more elaborate piece of propaganda had been completed only a few years before the production of the *Agamemnon* in the Stoa Poikile. The painting of the *Sack of Troy* by Polygnotus must evidently have been a visual representation of the epic version and intended as oblique praise for Cimon, recalling once again the capture of Eion (or perhaps other campaigns in the North Aegean): just as the companion piece, Micon's *Battle against the Amazons* was intended to remind viewers of Cimon's recovery of the bones of Theseus from Scyrus.<sup>30</sup> In each case, the glamour of epic was being used to elevate the dignity of recent campaigns.<sup>31</sup>

In the light of this evidence it therefore appears probable that Aeschylus was not uttering commonplaces but actually going against current ideas in presenting the Trojan War in terms of unglamorous realism. In fact he was exactly inverting the idea which had inspired the Eion dedication and the Stoa paintings. Where they had used the associations of epic to elevate recent campaigns, he was using echoes of contemporary warfare to strip the Trojan War of its glamour. The realism of the

<sup>29</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 7.4; Aeschines, 3.183-85.

<sup>30</sup> Paus. 1.15.2-3. On these wall paintings and their political significance cf. L. H. Jeffery, "The *Battle of Oenoe* in the Stoa Poikile: a problem in Greek Art and History," *BSA* 60 (1965) 41-57. An epic style treatment of the Sack of Troy by Polygnotus is strongly suggested by a comparison between what Pausanias says of this picture and his extended description of Polygnotus' treatment of the same subject at Delphi, 10.25.2-27.4, which clearly shows that the painter has been at pains to create a visual representation of detailed material from epic.

<sup>31</sup> The other subject chosen by pro-Cimon propaganda for inclusion in the Stoa Poikile, the Battle of Marathon, was a near contemporary event, but it is clear from Pausanias' description, that the treatment, with gods and heroes taking part in the battle, had a strong epic colouring (Paus. 10.15.4).

*Agamemnon*, for which there is no parallel in the extant plays,<sup>32</sup> begins to look like shock tactics.

So striking, in fact, is the inversion of pro-Cimonian propaganda that one must consider the question whether it may be that the realistic treatment of the Trojan war was intended as a piece of counterpropaganda in the democratic interest: all the more so if the public funerals of war dead are rightly explained as an innovation promoted by democratic politicians after the one major reverse in the period of Cimon's successes, the defeat at Drabescus.<sup>33</sup>

On balance, however, it appears improbable that this is the explanation of the realistic treatment of the war. The pursuit of political references in Aeschylus, except where they are so obvious that no one in the original audience could have missed them, is a hazardous business. Criticism of Cimon's campaigns, as opposed to personal criticism, would in any case have been inept, for his victories were shared with the Athenian people<sup>34</sup> and their advantages retained despite his loss of public favour. And the place of mythology in the party propaganda of the period cannot be clearly defined on the basis of the scanty evidence now available.<sup>35</sup> It has the air of being an aristocratic

<sup>32</sup> Contemporary realism occurs in the *Persae* because the subject requires it; but it is not used to cheapen but rather to enhance the Greek victory. The other Aeschylean play in which warfare figures prominently, the *Seven Against Thebes*, may in some degree recall emotions aroused by experiences in the Persian Wars, but the presentation of the siege is, by and large, traditional. And though appreciations of the *Seven* later in the fifth century may not have centred on what a modern view may see as most significant, the testimony of Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1019ff. (which in fact echoes Gorgias' view of the play) does at least show that there is no obvious antiwar presentation.

<sup>33</sup> Jacoby, "Patrios Nomos," 51-52: *contra*, Gomme, *op. cit.* II, 94-100.

<sup>34</sup> This was in fact stressed by those responsible for the actual wording of the Eion dedication, which (as Aeschines points out, *loc. cit.*) avoids naming any individual commander.

<sup>35</sup> The most serious loss, from this point of view, is probably the body of tragedy written by Aeschylus and others during the 460's. It is perhaps noteworthy that A. J. Podlecki doubts whether the *Seven against Thebes*, the only extant tragedy on a mythological subject earlier than the *Suppliants*, should be taken as having contemporary political reference, and is very cautious about possible political references in the plays which we know from fragments only. (*The political background of Aeschylean Tragedy*, chs. 3, 7 and App. C.) It so



device, and obviously it was exploited by those who supported Cimon: indeed, it may well have been they who introduced it into party politics. But we cannot assume that it remained for long characteristically antidemocratic. The foreshadowing of the Argive alliance and other aspects of the reformed foreign policy in the *Eumenides*<sup>36</sup> shows that by the time of the *Oresteia* mythology was being used as propaganda for the democratic platform; and it is distinctly possible that the *Supplices* was advocating such policies even before the fall of Cimon.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, even if the public funerals of war dead were introduced by democratic politicians—and this is by no means certain—they seem quickly to have adopted the use of mythological exemplars as stock material for their funeral orations.<sup>38</sup> It is even possible (though I would rate it no higher than this) that the new democratic leadership continued for its own purpose the use of myth-based visual propaganda in a further battle picture in the Stoa Poikile.<sup>39</sup>

And more crucial than any of these considerations is a final one. The Chorus' description of the funerals of those who died at Troy, and the bitter criticism which they cause the Argives to

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happens that the earlier plays with which the names of contemporary politicians can be connected with any degree of assurance are all on recent-history themes, Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus* and *Phoenissae* and Aeschylus' *Persae* (cf. A. Lesky, *History of Greek Literature*, 230-31).

<sup>36</sup> Argive alliance: *Eumen.* 286-91, 669-73, 762-74: other aspects, 292-98. Aeschylus' attitude to the constitutional changes enacted or proposed by the reformers remains a matter of some controversy, but his approval of the new foreign policy is, I believe, unmistakable. See further, K. J. Dover, "The Political Aspect of the *Eumenides*," *JHS* 77 (1957) 230-37 and E. R. Dodds, "Morals and Politics in the *Oresteia*," *PCPS*, NS 6 (1960) 20-21.

<sup>37</sup> Podlecki, *op. cit.*, ch. 4. The favourable presentation of Argos is evident, whether or not conjectures about references to the exile of Themistocles are accepted.

<sup>38</sup> G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, 154ff. For a possible example from a date prior to the *Oresteia* see Jacoby, "Patrios Nomos" 54-55 and n.83.

<sup>39</sup> This is argued by Jeffery, *op. cit.* pp. 45-57. It involves postulating that Pausanias (1.15.2) has misidentified the Athenians' opponents in the picture of the *Battle of Oenoe*, and this, as Jeffery admits, "sounds forced" (51). The chief argument adduced by Jeffery in favour of this is the doubt whether a contemporary battle between Greeks could have been directly represented in a painting for public display in Athens in the 450's.

make against their leaders, mark an extreme stage in the degradation of the Trojan War; but at Athens, the most recent public funeral witnessed by the first audience of the *Agamemnon* seems likely to have been that of the men who fell, not because of Cimon, but because of the imperialist democratic policies supported by Aeschylus in the *Eumenides* "on Cyprus, in Egypt, at Halieis, at Aegina, at Megara, in the same year."<sup>40</sup>

In short, the contrast between the glamour of epic tradition and the squalor and misery of contemporary warfare cannot be shown to coincide with any clear-cut distinction between the attitudes of opposing parties. It is therefore unlikely that the introduction of contemporary realism into the *Agamemnon* is to be explained as propaganda. The reason for it must be sought elsewhere.

If one considers the actual items singled out for realistic treatment, it is noteworthy that they are not incidental to the plot but directly related to Agamemnon's own moral responsibility. For the sake of a wanton he has led his people into a war which has caused misery and death to his troops and bereavement to their families at home; and by his sacrilege in the moment of victory he has denied a safe return to many of the survivors of the fighting (for this is what the account of the wreck of the fleet means).<sup>41</sup>

It is generally accepted that the guilt which Agamemnon has incurred in waging the Trojan War is in some way related to his subsequent fate. However, the nature of this relationship has been obscured rather than illuminated by some of the interpretations offered. A key-point is clearly the passage describing how the relatives of the fallen murmur against the Atreidae. For

<sup>40</sup> I.G. I<sup>2</sup>, 929: commentary and dating, R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 73-76.

<sup>41</sup> Other explanations have been offered for the storm narrative: preparation for the satyr play, *Proteus* (Wilamowitz, *Griech. Trag.*, II, 43, n.1), conformity to tradition (Murray, *Aeschylus*, p. 215), and a desire to explain the absence of Menelaus, this being an important factor for the murder of Agamemnon (D. W. Lucas, *Greek Tragic Poets*, 93). However, whilst there may be an element of truth in these explanations, the storm clearly relates to Clytemnestra's warning about the dangers facing the Greeks on their return voyage should they commit sacrilege—whether or not the controversial 1.527 is to be read (cf. below, n.61). See Lloyd-Jones, "The guilt of Agamemnon," *CQ* NS 12 (1962), 193.

Fraenkel the angry voice of the people is "the first step towards revolt"; and Owen similarly envisages a situation where the alienation of the people from their rulers is a relevant factor in the death of Agamemnon.<sup>42</sup>

But there is nothing either in the language or in the action of the play to support this interpretation. The Watchman and the Chorus in conversation with the Herald refuse to specify the origins of their anxiety, but fear of Aegisthus is at least as plausible as fear of the people; and it may well be that Aegisthus is intended in the oblique warning about false friends which the Chorus give to Agamemnon on his arrival.<sup>43</sup> Certainly, at the moment of the murder it is a *coup d'état* to establish a tyranny that the Chorus fear has taken place, not a popular revolt: indeed the first suggestion offered to meet the crisis is that the people of Argos should be summoned.<sup>44</sup> The only specific statement about the danger of popular revolt is to be found in the explanation of Orestes' absence given by Clytemnestra to Agamemnon;<sup>45</sup> and since the speech in which this occurs is an

<sup>42</sup> Fraenkel, II, 234; E. T. Owen, *The Harmony of Aeschylus*, 74. (His citing of Verrall in support of his view (74, n. 1) encourages the suspicion of documentary fallacy.) Lattimore's argument (op. cit. pp. 10-11 and n. 6) that the people found, or at least thought they had found, a champion in Aegisthus seems to me to lack sound evidence in the text (it ignores 1349): his observation that Aeschylus is shadowing the character of Aegisthus "with the dark memory of the hated historical tyrant" is true in itself, but it is pressing Aeschylus too hard to make this include a reference to the historical genesis of tyranny without more substantial evidence from the text than that cited by Lattimore. (And it is doubtful if the schematic account cited by Lattimore would match Athenian memories of the rise of Peisistratus.)

<sup>43</sup> Golden, *In Praise of Prometheus*, 64-72 makes the fear refer to Clytemnestra. I find this difficult to accept, not least because the more fear of Clytemnestra is stressed in the first part of the play, the harder it becomes to accept as credible the Chorus' inability to grasp Cassandra's warning. Aeschylus' failure to specify exactly the source of the fear is part of the deliberate vagueness which he preserves in the first part of the play so as to secure greater dramatic effect later. (And Golden's reading of the play so predominantly in terms of Clytemnestra's psychology seems to me to amount to a serious misapprehension of what Aeschylus is saying—notably in the scene following the murder, 73-74.)

<sup>44</sup> 1348-49, 1354-55.

<sup>45</sup> 877-86.

elaborate piece of hypocrisy this evidence is worthless. Moreover the action of the play leaves no room for any popular involvement of a political nature: the usurpers kill Agamemnon for non-political motives and thereafter rule by force with total disregard for the feelings of the people of Argos. The idea of a popular revolt, or even the first step towards it, has no place in the structure of the play, and attempts to introduce it bring with them the danger of documentary fallacy.<sup>46</sup>

A truer interpretation of the significance of the popular anger emerges when the description of it is read in relation to what immediately follows:

βαρεῖα δ' ἀστῶν φάτις ξὺν κότῳ·  
 δημοκράντου δ' ἄρ' αἶς τίνει χρέος.  
 μένει δ' ἀκοῦσαι τί μοι  
 μέριμνα νυκτηρεφές·  
 τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ  
 ἄσκοποι θεοί· κελαι-  
 ναὶ δ' Ἑρινύες χρόνῳ  
 τυχηρὸν ὄντ' ἄνευ δίκης  
 παλιντυχεῖ τριβᾶ βίου  
 τιθεῖσ' ἀμανρόν, κτλ.<sup>47</sup>

The people are not pictured as planning revolt against their rulers but as cursing them. And as a consequence the loyal Chorus fear not political action but something shrouded in night; and what gives shape to their anxiety is the thought that the gods mark those who are responsible for the deaths of many, and that the Furies destroy those who prosper without justice. The two thoughts seem to be related, and characteristically the Furies are the powers invoked by the curse.<sup>48</sup> Thus behind the realism of the public funerals there is seen to be another dimension, which has sinister implications for Agamemnon.

A brief consideration of the other passages where this realism occurs shows that they too have connections with this other dimension: Clytemnestra's portrayal of the sack of Troy leads into the reflection that the Greeks in their moment of victory

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Wilamowitz, *Greich. Trag.* II, 33, n.1.

<sup>47</sup> 456-66.

<sup>48</sup> *Eumen.* 417.

stand on the brink of a sacrilege that will bring disaster. The Herald talks in his second speech of the dead comrades he has left at Troy (those same dead whose kin now curse the Atreidae) and in his third speech by reporting the wreck of the fleet implies that the sacrilege and divine vengeance foreshadowed by Clytemnestra have indeed occurred.

It thus begins to be clear that the passages in which realism is prominent are not to be explained in terms of incidental adornment or of contemporary politics or of human motivation: the explanation must be related to the deepest level of the play, its theology.

As a first step towards achieving this explanation, it is necessary to set the "realistic" passages about the War in relation to other aspects of it presented elsewhere in the play: for there are no fewer than three different aspects in all, and the third of them, the most clearly theological, finally subsumes the others and explains their apparent incoherences.

The first aspect, the realistic one, can now be briefly summarized, since it has already been discussed at some length: it presents the War as a source of hardships to Greek and Trojan alike, fighting over a worthless woman, and as incurring bitter sorrow and resentment in Agamemnon's own subjects. It has a strong objective element, since much of it comes from the Herald's eyewitness account, and Clytemnestra's picture of the sack of Troy, though imaginary, accords so well with the Herald's description that it can be taken as "true in spirit"; and the Chorus provides a factual statement of popular reaction in Argos itself.

The second aspect is very different. It presents the War in terms which are much nearer to an epic presentation. According to it, the War was undertaken by the Atreidae of their own accord to obtain redress for the abduction of Helen, and brought to a glorious conclusion with the help of the gods invoked by the victors. It is expounded most fully in the "official" description of the victory, given first in the Herald's proclamation, then by Agamemnon himself on his arrival.<sup>49</sup> There is no contemporary

<sup>49</sup> On the similarity between the first speeches of the Herald and Agamemnon cf. Fraenkel, II, 294.

realism about it—indeed it is in Agamemnon's own account of his victory that we find the only reference to the part played in the capture of Troy by the Wooden Horse:<sup>50</sup> nor on the other hand is there any consciousness that the Atreidae have in any special sense been the instruments of Zeus. The basic epic concept has however been overlaid with sinister moral overtones by the manner in which this aspect is presented—a manner characterized by legalistic language, a complacent assumption that the gods have favoured a just cause, pride in victory and insensitivity to other considerations.<sup>51</sup> The reason is that this is the view of the War taken by Agamemnon himself, limited by his lack of insight and distorted by his arrogance.

There is one more passage which reveals Agamemnon's attitude to the War; and though it is not as fully expressed there as in the passages already cited, it is a very significant one. This is the soliloquy of Agamemnon at Aulis, reported by the Chorus in the lyric part of the Parodos. The crucial moment in that self-debate comes when Agamemnon poses the issue in terms of the disgrace involved in being a deserter, *λιπόνανς*.<sup>52</sup> Once he has formulated the issue in these terms, the decision to kill Iphigenia is a foregone conclusion; and it is Agamemnon's pride which has caused him to judge the matter in this way.<sup>53</sup> But at Aulis Agamemnon is credited with having at least realized and felt the terrible nature of the deed before deciding to perpetrate it. Once he has so decided he becomes, as the Chorus describe, insensitive to any appeals to pity; and thereafter there is no sign that

<sup>50</sup> 825.

<sup>51</sup> As will be apparent, I follow the estimate of Agamemnon's opening speech favoured by Page (Denniston-Page, xxxiii-iv) and Lloyd-Jones ("The Guilt of Agamemnon," *CQ*, NS 12 [1962] 194-95), in contrast to that of Fraenkel (II, 371ff.) and Lesky (*Greek Tragedy*, 78). Lesky's assertion that "His words make it clear that he feels no joy over his victory, he views his own action with horror," rests on an interpretation of the feeling of 823-24 which I find hard to believe. Certainly Agamemnon expresses no regret for the suffering and deaths which he has caused for his own subjects.

<sup>52</sup> 512. On this word as the turning point in Agamemnon's deliberations see Lesky, "Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus," *JHS* 86 (1966) 81.

<sup>53</sup> I have stated my views on the choice of Agamemnon at Aulis more fully in "The Role of Cassandra in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 52, 1 (1969), 169-72.

any subsequent decision has ever again caused him such moral anguish.<sup>54</sup> Evidently what happened at Aulis has set him on a course which thereafter remains unchanged; and his view of the War, more fully developed later in the play in the passages already cited, is consistent with the attitude first revealed there.

This aspect of the War, therefore, has no objective validity, its significance lying in what it reveals about Agamemnon's mental state: though that state is itself one of the objective "facts" of the play.

The third aspect of the War, the most obviously theological, is once again clearly meant as an objective statement, since it is presented in detail by the Chorus in the first part of the First Stasimon and in the Second Stasimon and finally confirmed when the theological pattern which it implies is brought into focus by the revelations of Cassandra. Seen from this aspect, the War is a sort of "crusade" for the honour of Zeus Xenios, the insult to the god being more important than the loss of Helen (poignantly though Aeschylus describes this). Zeus himself has willed the expedition, which is a pre-ordained part of a long-term plan to punish Trojan *hybris*; and in this plan both Helen and the Atreidae are in some sense the instruments of Zeus, though apparently not to the exclusion of all free-will.<sup>55</sup>

At first sight, this last aspect appears incompatible with either of the first two: the high dignity thus accorded to the War contrasts both with the squalor and misery of the realism and with the false vainglory with which Agamemnon views what he has done.

Ultimately, however, the Aeschylean theodicy does reconcile these disparate aspects of the War. The general pattern appears to be that where a community<sup>56</sup>—be it a city or a

<sup>54</sup> Thus Agamemnon's recital of a string of moralizing platitudes at 922-30 is a very different reaction to temptation from that felt at Aulis, 206-11.

<sup>55</sup> Thus although Helen is in a sense, as the Second Stasimon shows, a Zeus-sent cause of suffering, she is nevertheless described as *ἀτλήτα τλᾶσα* (408).

<sup>56</sup> A precise understanding of this is made more difficult by the corrupt state of the text in the crucial stanza, 374-80. Page (Denniston-Page, 102) and Lloyd-Jones (*Agamemnon by Aeschylus*, 37-38) tentatively interpret these lines as referring to the punishment of fathers' sins being visited upon children, which

family—has once been guilty of *hybris*, there is no escape from the consequences; and supernatural forces impel a member of that community towards choosing to commit an act which is both sinful and at the same time the direct cause of disaster. How great the degree of compulsion is remains obscure: perhaps the truest answer is that though an element of freewill (and therefore of guilt) remains, it is a moral certainty that the wrong act will be chosen. Thus the disaster brought about by the sinful choice brings on the community the punishment willed by Zeus for its original *hybris*.<sup>57</sup>

The third aspect of the War is in fact this theodicy seen from the Trojan side. The War has been launched by Zeus as God of Hospitality to punish the affront caused by Paris' abduction of Helen, and yet this was not the beginning: for when Paris committed that sin he was under the influence of Peitho, unleashed by the previous *hybris* of Troy.<sup>58</sup> However, it is ultimately this *hybris* which it is the purpose of Zeus to punish; and that purpose is duly fulfilled, for Paris' sin leads directly to the Trojan War and the destruction of Troy.

But at the same time, the theodicy has a side which is relevant to the House of Atreus, though the Chorus cannot (or will not) see it, and it is left to Cassandra to provide the key piece of evidence, the sins of Atreus and Thyestes, which stand in the same relation to Agamemnon's generation as Trojan *hybris* does to Paris.<sup>59</sup>

would be an exact parallel to the way in which the House of Atreus was treated. Fraenkel (II, 195-96) states the difficulties involved in extracting this sort of meaning from the corrupt text. However, it is at least clear from the uncorrupted lines 376-77 that Paris' behaviour must bear some relation to the excessive prosperity of his family—an excess which seems likely to be itself sinful.

<sup>57</sup> This is a position not, I think, substantially different from that adopted by Lloyd-Jones, "The Guilt of Agamemnon" pp. 191-92; except that I would stress that nowhere does Agamemnon show any sign of acting with any knowledge of Zeus' plan, so that his motives may still be sinful (cf. n.51). The complexity of this paradox of divine purpose being achieved only by human sin is not peculiar to Aeschylus, but is found also in Christian theology: *O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est.* (Roman liturgy for Easter Vigil, *Exultet.*)

<sup>58</sup> 399-402.

<sup>59</sup> 1186-93, 1217-22.



In the light of this knowledge we can see that the Trojan War is not only Zeus' means of punishing Trojan *hybris*: it is also the starting point for his punishment of the other guilty community, the House of Atreus. And the process here follows the same pattern. Agamemnon, conditioned like Paris by past *hybris*, makes his own sinful and disastrous choice: he chooses to kill his daughter and to wage a war involving misery and death for his people and sacrilege against the gods, thereby incurring his own death and the agonies of the vendetta for the House of Atreus.

We can thus move towards a reconciliation of these three aspects of the War, despite their apparent contradictions. The War is indeed Zeus-sent, for it is the necessary means of punishing the wickedness of Troy and the House of Atreus. Agamemnon's view of the War, though wrong, is essential as revealing the mentality of the man who could make the fatal choice that is required if the War is to be fought. And the realism centres on those facets of the War which, together with the sacrifice of Iphigenia which preceded them, represent the disastrous guilt incurred by Agamemnon in fighting the War, a guilt which is in turn a prerequisite for the final punishment of the House.

But this still does not provide exactly the answer to the question why Aeschylus uses contemporary realism. For it is not enough to say that the things so portrayed are part of the guilt of Agamemnon: they could have been left within the framework of mythology and still been equally valid. Their origins are after all to be found in epic; and the other great sin of Agamemnon, the killing of Iphigenia, is represented without any attempt at a contemporary setting.

The answer lies in the fact that, despite the elaborate theology, Aeschylus was essentially a dramatist—and moreover a dramatist writing not for a public whom he might expect to read his plays, nor for a restricted class of playgoers, but for a mass audience which might well have only the one opportunity to grasp what he was intending to convey. Under such circumstances he could not expect everyone to absorb the full details of so elaborate a play, but nevertheless he needed to ensure that however much of the play individuals in his audience did assim-

late they should all understand his meaning—unless of course we are prepared to accept Aristophanes' caricature of him as only concerned to dazzle an audience of "fools brought up by Phrynichus"<sup>60</sup> with unintelligible grandiloquence and spectacular but bogus stage effects.

Now if an audience is to make anything at all of the *Agamemnon* a proper appreciation of the title role is essential. Though *Agamemnon* is only on stage for a comparatively short period everything turns upon what he is and what he has done. An audience may have grasped only imperfectly the theological background of the play—which depends heavily upon the long choral odes—and yet realize that the fate of *Agamemnon* is in some sense bound up with the process of divine justice provided that, before *Agamemnon* comes to die, they feel that he has merited death. And conversely, if the audience has been allowed to retain an Odyssean notion of him as a noble king wickedly murdered by an adulterous pair none of the play will make the required sense.

It is therefore essential for Aeschylus to present the guilt of *Agamemnon* in such a manner that no one in the audience can mistake it. That guilt has two main parts, distinguishable though related, the sacrifice of *Iphigenia* and the War itself; and in each of these, Aeschylus has to involve the audience emotionally.

He keeps the sacrifice in its mythological setting: appropriately enough, for the sacrifice of a daughter by a father was not a subject with contemporary implications. But he treats it at considerable length and with a notable amount of verbal scene painting, being obviously concerned to leave his audience with an abiding impression of the piteousness of *Iphigenia* and the brutality of her killer.

With the War itself, Aeschylus had a different problem. Whilst it is improbable that there was in contemporary Athens any body of opinion that would have applauded the sacrifice of *Iphigenia* it is probable, if the assessment made earlier is correct, that he could expect a fairly large proportion of his audience to have been so conditioned by an education based on epic, by recent successes in war and by political propaganda, as to

<sup>60</sup> *Frogs*, 910.

regard the Trojan War as glamorous. And this is precisely the wrong attitude for a proper understanding of the *Agamemnon*. Accordingly, Aeschylus works to demolish this attitude by concentrating the attention of his audience on those aspects of warfare which they had been encouraged to discount; and by making these things—hunger, weariness, cold, hard lying, vermin, shipwreck, death, bereavement—the sum total of his description of what the Trojan War was really like, he summons up the strongest possible emotional reaction against Agamemnon for what he has caused his people to suffer. It is a remarkable departure from what the audience may be presumed to have expected: squalor and misery instead of glory.

But the idea of glory does still appear: only now it comes in the language with which Agamemnon displays his attitude to the war which he has fought; and so its very presence helps to make the audience feel that the play is taking a shape uncomfortably different from what they could have anticipated. The count against Agamemnon—Iphigenia, Clytemnestra's description of the sack of the city, the funerals of the dead Argive warriors—has already been emotionally built up when the Herald arrives to present Agamemnon's claim to glory: the proclamation already rings false, its insensitivity already verges on *hybris*,<sup>61</sup> and when the Herald himself completes the tale of misery he leaves the audience to await the arrival of the victor with a feeling of uneasiness very different from what they might have expected to feel when the play began.

Agamemnon's own conduct when he arrives only serves to deepen that feeling. The crass complacency with which he describes his victory jars on the ears of an audience which has been made to feel what the victory has cost in terms of human suffering. Those who have grasped the logic of the choric songs will already suspect that Agamemnon is to prove another Paris: but even without this Aeschylus has done enough to ensure that no one can reasonably fail to sense that there is something wrong about Agamemnon, loudly though he talks of justice and

<sup>61</sup> I follow Page in retaining 1.527, with its boast that the holy places of Troy have been sacked. (Cf. also Kitto, *Form and Meaning in Drama*, 15-16). Even without this the description of Agamemnon as *εὐδαίμων* (530) is ominous.

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the favour of the gods. Surely he *knows* about all that suffering? How then can he be so insensitive to it?

So far, however, the misgivings of the audience have not crystallized into certain knowledge that Agamemnon is doomed. For until now it is Agamemnon's past, vividly impressed on the memories of the audience, which contrasts so disconcertingly with his actual behaviour on the stage. The two are not presented in a visible direct confrontation; and there still remains just a chance that Agamemnon will be able to do what the Chorus have already tried to do—to bury the past and make a fresh start.<sup>62</sup>

And so the uneasiness reaches its climax in the tapestry scene. Here there is no longer a contrast between past and present, between what the audience have heard and what they can see: the confrontation between Agamemnon's deluded mind and the temptation to *hybris* now becomes immediate, and visible to the audience in the crimson path that stretches from the chariot to the palace door.<sup>63</sup> For one desperate moment, when Agamemnon rebuffs Clytemnestra, it appears that he may perhaps after all refute the misgivings which the audience have been made to feel; but the hope passes as quickly as it came, and Agamemnon finally demonstrates for all to see that he can recognize *hybris* for what it is and yet, possessed by Ate, still choose to commit it. The sense of uneasiness which Aeschylus has so carefully built up is at last seen to be justified, and disaster is now inevitable.

The realism with which Aeschylus invests his description of the Trojan War is thus not an interesting irrelevance but an integral part of the play. It is a device used to ensure a particular emotional response from the audience, a response which is in turn a true reflection on the emotional level of the play. By its use, Aeschylus ensures that despite the varying levels of understanding of his audience all will grasp what he intends. Those who do not achieve the fullest understanding of the elaborate doctrine of the choric songs will nevertheless be guided by their emotional reactions; whilst those who do achieve it will be able

<sup>62</sup> 799-806.

<sup>63</sup> Reinhardt, *op. cit.* 90ff.

to appreciate the skillful construction whereby what is seen and felt becomes a dramatic presentation of what is being stated. A poet who has taken such pains to build his play is certainly not the Aristophanic caricature of Aeschylus.

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## SOPHOCLES' AJAX AND SOPHOCLEAN PLOT CONSTRUCTION

This paper attempts to define, in terms of human and divine conflicts, a pattern of plot construction used by Sophocles in what are probably his earliest extant plays. The *Ajax* has been chosen for detailed study because it alone of the early plays presents a god speaking in person, and because the relation of that god, Athena, to the conflicts of the play has become a subject of controversy requiring to be dealt with in some detail.<sup>1</sup> The first third of the paper will, therefore, be an exposition of Athena's motives and involvement in the action; the next third will offer a broad outline of the plot structure of the *Ajax* as a whole, partly through comparison with the techniques of Aeschylus; and the remaining third will parallel the plot structure of the *Ajax* from other plays of Sophocles, especially the *Antigone*.

### I. ATHENA'S ROLE IN THE AJAX

The central action of Sophocles' *Ajax* is the hero's suicide, to which he is driven by two humiliating defeats, both recounted by Athena to Odysseus in the prologue. First, Achilles' armor was awarded as the prize of excellence to Ajax' rival Odysseus rather than to Ajax himself (verse 41; cf. 100, 441-46, 933-35, 1239-40, 1337). Ajax, deeply insulted, tried in revenge to murder the Greek leaders whom he considered responsible, including Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Odysseus. But at this point Athena handed him his second defeat by deluding him into slaughtering sheep and cattle which he mistook for his human enemies (51-54). On regaining his proper senses (306), Ajax

<sup>1</sup> No attempt, however, is made in these notes to give exhaustive bibliography. Ample references may be had from: B. M. W. Knox, "The *Ajax* of Sophocles," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 1-37; H. F. Johansen, "Sophocles 1939-1959," *Lustrum* 7 (1962) 94-288, esp. 169-79; M. W. Wigodsky, "The Salvation of Ajax," *Hermes* 90 (1962) 149-58; A. Leský, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*<sup>2</sup>, (Göttingen 1964), 108-13; M. Sicherl, "Die Tragik des Aias," *Hermes* 98 (1970) 14-37.

found himself frustrated not only of the initial honor, the award of Achilles' armor, but also of revenge.<sup>2</sup> The realization of his total helplessness in the face of divine opposition (447-56) sets Ajax' face toward death. And he knows very well who has denied him the satisfaction of revenge (401-3, 450-52, 655-56). Indeed, if Athena had not intervened, Ajax' vengeance would have succeeded (45, 447-49, 1057-61), and there would have been no grounds for suicide: witness Ajax' triumphant mood (91-117) while enjoying the delusion of success. In a sense, then, Athena's intervention was the cause of Ajax' death.

It would be difficult, however, to argue that Athena was directly and immediately responsible for Ajax' death.<sup>3</sup> There is no evidence at all that she specifically desired it, and her direct intervention is limited to the delusion she describes and to her exposure of Ajax' deeds to Odysseus in the prologue. It is sufficient to say that Ajax' suicide was an indirect effect of Athena's intervention, precipitated of course by the shame she imposed on him, but nevertheless more immediately due to his own character and choice. Even when the seer Calchas says (756-57) "The wrath of the goddess Athena is driving him . . .," he need only mean that Ajax' earlier experience of her wrath is still affecting his behavior, through the shame and frustration he feels.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The details of Ajax' motivation and an exposition of his concept of honor should be sought in Knox.

<sup>3</sup> C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy*, (Oxford 1944) 43-44, supposed that a fresh accession of madness sent by Athena drove Ajax to suicide following his "Deception Speech." But Ajax' mind had been fixed on death since recovering from his first delusions. He needed no new incentive, and the text gives no indication that any occurred.

<sup>4</sup> The one-day limit assigned by Calchas to Athena's wrath (752-57, 778-79, 801-2) does not in my opinion materially affect the present argument, but it does perhaps require interpretation. First, it recalls Athena's remark at 131-32 that a day can make or break a man. The statement was general in form, but we now realize that it can also apply very specifically to Ajax. But, secondly, it involves the suggestion that Ajax' life might be saved, if he could be carefully guarded for one day. Does this mean that, at this stage in the action, there is a genuine possibility of preventing his death? Certainly not; the requirement that he be kept in his tent is the clearest proof. Calchas said that the hope of saving his life lay in keeping him indoors (752-55), yet he is already gone (794). Therefore there is no real hope. Cf. H. Diller, "Göttliches und menschliches Wissen bei

This brings us to the central and most controversial question. Granted that Ajax' suicide was an indirect result of Athena's intervention, why did she intervene? The very word "wrath," used by both Calchas and Ajax (656, 744, 757), implies that she did so to harm Ajax, and certainly she behaves in the prologue like a hostile god. She urged him on into the trap (*εἰς ἔρκη κακὰ*) which she had prepared (59-60); she instructs Odysseus to publicize the humiliating story (66-67); finally she warns Odysseus (127-33) against imitating Ajax, lest he incur the hostility of the gods.

Much later in the play, Calchas offers a simple motive for Athena's wrath, namely that Ajax had offended the gods twice: first by asserting that he needed no divine assistance to win glory (767-69), and secondly by refusing the encouragement of Athena herself on the battlefield (770-75). "By such words he earned the dire wrath of the goddess, through entertaining more than mortal thoughts" (776-77). This wrath, Calchas says, is driving Ajax today (756, 778, 801-2), so that his very life is in danger (755, 783, 798-99, 802). And immediately following this scene, without so much as an intervening Choral ode, Ajax himself returns to the stage, delivers his last speech, and commits suicide.

Sophocles could hardly, in my opinion, have given a clearer exposition of Athena's motives as well as of the effects. Yet most critics of the play are unwilling to accept Calchas' account at face value. To some this story of *hybris* and *ate* is simply a relic of Aeschylean theodicy<sup>5</sup> or of archaic Greek ethics,<sup>6</sup> which

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Sophokles," p. 6, in *Gottheit und Mensch in der Tragödie des Sophokles*, (Darmstadt 1963). Stated in its simplest form (802: this day will bring Ajax either life or death), the prediction of Calchas is a close parallel to the oracle predicting the end of Heracles' labors in the *Trachiniae* (79-81, 154-74, 821-30, 1164-73). There also we are offered the alternatives of life and death at the end of a specific period of time. In both plays the only conclusion we are justified in drawing from the prediction is that by a certain time all will be over; but the ambiguous wording allows interested persons in each play to nourish vain hopes. Furthermore, just as both alternatives turn out to be true in the *Trachiniae* (the "release" equals "death"), so in the *Ajax* Calchas' hope of "saving" Ajax (779) ironically corresponds to Ajax' own hope for "salvation" (692, cf. 812), by which he means death. Cf., with references, Wigodsky, 57.

<sup>5</sup> A. Lesky, *Die griechische Tragödie*<sup>3</sup>, (Stuttgart 1964) 131.

<sup>6</sup> K. Reinhardt, *Sophokles*<sup>3</sup>, (Frankfurt am Main 1947) 38.



Sophocles did well to eliminate from his later plays; by others it is interpreted as the poet's concession to the tastes of "the simple-minded in the audience,"<sup>7</sup> to be disregarded by the more sophisticated. In any case, it is "marginal"<sup>8</sup> to the play as a whole, and was accorded very little "weight"<sup>9</sup> by the poet. What can be the reason for these attempts to discount so prominent a part of the play, a part which alone seems to explain clearly why Athena intervened, and thus to explain the indirect cause of Ajax' suicide?

One important reason why some scholars have not accepted Calchas' account is their belief that Sophocles has already supplied us with other and more compelling motives for Athena's intervention. These other motives are (a) the desire to execute justice upon Ajax for attempted murder;<sup>10</sup> (b) the desire to protect Odysseus, Athena's long-time favorite and an intended victim of Ajax.<sup>11</sup> These are both plausible reasons, and they would seem to render Calchas' account superfluous, even naive. The first of these interpretations collapses immediately when pressed for evidence. I. M. Linforth says of Athena and Ajax, "But in her whole story of the night's occurrences there is no condemnation of him as a guilty person. She passes no judgement on his conduct. She does not blame him for his sullen resentment at the loss of the arms, she expresses no horror or reprobation at his attempted murder of the chiefs."<sup>12</sup> If Athena's motive for interfering with Ajax' vengeance was the desire to punish him for attempted murder, it is hard to believe that she should say nothing to suggest that motive throughout the prologue. This motive must therefore be set down as extremely questionable.

The second proposed interpretation does not yield so easily.

<sup>7</sup> T. G. Rosenmeyer, *The Masks of Tragedy*, (Austin 1963) 183; cf. C. Whitman, *Sophocles*, (Cambridge 1951) 68.

<sup>8</sup> J. C. Kamerbeek, "Prophecy and Tragedy," *Mnemosyne* 18 (1965) 35.

<sup>9</sup> Lesky, *Tragische Dichtung*, 110-11.

<sup>10</sup> G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*, (Ithaca 1958) 274; Knox, 7.

<sup>11</sup> I. M. Linforth, "Three Scenes in Sophocles' 'Ajax,'" *U. of California Publications in Classical Philology* 15 (1954) 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p. 4.

Linforth indeed adopts it, saying of Athena and Odysseus, "She had saved him from the sword of Ajax in the night, and now, as we can see from her own words, her only wish is to guide him, protect him, and counsel him in the present emergency."<sup>13</sup> But we are not told what "her own words" are. Certainly Odysseus freely expresses his affection for Athena (14, 38). But what is her attitude toward him? To answer this question, it will be necessary to reread the entire prologue, examining every word for evidence which might support Linforth's position. Matters of wider interest, as I hope to show, depend on this point.<sup>14</sup>

In verses 36-37 Athena declares herself a "zealous watcher"; but she does not say a watcher "of Odysseus," still less "of Odysseus last night." Her watchfulness is directed toward the success of his detective work, and this need only mean that her aim is the ruin of Ajax, not the protection of Odysseus. Similarly in verse 45, when she says "And he would have carried [the murder] out, if I had been neglectful," the verb *κατημέλησα* suggests care; but it need not mean care for Odysseus' safety. The subject of the sentence is Ajax; Athena might merely be saying that she took care to prevent Ajax from achieving successful revenge, regardless of who his intended victims were. And of course verses 109 and 111, being part of Athena's not-so-subtle mockery of Ajax, cannot be taken as evidence of her true feelings. There is in fact no explicit evidence that Athena cared about the personal safety of Odysseus or the Atreidae. This motive also must therefore be seriously questioned.

Athena's failure to express concern for Odysseus need not,

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 3. Linforth is not entirely consistent. On page 22, in criticizing the account of Calchas, he assumes that Athena's anger was due to the murder attempt.

<sup>14</sup> I emphasize the necessity of drawing evidence only from Sophocles' text because it is all too easy to assume, through familiarity with the *Odyssey*, that Athena must be motivated by concern for Odysseus' welfare. Undoubtedly the Homeric association of Athena with Odysseus made it particularly convenient for Sophocles to associate them in the prologue to the *Ajax*. But the question remains: did he also give them Homeric motives? If one fact has emerged clearly from recent studies of the *Ajax*, it is that Sophocles' Odysseus is not Homeric (e.g. B. M. W. Knox, op. cit., passim). We may therefore not assume that Athena remains unchanged since Homer. For an instance of such change, see note 26.

indeed, mean that she was completely indifferent to his safety or that she was hostile to him. There is no explicit evidence to support these alternatives.<sup>15</sup> But Sophocles' failure to make her attitude toward Odysseus clear may be significant; possibly Sophocles meant to leave the way open for the operation of some quite different motive. Does Athena herself indicate any motive at all for her treatment of Ajax? Consider her very last words of the scene (127-33):

Do you yourself, therefore, looking upon such things, never speak any haughty word to the gods, and do not exalt yourself at all, if you surpass another in the strength of your arm or the extent of your wealth. For a day can bring low and raise up again all human things; and the gods love the wise and abhor the evil.

The word *αὐτός* indicates that Athena is drawing a contrast between what Ajax has done and what Odysseus ought to do. Further, the whole speech is framed as a warning to Odysseus that if he behaves as Ajax did he will similarly earn the hostility of the gods. Her warning is thus also a statement of her own reason for her treatment of Ajax. Here if anywhere, if she really was punishing him for attempted murder, she should denounce murderers, at least in general terms. But she does not. As Lesky<sup>16</sup> among others has stated, Athena's warning against proud words to the gods points forward to the message of Calchas, with which it well agrees. If Athena's warning is not connected to the message of Calchas, it becomes virtually irrelevant to the play as a whole and thereby an embarrassment to everyone.<sup>17</sup> But I need not labor my own position any longer: of

<sup>15</sup> For this reason I cannot entirely agree with Kirkwood, p. 275, that "Athena is just as ready to be cruel to her supposed favorite Odysseus [as to Ajax] . . . ." Cf. pp. 101-2. But such a statement implies agreement with my contention that Athena was not primarily or obviously motivated by concern for Odysseus' welfare.

<sup>16</sup> *Tragische Dichtung*, 109-10.

<sup>17</sup> Bowra, p. 28, takes 127-33 as a reference to the murder attempt, but confesses surprise that Athena should speak of pride when Ajax' crime was one of anger. Linforth, p. 5, rejects the entire passage as a generalization not specifically applicable to Ajax. Rosenmeyer, p. 171, calls these lines "a bare faced mockery of the truth." Linforth (p. 5) argues, in accordance with a

three possible motives for Athena's intervention two are supported at best by equivocal phrases, while the third is supported by two very explicit passages in widely separate parts of the play, one having the authority of the seer Calchas, the other spoken by the goddess herself. I can see no alternative to accepting the third motive as the one Sophocles meant to be important for the interpretation of the play.<sup>18</sup>

Whether or not the above reasoning finds acceptance, most readers will probably still feel that Athena's moralizing in verses 127-33 "is irksomely inadequate in comparison with the intuitive response which the great figure of Ajax evokes in us. We feel, and feel rightly, that the meaning of the play is some-

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principle stated on p. 2 of his study, that verses 127-33 cannot be interpreted in the light of Calchas' account because the audience has not yet heard that account. Such an argument is acceptable only if the critic's sole aim is to recreate the first impression of a play on an audience; it is not universally valid in a more general study. Thus Linforth himself (pp. 15-16) is willing to see in Ajax' promise to hide his sword (657-59) a precise description of the manner of his suicide, even though the double meaning cannot be properly appreciated by the audience until later, when the suicide takes place. Cf. note 18, below. Linforth also contends that, because Ajax was not famous for wealth, Athena's strictures cannot apply to him. But Ajax was known for insolence to the gods and for strength; as a Homeric hero he must by definition have been wealthy; therefore there is every reason to suppose that Athena here means Ajax in particular.

<sup>18</sup> There is one further piece of evidence which carries weight as an indication of Sophocles' intent. The Chorus are preoccupied in the parodos with the shame which Ajax' slaughter will bring upon him and themselves. They know nothing of the cause of this mad act, but their guessing is ironically near the mark. They imagine two separate ways (172-81) in which Ajax might have incurred divine wrath, both of them examples of failure to acknowledge divine aid. This is precisely the type of offense Calchas describes; it has nothing to do with the meting out of justice for attempted murder or with divine protection of a favorite mortal. When we consider that the rumor of Ajax' crime as the Chorus have received it (141-50) does not even include any hint of divine intervention, so that the Chorus' presumption of a *θέλα νόσος* (185) is probably a mere guess, we must conclude that their guessing is remarkably accurate. Sophocles is here using a favorite technique of Aeschylus, particularly obvious in the *Persae* and *Agamemnon*. It consists in a gradual accumulation of guesses by the Chorus and other characters about the relation of supernatural forces to human events until, late in the play, an authoritative revelation confirms and clarifies the guesses (Darius in the *Persae*, Cassandra in the *Agamemnon*, Calchas in the *Ajax*). With Aeschylus this build-up is a primary element of plot construction; in the *Ajax* it is secondary.

thing more complex and more intimately bound up with the whole character of Ajax and the whole action of the play."<sup>19</sup> Or, in the words borrowed by Lesky from Welcker, "Aber es scheint mir, dass Aias weit mehr durch das, was er ist, als durch das, was er fehlte, das Drama erfüllt."<sup>20</sup> Here I think is probably the most important reason why scholars feel unable to accept Calchas' interpretation of Ajax' downfall at face value. Sophocles has lavished most of the resources of this play upon an exposition of Ajax' character and has presented him as a very great man. It is indeed Ajax' character which makes his choice of suicide comprehensible, even admirable. Calchas' account, however, does more than provide added illustration of Ajax' character;<sup>21</sup> it attributes his death, the climax of the whole play, to events falling entirely outside the action of the play, so that this action seems for a moment to have no relevance to the climax. Further, the events described by Calchas introduce the idea of divine retribution, a concept which in the rest of the play has very little place by comparison with human interaction and human character portrayal. Calchas' assertions, in other words, seem to be a direct challenge to the meaning of most of the rest of the play. I hope nevertheless to have shown that Calchas' account does provide the motive for Athena's intervention, and that her intervention was indirectly the cause of Ajax' suicide. I hope now to show that only by thus frankly accepting Calchas' story can we perceive how it does not at all challenge the meaning of the rest of the play; rather it makes possible greater emphasis on Ajax' character and reveals more clearly Sophocles' artistic purposes.

## II. PLOT STRUCTURE OF THE *AJAX*

Θεοῖς τέθνηκεν οὗτος, οὐ κείνοισιν, οὐ. With these words (970) Tecmessa rejects any claim Odysseus and the Atreidae might have to glory in the death of Ajax.<sup>22</sup> She is, whether

<sup>19</sup> Kirkwood, 32.

<sup>20</sup> Lesky, *Tragische Dichtung*, 111.

<sup>21</sup> According to some critics, Calchas' account is only illustrative: e.g. Sacherl, 34; Whitman, 73; Bowra, 30-31.

<sup>22</sup> I feel as apparently R. C. Jebb does (*Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments*, Part VII, Cambridge [1896] 148) that at least two meanings are implied by the

intentionally or not, confirming the message of Calchas as well as posing the problem which is to be debated at length in the remainder of the play: what right have the Atreidae to interfere with Ajax' funeral? But Tecmessa has also suggested a fundamental problem of dramatic construction: what right have Odysseus and the Atreidae to be in the play at all? Suppose it is true that Ajax' defeat and suicide are an illustration of the law that *hybris* is punished by the gods, in this instance by Athena. This is a matter between Ajax and the gods. He offended them with proud words; Athena retaliated by frustrating an attempt at vengeance; he realized his inability to regain control and committed suicide. Odysseus and the Atreidae are necessary to this story only because Ajax' desire to kill them provided Athena with the opportunity to frustrate him. They have no other necessary function. Athena hardly even uses them as her agents in destroying Ajax.<sup>23</sup> Tecmessa is quite right that "His death concerned the gods, not them." What is the dramatic justification for the rôle of Ajax' human adversaries in this play?

I have already concluded that Athena took no special interest in the safety of Odysseus and the Atreidae; nor does she ever condescend to judge the rightness or wrongness of Ajax' quarrel with them. It would be perfectly fair to say that she simply uses the quarrel as the best opportunity for humiliating Ajax—no more, no less. It may now be stated briefly that the human enemies of Ajax never show the slightest interest in his irreverent attitude toward the gods. Thus, although Athena, the Atreidae, and Odysseus are all enemies of Ajax, the conflict be-

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datives in verse 970: "His death concerns the gods," and "His death was due to the gods." These are mutually compatible meanings in the context, and I see no point in attempting to exclude either. For further references, see W. B. Stanford, *Sophocles, Ajax*, (London 1963) 185.

<sup>23</sup> Odysseus does at Athena's command (67) spread the story of Ajax' guilt through the army (148-49), thereby increasing the burden of shame for Ajax and making it possible for the Greeks to direct their anger at him (228-32, 253-56, 408-9, 723-28). But it cannot be said that Odysseus' action was a necessary contributing factor to Ajax' suicide. The hostility of the army (458) is only one of the factors which make honor no longer attainable for Ajax in life. Athena's prevention of the attempted vengeance was itself a sufficient demonstration to Ajax that he could not hope to recover his honor except by death.

tween Ajax and Athena is separate from his quarrel with the Greek generals. The former concerns Ajax' earlier affronts to the gods; the latter concerns the awarding of Achilles' armor. Furthermore, the objectives of the human enemies of Ajax are distinct from those of the goddess. The only specific objective of the Atreidae is to deny him burial (1047-48) as a belated punishment for attempted murder (1055-56). Odysseus enters looking for an occasion against his enemy (1-2), but his hostility rapidly gives way to pity (121-26), and he leaves the final scene having rendered his enemy a great service by obtaining permission for the burial. Still others of the Greeks threaten to stone him or Teucer (see note 23). None of these objectives is the same as that of Athena, who, as we have seen, simply imposes on Ajax the shame of frustrated vengeance and leaves to him the decision to commit suicide. Indeed, Ajax' human enemies, with the exception of Odysseus' brief appearance in the prologue, do not participate at all in the action of the play until Ajax is already dead.

Because Ajax is the target of two distinct sets of adversaries, the play may be said to have a double plot. But if the mere presence of gods together with human beings in a single play makes a double plot unavoidable, we should certainly expect this peculiarity in every play of Aeschylus. A brief reference to the techniques of Aeschylus at this point may help explain the plot structure of the *Ajax*.

Of the extant works of Aeschylus, the *Septem*, *Prometheus*, and *Supplices* are fragments of trilogies. Only the *Persae* and the *Oresteia* are complete in themselves. I shall for simplicity's sake restrict my references mainly to the latter. It is usual to observe that Aeschylean tragedy shows the working out of justice in the affairs of men under the guidance of the gods. This fundamental characteristic of Aeschylean tragedy leads Lesky to say that Calchas' story is reminiscent of "Aeschylean theodicy."<sup>24</sup> Zeus in particular is responsible for the ruin of Xerxes in the *Persae* (532, 740, 827, 915) and for the successive punishments in the *Oresteia* (Ag. 62, 355, 526, 973, 1485; Cho. 18, 246, 306, 382, etc.). But neither Zeus nor the other gods

<sup>24</sup> See note 5.

normally deliver punishment in person.<sup>25</sup> Instead the justice of the gods is regularly brought about by human agents, who may or may not have independent motives for pursuing the transgressor, but whose objective is the same as that of the gods, the transgressor's destruction. In the *Persae* the Greeks are the human agents; in the *Oresteia* they are successively Agamemnon (who punishes Troy), Clytemnestra (who punishes Agamemnon), and Orestes (who punishes Clytemnestra). To ignore the subtle balance of guilt and righteousness in a single person is to ignore an essential feature of the *Oresteia*; but here I seek only to establish that in Aeschylus the transgressor normally has both a human and a divine adversary, both of whom are satisfied by his destruction.

What Sophocles has done in the *Ajax* is to break apart the divine from the human adversaries without actually discarding any of the three basic Aeschylean elements. Ajax is the transgressor (whether we admire him or not), and he has both a divine adversary (Athena) and human adversaries (Odysseus and the Atreidae). But, as we have seen, these two sets have neither the same motives nor the same objectives. Using the three Aeschylean elements, Sophocles has created a double plot by separating the human conflict from the divine. Why?

In the plays of Aeschylus, every human being is ultimately either an agent of the gods or their intended victim (sometimes first one, then the other, e.g. Clytemnestra). At the same time, the gods are ultimately just. It follows that for Aeschylus every

<sup>25</sup> Capaneus in the *Septem* (444-45) is exceptional. In the *Prometheus Vinc-tus*, since both Prometheus and his adversary Zeus are gods, the pattern exemplified by the *Persae* may seem unworkable; in fact, however, the same pattern seems merely to have been lifted to a higher plane. Instead of a conflict between human opponents guided to a just conclusion by the gods, we have a conflict between divine opponents guided to a just conclusion by a still higher power, Fate (*PV* 511-20, 694, cf. 871-76, 895, 907ff.). In the *Eumenides* a similar pattern emerges: the Furies come into conflict with Apollo, and the matter is settled through the arbitration of Athena, with strong suggestions that the higher power of Zeus lies behind the decision (92-93, 229, 622, 640, 664, 797-99, 826-28); but human jurors also participate in the judgement of the human defendant, Orestes. In this play Fate does not clearly conflict with Zeus despite the obvious opportunity (334-40, 1045-46). By such devices Aeschylus manages to show that justice reigns not only over human conflict but also over the quarrels of the gods.



man's actions are ultimately to be determined as just or unjust, good or bad, moral or immoral (or both) according to whether the man is agent or victim of the gods. Sophocles, however, created a plot structure in which a man's conflict with the gods is separate from his conflict with other men, so that the goodness of those participating in the latter conflict cannot be determined by their relation to the gods. In the *Ajax*, as we have seen, Athena never passes judgement in the quarrel of Ajax, Odysseus, and the Atreidae over Achilles' armor.<sup>26</sup> Sophocles is therefore free to represent the contrasting motives and objectives of Ajax, Odysseus, Agamemnon, Tecmessa, and so on, without ever obliging us to accept a god-given judgement upon them. These persons become in this sense morally ambiguous—the judgement upon them is left to the audience and the critic.

To say that Sophocles creates a new opportunity for representing motives and objectives untrammelled by divine sanctions is to say that he gives freer range to the representation of character. It may be worthwhile to point out here how large a rôle character plays in the *Ajax*. Both sides of the double plot are traceable to Ajax' extreme self-confidence: he affronted the gods because he felt competent to win glory without them; he turned to vengeance on the Greek generals because he felt certain he was the best warrior after Achilles. This common source for the double plot makes possible a thematic unity throughout the play. Ajax' character may also be said to be the instrument of his downfall. Athena does not strike him with a thunderbolt, nor does she destroy him (as Aeschylus would probably have it) through a human agent, except insofar as the rumor spread by Odysseus is one link in the chain of causes leading to Ajax' suicide.<sup>27</sup> Rather she lets his own pride drive him to kill himself. To appreciate the novelty of this use of character as an instrument of punishment, one has only to search for a suicide in the extant plays of Aeschylus. Finally, we

<sup>26</sup> Doubtless it is because Sophocles wished to keep Athena entirely separate from the human quarrel that he does not admit into his play the Homeric tradition of Athena's participation in the award of Achilles' armor (*Odyssey* 11.547).

<sup>27</sup> See note 23.

may say that in virtually all the confrontations of the play, character contrast is Sophocles' primary interest.<sup>28</sup> But suffice it to note here that only because Sophocles splits the Aeschylean plot in two is he able to isolate the moral aspect (*hybris-ate*) from the purely human conflict and to devote most of his attention to the development of character contrast within the human conflict.

Sophoclean critics are therefore right in a sense to consider Calchas' pronouncements on Ajax "marginal" and relics of Aeschylean theodicy.<sup>29</sup> They are certainly right to concentrate their efforts on analyzing the intricacies of character contrast, for this was also Sophocles' main interest. But it seems to me that Sophocles paid a price for this achievement.

As already suggested, the creation of two separate conflicts within one play results in a double plot. If we consider the distribution of the two plots within the *Ajax* (divine retribution and human quarrel), it becomes evident that they occupy respectively the two parts which have for long been distinguished by those who stress the play's "diptych" form. In the first half of the play Athena's wrath is introduced, and we see its effects on Ajax and his followers; the human quarrel is introduced through Odysseus but is not given a chance to develop further until after Ajax' death. Although Sophocles interlocks these two parts of the play, and although Ajax is the single focus of both, still there are two parts, embodying the two conflicts. We cannot be certain that the double plot was the sole cause of the diptych form; there may have been other considerations.<sup>30</sup> But it seems clear to me that in the *Ajax* the diptych form was used as a simple means of incorporating the double plot.

### III. OTHER PLAYS

It will now be obvious that my purpose is not to demonstrate the unity of the *Ajax* or in any other way to vindicate Sophocles

<sup>28</sup> For fuller treatment of this subject see G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*.

<sup>29</sup> See notes 8 and 5.

<sup>30</sup> Sophocles and Euripides may have been experimenting with the diptych form as a vehicle for comparison and contrast. The *Trachiniae* and *Hippolytus* are fairly clear examples.

from all hostile criticism. There is nothing more damaging to Sophoclean studies than the assumption that Sophocles was perfect. On the other hand, we should not hastily condemn the poet for failing to achieve unity of plot without considering what options were available to him. Let us not assume that it was easy for Sophocles to make changes in the Aeschylean pattern; he himself had grown up with Aeschylus as a model,<sup>31</sup> and his audience may well have expected a tragedy to resemble the Aeschylean type. Furthermore, and probably more important, Sophocles presumably knew at least as well as we that a tragedy could not develop unless some superhuman power were available (fate, Zeus, Athena, etc.) to set limits to human action.<sup>32</sup> A play in which all forces were subject to human control and choice simply could not be a tragedy. If Sophocles had not used the Aeschylean pattern of divine retribution, he would have needed a substitute, and what could that be? Initially he retained the Aeschylean pattern.

Euripides solved the problem in his *Medea* and frequently thereafter by letting an element of character or an emotion serve as the superhuman element in the play which eventually defeats the human beings in whom it operates.<sup>33</sup> *Medea's* passionate desire for revenge is the classic example. Sophocles, however, was apparently unwilling to take this function away from the gods. In the *Trachiniae* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* he resolves the problem of double plot by making still another important change in the Aeschylean pattern. In neither of these plays is there any divine retribution whatever. The element of fate is provided by oracles which merely state what will happen, *without any suggestion that the event is reward or punishment*.<sup>34</sup> The oracles

<sup>31</sup> Perhaps it is worth recalling what is said of Aeschylus in the anonymous *Life*, Section 16 (*OCT* p. 372), to the effect that Aeschylus' art may look bleak in comparison with that of his successors, but appears marvellously innovative when compared with that of his predecessors. Greek tragedians operated within a context of tradition.

<sup>32</sup> See e.g. Jean Carrière, "Sur l'essence et l'évolution du tragique chez les Grecs," *Revue des Études Grecques* 79 (1966) 6, cf. pp. 12-13.

<sup>33</sup> See Lesky, *Tragische Dichtung*, 163.

<sup>34</sup> This is bound to be a controversial claim when applied to *OT*. Rather than discuss the matter here at length, I would refer the reader to E. R. Dodds, "On

are known throughout each play so that they give a constant sense of fate, yet they are ambiguous or incredible enough so that the actions of persons in the play cannot be guided by them and thus are (as in the *Ajax*) untrammelled by divine standards of justice. The event which the oracle predicts is also the climax of the play, and thus both the divine and human elements are satisfied by one solution, as in Aeschylus—but with what drastic change of emphasis! The *OT* is a model of purely human struggle; and again, critics are divided as to whether Oedipus was or was not admirable. Athena's description of Ajax (*Ajax* 119-20) could easily be applied to Oedipus: "Whom would you have found to have greater foresight than this man or to be better at performing timely actions?" Yet both Ajax and Oedipus are, paradoxically, guilty of monstrous crimes, and no god decides once and for all whether these men are good or bad.

The later plays, however, are not the main concern of this paper. I should like to conclude by pointing out how Sophocles' most famous diptych play, the *Antigone*, resembles the *Ajax* in the technique of plot construction. I hope in so doing not only to provide some external support, as it were, for my interpretation of the *Ajax*, but also to make as clear as possible my claim that Sophocles did face problems of plot construction and solved them in ways which reveal his purposes as an artist.

It is notorious that the divine powers whom Teiresias represents show virtually no interest in the person or fate of Antigone. This is disconcerting to those for whom Antigone is the principal character, and who would like Creon's downfall to constitute her vindication. Teiresias' first message is simply that sacrifice and augury no longer work because the birds have eaten the flesh of Polyneices' unburied body (1021-22), and dogs

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Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex," *Greece and Rome* 13 (1966) 37-49. Dodds particularly stresses (p. 41) that Sophocles altered the Aeschylean form of the principal oracle (see *Septem* 742ff.) in order to exclude the element of crime and punishment. I would stress that the plague which causes Oedipus' investigation is also not presented as punishment; nor is the exile of Oedipus. The problem is not so much one of guilt as of formal pollution (see Dodds pp. 43-44). As for Apollo, who "brought all these sufferings to pass" (*OT* 1329-30), his only contribution was to answer Oedipus' question (71-72) on a matter of fact: he indicates what is the cause of the city's distress and how to remove it (100-1).

and birds have contaminated the altars with flesh (1016-20). He therefore urges Creon to admit his mistake and end his stubborn maltreatment of the corpse (1023-32). In his second speech the seer elaborates both on the causes of divine displeasure and on the results. Creon, he says, has buried a living soul (i.e. Antigone, 1069) and refused to bury a corpse (1070-71). In this he has offended both the upper gods and Hades. Therefore avenging Furies from both will assail him (1074-75), and one result will be the death of his son (1066-67). Furthermore, the contamination of Polyneices' unburied corpse will spread to other cities and arouse them against Thebes (1080-83).

Because no god appears in person in the *Antigone*, our knowledge of divine motives and objectives must be taken entirely from the statements of Teiresias. On the basis of what he says, we can only conclude that divine displeasure and retribution have been aroused exclusively by occurrences which affect divine well-being directly (as Athena in the *Ajax* is concerned only with the hero's affronts to the gods). The gods react to contamination of their own altars and to infringement of their own rights to possess a dead body or a living soul. They show not the slightest interest in the rights of Antigone or in the principles of family loyalty she stands for.<sup>35</sup> If the motives of the gods are distinct from those of Antigone, what are their objectives? They have, like Athena in the *Ajax*, a proper Aeschylean object, the downfall of the human transgressor, Creon. Antigone's objective is certainly not the same; she

<sup>35</sup> On Antigone's motives, see G. H. Gellie, "Motivation in Sophocles," *BICS* 11 (1964) 1-14, esp. 9-11; also Charles S. Levy, "Antigone's Motives: A Suggested Interpretation," *TAPA* 94 (1963) 137-44, esp. 139. I am thoroughly in agreement with these interpretations that Antigone's ruling motive is loyalty to Polyneices.

There are suggestions at 278-79 and 417-21 that the gods may have cooperated with Antigone in her attempts at burying Polyneices. These suggestions are in themselves no more than guesses and certainly do not indicate *why* the gods should have intervened. Creon's angry denial that the gods might have wanted to honor the corpse is, indeed, never contradicted. The dramatic function of these suggestions, it seems to me, as well as of Antigone's appeals to the unwritten laws of the gods (450-60, 519) is the one proposed in note 18 above, namely the accumulation of tentative explanations in preparation for an authoritative revelation, this time by Teiresias.

wants only to bury Polyneices. It follows that the play has a double plot; and it will be obvious that the two parts of this plot are developed separately in the two parts of the diptych play. Creon's quarrel with Antigone has been completed just before Teiresias comes on stage.

In the *Ajax*, the hero's character was the common cause of the two conflicts forming the double plot. Similarly in the *Antigone*, Creon's stubbornness in refusing to bury Polyneices is responsible for both his conflicts. This permits thematic unity throughout the play, including a certain homogeneity in the kinds of character contrast used throughout. Somewhat greater unity of plot is achieved for the *Antigone* than for the *Ajax* because Creon, in an effort to remove the cause of divine anger (1103-4, cf. 1074-75) before the retribution can materialize, buries Polyneices and thereby incidentally fulfills the objective of Antigone. This extra degree of unity is no doubt influential in persuading the audience or reader that he is still dealing with the same play as that with which he started, and the effect is made possible primarily because the purely human conflict comes in the first half of the play, the reverse of the order followed in the *Ajax*. Furthermore, the delayed report of Antigone's death (1220-22) permits our interest in her fate to carry over into the second half of the play, much as Odysseus' participation in the prologue of the *Ajax* enables us to accept him, Menelaus, and Agamemnon when they finally take up their conflict with Ajax after his death. But these unifying factors in no way eliminate the double plot; they simply make it easier to accept. This can readily be shown by reference to one more aspect of the *Antigone's* second half which has traditionally irritated critics. Why does Creon bury Polyneices *before* rescuing Antigone? Those who see in her the central figure of the whole play want some good reason why Creon did not attend to the more important business of saving her first. After all, even the Chorus (1100-1) seem to suggest this procedure. The fact is that Creon did do first what was most important. He had been roused to action by threat of punishment from the gods (1095-97), not by any concern for Antigone, and he therefore turned his attention first to the business which most concerned the gods, namely the

status of Polyneices' corpse. He was too late to avoid personal disaster, but he did the only sensible thing, knowing as he did that now his conflict was with the gods, not with Antigone, and that he must hasten to set himself right with them. Sophocles does not even permit prolonged consideration of Antigone's unhappy death following the discovery of her body. Nor was Polyneices' burial placed first to avoid anticlimax. Not Antigone's death but Creon's punishment is the climax in this part of the play, and his punishment is the successive suicides (not murders, as in Aeschylus, but character-revealing suicides, as in *Ajax*) of his son and wife. The play does not end as it began, with interest centered on Antigone; the double plot is built rather around Creon, who, whether he is the most sympathetic character, the "hero," or not, is the common foe of both Antigone and the gods, just as Ajax is the common foe of the Greek generals and Athena. Ajax and Creon in their respective tragedies each provide in their persons the structural unity of the play. Thus in general plan and in numerous details the *Ajax* and *Antigone*, probably Sophocles' earliest extant plays, resemble each other closely and show important departures from Aeschylean technique, the first steps toward even greater changes in Sophocles' later plays.

The conclusions to which I have been led in this study may be summarized as follows:

(1) The motives and objectives of Athena in the *Ajax* are those offered by Calchas, and they are distinct from the motives and objectives of Ajax' human adversaries. The result is a double plot.

(2) The separation of the human conflict from a conflict involving the gods constitutes a modification of the Aeschylean pattern of tragedy and makes possible representation of purely human, morally ambiguous action with emphasis on character portrayal, thanks to the absence of divine sanctions and judgments.

(3) The double plot of the *Ajax* is accommodated by the diptych form.

(4) A further modification of the Aeschylean pattern, as seen in the *Trachiniae* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*, eliminates the double

## PROPERTIUS 4.2: CALLIMACHUS ROMANUS AT WORK

The Vertumnus elegy of Propertius, although the subject of several recent discussions, has still received no really detailed and thorough appreciation of its many merits.<sup>1</sup> This essay will attempt to demonstrate that it possesses numerous felicities and subtleties characteristic of Propertius' best writing, that if it is meant as a *jeu d'esprit* it is nevertheless most carefully and artfully composed, and that it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of Propertius' aims and methods in the "Romanizing" phase of his latest work.

One of the most intriguing aspects of book 4 is the delicate balance Propertius so often establishes in those elegies which have a narrator different from the familiar *persona* of the poet himself.<sup>2</sup> On the whole, he satisfies the potentially divergent claims of characterization and artistry with considerable success, treading a thin line between artifice and realism. In 4.2 this balance is accomplished by combining on the one hand literary motifs from the Hellenistic and Augustan worlds and on the other some small touches which give the equivalent of personality traits to the speaking god. This combination is present from the very first lines of the poem. The opening couplet presumes a question and proposes to answer it. A question and answer session with a statue is an attested Hellenistic technique for an *aition* (Callimachus, *Ait.*, fr. 114 Pf., *Ia*. IX, fr. 199 Pf.), as is a

<sup>1</sup> The most recent discussions, of the whole or of specific problems, are: H. Tränkle, *Die Sprachkunst des Properz und die Tradition der lateinischen Dichtersprache* (Wiesbaden 1960) 174-75 especially; G. P. Goold, "Noctes Propertianae," *HSCP* 71 (1966) 59-106; T. A. Suits, "The Vertumnus Elegy of Propertius," *TAPA* 100 (1969) 475-86; H. E. Pillinger, "Some Callimachean Influences on Propertius, Book 4," *HSCP* 73 (1969) 171-99 (178-81 especially). These will henceforth be referred to by the author's last name only.

<sup>2</sup> The principal speakers in book 4 are: Horos (1), Vertumnus (2), Arethusa (3), Tarpeia (4), the *Iena* (5), Cynthia (7), Hercules and the priestess (9), Cornelia (11). For some perceptive remarks on this tendency toward the dramatic, cf. C. Becker, "Die späten Elegien des Properz," *Hermes* 99 (1971) 473, note 1; 479.



monologue by a statue (Callimachus, *Ia.* VII, fr. 197 Pf.).<sup>3</sup> Propertius, however, goes beyond Callimachus in using a monologue form to exploit some of the possibilities of the dialogue type and in keeping the identity of the addressee obscure until an appropriate and almost dramatic moment. Along with this individual adaptation of a traditional motif, there is a touch of characterization. Tränkle describes the introductory lines 1-6 as "feierlich und hoch im Stil."<sup>4</sup> He takes as evidence the phrase *signa paterna*, which he wrongly calls a poetic plural, the repetition *Tuscus . . . Tuscis*, the "grecizing" present *orior*, and the "gehobene Wendung" *Volsinios focos*. If we exclude *signa paterna*, then, all these points come in lines 3-4. There is nothing remarkable *stylistically* about the first two lines. The "high solemnity" appears only when Vertumnus speaks of his Etruscan homeland. Propertius may well have meant this as a small stroke of character portrayal, for, while Vertumnus is quite pleased to be established in the midst of the conquering city, he very emphatically maintains his pride in the country and people of his "birth," both here and in lines 49-50, as we shall see shortly. The stylistic shift reflects a heightened interest on the part of the god; Propertius has combined the two elements most ingeniously.<sup>5</sup>

Vertumnus begins the lengthy etymological section of the poem in a rather offhand manner, indeed, there is nothing in lines 7-8 to suggest that the new topic is etymology at all. While setting the stage for the first *etymon*, Propertius allows himself one couplet to engage in what is virtually a lesson in stylistic criticism. Tränkle has given a fine discussion of the "improvements" Propertius has made upon a couplet of Tibullus, 2.5.33-34:<sup>6</sup>

At qua Velabri regio patet, ire solebat  
exiguus pulsa per vada linter aqua.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of these Hellenistic antecedents, cf. Pöhlinger, 178-81.

<sup>4</sup> Tränkle, 174.

<sup>5</sup> Tränkle tends to overlook the possibility of such functional interpretations; it would be unwise and uncharitable not to give Propertius the benefit of the doubt.

<sup>6</sup> Tränkle, 96-97.

I would add only a few points to Tränkle's observations. First, Propertius has "replaced" the dry *Velabri regio* with the rare and poetic use of *Tiberinus* as a noun.<sup>7</sup> Second, whereas *qua Velabri regio patet* does little but specify the location, Propertius creates an unusual and vivid image with the phrase *Tiberinus iter faciebat*. Finally, *aiunt* suggests the traditions, oral and written, that link Rome's past and present and reinforces the antiquarian mode of thought that runs through the entire poem. Propertius' central concern here is the imaginative and pictorial evocation of a scene, and his artistry comes to the fore.

The explanation Vertumnus gives in lines 9-10 may tell us something about Propertius' attitude toward his subject. The arbitrary conjunction of the turning of the Tiber and the name of the god is quite fanciful and probably not altogether serious. It is even possible that Propertius himself invented the derivation as a way of getting a piece of familiar antiquarian lore into his poem. The brevity and the absence of any outright rejection suggest that Propertius thought the whole thing too transparently silly to need further comment, that he wanted to set a tone of light and genial wit, which will be maintained almost from beginning to end in this portion of the elegy.

At line 11 Vertumnus enters upon the first etymology "serious" enough to merit full development. The extent of that development is in some doubt because of the uncertainty regarding Schrader's transposition of lines 41-46 to follow line 18.<sup>8</sup> Two arguments give strong support to the transposition. First, *fama* in 19 is surely easier when preceded by *maxima fama* (41). The emphasis given to this etymology by the addition of these six lines makes the mock irritation of *mendax fama, nocet* more appropriate. Second, the theme of lines 41-46 is not changing *figurae*, as in 21-39, but offerings and first fruits (*dona*, 42), just as in 13-18. It will not do to say that Vertumnus "whimsically interprets the cult practice to prove that he is a master gardener in addition to his other accomplishments."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Vergil *Aen.* 7.30, Ovid. *Fast.* 4.291, 6.105.

<sup>8</sup> It is defended by Goold, 99, rejected by Suits, 478, note 11.

<sup>9</sup> Suits, 478.

Line 42 would then imply that Vertumnus offers the *dona* to himself! And in any case, Vertumnus is not boasting about the particular professions themselves so much as about the fact of his ability to change shape. The transposition restores coherence to the narrative and is, in my opinion, more acceptable than most of the transpositions proposed for the text of Propertius. With the transposition, there are two lines of introduction followed by twelve of very colorful description, in which Propertius mixes literary reminiscences with borrowings from the vocabulary of the agricultural world and produces, perhaps for the first time in aetiological elegy, that kind of literary rusticism pioneered in Latin verse by Vergil. A few examples will show the kind of work Propertius has done in this section. The intransitive use of *variare* seems to be confined almost exclusively to poetry,<sup>10</sup> but Columella (12.52.9) has the word, referring to *bacae*, in what is apparently a technical sense. Such a technical meaning may lie behind the name of a type of grape, *varianus*, reported by Pliny, *HN* 14.29. Propertius has both, the poetic usage in an agricultural context. The remainder of line 13, *liventibus uva racemis*, has parallels perhaps closer than pure coincidence would allow in Horace, *Ode* 2.5.10-12:

tibi *lividos*  
distinguet Autumnus *racemos*  
purpureo *varius* colore.

and in the phrase of Vergil, *G.* 2.60, *uva racemos*. Conscious imitation is of course not demonstrable, but it is a possibility. The following line has a more evident adaptation of Vergil, *G.* 1.314-15, *spicea . . . messis . . . et . . . frumenta . . . lactentia*, in the phrase *coma lactenti spicea fruge* (14). *Cerasus* and *prunum* (15) both are found only in Vergil's *Eclogues* and *Georgics* and in such agricultural writers as Varro prior to Propertius.<sup>11</sup> *Insitor* (17) is a word of extreme rarity in surviving literature. Its only previous occurrence is in a list of gods quoted from Fabius Pictor by Servius Auct. on Vergil, *G.* 1.21, and its

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Lucretius 2.484; 4.648; 5.722, 825; Catullus 64.50; Vergil *Aen.* 12.223; Propertius 2.5.11; Ovid *Met.* 8.414; 12.465; 15.255, 648.

<sup>11</sup>*Cerasus* in Varro *Rust.* 1.39.3 and Vergil *G.* 2.18; *prunum* in Vergil *Ecl.* 2.53; *G.* 4.145.

only subsequent appearance in classical Latin is in Pliny, *HN* 18.329. Propertius seems to be playing upon another Vergilian passage, *G.* 2. 33-34:

mutatamque insita mala  
ferre pirum et prunis lapidosa rubescere corna.

We cannot tell anything about the currency of the word in everyday speech, but there is little doubt that its meaning is technical. Finally, there is both poetic boldness and literal accuracy in the phrase *invito stipite* (18). Only Vergil, *G.* 1.224 *invitae terrae*, provides a parallel for applying *invitus* to something other than humans or animals. Yet the phrase is proper, for the pear is one of those plants notably reluctant to accept a graft.

The six lines to be transposed (41-46) continue the language of the country, but the final couplet of the series possesses a somewhat higher level of tone and diction. The *dona* named in lines 43-44 are all of plainly rustic origin, and each word (*cucumis*, *cucurbita*, *iunco*, *brassica*) is quite rare in poetry and prose as well.<sup>12</sup> Propertius takes this rusticism a step further in line 43, which is one of the most deliciously alliterative lines in Latin poetry, capped by the amusing and surely unparalleled double "cucu." The humor is broad, and though Callimachus and Vergil, and perhaps even Ovid, might have balked at writing such a line, it is in its way one of the high points of the poem. The image of the flower calls forth some striking examples of poetic language. The expression *flos hiat* (45), to which Tränkle ascribes an "ungewöhnliche Lebendigkeit," finds its only parallel in the phrase of Ovid (*Ars Am.* 2.115), *hiantia lilia*, and *languet* (46) is probably an echo of the famous simile at *Aen.* 9.435-36, *flos . . . languescit*. More difficult to judge is the compact and unusual statement form *nec flos ullus . . . quin ille*. Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr class structures in which a demonstrative *is* or *ille* is repeated as "dichterisch und umgangssprachlich," but their only examples are Lucretius 2.1026

<sup>12</sup> Before Propertius, we find *cucumis* only in Plautus *Cas.* 911 (a bawdy joke), Varro *Ling.* 5.104 and Vergil *G.* 4.122; *cucurbita* only in Varro *Rust.* 3.16.25; *iuncus* in Plautus *Rud.* 732, a few times in Varro, in Vergil *Ecl.* 1.48 and in Tibullus 2.13.15; *brassica* in Plautus *Pseud.* 815, several times in Cato and Varro, and, entertainingly, in *CIL*, IV, 4533 (Pompeii, date uncertain).

(not an outstandingly poetic line) and the present passage.<sup>13</sup> There are in fact no other instances of *quin is* or *quin ille* in classical Latin poetry, so the "dichterisch" category collapses into virtual non-existence. The two verbs create strong and effective images within a context which preserves the colloquial atmosphere of the foregoing. We find throughout this passage the vocabulary of farming and the countryside, heightened and intensified at many points by the manifold techniques of poetry. While this was first done in the hexameters of Vergil, Propertius is almost certainly the first Latin elegiac poet to make such a large-scale use of rustic terminology. The result is an attractive innovation, elements of the language of the *populus Romanus* incorporated in verse. This procedure may well be one aspect of Propertius' "Romanization" of Callimachean subjects and style. Finally, when we consider this passage as a whole, we may well wonder why Propertius would expend so much effort and ingenuity on what is going to turn out to be a false etymology. The answer is simple: he is writing, not a scholarly disquisition that seeks to uncover the truth, but a piece regarded as artistic entertainment. This concern with artful treatment of subjects not in themselves taken seriously is another reflection of Callimachean theory and practice.

The "personality" of Vertumnus asserts itself in the mock irritation, reflected in the short paratactic clauses of line 19, with which the god sweeps aside the "false" etymology and turns, with a funny "con-man" type of aside (line 20), to the "true" one.<sup>14</sup> As in the first catalogue (lines 11ff.), there is an introductory couplet which states the proposed etymology in plain and straightforward terms. Vertumnus proceeds to take the hint implicit in *quamcumque* and makes his first example comically paradoxical. The mention of Coan silks at once conjures up the world of amatory elegy, itself a touch of dry wit in this supposedly antiquarian and aetiological poem. But the statement *fiam non dura puella* is a fine twofold joke. For any

<sup>13</sup> Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik, Zweiter Band: Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (München 1965) 679.

<sup>14</sup> This may be Propertius' "version" of Apollo's amusing *ναὶ μὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμέ* in Callimachus *Ait.*, fr. 114, 5 Pf.

male to say *fiam puella* is amusing enough;<sup>15</sup> for a bronze statue to call itself *non dura* is a brilliantly witty play upon the literal and amatory meanings of *durus*. The humor of this opening example warns us that Propertius is no more serious about this etymology than he was about the previous one.

After this most dramatic of form changes, Vertumnus settles down to what is in effect a catalogue of professions and activities, all of which were part of normal, everyday life in Rome and the surrounding countryside. That most of these are characteristic of the middle and lower classes is probably due both to the humble and unpretentious nature of the actual god and to the literary interest, traditionally associated with Hellenistic literature, in those classes. Again, we have a kind of "Romanizing." These allusions to the rich and varied life that swarms around the statue may serve to counteract the tempting look of such excessive generalizations as Nethercut's statement, "behind the bright exterior of Augustan Rome Propertius sees a city of the dead."<sup>16</sup>

The return of the god to stage center and first person singular produces a greater emphasis on humor and colloquialism than was possible in the less personal narrative of lines 11-18 and 41-46. Lines 25-26 take us back into the rustic world again, while the clearly colloquial *iurabis* (26) has just the right amount of arch overemphasis to make sure that we are all in on the joke. For Propertius is playing throughout this section on the contrast between the true nature of the statue and the often comically exaggerated claims of the god to *be* whatever a particular token represents. A good example is line 27, where we can hardly miss the wry and colloquial tone of *memini*, which underlines the playfulness of *laudabar in illis*—Vertumnus reveals a trace of outright egoism!<sup>17</sup> The following couplet is even more colloquial in diction, as well it might be, for its principal subject is the

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Hercules' *apta puella fui* (4.9.50) and the grotesque touch of his wearing the *fascia*.

<sup>16</sup> W. R. Nethercut, *Propertius and Augustus*, Dissertation, Columbia University (New York 1963) 310-11.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. E. Lefèvre, *Propertius ludibundus: Elemente des Humors in seinen Elegien* (Heidelberg 1966) 97.

appearance of drunkenness. Following a concentrated and elliptical phrase portraying sobriety, the very brevity of which prepares us for an opposition in the remainder of the couplet, Propertius uses the colloquially syncopated form *imposta* to suggest a drunken condition. The irregularity of this form is accentuated by the presence of the normal form in the previous line and in line 33. But to make such a statement brings up a question of methodology. Tränkle, borrowing from Norden's comments on Vergil, *Aen.* 6.24 (*supposta*) and 57 (*direxti*), concludes that all three instances of such forms in Propertius are "archaizing."<sup>18</sup> This may be correct for 1.3.27, where the drunken Propertius uses *duxti*, and in line 37 of the same poem, where the enraged Cynthia says *consumpsti*, yet a colloquial tone for "realistic" characterization seems just as plausible in both cases. But it is hardly proper to regard some "archaizing" expressions in lines 57ff. of this poem as indicators of the tone of a word some 19 or 25 lines away, reckoning with or without the transposition. Norden's discussion is worth quoting at some length:

Die synkopierten Formen dieser Art [sc. *direxti*] haben für Catull noch volles Leben, aber sie galten ihm bereits für vulgär. . . , da er sie nie im Epyllion gebraucht. Auch die Augusteer müssen so geurteilt haben. . . . Dagegen hat Vergil sie für würdig des hohen Stils erachtet . . . : er empfand sie also (wie die zu 24 besprochenen Synkopen) als archaisch, ein deutlicher Beweis für die Tatsache, dass das Archaische mit dem Vulgären oft zusammenfällt und erst die Umgebung das eine oder andere Kolorit bestimmt.<sup>19</sup>

What is "die Umgebung" here? We have the colloquial *memini* and the humor of line 27, the rustic associations of *corbis* and *messor*, the brusque and pictorial *sobrius ad lites* with its hint of a contrast to come—all in the preceding couplet—and immediately following comes the unmistakably colloquial expression *capiti vina subisse*.<sup>20</sup> This is not the serious and high-toned

<sup>18</sup> Tränkle, 32.

<sup>19</sup> E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro, Aeneis Buch VI Erklärt* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1916?) 140-41.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Horace *Sat.* 2.1.25, *accessit fervor capiti*, and Petronius 41.12, *vinus mihi in cerebrum abiit*.

atmosphere in which archaism thrives, whereas a colloquial feeling is just right. So both Norden's principle and Propertius' artistry can be vindicated.

Vertumnus continues this cheerful and bantering tone with a description of his "theft" of the appearances of Iacchus and Phoebus. The bold and unparalleled metaphor *speciem furabor*, repeated for effect, gives life and energy to the image. Another strong expression is *mitra*, which, when applied to a male, carries an unequivocal suggestion of effeminacy.<sup>21</sup> Here the intention is not sarcastic insult but the choice of a single detail most vivid and effective for calling up the image of the god. This fondness for epithets exaggerated even to the point of comedy is evident in the next couplet (33-34). The key-word is *plumoso*, which, significantly, seems to be a coinage. Propertius apparently felt that the humor of the rather improbable transferred epithet was sufficient justification for the invention. Vertumnus proceeds to draw upon two professions related to the Circus games, those of the *auriga* and the *desultor*, for his next two changes. Propertius once again presents a description that plays upon the true nature of the statue. For a heavy bronze statue to compare itself to the *leve pondus* of a *desultor* is too wry a touch to be missed and too close to the joke *non dura* (23) to be emended.<sup>22</sup> Humor still characterizes lines 37-38. The unprecedented and comically bold expression *piscis praedabor* is yet another example of Vertumnus' tendency to over-statement. Sometimes the subtlety of this humor has caused difficulties for interpreters. The *Thesaurus* cites this passage as the only classical instance of an *epitheton laudans* with *institor*—the reputation of the profession was rather low in the ancient world.<sup>23</sup> This

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Vergil *Aen.* 4.215-16 and Servius Auctus ad loc. *quibus effeminatio crimini dabatur, etiam mitra eis adscribebatur*, and Vergil *Aen.* 9.616.

<sup>22</sup> This part at least of the text of lines 37-39 can be defended against Goold, 78-79. He argues there in favor of Postgate's *cum verberare*, Schrader's *corpus*, and Alton's *sub petaso*. Against Alton's conjecture one may object that it creates a very awkward and unpleasant quintuple rhyme (*alternus . . . equo*, 36, *petaso . . . calamo . . . ibo*, 37). Could it be that the manuscript reading *et elus* should be altered to something other than *et eius*? The rarity of forms of *is* in the Augustan poets is well-known, cf. B. Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter* (Lund 1945) 70-74.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Horace *Epod.* 17.20, *Carm.* 3.6.30; Ovid *Rem. Am.* 306; Livy 22.25.19. The dress and appearance of the *institores* (*dēmissis in tunicis*, 38)



is slightly ingenuous. There is a paradox in the combination *mundus* and *demissis in tunicis*, which only the god himself can resolve. The context and manner of expression actually imply agreement with the general opinion as regards all other *institores*. The very plausible corrections *me* and *curvare* (39) form Propertius' last piece of wit based on the rigid immobility of the real statue. Fanciful as these arabesques are, they do spring from the central theme of the elegy, unity of essence within multiplicity of appearances.

Following the relatively straightforward summation of the "true" etymology in lines 47-48, Vertumnus returns to the antiquarian mode with a story that reaches back to the very beginnings of Roman history. He gives in passing an *aition* for the Vicus Tuscus in Rome and again reveals his pride in his Etruscan origins. The style, to which Tränkle ascribes an "epische Macht," reflects this shift in subject matter.<sup>24</sup> Chief elements in this change are the name Lycomedius, unique in Latin poetry, which must have had rich and somewhat obscure associations with the archaic past, and the striking image *contudit arma*.<sup>25</sup> It is perhaps significant that Vertumnus edits the traditional version of Etruscan assistance to Rome in a manner which all but gives full credit for the victory to the Etruscans. This may well be regarded as another subtle touch of characterization on Propertius' part: Vertumnus' patriotism leads him to produce a mild distortion of the conventional historical account, exaggerating the cause for Rome's gift of *praemia* to the Etruscans. Vertumnus augments his description of the Etruscan victory with a brief and rather unexpected eyewitness account of the fighting. Accordingly, the images he uses are strongly visual in nature (*labentis acies, tela caduca*, 53), in some contrast to the more abstract and intellectual *contudit arma*. The greater intensity of expression helps to suggest the "personal interest" of the narrator. This rise in diction reaches an almost grandiose high point in lines 55-56,

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evidently fit in with this somewhat disreputable character, cf. Horace *Epod.* 1.34; Ovid *Ars Am.* 1.421; Suetonius *Jul.* 45.3.

<sup>24</sup> Tränkle, 174.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Tränkle, 13, on 1.1.10, *saevitiam contudit*.

where Tränkle points to the undoubtedly epic phrases, *divum sator* and *per aevum*, the enjambement *Romana . . . turba*, and the alliteration in line 56.<sup>26</sup> But we may wonder whether there is not some wry undercutting going on at the same time. The phrase *turba togata* does not sound very epic in tone or image, especially when it is compared to its famous predecessor, Vergil *Aen.* 1.282:

Romanos, rerum dominos gentemque togatam.

And the wish Vertumnus actually expresses is quite literally self-centered, with none of the more exalted atmosphere one usually associates with prayers and prophecies about the perpetuation of the empire. Still, the primary purpose of these lines is to set the stage for the sudden change of subject and manner.

The address in lines 57-58 plays brilliantly upon the conventional motif of the statue speaking to an audience. Nowhere else do we have a suggestion that the listener might be getting bored, that he might actually walk away without hearing the rest. Propertius here echoes the language of sepulchral inscriptions in which a shade addresses a disinterested *viator*, but the precise reference in *vadimonium*, revealing what sort of audience Vertumnus has had all along, brings the motif to life.<sup>27</sup> The god's plea concludes with an image borrowed from the Circus games (*ultima creta*, 58). It is mildly ironical that Vertumnus should need to draw upon the language of present-day entertainments to inspire in a modern Roman even a temporary willingness to listen to antiquarian matters.

The final lines contain a remarkable mixture of motifs. From dedicatory epigram come the *laus artificis* and the *olim et nunc* themes, from sepulchral inscription the ingenious variation on the *sit tibi terra levis* wish, and from the literary world the reference to Rome's humble beginnings.<sup>28</sup> The phrase that alludes to the latter (*grata pauper in urbe deus*, 60) is pleasantly ambiguous, for *grata in urbe* can mean either "in a city pleasing

<sup>26</sup> Tränkle, 39, 175.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Suits, 483-84, R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana 1942) 232-34.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Suits, *ibid.*, Pillinger, 181. Both refer to E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 121-23.

to me" or "in a city pleased with me." Since Vertumnus elsewhere emphasizes how happy he is to be at Rome (*nec paenitet*, 3, *iuvat*, 5) and since he has just given reasons for Rome's gratitude toward his people and, presumably, himself, we are probably supposed to take it both ways at once. There is a similar geniality in *pauper*, which in tone and context reminds us of 4.1.21:

Vesta coronatis pauper gaudebat asellis.

This complaisance, a mixture of pride in his origins and of ready acceptance of his new location, is one of Vertumnus' most prominent character-traits and is plainly appropriate for a god who claims to be *decorus* in all situations. Moralistic comparisons of the frugality of the ancients and the luxury of the present, to the detriment of the latter, were a *topos* in Augustan writing, but it is worth noting that Vertumnus, true to his character, does not condemn the present even when he praises the past.

The final line is the last of a series of skillfully varied statements summing up the paradox of Vertumnus' many shapes and single essence: *tot in uno corpore formas* (1), *opportuna . . . cunctis natura figuris* (21), *formas unus vertebar in omnis* (47), *tam docilis fundere in usus* (63), *unum opus est, operi non datur unus honos* (64). The rhetorical conceit of this pentameter is almost Ovidian in its ingenuity, yet it revolves around the central theme of the elegy and so forms an admirable conclusion to Vertumnus' skillful and entertaining discourse.

When we consider the poem as a whole, several points of originality and importance become evident. First, the setting, as it is gradually revealed, is unlike anything in the surviving fragments of Callimachus' aetiological poems. The address to a listener who is at best merely curious and mostly quite disinterested is unique, while the location of the scene in the midst of the bustle of city life, alluded to in *haec turba* (5) and *vadimonia* (57), seems unprecedented.<sup>29</sup> In contrast, Callimachus seems to have avoided setting his aetiological works in the surroundings

<sup>29</sup> The Vicus Tuscus was a very crowded and slightly unsavory street, cf. Plautus *Curc.* 482, Horace *Sat.* 2.3.228, Platner and Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (London 1929) 579. For a new and plausible suggestion regarding the precise location of the actual statue, see M. C. J. Putnam, "The Shrine of Vortumnus," *AJA* 71 (1967) 177-79.

of his own contemporary world; it is the scholar of the Alexandrian Library who writes of the Delian Apollo and the Thracian Hermes, whose statues he himself almost certainly never saw.<sup>30</sup> The situation with which Propertius' poem begins, the momentary puzzlement of a passer-by, could easily occur every day and could well have been observed by the poet himself.<sup>31</sup> Propertius is writing not just from Hellenistic literary texts but out of Roman daily life. This is another part of what he meant by *Romanus Callimachus*, that he would draw his subjects as well as his language from the life of his own city and countryside.

A second point is that Propertius seems to have presumed a rather negative attitude towards things antiquarian on the part of his prospective audience, whether we are thinking of the fictional *viator* or the reader. Indeed, Vertumnus' very nature and presence create a sort of cultural gap between the old rustic god, a witness of the bitter wars among the Italian peoples, and the modern, disinterested inhabitant of the peaceful and sophisticated megalopolis. The echoes of sepulchral inscriptions noted above reinforce the impression that Vertumnus is virtually a figure from an old, dead culture, attempting to communicate with the present Augustan world. All this may hint at Propertius' view of Roman antiquities, *vis-à-vis* the people of Augustan Rome, that they were a scarcely comprehensible curiosity, tolerable only if made brief and amusing. And in an ironical way, Propertius shares the people's view of antiquities, for he does not consider the etymological and historical research used in the poem as serious in itself, but only as the raw material for his own poetry, to be worked upon and adapted as the poet himself wishes. By working within these self-imposed limits and by applying the wit and artistry we have observed throughout the poem, Propertius might hope not only to "Romanize" but even to surpass Callimachus.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO CIRCLE

JAMES H. DEE

<sup>30</sup> Cf. R. Pfeiffer, "The Image of the Delian Apollo and Apolline Ethics," *JWI* 25 (1952) 26 (= *Ausgewählte Schriften* [München 1960] 63).

<sup>31</sup> As a modern analogue, imagine a New York City businessman stopping off briefly to read a plaque or tombstone inscription in the cemetery of Trinity Church, Wall Street, then hurrying on to get to work.

# FRAGMENTS OF A NEW VITA VERGILIANA IN CODEX REG. LAT. 1669

Codex Vat. Reg. Lat. 1669 is a tenth-century manuscript containing (fols. 3<sup>r</sup>-191<sup>v</sup>) the *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Aeneid of Vergil*, accompanied by the complete text of *Commentaries* of the Vulgate Servius (S) on all three works in the adjacent margins.<sup>1</sup> The final folio of this manuscript (192) is somewhat smaller than the others and has obviously been removed from some other manuscript to be attached to this one as a protecting leaf. The verso of 192 has the Greek alphabet in uncial characters at the top with the numerical value of each character inserted above it in Roman numerals. Otherwise, the page is completely blank except for a few *probationes penna*. The recto, on the other hand, is well filled with miscellaneous unrelated items arranged in double columns.<sup>2</sup>

The most important of these miscellaneous items is a collection of excerpts from, or epitome of, a previously unknown *Vita Vergiliana*. The text of these excerpts, which extend through the lower four fifths of the left column, is in a Carolingian hand of the late ninth century (and, therefore, somewhat earlier than the texts of Vergil and Servius in the codex proper). One use of ÷ for *est* suggests an insular origin for the document. The 2 – symbol above *t* is used once for – *tur*. The following is the text of the excerpts:

Salva expositione Servii enodemus VII periochas  
secundum Iohannem Scottum, quae in libris autenticis  
sunt requirendae, utentes proprietate Achivi sermonis:

id est quis	quid	cur	quomodo	ubi
τίς	τί	διὰ τί	πῶς	ποῦ
quando	unde			
ὅτε	πόθεν. <sup>3</sup>			

<sup>1</sup> I have discussed the Servius text in this manuscript in an article to appear elsewhere at an early date.

<sup>2</sup> The discussion of this manuscript contained in this paper is based on a microfilm copy of it placed at my disposal by The Knights of Columbus Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis University.

- 5 *τίς*,<sup>4</sup> id est, quis? Ad quam  
interrogationem redditur, *πρόσωπον*,<sup>5</sup> id est, persona,  
ut quis scripsit? Virgilius. Cum qua etiam vita illius, id  
est, *ζωή*.<sup>6</sup> *τί*,<sup>7</sup> id est, quid? Ad quod respondetur *ἔργα*,<sup>8</sup>  
id est, res, ut quid scripsit? Aeneida, titulum operis  
10 demonstrantes. *διὰ τί*,<sup>9</sup> id est, cur? Redditur *πρᾶγμα*,<sup>10</sup>  
id est, causa, ut cur scripsit? Ideo, scilicet, ut laudaret  
Octavianum Augustum, simul etiam ut historiam de-  
scriberet Romanae gentis, quod maxime in illo libro ubi  
*ἀσπιδοποιίαν*,<sup>11</sup> id est, facturam scuti commemorat,  
15 *(anim)* adverti potest. Unde apud antiquos gesta populi  
Romani iste liber vocatur. *πῶς*,<sup>12</sup> id est,  
quomodo? Ad quod redditur *τρόπος*,<sup>13</sup> id est,  
modus. Modi audilocationum tres sunt: humilis,  
mediocris, et grandilocus. Quos Virgilius in suo opere  
20 tenuit, humilem in Bucolicis,<sup>14</sup> mediocrem in Geor-  
gicis, grandilocum in Aeneidis. *ποῦ*,<sup>15</sup> id est, ubi? Re-  
spondetur *τόπος*,<sup>16</sup> id est, locus, ut ubi scripsit? Partim  
Cremonae, partim Neapoli, partim Romae. *δτε*,<sup>17</sup> id  
est, quando scripsit? Ad hanc interrogationem respon-  
25 detur *χρόνος*,<sup>18</sup> id est, tempus. Fuit enim iste tempore  
Octaviani Augusti et sub ipsa tempora Dominicae  
nativitatis. *πόθεν*,<sup>19</sup> id est, unde? Requirit *ἔλην*,<sup>20</sup> id

<sup>3</sup> The seven Greek words appear in the codex in the following forms: *ΘΙΣ ΘΙ ΔΙΑΘΙ ΠΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΩΘΗ ΠΑΘΗΝ*. The latin translations inserted above them are by the original hand.

<sup>4</sup> The form in the codex is *ΘΙΣ*.

<sup>5</sup> The form in the codex is *prosopa*.

<sup>6</sup> The form in the codex is *ZI*.

<sup>7</sup> The codex has *ΘΙ*.

<sup>8</sup> The codex has *ΕΡΓΙΑ* (sic).

<sup>9</sup> The form appearing in the codex is *ΔΙΑΘΙ*.

<sup>10</sup> The codex reads *pragma*.

<sup>11</sup> The codex reads *aspidopiam*.

<sup>12</sup> The codex has *ΠΟΣ*.

<sup>13</sup> The codex reads *tropos*.

<sup>14</sup> The spelling in the codex is *bucholicis*.

<sup>15</sup> The form in the codex is *ΠΟΥ*, with *pu* written above in Latin characters.

<sup>16</sup> The reading of the codex is *topos*.

<sup>17</sup> The form in the codex is *ΩΘΗ*, with aliter *ΠΟΠΗ* (= *πότε*) written above.

<sup>18</sup> In codex *kronos*.

<sup>19</sup> The form in the codex is *ΠΑΘΗΝ*, with *pathen* written above.

<sup>20</sup> In codex *hlen*.

est, materiam, ut unde scripsit? De excidio videlicet  
Troianae gentis et de his quae Aeneas passus est donec  
30 ad Italiam venit.

De vita autem poetae pauca sunt dicenda quia nec  
talis fuit ut imitari debeat nec ut in aeterna memoria  
reponi debeat. Sciendum autem Virgilium congruum  
humanae vitae tenuisse ordinem in componendis opus-  
35 culis. Nam prima vita hominum pastoralis fuit sicut  
Virgilius primo Bucolica scripsit. Deinde agriculturae  
studuit sicut Georgica secundo composita sunt. Cres-  
cente itaque populi multitudine simul belli amor in-  
crevit. Unde Aeneida tertio loco ponuntur bellorum  
40 plena. Composuit autem Bucolica tribus annis, Geor-  
gica VII, Aeneida XI. Dictus est autem Partenites, id  
est, virgineus. Fuit enim verecundissimus, adeo ut in  
publico videri nollet.

A comparison of this Vatican Vita (which will henceforth be designated Vat. in this paper) with the various *Vitae Vergilianae* published by Brummer<sup>21</sup> will show that it bears a closer resemblance to Vita Gudiana I<sup>22</sup> than to any other. Vita Gudiana I is known from only one manuscript—Codex Gudianus fol. no. 70, saec. ix—being found on fol. 1<sup>r</sup> of this document. Vat. and Gudiana I share the following features not found in the other lives: both refer to Johannes Scotus as author of seven *periochae* (Vat. 2-5, Gudiana I. 64-66). These are listed in Latin in Gudiana I, but the same seven are designated in Vat. by Greek words with the corresponding Latin terms inserted above the Greek designations in each case. The Latin designations are the same in the two lives for six of the seven *periochae*. The one instance of difference in wording is for the last of the seven which is *quibus facultatibus* in Gudiana I.66, but *unde* in Vat. 5. Furthermore, the positions of the fifth and sixth are interchanged in the two lives with the order being *quando*, *ubi* in

<sup>21</sup> Iacobus Brummer, *Vitae Vergilianae* (Leipzig 1912; reprinted Stuttgart 1969). References in this paper to all lives of Vergil except Vat. will be by the line numbers in this edition. References to Vat. will be by the line numbers of the edition contained in this article.

<sup>22</sup> Brummer (above, n. 21) 60-62. This vita is not included in Colinus Hardie, *Vitae Vergilianae Antiquae* (Oxford 1966).

Gudiana I.66, and *ubi, quando* in Vat. 4-5. Another feature found in none of the lives except Vat. and Gudiana I is identification of the three styles of writing by use of the adjectives *humilis*, *mediocris*, and *grandilocus* (Vat. 18-19, Gudiana I. 54-55). Among the other lives the one which is the closest to Vat. and Gudiana I in this respect is Vita Noricensis. This life uses the terms *humile eloquium*, *medium eloquium*, and *magnum eloquium* in lines 44-45. Donatus designates the three styles with Greek terms which he translates with the following Latin words: *tenuis*, *moderatus*, *validus* (255-56). Philargyrius I (155-56) uses the same Latin terms without their Greek counterparts. A third example in which there is considerable similarity in the texts of Vat. and Gudiana I is found in sentences in the two in which reference is made to places where Vergil is reported to have carried out his professional duties. In Vat. 22-23 we are told that he [*scripsit*] *partim Cremonae, partim Neapoli, partim Romae*. In Gudiana I. 16-17 it is reported that . . . *studuit partim Cremonae, partim Neapoli, partim Mediolani*. The fact that the verbs are different in the two cases and that the third place named in the two series is different does not invalidate the general similarity in the two expressions.

There are, of course, other features shared by Vat. and Gudiana I which are also shared by one or more additional lives. One example is use of the word *Parthenias* or some similar word as a special name for Vergil (*Partenites*, Vat. 41; *Partenias*, Gudiana I.8; *Parthenias*, Donatus 36 and Servius 8). A feature which Vat. (42) and Gudiana I (7) share with Servius (7) is use of the adjective *verecundissimus* to describe Vergil. The statement made by Vat. (40-41) and Gudiana I (39-42) that three years were used by Vergil for composing the *Eclogues*, seven for the *Georgics*, and eleven for the *Aeneid* is also found in Donatus (89-90), Philargyrius I (87-89), and Servius (24-27).

There are two items not found in Gudiana I which Vat. has in common with one or more other lives. One is a statement of the fact that Vergil did not like to appear in public places. This is not mentioned in Gudiana I, but is noted in Vat. 42-43, Donatus 37-39, and Philargyrius I.36-38. The other item is an ac-



count of the order in which Vergil composed his works, expressed in the following words in Vat. 33-40: Sciendum autem Virgilium congruum humanae vitae tenuisse ordinem in componendis opusculis. Nam prima vita hominum pastoralis fuit sicut Virgilius primo Bucolica scripsit. Deinde agriculturae studuit sicut Georgica secundo composita sunt. Crescente itaque populi multitudine simul belli amor increvit. Unde Aeneida tertio loco ponuntur bellorum plena. This is closely matched by Donatus 247-49: quod videtur Vergilius in ipso ordine operum suorum voluisse monstrare cum pastores primo deinde agricolas canit et ad ultimum bellatores. Exactly the same words just quoted from Donatus are found in Philargyrius I 148-50. The same order of composition is outlined in Focas 118-24.

There are two features in Vat. which are not duplicated by any of the other published lives of Vergil. One is reference to Vergil's use of a description of a shield as a vehicle for recording Roman history (Vat. 12-15). The other is the statement that Vergil's character is unworthy of emulation and that he does not deserve to be memorialized for eternity (Vat. 31-33). This is in sharp contrast with the high regard in which Vergil is held in the other lives. One can only speculate about the cause for the reservations evidently held by the author of this life.

From what has been said above it is obvious that Vat. is closely related to Gudiana I. (It is perhaps of some slight significance that each is preserved in a single manuscript and that both manuscripts date from the same century.) Vat. clearly cannot be regarded as an epitome of Gudiana I, since it contains well established features of the life of Vergil not included in the latter life. It seems necessary, therefore, to assume that both Vat. and Gudiana I have descended independently from some lost vita composed by some unknown person who flourished in the ninth century. The intermediate Vita doubtless dealt with the *periochae* of Johannes Scotus in detail, identifying them with both Greek and Latin terms and employing them in an analysis of each of the works of Vergil. In addition, the intermediate life no doubt had much of the standard material found in most of the other lives. Gudiana I retained much of the standard material and also made reference to Johannes Scotus and his *periochae*, but drastically abbreviated this latter segment, eliminating use

of Greek terms for the *periochae* and limiting their use in the analysis of texts to the *Eclogues* only. Vat., on the other hand, though apparently preserving only excerpts from the intermediate vita, retained a much fuller account of the *periochae* of Johannes Scotus, retaining their Greek designations along with the Latin, and demonstrating their use in the analysis of texts by applying them to the *Aeneid*. Although Vat. has retained less of the standard biographical material than is found in Gudiana I, it does contain some elements of that material not present in Gudiana I, and introduces a few new elements. For these reasons it deserves a place among the *Vitae Vergilianae* in future editions of these works.

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## APULEIUS APOLOGIA 20

“Non habuit tantam rem familiarem Philus quantam Laelius, nec Laelius quantam Scipio, nec Scipio quantam Crassus Dives, at enim nec Crassus Dives quantam volebat; ita cum omnis superaret, a suamet avaritia superatus est omnibusque potius dives visus est quam sibi.”

In Oudendorp's edition, which contains notes by various hands,<sup>1</sup> the Crassus Dives mentioned in this passage is identified as M. Licinius Crassus, the consul of 70 and 55 B.C. and member of the first triumvirate. Justification for such an identification is presumably taken from the clause *ita cum omnis superaret, a suamet avaritia superatus est*, since Crassus did have the reputation for being the richest man in Rome,<sup>2</sup> and his downfall (defeat and death at Carrhae in the Parthian campaign) was traditionally due to his greed.<sup>3</sup>

There are two objections to this identification. The first is that there are doubts whether Crassus the triumvir did have the cognomen Dives.<sup>4</sup> True, Oudendorp's edition does not suggest that Dives was a cognomen of Crassus, for it follows the manuscript reading and prints *dives* as an adjective.<sup>5</sup> To back up the identification of Crassus as the triumvir, Oudendorp cites a passage from Valerius Maximus.<sup>6</sup> This passage, however, is

<sup>1</sup> *Apuleii Opera Omnia*, rev. J. Bosscha, 2nd ed., (London 1825).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Sen. *Controv.* 2.1.7; Plin. *HN* 33.134. Cf. Cic. *Att.* 1.4.3; Dio 37.56.4. For his greed, see Cic. *Off.* 3.75; Plut. *Crass.* 2.1

<sup>3</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.46.2; Plut. *Crass.* 14.4, 17.5; App. *BCiv.* 2.18; Flor. 1.46.2; Fest. *Brev.* 17; Dio 40.12.1.

<sup>4</sup> Doubts are cast by Münzer, *RE* 13, 246. J. Carcopino, *Histoire Romaine* (Paris 1936) 520, and T. J. Cadoux, *G. & R.* 2nd ser., 3 (1956) 160-61, deny that he had the cognomen Dives. See now B. A. Marshall, *Historia* 22 (1973) 459-67.

<sup>5</sup> This is followed by G. F. Hildebrand in his edition (Leipzig 1842). Others regard it as a cognomen (see below).

<sup>6</sup> Val. Max. 6.9.12: *quid, Crasso nonne pecuniae magnitudo locupletis nomen dedit? sed eidem postea inopia turpem decoctoris appellationem inussit, siquidem bona eius a creditoribus, quia solidum praestare non poterat, venierunt. itaque qui amara suggillatione non caruit, cum egens ambularet, Dives ab occurrentibus salutabatur.*

probably not a reference to Crassus the triumvir, but to P. Licinius Crassus Dives: for it talks of a man who had suffered a reverse of fortune and whose cognomen was therefore no longer appropriate. Such a reverse of fortune was not true of Crassus the triumvir, but it was apparently true of the Crassus Dives mentioned.<sup>7</sup>

The editions of Van der Vliet (Leipzig 1900), Helm (Leipzig 1910), and Butler and Owen (Oxford 1914) all suggest that Dives should be regarded as a cognomen. In view of the fact that there are doubts whether Crassus the triumvir had the cognomen, and that there was a branch of the family that did bear the name Dives, attempts should centre on finding a person from that branch who might fit Apuleius' description.

That brings us to the second objection to the identification in Oudendorp's edition. The context of the passage suggests that the four persons mentioned are linked in some way: the best way to link them would be to see them as contemporary figures. Two possible groupings of contemporaries will be suggested below, and it can be seen that Crassus the triumvir was not a contemporary of either group, nor linked to the others in any way.

The first possible grouping is that of men who held office at the end of the third century B.C., at the time of the Hannibalic war. A L. Veturius Philus was consul in 206 B.C., and magister equitum to the dictator, Q. Caecilius Metellus (with whom he had also shared the consulship), in 205 B.C. The consuls in that same year were P. Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus) and P. Licinius Crassus Dives, the first of the Licinii Crassi to bear the name Dives, according to Pliny (*HN* 33.134). C. Laelius, the consul of 190 B.C., is well-known as the friend of Scipio Africanus. The joint consulship of Crassus Dives and Scipio points to a connection between them, while the assumption of

<sup>7</sup> Cic. *Att.* 2.13.2: *quanto in odio noster amicus Magnus! cuius cognomen una cum Crassi Divitis cognomine consenescit*. For the view that this is a reference to the *iudex quaestionis* in the Vettius affair of 59 B.C. (Cic. *Att.* 2.24.4), and not the triumvir, see R. Y. Tyrrell, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, 2nd ed. (London 1885) I, 293; Münzer, *RE* 13,334; H. A. Sanders, *MAAR* 10 (1932) 63; A. Garzetti, *Athenaeum* N.S. 19 (1941) 7; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus* (Cambridge 1965) I, 379 and 403.

the cognomen Dives indicates that Crassus was a wealthy man, to whom Apuleius' description might apply.

The second grouping is the one put forward by Butler and Owen (op. cit., n. ad loc.) who suggest that the first three mentioned by Apuleius were members of the so-called "Scipionic circle", and that the Crassus Dives referred to was not the well-known triumvir, but probably a famous contemporary of the other three, P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, the consul of 131 B.C. Butler and Owen's note gives this identification without argument, and it is hoped to show below that there are reasons for believing that this grouping, and particularly the identification of Crassus Dives as P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, fits the context of Apuleius' statement better.

For this grouping, one can find links between the first three mentioned by Apuleius. L. Furius Philus, consul of 136 B.C., is a known connection of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and C. Laelius Sapiens: he is introduced as one of the speakers in Cicero's *de republica*, along with Scipio and Laelius, and is linked with Laelius and Scipio on a number of other occasions by Cicero.<sup>8</sup> Laelius, consul in 140 B.C., is the well-known friend of Scipio Aemilianus,<sup>9</sup> who was consul in 148 and 134 B.C. All three of these men were grouped together as cultured and educated, as well as politically influential, by Cicero (*de or.* 2.154). As noted above, there was a Crassus Dives who was a contemporary of these three: P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus. He had a reputation for wealth,<sup>10</sup> and so would be appropriate to a discussion of riches.

With both of these suggested groups there is an odd man out. In the earlier group, L. Veturius Philus is the odd man, because

<sup>8</sup> For example, *Amic.* 14, 21, 69 and 101; *Rep.* 1.17-18; *Arch.* 16.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, *Cic. Amic.* 10; *Rep.* 1.18; *Plut. Ti. Gracch.* 8.4; *Val. Max.* 8.8.1.

<sup>10</sup> *Gell.* 1.13.10: *traditur habuisse quinque rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iurisconsultissimus, quod pontifex maximus.* The reference to a P. Crassus, who put on lavish aedilician games, in *Cic. Off.* 2.57, could be to Mucianus (so Münzer, *RE* 13, 249, 288 and 335; and Broughton, *M. R. R.* 1, 568). The reference to a wealthy daughter of a P. Crassus in *Cic. Rep.* 3.17 may also be to Mucianus.

he has no known connection with any of the other three, apart from the fact that he was a contemporary. In the latter group, Crassus Mucianus is the odd man, for the other three were friends belonging to the so-called "Scipionic circle", while Mucianus was in fact a political opponent of the Scipiones.<sup>11</sup>

It is possible that the whole passage can be explained as a proverbial expression. In two places, Cicero produces a proverbial statement concerning wealth and related to some of the figures mentioned in the passage of Apuleius. In one (*Or.* 232) he says: *neque me divitiae movent, quibus omnis Africanos et Laelios multi venalicii mercatoresque superarent*. From this it would seem that Scipio and Laelius had a reputation for wealth. In the other (*Att.* 1.4.3) he says: *quod si adsequor, supero Crassum divitiis atque omnium vicos et prata contemno*. This could be a reference to Crassus the triumvir, but in view of the fact that one branch of the Licinii Crassi bore the cognomen Dives, it is also possible that their wealth was proverbial.<sup>12</sup> The difficulty about accepting Apuleius' comment as a proverbial expression is that no such expression exists about Philus (though as the least wealthy on Apuleius' scale he need not necessarily have been proverbially rich at all). But the further problem is raised that such a proverbial expression would have an origin, and that would leave the problem of deciding which of the two suggested groupings provided the basis for the proverbial expression.

There would seem to be a preference for the latter group in the passage of Apuleius itself. The last part of the passage singles

<sup>11</sup> He was one of the group who supported the agrarian legislation of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C.; as a legal expert, he no doubt had a hand in framing the legislation. An indication of his support for the faction in favour of Tiberius Gracchus' legislation is given by the fact that his daughter, Licinia, was married to the tribune's younger brother Gaius. On the rivalry between this faction and the Scipiones, see D. C. Earl, *Tiberius Gracchus: A Study in Politics* (Collection Latomus, 66) pp. 10-15 and 72-78. There was also rivalry between the Mucii Scaevolae (the family from which Mucianus was adopted) and the Scipiones for the position of pontifex maximus.

<sup>12</sup> For the suggestion that this is a proverbial expression, see Shackleton Bailey, *op. cit.*, I, 289. For a similar proverbial expression about Crassus, cf. *Plut. Cat. Min.* 19.5 and *Luc.* 40.3.

out Crassus for particular description: of the two groups the latter is the one in which Crassus is the odd man out, and this group thus would seem to fit the context better. Crassus Mucianus fits the description in the last part of the passage, as well as Crassus the triumvir, for he too was killed ingloriously in battle by a foreign enemy, Aristonicus (*Liv. Per.* 59). In his case there could be some suspicion that he was destroyed by his own greed: at the time of taking up the command following his consulship in 131 B.C., he was pontifex maximus, and in that position he prevented his consular colleague, L. Valerius Flaccus, who was flamen Martialis, from taking up the command of Asia, but proceeded to take up the command himself, disregarding any religious restriction on himself. Such an action could be construed as *avaritia*,<sup>13</sup> and helps to confirm the view that Apuleius was referring to Crassus Mucianus.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Justin's comment (36.4.8) on P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus' campaign against Aristonicus: *qui intentior Attalicae praedae quam bello, cum extremo anni tempore inordinata acie proelium conseruisset, victus poenas inconsultae avaritiae sanguine dedit.*

<sup>14</sup> I should like to thank my colleague, Mr. R. J. Baker, for reading a draft of this paper and making useful criticisms.

## REVIEWS

- A. W. H. ADKINS. *From the Many to the One. A Study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs.* London, Constable and Co., 1970. Pp. xv +311. 70 shillings.

The subtitle of this work is an accurate indicator of its contents. Professor Adkins, following in the track of his well known *Merit and Responsibility*, offers a detailed and subtle analysis of certain Greek terms which throw light on Greek views of the human personality. The main terms studied are *psuche* and *phusis* (sic: Adkins justifies his transliterations in a convincing preliminary note, p. xiii); but many other Greek words are studied as well: e.g. *thumos*, *phren(es)*, *noos*, *nomos*, etc.

In general, one may say that Adkins finds the Greek view of personality "fragmented." This is easiest to illustrate from Homer: the Homeric man's hand does something, or he feels something in his *thumos* or *phren*, and seldom acts or feels as a whole person. This "fragmented" personality persists through the fourth century B.C., and is perhaps intensified by the sharp opposition of *soma* and *psuche* in Plato and others. Only with the Stoics and Epicureans does Adkins find the conditions in which the development of a more stable personality might be rendered possible.

This is a difficult book to read through, often abstract and vague, and even more difficult to review in a brief compass. Although the author states that he is writing for the Greekless reader as well as for classical scholars, a general classics teacher like the present reviewer may occasionally be baffled. The general reader, therefore, would do well to read first chapter 1: "The Concept of Human Nature," which sets forth the author's method: i.e. a close analysis of certain key words, which the author hopes will lead to a deeper understanding of a society's views of human nature and personality. He stresses here the "range of meaning" of certain words: e.g. the English word "good." After this chapter, the reader should turn to chapter 10: "Conclusions," which recapitulates the evidence and states the author's final conclusions: "... from Homer to Aristotle the characteristic portrayal of Greek personality which we find in surviving documents appears to be far more fragmented than that which we regard as normal" (275). The reader should then be ready to follow the detailed discussions in chapters 2 through 9. Perhaps a listing of these chapters, with brief comments, may help to convey some idea of the work. (Ch. 2) "The Homeric World," a chapter which I found one of the most illuminating in the



book (Ch. 3) "Other Traditional Views," a treatment of Hesiod, Aeschylus' *Prometheus*, the significance of hero cults and the mystery religions, shifts in the meaning of *arete*, etc. (It seemed strange to me that Adkins never quotes or alludes to Solon's poetry in this or any other chapter.) (Ch. 4) "Presocratics and Doctors," a fairly standard treatment. (Ch. 5) "Human Nature and Ethics in Early Thinkers: 'Sophists,' *Nomos* and *Physis*," a chapter which I found disappointingly vague. (Ch. 6) "Plato," another excellent chapter, with good remarks on the developing opposition between "competitive" and "cooperative" *aretai*. (Ch. 7) "Aristotle," a chapter which gives an admirable account of Aristotle's ethics. He concludes (rightly, I think) that Aristotle's values "are those of a member of a leisured class in a patriarchal, slave-owning society, able to impose its own evaluations . . . on that society" (211). Ch. 8 and ch. 9 on the Stoics and Epicureans are also useful.

The work is generously equipped with "back-matter," which makes it a very useful reference volume. We get an appendix of brief notes on the ancient authors who appear in the book (dates, nature of works, etc.); next, a Select Bibliography (books only), and finally an Index Locorum and a General Index. The book is attractively printed, and I have found no serious misprints. Without doubt, this is a valuable study, and it should be consulted by all teachers of Greek literature and thought.

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ALBRECHT DIHLE. *Homer-Probleme*, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970. Pp. 180. (*Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen*, Band 41)

In the past, Lesky has been almost alone in bridging the gap between the research interests of English-speaking and German-speaking Homerists. He is now joined by Dihle, who in this book re-assesses recent trends in continental Homeric scholarship, bringing to bear the work of Milman Parry and the refinements made in the last few years by Hoekstra and Hainsworth.

Dihle's book covers varied material, but is unified by his constant concern with the question of the differences between oral and written composition. He begins with an examination of the theories of the Neo-Analytics, who hold that the poet of the *Iliad* used as a source an earlier, and written, *Aithiopis*, which itself survived and can be reconstructed in outline from different kinds of evidence. He tests and rejects the seven motifs listed by Schadewaldt, usually by showing that

the few facts available cannot bear the weight of interpretation laid upon them, and concludes that there is really nothing in what we know of the content of the poems to indicate priority. He goes on to challenge, less successfully, Fenik's views on pre-Iliadic versions of the Rhesus tale.

The second chapter, "The *Iliad* and oral epic," introduces the work of Milman Parry, carefully explaining that though the formulae show the *Iliad* as a whole is orally composed this can only be done on the overall statistics and does not apply to short passages. A discussion of Hainsworth's *Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* follows, and Dihle establishes the criteria he is going to use to distinguish orally composed sections from those which were written down from the first, i.e. that the latter can be identified by wide variety in the nature and use of formulae and by greater interchangeability of epithets. In the following chapter he presents detailed arguments to show an accumulation of peculiarities in formula usage in the *Aeneis* (Y 75-352) and the *Dios Apate*, and concludes that both were composed with the help of writing, probably about 620-550 B.C. (I shall say more about his arguments below.)

The fourth chapter, on the parts of the *Iliad* composed in writing, contains Dihle's main conclusions and is the most important in the book. How could the non-oral parts which he has identified get into the text of the *Iliad*, which has kept oral diction to such a large extent and so must be non-literary? After review of the evidence for and against a Peisistratean recension he concludes that the original of our text was established in, or at least for, sixth-century Athens; before that time, practical difficulties of writing make a text of the whole of the epics improbable, but there was some composing with the help of writing and some recording of parts of the great epics. The oral tradition continued side-by-side with constantly increasing recording of separate parts, until the appearance of the prestigious Athenian text and the ending of the oral tradition of poetry in the course of the sixth century set up the canonical versions.

Dihle goes on in the next chapter to examine the usage of certain words in Hesiod, and decides the proportion of changes in formula usage and of unique expressions is best explained by considering both *Theogony* and *Erga* to have been composed with the help of writing (more on this below). Finally, he summarizes his views on the *Iliad*, and takes a similar stand on the composition of the *Odyssey*. He cautiously reviews arguments bearing on the relative age and the interrelationships between the poems, and (in a most interesting section) gives his own belief that differences in thought are so great as to suggest the intervention of at least a generation between their composition.

The above synopsis does not do justice to the fullness and good sense of Dihle's treatment of a host of matters bearing on the Homeric

question. His own hypothesis is complicated, but at least as reasonable as others. It has, of course, difficulties. The postulated continuance of the oral tradition to the sixth century will cause some surprise, and means Dihle must accept the neo-analytic view that written versions of at least some of the Cycle poems existed at the time the final version of the *Iliad* was committed to writing, though of course he can reject any influence. And we must ask which is the real "Homer" who gets the highest seat on Parnassus—the bard who first composed the great eighth-century epics (Dihle once refers to them as "unverwechselbare, individuelle Kunstwerke" (144), but since he rejects the possibility of unwritten verbatim transmission (109f.) his words must be taken very loosely); or the oral poet at the end of the line, who sang the sixth-century version with the miniature refinements of beauty to which Adam Parry very properly directed attention (YCS 20 [1966] esp. 197ff.); or the scribe who, like a good drafting committee chairman, merged oral and written contributions together so well that they cannot now be cleanly separated—and this does not include the others who both composed and wrote down the parts to which Dihle assigns that origin.

My major criticism, however, is that Dihle seems partly a prisoner of old-style Analyst techniques. He is careful to stress that the points he urges with respect to individual lines may be weak in any particular case, but that the cumulative effect of many such points in a certain passage supports his argument. This is right, but often I feel a more sceptical, post-Hainsworth assessment of the value of such arguments would reduce the accumulation so much that the support would be seriously weakened. My reservations center on, in particular:

a) The use of *hapax legomena* as a criterion (e.g. the comments (84f.) on lines 172, 180, 249, 259, 261, 307, 316); or occurrence in a passage of words which are found elsewhere only in the *Odyssey*, or the *Odyssey* and the *Hymns*, or in parts of the *Iliad* which he suspects (e.g. comments on lines 153, 164, 169, 182, 185, 204, 219, 245, 247, 258, 276, 287, 308).

b) In discussions of the epithets which go with proper names, a failure to allow for the generic use of adjectives (M. Parry, *Ép. Tr.* 80f. and 181f.) and the ordinary exchange of words of like metrical shape. For instance, in Dihle's treatment of formulae including the name of Aeneas (which he says is the clearest example of difference in formulaic diction between *Aeneis* and *Iliad*, 72-73) he finds seven formulae for Aeneas in the *Iliad* (without *Aeneis*) and five in the *Aeneis*; only two are common to both. But (i) five of the *Iliad* and three of the *Aeneis* formulae include generic epithets and therefore prove nothing;<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> With *Τρώων βουλευφόρε*, cf. *Λυκίων β.* of Sarpedon (E 633), *Κρητῶν β.* of Idomeneus (N 219, 255), *Θρηκῶν β.* (K 518) of Hippocoön, *Μυρμιδόνων β.* (H 126) of Peleus; with *Τρώων ἄγος*, cf. *Κρητῶν ἄγος* 7 times, *Λυκίων ἄγος* 6

of the others, *Αἰνείας Ἀγχισιάδης* occurs in both, and the rest are unique (and odd)<sup>2</sup> and again prove nothing; and (ii) in any case, the only way to prove variety is to show that the *Aeneis* poet avoided available standard expressions in favor of new ones of the same metrical shape; and the one formula which is peculiar to Aeneas, *ἔθς πάϊς Ἀγχίσαιο* (3 times in the *Iliad*, and no parallel nearer than *Theog.* 565, *Erga* 50, *Sc.* 26) does not occur in the *Aeneis* but has no substitute there either. Amongst other dubious arguments of this type: (67) *ποδώκεος ἄντ' Ἀχιλλῆος* (Y 89) is hardly unparalleled, cf. *πόδας ταχὺν ἄμφ' Ἀχιλλῆα* (Σ 354), *ἀγακλυτὸν ἄμφ' Ὀδυσῆα* (Θ 502); (69) *Θέτιδος καλλιπλοκάμων ἄλοσύδνης* (Y 207) is ejected from the oral tradition because the first adjective elsewhere always has the genitive ending -οιο, and the second only occurs once elsewhere, for Amphitrite, though no combination of the three epithets Dihle accepts for Thetis will fill out the line; (75) *ἦδ' ὁ κλυτὸς ἦεν Ἀχιλλεύς* (Y 320) has a close parallel at κ 436, *σὺν δ' ὁ θρασὺς ἔλπετ' Ὀδυσσεύς*; (p. 80 n. 13a) I see nothing surprising in the unique appearance of *ἀκερσικόμεης* for Apollo (Y 39), since it belongs to him alone (also in Hesiod, fr. 60 M-W) and there is no alternative form—the oddity here is why *κορυθαίολος* is chosen for Ares and not the generic adjective *λαοσσόος* or *χρυσήνιος*.

c) The author's attitude towards the extent of adaptation and combination of formulae consistent with oral composition. Here many will agree with him rather than with me (I myself would accept *Πηλιάς ἦιξεν μελίη* [Y 277] as a possibly oral development of the old *Πηλιάδα μελίην*, for instance), but there is little weight in Dihle's comments (84f.) on lines 158 (certainly *Ζῆνα* does not occur elsewhere at the beginning of the verse, but *Ζηνός* does 9 times, *Ζηνί* 3 times, and *Ζῆν(α)* 3 times), 170, 200, 270 (there is a close parallel, P 33), 294, and 320.

These are, however, matters still open to dispute. I hope I have made it clear that Dihle's contribution to Homeric studies is a very valuable one.

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times; *ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν* is also used of Anchises, Augeias, Euphetes, and Eumelus, not to mention Agamemnon; *μεγαθύμου*, *μεγαλήτορος*, *δαίφρονος* go with many names (M. Parry, *Ép. Tr.*, 83).

<sup>2</sup> The epithets in N 477 and 482, in verses similar in construction, seem inexplicable; *Διφύλον* would be normal in these circumstances.

CORNELIS ANTON BOS. *Interpretatie, vaderschap en datering van de Alcibiades Maior*, (Diss.). Culemborg, Tjeenk Willink-Noorduijn, 1970. Pp. 120. Fl. 12.50.

The *First Alcibiades* is, with the *Epinomis*, the most worthwhile of the doubtful works in the *Corpus Platonicum*: worth claiming for Plato, if there is ground for such a claim, or, if somebody else wrote it, worth reading for its own sake as well as for the sake of a curious development in or around the Academy which it documents. Attempts to trace back currents in later Platonism to the early times of the Academy have played an important part in Platonic scholarship of the last twenty years or so; now precisely in the *Alcibiades* there are two passages apparently "Neoplatonic" enough to be suspected as interpolations. In view of this, a harvest of four books (two of which are available in typescript only) plus ten articles as the entire production of half a century's special research on the *Alcibiades* is certainly not excessive, as compared to the total output in Platonic studies.

The present thesis (the second in Dutch on this subject, after Vink's, 1939) deals with the "interpretation, authorship and date of the *Alcibiades Maior*." The author's detailed reconsideration of the case for authenticity has not led to any surprising revelations. Unlike his predecessor, B. arrives at the conclusion that the dialogue is not genuine. Two arguments which he emphasizes more especially are hardly the most impressive. The belief in a world mind is not equivalent to a belief in astral religion nor does the one lead necessarily to the other; therefore this point cannot be used to establish a link with a well-known trend in Plato's late work. On the contrary, the fact that in the *Alcibiades* this decisive step is apparently *not* taken (the evidence for it on pp. 70-71 is too flimsy to carry weight) could serve as a reason to separate it, chronologically or otherwise, from the *Laws* and the *Epinomis*. A second, entirely different suggestion is that the allusion to Meidias the "quail-striker" derives its point from the incident between the other Meidias and Demosthenes, which took place in 348. If, for independent reasons, the dialogue could be dated to 348/345 (which is far from being the case), one would regretfully have to consider the possibility of such a poor pun, but I do not think the argument will work the other way round. The arguments that really count remain some of the older ones, which are also reviewed: the rectilinear course of what, after all, presents itself as a Socratic dialogue, the positive tone and self-assured attitude of Socrates, the schematic form in which some of Plato's ideas appear, the poor characterization.

The most substantial and most interesting section of the book, however, is the part devoted to the interpretation of the text. A commentary, in fact, was the most urgent desideratum, and in this respect considerable progress has been made. Concentrating on the "great simile" (132c7-133d17) B. has shown, convincingly, it seems to me,

that (1) the controversial passages 133c8-17 and 134d1-e7 cannot be excised without destroying the structure of the simile and that (2) the text of 131b7-c7 as constituted by Burnet is the best basis for a satisfactory interpretation. A careful and methodical analysis of this paragraph and of the puzzling *αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό* at 129b1 has done a great deal to clarify the two problematic passages in an otherwise not too difficult work.

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GENEVÈVE HUSSON. Lucien, *Le navire ou les souhaits*. Vol. I, Introduction, texte et traduction, pp. 73. Vol. II, Commentaire, pp. 102. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1970.

Lucian's *Navigium* is in the form of a dialogue among a group of friends on their return to Athens after a visit to the Peiraeus to see a huge freighter which had unexpectedly come into port. One of them daydreams aloud on the way of what he would do if heaven suddenly made him the owner of such a ship, a man of fabulous wealth. This induces the others to do likewise. Though often discussed, the *Navigium*, like so many of Lucian's works, has never received special treatment. The author has rectified this situation for fair, equipping the piece, which covers 22 pages in the Teubner edition, with 24 pages of introduction, a translation, and 102 pages of commentary.

For the text she has collated afresh all manuscripts previously used and a few new ones. There are no surprises, particularly since Kilburn had restudied the principal manuscript (Vaticanus 90) for his text in the Loeb edition (vol. VI, 1959); Husson's text is practically identical with his (neither, as it happens, offers any significant variations from the text long available in nineteenth-century editions). The introduction discusses the date, the personalities of the speakers and Lucian's characterization of each as an individual, the organization of the piece, the style, the manuscript tradition. Of the commentary, much is devoted to the treatment of the speakers and to demonstrating how the wishes they express are psychologically in character. More useful are notes explaining Lucian's description of the ship and his narrative of its voyage, the various Egyptian allusions, the Athenian place-names that crop up, the gastronomic delights one of the speakers yearns for, and the like. Equally useful are notes on points of grammar and diction in which the author indicates nuances of meaning and identifies, with parallels from other pieces, typical Lucianic turns of phrase, proverbial expressions, rhetorical commonplaces. Her comments are generally accurate and well documented and her judgement good, though inevitably there are some debatable statements (the number seven in *Nav.* 7

need not be figurative; it is very farfetched to explain the "Sisyphean weight" of *Nav.* 21 as a type of cup; the *ephippion* in *Nav.* 30 cannot imply a "selle rigide," if the author means by that ambiguous term a saddle with a rigid tree, since this type was unknown until late Roman times; the Alexandrian grain fleet most likely made two trips a summer, not one, as stated in the notes to 7.5 and 14.6).

For some reason the printer has introduced distractingly prominent paragraph breaks between numbered sections even when the sense runs right on. And why must a work totalling 175 pages be published in two volumes?

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ANTHOLOGIE GRECQUE. Première Partie: Anthologie Palatine. Tome XII (Livres XIII-XV). Texte établi et traduit par Félix BUFFIÈRE. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1970. Pp. vii + 299.

The Budé edition of the Greek Anthology, begun by Pierre Waltz almost fifty years ago, is nearing its completion. This volume includes 'Epigrams in Various Metres' (bk. XIII), 'Problems, Oracles and Riddles' (bk. XIV), and 'Mixed Epigrams' (bk. XV). Among the 31 pieces of book XIII there are some by famous poets (Simonides, Callimachus), and most of them are of exceptional quality. The metrical patterns are unusual; some are unknown to Hephaestio. It is generally assumed (cf. Buffière, pp. 4-5) that the redactor of the Palatine Anthology did not find the epigrams of this book (nor of the following two) in Cephala's collection, but that he took them from an unknown metrical treatise where they served as illustrations. This would explain the fragmentary condition of 4, 9 and 10. Philippus, the most recent of the poets represented, would give a *terminus post quem* for this handbook. Book XIV contains 45 mathematical problems (31 of which are attributed to Metrodorus and have scholia), 45 oracles (mostly taken from Herodotus), and 53 riddles (5, 14, 25, 37, 53, 56, 60 seem to me especially attractive), and 7 pieces which cannot be classified. Among the 51 pieces of book XV we find: 12 Christian epigrams (mostly genuine inscriptions, it would seem), 6 *technopaegnia* or *carmina figurata* (e.g. Theocritus' *Syrinx*), 10 inscriptions from the Hippodrome of Byzantium honoring great charioteers, and 23 varied pieces, thrown in, as Buffière (p. 120) says "comme on jette dans un sac fourre-tout, au dernier moment, les derniers objets, une fois les valises bouclées."

Buffière has given us a reliable text, an elegant translation in rhythmical lines, useful introductions and copious notes; it should be said that the distinction between 'regular' and supplementary notes is arbitrary.

trary and rather confusing. A few remarks: XIII, 19,5 he translates Pflugk's *εἶδεν ἐλόντα* but prints, less plausibly, Schneidewin's *οἶδεν ἐλόντα* in the text. On the whole he is sparing with conjectures of his own, but in the case of Simmias' *Wings* where the text is notably corrupt, he offers three new suggestions, two of which (8 καὶ τι for οὐ τι, and 10 ἀδὸς Ἐρωος for ἀέριος P) seem excellent to me.—On XIV, 71 cf. Parke-Wormell, *Delphic Oracle* I, p. 383; II, pp. 229; Koep-Clemen, *Reallex. Antike u. Christentum* II, col. 186; in v. 2 νυμφαῖος must mean 'limpid,' 'pure'; cf. Aesch. *Pers.*, 613 παρθένου πηγῆς μέτα. 'Archias' should be added as the author of XV, 5 to the index (p. 225).<sup>1</sup>

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W. R. JOHNSON. *Luxuriance and Economy: Cicero and the Alien Style*. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1971. Pp. 72. \$3.00. (*University of California Publications: Classical Studies*, 6)

The author of this monograph makes some original contributions to a new understanding of Ciceronian stylistics. Johnson bases his concept of style squarely on: (1) sentence length by word count, (2) the ratio of subordinate clauses, both indicative and subjunctive, to main clauses, and (3) the use of eight different sentence types, which he defines in chapter 3 of the first part and partially analyzes in chapter 4 of the second part. This he does at the expense of all other stylistic criteria, e.g. vocabulary, diction, clausulae, figures of speech, etc., analyzed by such outstanding Ciceronians as Zielinski and Laurand, and calls them "accessories" which writers use to make up for the poverty of sentence structure. He also dismisses the theory of the three styles (high,

<sup>1</sup> This, the last poem of the Palatinus, forms part of the curious Sylloge Σ<sup>α</sup> which was superimposed, as it were, on to the Palatine Anthology (in the thirteenth century?) and has been embodied in the editions in a misleading manner. R. Aubreton, in the latest volume of the Budé Anthology (1972) shows (pp. 1; 17, n. 1) that it included VI, 256; VII, 307; IX, 51; 127; 442; 748; 823-27; X, 30; 104; XI, 255; 294; 442; XV, 41-51; App. Plan. XVI, 25 (not 28), and no. 2 in Cougny's App. At least three pieces can be assigned to Philippus' *Garland*: Antipater Thess., VI, 256 (beginning with T-) on a boxer, Philippus, XVI, 25 (beginning with T-) on a wrestler, and Erycius, IX, 825 in a series of bucolic epigrams (Pan, Satyrs, Nymphs). This could mean that 'Archias,' XV, 51 also was taken from Philippus' *Garland*. Three pieces in this Sylloge are attributed to 'Plato': IX, 51; 748 ('Plato the Younger'); 823 (in the series mentioned above). Planudes, incidentally, gives both IX, 826 (anonymous) and 827 (Ammonius) to 'Plato'; perhaps because they were grouped together, following 823, in his source.



middle, and low) in favor of two styles (exuberant and restrained). His method of investigation consists of a close analysis of thirty opening sentences in thirty-two of Cicero's speeches, i.e. eight from each of the four periods into which Schanz-Hosius divides Ciceronian oratory: Period I (81-66), Period II (66-59), Period III (57-52) and Period IV (46-43).

In the second part of the monograph Johnson contrasts Latin "lapidarity" with Greek, or English, "plasticity." Against this background and with the aid of statistics accumulated in eleven tables of an appendix, he perceives Cicero's style as moving in the following way: Period I is marked by youthful timidity and experimentation as shown by: (1) fluctuating sentence length, (2) a free use of subjunctive and low use of indicative subordination, (3) an avoidance of unsubordinated, i.e. simple-compound, sentences. Period II is marked by a perfection of amplitude, generally called "Ciceronian," as shown by: (1) an increase of sentence length, (2) a restrained use of subjunctive, but higher use of indicative subordination. (3) a preference for the simple-compound sentence which is proved to be "normal" for Latin as shown by "controls." Period III is marked by a certain mannerism, failure of *persona* and "nerve" as shown by: (1) increased sentence length, (2) a movement back toward a balance between indicative and subjunctive subordination, (3) a preference for the initial main clause with following subordinations. Period IV is marked by a final struggle and triumph over shapeless luxuriance as shown by: (1) a dramatic shortening of sentence length to what is "normal" for Latin, (2) a restrained use of subjunctive subordination, (3) an almost equal balance between the use of simple-compound sentences and initial-terminal main clauses with medial subordination, a type ideally suited to statement and compression. Johnson ascribes this final triumph to Cicero's vanity, which made him move, towards the end of his life, from the corruptions of luxuriance to the other, i.e. alien style.

Any study that claims to be based on statistical evidence must remain unsatisfactory if the statistics are incomplete and the samples chosen at random. Particularly the choice of "controls" is misleading. Why does Johnson take all of his eight examples from historians (Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus), whose speeches are stock-in-trade of their narrative styles, and not for instance from Pliny the Younger, or even Caesar, who, in Johnson's opinion, comes closest to what he calls Cicero's middle style (59)? Johnson himself admits that his definition of "sentence" is arbitrary and that only a complete investigation aided by a computer can do justice to statistical evidence (40). Throughout the monograph one encounters a confused reference to the numbers and modes of style. Although committed to the theory of two styles, Johnson uses Demetrius' theory of the four styles (plain, elevated, elegant and forcible), admits Cicero's and Quintilian's theory of the three styles, and speaks himself of the "quiet flow" of the middle style, the "impetuous surge" of the high style and the "modest trickle" of the

low style when he discusses Isocrates (26). In Cicero's development as an orator Johnson considers only the *persona*, not the *materia*, i.e. whether he is dealing with a judicial or deliberative speech, nor the *audiens*, i.e. whether the orator addresses a law court, the senate, or the people in an assembly. Cicero himself was very much aware of the distinctions of *materia* (*Orat.* 29, 101-2) and of *audiens* (*De Or.* 2.333-34), and they are borne out by Johnson's own statistics. This is especially obvious in Period II, where the speeches high above average in sentence length (*Rab. Perduell.*, *Cat.* 3, *Leg. Agr.* 2) are speeches delivered before the people, while those lowest in number of words per passage are senatorial speeches (*Cat.* 1, *Cat.* 4). The low count of sentence length in Period IV may, therefore, be due to the fact that two of the *Caesariana* were pleaded before a single judge, while the *Pro Marcello* and the majority of the *Philippics* were delivered before the senate. One also begins to wonder if word count rather than syllable count is a good criterion for sentence length.

The monograph is marred by misprints on almost every page in the English text and in the quotations from Latin, German, and Greek. This becomes particularly exasperating in the Greek transliterations, which make no distinctions between long and short vowels and are sometimes cited in the original case construction, sometimes in the nominative form. On p. 49 a whole line of the Latin quotation is missing and replaced by a wrong one, while a whole line of the English text is transferred from the bottom of p. 27 to the bottom of p. 25. There is no consistency in the use of italics or quotation marks, e.g. the word *aporia* (42) occurs in different shapes on the same page.

Nevertheless, Johnson deserves credit for his original approach to a difficult problem and his good analyses of various sentence types in chapter 4, of the second part.

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URSULA HEIBGES

GERHARD BINDER. *Aeneas und Augustus. Interpretationen zum 8. Buch der Aeneis*. Meisenheim am Glan, Anton Hain, 1971. Pp. XII + 299. DM 47 (paper). (*Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie, Heft 38*)

The subtitle of Binder's monograph is misleading, whereas its title is not. His book is not in the same category as the recent monographs by Buchheit and Wlosok; it is really a commentary on *Aeneid* 8. As such it is informative and comprehensive (even though some irrelevant material is included) and the best work available on this particular book of the *Aeneid*. But the limitations of B.'s monograph are also those of a commentary: while one expects mastery of the bibliography, one cannot expect much originality or novel insights. When B. still speaks of

"interpretation" it is because he endeavors, as he points out in the introduction, to interpret Aeneas consistently as the typological model of Augustus. To B.'s credit, he realizes that this is a rather narrow approach to the subject and that there are other poetic intentions to consider in the epic. Even more to his credit, B. has, as I have already pointed out, proceeded to write a valuable historical, religious, and topographical commentary on book 8 instead of restricting himself to his "interpretive" subject. Yet the latter is a leitmotif in his book. Is it in *Aeneid* 8 to the extent that B. thinks it is?

Without question, Aeneas in the *Aeneid* incorporates some of the most prominent qualities which Augustus himself sought to exemplify and which he tried to inculcate in the Roman people. Specifically in book 8, we see Aeneas as a ruler concerned with *pax* (114ff.), as sacrificing piously to the gods (81ff; cf. the Ara Pacis reliefs where the sacrificing Aeneas and Augustus are juxtaposed), as fighting against the forces of barbarism (Cacus) just as Augustus fights against the *ops barbarica* of Antony and Cleopatra, and as marching into a *bellum pium et iustum* (532ff.) just as

Augustus agens Italos in proelia Caesar  
cum patribus populoque, penatibus et magnis dis,  
stans celsa in puppi (678-80)

a passage in which the verbal echoes with 3.11-12 and 10.261 have received due attention. Besides, Aeneas is boldly propelled into the Augustan present by receiving a guided tour of part of Augustan Rome and then there is the intentional coincidence of the festival of Hercules and Augustus' triple triumph in 29 B.C. And since the book culminates with the description of Augustus' victory at Actium and of his triumph more "Augustan" notes can be expected in book 8 than in other books simply for the sake of thematic unity and coherence.

Yet Vergil, unlike Binder, does not overdo it and Aeneas, even in book 8 is not simply Augustus or merely an Augustan prototype. Many of the parallels which Binder believes to have found are strained and tenuous, and many more simply amount to a *petitio principii*. A few examples may illustrate:

- 1) The Salians end their hymn by invoking Hercules (301-302):  
salve, vera Iovis proles, decus addite divis,  
et nos et tua dexter adi pede sacra secundo.

B. points out that Augustus had his name included in the Salian Hymn and, then as so often, throws in a bit of irrelevant information ("Damit gelangte Augustus in enge Beziehung zum Kult des Mars" [194])—which only undercuts his main argument, even if one does not accept all of R. Schilling's thesis of Augustus's favoring the cult of Mars at the expense of the Hercules cult [*RPhil* 68, 1942, 31ff.], only to continue: "Offensichtlich ist die Ehrung für Augustus von Vergil zurückprojiziert (*sic*) auf Hercules." But to say *offensichtlich* is no

substitute for actually proving one's contention. Nor is B.'s far-fetched argument that a prayer to the deified Augustus (in the provinces) would have hardly been phrased differently than this Vergilian invocation to Hercules—as if there was no other possible way to pray to Augustus.

2) In lines 146-49, Aeneas describes to Evander the danger with which their common enemy, the Rutulians, presents them: they will put all of Hesperia under their yoke after driving Aeneas and Evander off. B. claims (66) that this is an echo of Octavian's propaganda against Antony. B.'s argument, which once more is indirect and tenuous, rests on the ready-made assumption that Aeneas and Turnus point not only to the victorious Hercules and the criminal Cacus, but also to Augustus and Antony. But it is the other way around: Hercules and Cacus point to Aeneas and Turnus, and not vice versa. More importantly, even if there are correlatives between Aeneas and Augustus and, to a far lesser degree, Antony and Turnus, it does not follow that these men are in all respects the same and that we must constantly look for Augustan and Antonian allusions in the events surrounding Aeneas and Turnus. B. goes on to claim that lines 685-88 (the description of Antony, Cleopatra, and their barbarian host) throw light on the earlier passage, but in fact they do so only if one is already convinced of B.'s interpretation which they do not independently support.

3) Occasionally, even B. admits that a direct connection with Augustus cannot be established, but he still presses on for some kind of association. Thus, when he discusses Vergil's collocation of Evander, Aeneas, and Saturn as exiles and fugitives (88-89), he realizes that this does not apply to Augustus. But not all is lost: "Die gezeigte Parallelisierung ermöglicht keine direkte Brücke zu Augustus, erleichtert aber die gerade an dieser Stelle wichtige Einbeziehung des Aeneas als Vorläufer des Augustus in das Gespann Saturnus-Augustus." And how? Aeneas is linked to a Latin tradition (possibly by R. Merkelbach rather than Vergil) and Augustus was from Latium, so there is, after all, a bridge from Aeneas to Augustus even here. With such methods, and considering the immense range of the activities and associations of both Aeneas and Augustus, points of contact can be found *sine fine*. But as in the case of the verbal echoes in the *Aeneid*, the real task is not to ferret them out or drag them in, but judiciously to examine which are valid, which are peripheral, and which are artificial.

To confine the *Aeneid* to Augustanism or, as has latterly become fashionable, anti-Augustanism is to overlook most of its timeless significance. The oversight begins with the commonly accepted notion that Vergil chose Aeneas as the hero of his epic only because Aeneas was the Julian ancestor. But we must at least begin to be aware of the almost unprecedented—at least by ancient standards—creative opportunity which Aeneas afforded Vergil because this hero had not been greatly developed by the earlier tradition. By creating a complex and

problematic protagonist Vergil meant to reflect not only the Augustan and Roman experience, but much of the essence of the human experience in general.<sup>1</sup>

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MICHAEL WINTERBOTTOM. *Problems in Quintilian*. London, University of London, 1970. Pp. Xi + 225. £2.75. (*University of London. Institute of Classical Studies, Bulletin. Supplement no. 25*)

MARCUS FABIVS QUINTILIANUS. *Institutionis oratoriae libri duodecim; recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Michael Winterbottom*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970. 2 v. £2.25 each. Vol. 1: pp. xxvii, 364; vol. 2: pp. vii, 365-775. (*Oxford Classical Texts*)

To readers already familiar with Mr. Winterbottom's detailed and careful work on the text and tradition of Quintilian (in *Philologus* and *Classical Review*), the very high quality of the final text will come as no surprise. Not merely do we have the two volumes of the OCT (fully meeting the exacting standards of production we still expect of this series), but, as an added delight, there is the separate volume of *Problems*. This two-fold arrangement allows the editor a much more detailed examination of the textual tradition, and also a more thorough discussion of numerous difficulties in the text itself. One might hope that this practice can be followed in other texts, as its great value has already been shown in L. D. Reynolds's OCT of Seneca's *Epistulae Morales* and the companion volume *The Medieval Tradition of Seneca's Letters*.

Two qualities stand out most clearly throughout this work. One is its absolute honesty. No problem is glossed over; where certainty is impossible, W. clearly indicates his hesitation and the reasons for it. Secondly, there is a truly astonishing fertility of imagination. My count shows over seventy emendations introduced into the text, all deserving serious attention. (This achievement is all the more laudable when we consider how much work has been put into Quintilian by previous generations of scholars.) In addition, the *apparatus criticus* contains well over two hundred suggestions for improvement, many of which will surely be accepted as virtually certain.

Amidst such riches discussion could be endless. Let us content ourselves with a few brief observations. In the discussion of the history of the text, W.'s great contribution is a series of demonstrations: that

<sup>1</sup> See R. W. B. Lewis, "Homer and Virgil: The Double Themes," *Furioso* 5 (1950) 52, and my survey article on Vergilian criticism in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Festschrift für Joseph Vogt* II, 4 (Berlin 1975).

the Renaissance manuscripts afford no independent witness whatsoever (all variants being, at best, conjectures); that the supplements (*G*) and corrections (*b*) in the mutilated Bamberg MS. M.4.14. are both descended from the fundamental Ambrosian MS. A, which was written in the north of Italy around the year 850 A.D.; and that the Bern MS. *B* is the parent of all the other *mutuli*. If the exceedingly intricate argumentation can be upheld, then the previously confused picture of the tradition is clarified. The general trend of W.'s thesis seems inescapable, although certain difficulties do remain. Why is it, for example, that *G*'s Greek can be so much better than *A*'s? In *Problems* (16) W. can find no convincing answer; the supposition of an intervening manuscript seems to sweep the question under the carpet rather than to answer it.

The long section on orthography (*Problems* 35-59) provides a rich quarry for the textual critic. Here is given a minute analysis of the habits and fluctuations of the best manuscripts. Nevertheless it is unfortunate that the fundamental question is not touched: how far does the combined testimony of the most respectable manuscripts represent anything like the spelling of Quintilian himself, rather than Carolingian (or earlier) practice? To accept "archaisms" simply because they are found in ninth-century manuscripts is greatly to underestimate the knowledge (and cunning) of at least some copyists. It would seem that there is yet much work to be done on this subject for practically all Latin writers of antiquity.

A few remarks on the text itself:

2.15.14. *aliis qui eandem sententiam, non isdem tantum uerbis explicant*. The suspicious *tantum* (it goes without saying that later in the textual tradition it was amended to *tamen*) is defended by W. by a large number of passages in which it is clear that Quintilian is very fond of *tantum* within a certain syntactic pattern. Unfortunately, in none of them is there a negative attached to *tantum*, and surely this makes it much harder to accept here.

3.8.32. *haec autem quae tantum inter se pugnant*. Once again it is *tantum* which proves troublesome, and none of the traditional explanations seems to be of any help. Could it be that it should simply be deleted?

5.10.93. *et alibi* (a conjecture of W. himself): *et ibi B: tibi A*. As the reference required is to another passage within the same work, it may very well be that *item* will satisfy both palaeography and sense.

5.14.31. *feratur ergo non semitis sed campis, non ut ieiuni fontes angustis fistulis colliguntur, sed ut beatissimi amnes totis vallibus fluunt*. The words *ut ieiuni* are the neat emendation by *a* of what in *G* (and *A*?) appears as *uti et uti*; palaeographically excellent, but certainly a very surprising piece of Latin. Although the corruption would be harder to explain, much better sense would come from reading *ut (uti?) exiles*—see *TLL* s.v. 'exilis', 1480.65-57, especially Mela 2.62. [*Padus*] *ab imis radicibus Versuli montis exortus paruis se primum e*

*fontibus colligit, et aliquatenus exilis ac macer, mox aliis amnibus adeo augescit atque alitur, ut se per septem ad postremum ostia effundat.*

But *claudite iam rivos*. This is a truly magisterial text which so often gives new life to our understanding of Quintilian.

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ALAN CAMERON. *Claudian: Poetry and Propaganda at the Court of Honorius*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970. Pp. xvi + 508. \$13.50.

This long but lively book will interest general readers as well as historians of Stilicho's rule and students of later Greek and Latin poetry.<sup>1</sup> The first half examines Claudian's poetry primarily as a historical source for the ten years following the division of the Empire between the sons of Theodosius the Great in 395. The author bases his interpretation of the poems on two principles. The first is that Claudian was not a mere court flatterer, bidding for the favor of the western regent Stilicho, but Stilicho's official spokesman. The second principle derives from the first: that by reading Claudian's poems one can follow, sometimes month by month, an official presentation and justification of Stilicho's policy, as the regent himself wished it to appear. In the second half of the book the author treats Claudian's erudition, literary technique and attitude to Christianity and to the Roman past, and the nature of his audience at Milan and Rome.

Before following Claudian's career as court propagandist the author reconstructs his early life in Egypt with its cultural background. He shows that the study of Latin literature in Egypt in the fourth and fifth centuries was not as uncommon as is generally assumed. Moreover there were numbers of professional poets ("The Egyptians are mad about poetry," wrote Eunapius), the best of whom left Egypt in search of patrons. In this context the extraordinary achievement of a Greek-speaking Egyptian remains "astonishing, but no longer inexplicable and unparalleled" (21).

Against usual opinion Cameron dates the beginning of Claudian's career as propagandist as early as his panegyric on the third consulate of Honorius, recited in January 396. This was not merely conventional flattery, he argues, but calculated propaganda in support of Stilicho's claim that the dying Theodosius had appointed him regent for the eastern emperor, Arcadius, as well as Honorius. From this date on, Claudian's works contain recurring themes—the unity of the Empire,

<sup>1</sup> Though Cameron prefers the spelling "Stilico" (p. xiii), I use the more familiar form here.

Stilicho's ties with the imperial family, the continuity of policy between Theodosius and Stilicho—that justify the actions and policy of the government. This reading of Claudian leads Cameron (with V. Grumel) to reject the notion that Stilicho's basic goal during these years (396-404) was to gain control of Illyricum. His aim was far grander: the unification of the Empire under his rule.

After these introductory remarks the author analyzes the responses of Stilicho's government to the challenges presented by the eastern ministers Rufinus and Eutropius, the Gildonic war, and the devastation of Greece and the Balkans by the Visigoths under Alaric. Every page offers corrections and insights, but one example must suffice. After the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410, Christian and pagan alike bitterly blamed Stilicho for repeatedly running Alaric to earth (in 395, 397, and 402) only to allow him to extricate himself. Though most modern scholars have accepted the ancient imputation of treachery at least to the extent of supposing that Stilicho had an understanding with Alaric, in an important chapter Cameron makes a strong case for lack of discipline in Stilicho's army as the reason for his ineffectiveness. The evidence is difficult to interpret. The epitomators of Eunapius lump the campaigns of 395 and 397 into one, and Claudian is even vaguer than usual owing to the necessity of glossing over Stilicho's failures. But according to Cameron, Claudian's absurd over-emphasis on the unanimity of Stilicho's combined eastern and western armies suggests that dissension and disloyalty made battle impossible in 395. Similarly Cameron accepts Zosimus' explanation that poor discipline allowed Alaric to escape in 397, as against Claudian's allegation (which some have accepted) of eastern intervention. Later the propagandist reveals in spite of himself that Stilicho could not control his barbarian levies in 402. Cameron therefore concludes that the traditional notion of a pact between Stilicho and Alaric during the years 396-404 has no support.

There are obvious difficulties in interpreting a master propagandist who is our major source—indeed sometimes our only source—for the events in question. Some of Cameron's speculations on minor points go too far and could have been omitted. Thus Cameron conjectures that since Claudian, recalling in 404 the day that Theodosius had entrusted Honorius to Stilicho, passed up the chance to include Arcadius as well, Stilicho had temporarily abandoned his earlier claims to the eastern regency: "With a writer like Claudian his silences must be given at least as much weight as his statements" (154). No doubt, but there is no way of knowing the significance of his silence on a specific point. Cameron speculates that "the natural inference" from Claudian's praise of the honest bluntness of a speech given by Honorius is that the speech was a failure; with "transparent ingenuity" Claudian, who may be protesting too much, turns a fault into a virtue (385-86). But surely the praise of frank simplicity may legitimately form part of encomium.

Cameron demonstrates that Claudian, while indeed a pagan, was not



anti-Christian, and not a spokesman for the pagan aristocracy of Rome. Cameron's no less brilliant analysis of the audiences at which Claudian's propaganda was aimed shows that the superficially pagan character of his poetry (the result of writing within the classical tradition) would not have offended the Christians who predominated at the court of Milan, where most of his poems were recited. Those poems that were recited before Roman audiences show (as might be expected) appeals to specifically Roman patriotism, but not an aggressive paganism. For, as Cameron rightly emphasizes, an appeal by Claudian to senatorial interests would not now be an appeal to exclusively pagan interests (230). The Christianization of the senatorial aristocracy had quickened after the battle of the Frigidus in 394; this chapter is a valuable addition to the history of that transformation.

The chapter on Claudian's literary technique is not entirely satisfactory. Cameron's remarks are stimulating, as for example in his interpretation of *c.m.* xiii, Claudian's reply to a critic of his prosody (287-88). The comparisons with contemporary art are especially illuminating. But Cameron tries to cover too much in too few pages. The comparison of allegory in Prudentius and in Claudian remains unclear (278). The important question of the failure of Claudian's poetry by modern standards is alluded to repeatedly but never directly confronted. Sound judgments are scattered throughout the chapter, as are delightful quotations from Coleridge, Addison, and others of Claudian's readers. By pruning other chapters Cameron could have given the subject the space it deserves.

The book concludes with a sketch of some aspects of Claudian's *Fortleben*, but the necessary specialized research is yet to be done in this area. In the meantime Cameron's remarks on the use of Claudian by eighteenth-century political satirists are amusing.

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DIEDERICH BEHREND. *Attische Pachturkunden. Ein Beitrag zur Beschreibung der μισθώσεις nach den griechischen Inschriften.* München Beck, 1970. Pp. x + 172. D.M. 30. -(*Vestigia* 12)

The subtitle and dust jacket of this work are both misleading. For "griechischen" read "attischen"; non-Attic texts are only rarely mentioned and never discussed in detail. The distinction is important for, despite the author's confidence in the existence "'eines gemeingriechischen Konzepts der μισθώσεις'" (15), his evidence is drawn only from classical Athens. His approach to Greek law is one which promotes an easy transfer from individual texts to "Konzept" and from "attische" to "griechische." The case for the diversity of the laws of

the several Greek city states is brushed aside as an aberration of M. I. Finley in the face of "der übrigen Wissenschaft." But this formulation, like many in the work, is both inaccurate and condescending. In the two best recent books on Greek Law in English, MacDowell's *Athenian Homicide Law* and Harrison's *Law of Athens*, the unitarian approach is totally rejected. Presumably Behrend would fault these scholars for looking at Greek law "mit der Brille anglo-amerikanischer Begriffe" (15), since he clearly believes that only "die kontinentalen Rechtshistoriker" have an unclouded view of the subject. Nor is the author's parochialism restricted to geography, for he has a curious manner of speaking down to the "juristisch nicht vorgebildeten Leser" (9), which, however, backfires on p. 6 where classicists and ancient historians will read with a smile that the author has refrained from citing the epigraphic collections of Buck, Solmsen, and Tod since they are rarely to be found in juristic libraries.

Behrend's subject is leasing. His aim is to give as complete a picture as possible of the Attic inscriptions which use the term *μίσθωσις* and to investigate the conditions under which lessor and lessee operated. His method is to erect first a theory of *μίσθωσις* (ch. 2), next to discuss the inscriptions (ch. 3), and finally to extract the evidence from a legal description of the concept of *μίσθωσις* (ch. 4).

Chapter 2, which has not made the transition from thesis to monograph, is largely a tedious demonstration that the author has read the secondary literature and can construct a legal model of *μίσθωσις*. Readers who prefer to examine the evidence before the interpretation are reassured that the former is so fragmentary and bewildering that it can best be approached through an *Arbeitshypothese*. Few will find this method satisfactory, especially since in constructing the *Arbeitshypothese* much more emphasis is placed on the secondary literature than on ancient testimonia.

In chapter 3 Behrend proceeds to the inscriptions, but here the difficulties of using this book really begin, for he prints no texts at all. Relevant editions are cited in the lemmata which are followed in some cases by detailed commentary but this can only be understood if the reader has the text in front of him. To read intelligently this and the next chapter one must have at least twenty-seven separate volumes at hand. Even if, as Behrend warns us, his collection is not to be regarded as a *Corpus*, it is still inexcusable not to print the texts which constitute the primary evidence on which the book is built.

Also, despite the author's apologies that he is not an epigraphist, he does try his hand at restoration. This is in general legitimate, I suppose, but in Behrend's case very dangerous, because although he has studied in Athens (p. v), there is no evidence that he has personally examined any of the fifty-odd stones with which he is concerned. The most conspicuous example of the dangers in this approach is his treatment of *IG II<sup>2</sup>, 1176* = Behrend no. 30, pp. 86-88. A joining fragment of this

fourth-century text, which deals with the leasing of a theatre in Peiraeus, was published in *Hesperia* 29 (1960), p. 1, no. 1 (Agora I 2440) and has been duly noted by Behrend. The next entry in his catalogue, no. 31, p. 88, is a fragment found in exactly the same place in the Agora Excavations as I 2440; it was published in *Hesperia* 32 (1963), p. 12, no. 10 (Agora I 6439). This is regarded as a separate but "related" inscription by Behrend. A glance at the *Hesperia* photographs, however, reveals identical lettering on the two Agora fragments. If the texts of the two are set side by side, it is obvious that they form continuous lines with as few as one or two letters missing between them. If an inquiry is sent to the staff of the Agora Excavations the report comes back that I 6439 does in fact join IG II<sup>2</sup>, 1176 immediately to the right of I 2440. But this should not be left for a reviewer to point out, especially since restoring I 6439 "exempli gratia!" Behrend uses in lines 9-11 the very words which are preserved on I 2440.

The necessity of autopsy for those making collections of Greek inscriptions seems so obvious, and yet it is apparently not the general rule; cf. K. Clinton, *AJP* 92 (1971) 497. In Behrend's case it is to be hoped that he will learn this lesson soon since on p. 3 he announces that he is working with H. J. Wolff on a new collection of Greek legal inscriptions.

The most valuable part of the work is chapter 4 where the evidence from the inscriptions is presented. Here can be found helpful information about the duration of leases, the legal rights of the parties involved, taxation of leased land, war damage, water rights, the relationship of the inscribed stone to the original agreement, and many other aspects of *μισθώσεις*. Again, however, the author has made it as difficult as possible to read his interpretation and the ancient evidence side by side. Since he cites only his own catalogue numbers of inscriptions, one is forced to go back to chapter 2 for the reference, locate the appropriate text from the twenty-seven odd volumes on the table, and then read through the entire document, since Behrend refuses even to refer to line numbers.

This review may sound impatient, but it is very frustrating to try to extract from this monograph solid information about Attic leasing. A method which places theory before evidence, an unfortunate scholarly parochialism, and the anomaly of a body of inscriptions which the author has never examined at first-hand and which contains no Greek texts all make it impossible to recommend Behrend's work.

ROBERT O. FINK. *Roman Military Records on Papyrus*. Cleveland, Case Western Reserve University Press, 1971. Pp. xvii + 564. \$24.00 (*Philological monographs of The American Philological Association*, no. 26)

Despite the author's modest disclaimer in his preface, there can be little doubt that this is the definitive work. Scholars may continue to offer new readings or new interpretations, fresh papyri may come to light, but Fink's basic work will not need redoing.

The scope of the work is deliberately narrow: only those documents which are "concerned solely with the internal administration of the army." Soldiers' private letters are excluded, together with *diplomata*, *epikrisis* lists, receipts for supplies purchased from civilians, legal records, and the like. Given the volume of such para-military material (cf. the recent list in G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier*, appendix C), this restriction was inevitable; it results in a book whose theme is strictly the military bureaucracy. The student must go elsewhere for documents illustrating the soldier's life or the army's place in society. The work is also limited in time: documents from Diocletian onwards are excluded.

The book contains 134 documents on papyrus or, rarely, parchment: rosters and nominal rolls, parade-states, monthly and annual strength returns, pay records, receipts for money or rations, lists of supplies, official correspondence, a copy of the army's calendar (the *feriale Duranum*), and finally a number of "unclassifiable fragments" from Dura, some of them exceedingly fragmentary. There is a brief introductory chapter on what is known of military records under the Republic, and each group of documents is preceded by a discussion of documents of that type. In all, 83 of the 134 documents are from Dura, dating from around 210 to 256, when Dura fell to Shapor. The remainder are from Egypt and date from Flavian times to the end of the third century, apart from two, nos. 36 and 51, which appear to be Augustan and Tiberian respectively. It is perhaps to be regretted that the provenience of the Egyptian documents is not given, where it is known, and where the reference is not such (e.g. *PAnt.* or *POxy.*) as to reveal it.

The book also includes as document no. 78 a series of 77 receipts on ostraca, which Fink plausibly suggests were temporary records which would later have been entered on the permanent papyrus rolls. The book closes with 12 exhaustive and invaluable indexes, and a concordance, which might usefully have been enlarged to provide cross references to earlier secondary compilations, such as those of Cavenaile and Daris, to which Fink himself frequently refers. There is no general bibliography, except insofar as the list of bibliographical abbreviations fills that function, but the bibliography appended to each individual document is, as one would expect, exhaustive.

Most of the longer documents in this corpus are already well-known

to scholars. This has not however prevented Fink from making important contributions, for instance on the date of the so-called 'Moesian pridianum' (no. 63 = Brit. Mus. Pap. 2851), where Fink's argument for 100, though as he himself says not conclusive, is nevertheless attractive; and on the famous legionary pay record (no. 68 = *PGenLat.* 1 recto, 1), where Fink's re-examination of the papyrus suggests that each *stipendium* amounted to 247½ dr., not 248 (*ccxlvii s* instead of *ccxlviii*), and where he also rejects the normal restoration *in vestitorium* for col. ii 9, because "the fifth letter is a clear *r*," despite the apparent parallel with the later lists which have *in vestimentis* in a similar position on the list. Among other attractive new interpretations we may mention that of *hemanserunt* in a parade-state as *h(oneste) e(meriti) manserunt* (no. 47 = *PDur.* 82, col. ii 18), denoting re-enlistment of soldiers after discharge, "perhaps as *evocati*."

As one reads the documents in this corpus one is struck repeatedly by the efficiency of the Roman military apparatus and by the strong unchanging tradition (cf. the *feriale Duranum*, no. 117), insisting upon strict obedience (cf. the standard preamble to the morning report, *quod imperatum fuerit faciemus et ad omnem tesseram parati erimus*, nos. 47ff.). The system was extremely flexible: one observes the variety of tasks listed in, e.g. the Moesian pridianum already referred to, or the individual records of detached service, no. 10. Official channels seem to have operated smoothly (cf. correspondence, nos. 87ff., with its sending of certified copies, its painstaking recording of soldiers' movements); meticulous records were kept, and even files four years old were not yet considered 'dead' (349). The bookkeeping was sophisticated, as is shown by the accounts and receipts, and the letter (no. 98) to commanders along the route of the Parthian envoy travelling to the emperor, with its instructions to entertain him and charge the expenses to the provincial treasury.

We get only a glimpse of the machinery, but that glimpse is impressive. All students of the army and frontiers must be grateful to Fink for a job well done, and for making these documents accessible in so clear and usable a form.

WERNER ECK. *Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian. Prosopographische Untersuchungen mit Einschluss der Jahres- und Provinzialfasten der Statthalter*. München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1970. Pp. viii + 284. DM 46.-(*Vestigia*, 13)

This book has two parts. The latter half of it is occupied by chapters 7 and 8, which are complementary lists of Roman provincial governors from A.D. 69 to 138, arranged first year by year, with essential references and discussion, and then by province. This "reference section" will certainly be what most will consult the book for. But the first six chapters are of equal importance. Eck first (ch. 1) surveys the provinces from 69 to 138 with regard to their gubernatorial status, "senatorial" or "imperial," consular or praetorian. He next (ch. 2) turns to the Arval Brethren, and argues convincingly that their chief officers, the *magister* and *flamen*, were usually of praetorian rank or higher; when he attempts to reduce to the minimum the number of Arvals who also held one of the four major priesthoods, the argument becomes less cogent. Eck then shows (ch. 3) that proconsuls' legates in this period were normally of praetorian rank; this is an important corrective to the usual view that rank was of no consequence for obtaining the post. Chapters 4 and 5 are perhaps the best of these studies. Eck first proves that Pliny's remark in the *Panegyric* (57.1), that previous emperors on their accession took the consulates intended for others, cannot refer to Domitian as is usually supposed. He then analyzes the consuls of Domitian's reign, showing the various factors that guided the emperor's choice: the promotion of needed *virii militares*, favour to particular areas like Asia, and not least the desire to conciliate the senate. Both these chapters illustrate excellently how prosopography can be used to amplify or correct the written sources. Chapter 6 is a discussion of new inscriptions: two from Urbs Salvia (Picenum) revealing the career of Flavius Silva, the captor of Masada (this repeats, with slight differences, the author's presentation in *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 60 [1969], 282-89), and a bilingual one from Phrygian Hierapolis that mentions the author Julius Frontinus as proconsul of Asia.

It is worth looking at Eck's discussion of Flavius Silva in some detail, both because of the interest of the subject and because it illustrates the strengths and occasional weaknesses of this book. Eck first draws attention to two neglected inscriptions discovered in Urbs Salvia in 1957, which reveal Silva's career up to the consulate. From these Eck draws the conclusion that Masada did not fall in 73, the universally accepted date, but in 74. His argument is as follows. The new inscriptions give Silva's career in reverse order; at the period in question, [*legat. Aug. pro pr. pr*]*ovinciae Iudaeae, adlectus inter patricos [ab divo Vespasiano et di]vo Tito censoribus, ab iisdem adlect(us) inter pr(aetorios), legat. leg. XXI Rapac(is)*. Since Vespasian and Titus did

not become censors until the second quarter of 73, Silva can only have become legate after that date. Masada, however, is known to have fallen in late spring, on 15th. Xanthicos (usually equated with early May: Eck does not say why he prefers mid-April); this spring must therefore be that of 74 at the earliest. But this conclusion involves a serious conflict with Josephus. After giving a date of Vespasian's fourth year, i.e. 72-73 (*BJ* 7, 219), Josephus proceeds to narrate affairs in Commagene and Armenia, and then mentions Silva's arrival as legate of Judaea and the subsequent capture of Masada, for which he gives a precise date by day and month (401). "After all this" (*μετὰ ταῦτα*, 409) trouble breaks out in Egypt fomented by Zealots who had escaped from the revolt. Now this last disturbance occurred when Julius Lupus was prefect of Egypt (420), and therefore, as Eck admits, not later than August, 73. Eck denies that Josephus means to imply a chronological sequence: in any case, these troublemakers could not have escaped from Masada, since according to the historian there were practically no survivors of the siege. But because no one escaped after the siege, it does not follow that no one escaped during it, as certainly happened at Jerusalem and Machaerus (cf. *BJ* 7, 210); and it is very difficult to believe that Josephus' "after all this" refers to anything but the fall of Masada, which he has just described. It seems preferable, therefore, to approach the epigraphic evidence with more flexibility. Silva could have been posted from XXI Rapax to Judaea in 72 or so, still of tribunician rank; it should be remembered that the command in Judaea was as yet essentially a legionary legateship. The adlection to praetorian and patrician rank could have occurred *in absentia*, so that he continued to be legate after his promotion. Alternatively, it is possible that Silva's adlection to praetorian rank occurred before he went to Judaea, in other words that *censoribus* in the inscriptions refers only to his adlection *inter patricios*. Under either of these circumstances, the redactor of the inscriptions would naturally mention Judaea first, and juxtapose the two adlections in order not to repeat the names of the rulers. The rapidity of Silva's ascent is clearly due primarily to his military record (as Eck observes, he may already have served under Vespasian in Judaea), which would have counted with the emperor far more than the niceties of regulations.

Preoccupation with patterns of promotion tends to engender fixity: it is symptomatic that the name of Fergus Millar, who has repeatedly insisted on the lack of formality in the administration of the Empire, is absent from Eck's bibliography. However, though a little more uncertainty would have helped, this is a valuable and important book.

ANDRÉ CHASTAGNOL. *Recherches sur l'Histoire Auguste*. Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1970. Pp. vii + 112. (*Antiquitas*, Reihe 4, Band 6)

This slender volume consists of three papers, all marked by the learning and acumen that one anticipates from the author. His vast erudition dealing with the late empire is marshalled in the search for parallels to and sources of the *H. A.* not only to increase understanding of various aspects of the collection but also to determine with increasing precision its date. Readers familiar with Chastagnol's previous work will not be surprised that he clings to the belief that the collection was composed by one author in the period 394-98, with preference for the latest year. His arguments are powerful, although of course not susceptible to absolute proof, and, together with Syme's approval of a date about 395, focus attention most particularly upon the years following the death of the great Theodosius.

The first paper is a *Forschungsbericht* of *H. A.* scholarship for the years 1963 to 1969. Chastagnol here continues the survey of work done in the field that he began in the *Historia-Augusta-Colloquium* 1963 (see this *Journal*, 87 [1966] 485). Its value is obvious.

The second, "L'Histoire Auguste et le Rang des Préfets du Prétoire," examines in detail the statement in the life of Alexander Severus (21, 3-5) that Alexander made his praetorian prefects senators when they assumed the office, and that this remained customary under subsequent emperors. Chastagnol shows that this did not happen until the reform of Constantine a century later. Some prefects became *virī clarissimi* by becoming *consules ordinarii*, but the clarissimate was an adjunct of senatorial office rather than a prerequisite of the prefecture. Many prefects remained *virī eminentissimi*. The argument is convincing, although not new (L. L. Howe, *The Praetorian Prefect from Commodus to Diocletian* [A.D. 180-305], came to the same conclusion almost thirty years ago), and is bulwarked by an appendix listing the prefects from 202 to 326.

In "Sources, Thèmes et Procédés de Composition dans les 'Quadrigae Tyrannorum'," Chastagnol argues that the author of these four lives used St. Jerome as a major source while treating the material in such a way that Jerome's theses are corrupted into something totally different and contradictory. Chastagnol also suggests that Claudian was a source, and reinforces Syme's arguments that Ammianus was known to the author. The discussion is ingenious and impressive in its treatment of similarities of words and names, convincing in its cumulative effect but open to possible challenge in detail. Not every reader may be willing to see the similarities that Chastagnol discerns. The net effect, once again, is to pinpoint the year 398 as date of composition of these biographies at least, if not of the entire collection.

This brief review has given little indication of the subtlety and command of Chastagnol's research. The student of the *H. A.* must



sample them for himself. I do not think he will be disappointed with these slender contributions to the study of what may well be the greatest literary fraud known to us in Latin literature.

EMORY UNIVERSITY

HERBERT W. BENARIO

RONALD ANDREW ZIRIN. The phonological basis of Latin prosody. The Hague, Mouton, 1970. Pp. 91. Fl. 26.00. (*Janua Linguarum, Series Practica*, 99)

Zirin's work began, while he was a graduate student, with an examination of "the peculiarities of Plautine prosody," and he realized soon that, in order to make sense of it, it would "first be necessary to analyze the phonological basis of Latin prosody" (7). And that is the title of the present book. Later we are told, however, that prosody is "that aspect of phonology which deals with phenomena other than the segmental phonemes, e.g. accent, syllabification, intonation, etc." (13-14), and that the term is "used here to denote this portion of phonology" (14). But according to this definition prosody is phonology, and speaking of its "phonological basis" is at best tautologous. It is obvious that Zirin deals with the prosodies, or suprasegmental properties, of Classical Latin (a branch of phonology that one might name prosodics), in particular with syllabation, vocalic quantity, and accentuation, *and* their relation to the equivalent or parallel phenomena in the metrical use of the language, i.e. the phonological basis of metrics. That is an important piece of research, and Zirin does a very good job of it, which is all the more commendable since it is also a pioneering work.

Ancient grammarians were not linguists, and their statements on Latin phonology, in particular on prosodies, are mostly worthless, no matter how religiously they are quoted by modern philologists. (Zirin knows this, and his sifting of tons of dirt in search of a few nuggets of gold has only historical interest: 42-54.) Above all they made the mistake of straining wildly to ascribe to Latin all sorts of Greek features (since they wanted to describe the 'best' kind of Latin, much of which employed Greek meters) in spite of what they heard—and then they proceeded to plagiarize one another over the centuries. Also they (and many of their modern philological successors) could talk about the sounds of a language in terms of phonetics only, not as a phonological system. Thus quantities are equaled with duration, accent with loudness (or pitch), and syllables are articulatory and acoustic units. Finally the elaborate edifice of metrics is set upon this wobbly foundation. And even if the mere recital of metrical forms (feet, verses, strophes, etc.) is satisfactory enough, all attempts by metricists to fit these forms into the phonetics (not the phonological system!) of Latin, which was to a

great degree derived from them in the first place, could not but lead to a sheer chaos of misunderstanding and circularity, even in books written during the last decades. Zirin's work is a valiant and valid endeavor at housecleaning, at stating in linguistic terms the relation of prosodies and metrics, even if he must propound the "fundamental independence of metrics and prosody [read: prosodies]" (14). But the Augean Stables in which metrics and prosodies have lain together so long cannot be cleansed in one effort, not even a Herculean one. That the place is much less noisome after Zirin's sweeping and opening of windows is undeniable. One hopes that his labors will not cease.

There are many areas of agreement, and also of disagreement. Perhaps if Zirin had known my recent work about the syllable and other phonological units (which he could not, since it was published at the same time as his), he might have concluded with me (especially since we gratifyingly agree that the syllable cannot be described in phonetic terms) that morphological boundaries are irrelevant in syllabation, and that therefore in Classical Latin syllable boundaries need not coincide with lexeme boundaries—a circumstance which has repercussions on syllabic quantity and accentuation. (That this does not jibe with the metricists' descriptions, who do indeed operate with morpheme and word boundaries, is, as Zirin would fully agree, irrelevant.) And he might also have agreed that syllable boundaries, stated in terms of phoneme distribution, are best determined in such a way that as many syllables as distributionally permissible must be open in a given unit (not the 'word,' but the larger phonological unit, which I call *cursus*)—another circumstance that has profound consequences for all prosodies (since prosodies, too, form a system), and which leads to a simpler set of syllabation rules than Zirin's, I believe.

I find quite persuasive Zirin's analysis of vowel quantity, with his requirement that a long vowel is phonologically a vowel plus a semivowel, whence the syllable is closed, so that a long-vowel syllable is equivalent in Classical Latin to a closed syllable (except that the latter, whose closing phoneme is a consonant, is then called long *positione*). And there is a wholesome insistence upon distinguishing vocalic and syllabic quantity—to which all handbooks give lip-service, but which many promptly forget when real problems, phonological or metrical, arise.

The only dialect Zirin discusses is Classical Latin. But it must be pointed out that many metrical rules as traditionally stated are incompatible even with Classical Latin phonology since they are of Greek origin and artificially imposed upon an alien phonological system. Hence to these items too should be applied Zirin's notion that one must examine and operate on three levels of analysis, the systematic (Zirin says "linguistic"), the phonetic, and the metrical (65). And since all this still does not tell us anything about the prosodies of Spoken Latin, a dialect, or dialects, having some influence on Written (including Classi-

cal) Latin and in turn influenced by it, one must eventually, in order to attain a complete view of 'Latin', come to grips with those problems also. I fear, however, that Zirin's view of Classical Latin as covering a "period preceding the loss of quantity" (87), which is like saying that Classical Latin is followed by postclassical 'Vulgar Latin' lacking distinctive vocalic quantity, will lead us astray. (I rather perceive coexistence instead of succession of two Latin diasystems, each with its own phonology and metrics.)

What distresses me is that so many classicists will be unprepared to understand what Zirin's book (or, for that matter, my review) says. Efforts will have to be made on both sides so that professionally informed talk about language becomes comprehensible and is comprehended by *all* who are concerned with languages and teach them in any of their aspects.

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
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
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
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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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## A DOUBLE-BARRELED JOKE: ARISTOPHANES, *BIRDS*, 38\*

The *Birds* begins with two discontented Athenians, Peithetairos and Euelpides, wandering in search of Tereus, the hoopoe-fied hero, who presumably will tell them where they may find a τόπος ἀπράγμων (44), far from the madding litigiousness of their native city. The short expository speech by Euelpides has often been singled out for its highly skillful and imaginative metaphorical assimilation of human and ornithic images (27-41):

Οὐ δεινὸν οὖν δῆτ' ἐστὶν ἡμᾶς δεομένους  
ἐς κόρακας ἔλθειν καὶ παρεσκευασμένους  
ἐπειτα μὴ 'ξευρεῖν δύνασθαι τὴν ὁδόν;  
'Ημεῖς γάρ, ὦνδρες οἱ παρόντες ἐν λόγῳ,  
νόσον νοσοῦμεν τὴν ἐναντίαν Σάκᾳ  
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὢν οὐκ ἄστος εἰσβιάζεται,  
ἡμεῖς δὲ φυλῇ καὶ γένει τιμώμενοι,  
ἄστοι μετ' ἄστων, οὐ σοβοῦντος οὐδενὸς  
ἀνεπτόμεθ' ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ποδοῖν,  
αὐτὴν μὲν οὐ μισοῦντ' ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν  
τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγάλην εἶναι φύσει κεῦδαίμονα  
καὶ πᾶσι κοινὴν ἐναποτεῖσαι χρήματα.  
Οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὖν τέττιγες ἓνα μῆν' ἢ δύο  
ἐπὶ τῶν κραδῶν ἄδουσ', 'Αθηναῖοι δ' ἅει  
ἐπὶ τῶν δικῶν ἄδουσι πάντα τὸν βίον.

Although Aristophanes has not yet committed himself to the pair's eventual settling place, the spectators (who may already

\* I wish to thank my friend—and fellow Aristophanean—Jeffrey J. Henderson of Yale University for his valuable suggestions.

have an intimation from the title of the play) are led to expect that our two heroes will remain with Tereus himself, among the birds: "All we ask is to go to the crows," exclaims Euelpides with words pregnant with literalness, "and though we're all set for it, we can't seem to find the way." They are of course closer than they realize: later in the play they will even be given the opportunity to grow wings themselves (649-55), and this man-bird condition is here too subtly foreshadowed: "Without anyone shoosing<sup>1</sup> us we took flight from Athens on both our . . . feet." Then the flying images are abruptly interrupted for three verses (36-38):

αὐτὴν μὲν οὐ μισοῦντ' ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν  
τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγάλην εἶναι φύσει κεῦθαίμονα  
καὶ πᾶσι κοινὴν ἐναποτεῖσαι χρήματα.

The key word in these lines is the hapax *ἐναποτεῖσαι*, from *ἐναποτίνειν*: "to pay fines away in," which Aristophanes has coined for the occasion. No commentator since Alexandrian times has failed to call attention to the anticlimactic witticism: *παρ' ὑπόνοιαν, ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἐμβιῶναι καὶ ἐνοικεῖν,'* is the Scholiast's explanation.<sup>2</sup>

No one will contest that the humour of the passage is indeed generated by the element of surprise (*ὁ γέλως ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ προσδοκίαν*), a favorite comic device of Aristophanes.<sup>3</sup> Yet it appears that the attention of all commentators has been distracted by this jest away from another, no less humorous element residing in *ἐναποτεῖσαι*. Shouldn't we ask ourselves why Aristophanes felt the need to coin a new compound to sound this anticlimactic note? Would he not have achieved the same comic purpose without necessarily resorting to such neologistic means? It could be argued that perhaps Aristophanes was

<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that *σοβεῖν* is a term applied specifically to the scaring away of birds.

<sup>2</sup> Blaydes in his commentary (ad loc.) aptly illustrates the point with a parallel of his own days: "Ireland is the best country in the world—to live out of." The closest ancient parallel occurs, paradoxically, in a highly tragic context: *ἔστιν δὲ παισὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖσι τῆς ἐμῆς / χθονὸς λαχεῖν τοσούτον, ἐνθανεῖν μόνον*, (Soph. *OC* 789-90).

<sup>3</sup> See the examples listed by Starkie, in his edition of the *Acharnians*, pp. lxvii-viii.

satirizing the late fifth-century mannerism of using the epexegetic infinitive compounded with ἐν- (e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 1095f.):

ὦ πέδον Τροζήνιον,  
ὥς ἐγκαθηβᾶν πολλ' ἔχεις εὐδαίμονα.<sup>4</sup>

But it is rather unlikely that Aristophanes would think of satirizing a mannerism which he himself had already adopted: cf. e.g. later in the play (120-23), where Euelpides states his and Peithetairos' reasons for seeking out Tereus:

Ταῦτ' οὖν ἰκέται νῶ πρὸς σὲ δεῦρ' ἀφίγμεθα,  
εἴ τινα πόλιν φράσειας ἡμῖν εὖερον  
ὥσπερ σισύραν ἐγκατακλινῆναι μαλθακῇν.

Cf. also *Peace* 1228—Trygaios is suggesting the function which a breastplate could serve:

ἐναποπατεῖν γάρ ἐστ' ἐπιτήδειος πάννυ.<sup>5</sup>

The reason for the neologism must therefore be sought elsewhere. It may be shown that in Aristophanes a neologism—or a rare form—is very often introduced for the sake of making a pun: in an obscure passage of this play the chorus of birds, after disparaging the son of Peisias for some discreditable civic act, declares that he may well become a partridge (πέρδιξ), concluding (768):

ὥς παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν ἀσχρόν ἐστιν ἐκπερδικίσαι.

ἐκπερδικίζειν ("to flee like a partridge") is an Aristophanic fabrication whose only *raison d'être* is certainly as a hit at

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the example cited in n. 2, above, and Dodds on Eur. *Bacch.* 508, Cope on Arist. *Rh.* 2.4. 1381a12, who list several other instances.

<sup>5</sup> What K. J. Dover says, in his recent excellent book on Aristophanes, concerning Aristophanic use of technical language may be applicable here too: "It would be wrong to suggest, . . . that all the words and word-formatives which occur in Aristophanes but are alien to unspecialized prose must be either comic confection or parody and in either case humorous. Linguistic enterprise is characteristic of the fifth century as a whole, and much of the colour in Aristophanes' language is best explained by the assumption that the comic poet, no less than practitioners of other literary genres, was inventive, subtle and sensitive to combinations of associations." K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (London 1972) 77.

Perdiccas, Athens' inconstant ally.<sup>6</sup> One more example will suffice to illustrate the point: in the *Knights*, one of Demos' slaves (Demosthenes) complains of the Paphlagonian (54-57):

Καὶ πρώην γ' ἐμοῦ  
μᾶζαν μεμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ Λακωνικήν,  
πανουργότατά πως παραδραμὼν ὑφαρπάσας  
αὐτὸς παρέθηκε τὴν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μεμαγμένην.

The bold use of *μεμαχότος* (56) must have sounded odd even to the Greek audience: *μάσσω*, in the perfect active, occurs nowhere else in extant classical Greek. Yet Aristophanes introduces this rare form because he wants a sonic suggestion of the Pylos affair of the previous summer (425 B.C.), when Kleon (at least in Aristophanes' eyes) stole Demosthenes' thunder: behind *μᾶζαν μεμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ*<sup>7</sup> lurks *μάχην μεμαχημένου ἐν Πύλῳ*.<sup>8</sup>

If we now look at the passage under discussion we may detect a similar punning intent in the use of *ἐναποτεῖσαι*. As we have seen, the word occurs in the context of three lines which seem to interrupt the flow of avian images; I suggest that far from acting as an interruption, these lines actually promote the imagery in the form of a play on words: with a slight inflection of the voice—perhaps accompanied by a little by-play on stage<sup>9</sup>—the actor could easily make *ἐναποτεῖσαι* sound very much like *ἀναποτᾶσθαι*,<sup>10</sup> for which the ears and expectation of the audi-

<sup>6</sup> C. Holzinger, *De verborum lusu apud Aristophanem* (Wien 1876) 24, and Merry's commentary (ad loc.).

<sup>7</sup> Hermann's conjecture of *πυέλῳ* (adopted by Van Leeuwen) is quite attractive, especially in view of lines 1058-60 of the same play.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the commentaries of Merry and Rogers (ad loc.).

<sup>9</sup> Starkie (*Ach.*, p. lvii) points out that puns could be achieved not only by pronunciation but also by "a twinkle of the eye, a change of expression—in fact by any of the methods which orators employ (under the name of *actio*) to drive home their meaning."

<sup>10</sup> Jeff Henderson suggests to me that perhaps what the audience heard was *ἀναποτεῖδθαι*, for which the actor had to blur merely the initial vowel (theta of the infinitive ending is not sounded and therefore represents no problem). As for the vowel-grade of -o- versus -e- of the usual compound verb, no one in the audience would object: *ποτάομαι* / *ποτέομαι* is quite common in simplex, e.g. *Birds* 1445, *Clouds* 319.



ence were prepared, not only by the several metaphors pointed out above, but also by the use of ἀνεπτόμεθα three lines earlier (35). It should be remembered that a Greek audience was very quick to catch the slightest alteration (whether intentional or not) in pronunciation;<sup>11</sup> this is perhaps best evidenced by the notorious example of the tragic actor Hegelochos, who brought down the house—and incurred the inexhaustible mockery of the comic poets—by a mere accentual substitution in one line of the *Orestes* of Euripides.<sup>12</sup>

Therefore the humour of ἐναποτεῖσαι depends as much on a play on words as it does on the element of παρὰ προσδοκίαν. This sort of dual comic effect is not uncommon in Aristophanes: one has but to glance ahead fifty-four lines in the play and listen<sup>13</sup> to the first words uttered by the hoopoe as he appears on stage (92):

Ἄνοιγε τὴν ὕλην, ἔν' ἐξέλθω ποτέ.

Here ὕλην comes as a surprise for some such word as θύραν or πύλην, and is also a play on the latter word.

Like numerous other such instances in Aristophanes, the double-barreled joke in ἐναποτεῖσαι is untranslatable: "Not that we hate Athens, not that it isn't a naturally great city, a happy place, open to all . . . to have their money fly away<sup>14</sup> into legal fees (or fines)."

HERBERT H. LEHMAN COLLEGE, CUNY

FRED SCHREIBER

<sup>11</sup> Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1968) 170.

<sup>12</sup> At *Or.* 279 he accidentally said ἐκ κυμάτων γὰρ αὐθις αὐ γαλῆν ὄρω (instead of γαλῆν' ὄρω); cf. *Frogs* 303, and Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit., 170.

<sup>13</sup> I use the word advisedly: it is often only by *listening* to Aristophanes' words that one can catch these otherwise hidden puns; cf. K. J. Dover, in *Fifty Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 125.

<sup>14</sup> For another instance of a verb of flying used to mean "to be gone," "to vanish," cf. *Lysistrata* 105-6: ὁ δ' ἐμός γα, καὶ κ' ἐκ τᾶς ταγᾶς ἔλῃ ποκά, / πορπακισάμενος φροῦδος ἀμπιτάμενος ἔβα.

## PLATO ON PAINTING

(Citations of the dialogues are from the OCT by J. Burnet. Translations are by the author. The presumed broad chronological order of the dialogues is that established by P. Friedländer.<sup>1</sup> Special abbreviations are listed in the back.)

In the key passage on the mimetic arts in book 10 of the *Republic*, Plato rejects them *in toto*, mainly because the mimesis of an object reproduces but a copy of its idea or essence and hence is one step further removed from reality (*τρίτη ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*) than the model itself (598-99).<sup>2</sup> The only permissible types of poetry here are hymns and eulogies (607a). However, this harsh resolve was the outcome of an inner struggle between Plato the artist and Plato the philosopher, as has often been remarked.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the visual arts as well, a vein of reluctant condemnation can be traced through the earlier dialogues and the *Republic*: a number of artists are mentioned by name, always respectfully and sometimes with admiration. In book 3 of the *Republic* painting as well as architecture and various crafts are admitted to the lower levels of education (401a); in *Rep.* 373a, painting is included among the admissible, if perhaps not desirable luxuries.<sup>4</sup>

In the dialogues of the late period Plato's attitude against the fine arts stiffens into hostility, expressed especially against painting.<sup>5</sup> In the *Laws* this art is the butt of some of the most

<sup>1</sup> *Platon*<sup>2</sup>, (Berlin 1960) III, 415-23.

<sup>2</sup> For the hierarchal structure of reality in Plato see W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis*<sup>2</sup>, (Leiden 1962) 16-18. For the history of the concept of mimesis H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike* . . . (Bern-1954) 119-21; Wehrli, "Die antike Kunsttheorie und das Schöpferische," *MusHelv.* 14 (1957) 39-119.

<sup>3</sup> See esp. *Rep.* 398a. Cf. Pfuhl, op. cit. (infra n. 8) 20. "... die Verturteilung des Homer ringt der Verstand dem Herzen nur mühsam ab." In *Lysis* 214a poets are still called "fathers of wisdom and our mentors."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 558b and *Leg.* 654e where it is advised to surround the young with beauty.

<sup>5</sup> As an example of the increasing harshness towards the art of painting I might here contrast *Phd.* 110b-c, where the colors of the painters are said to give

scoffing pronouncements made by the Athenian<sup>6</sup> (and by implication its practice is banned from the lives of citizens along with all other manual crafts, 846d). Although both *Laws* and *Politicus* also contain passages which reveal sensitivity towards the fine arts,<sup>7</sup> nevertheless a hardening of Plato's attitude towards them is apparent and most students of Platonic esthetics recognize it. According to the canonical explanation, this change in outlook was brought about by the introduction of illusionistic innovations in painting during his lifetime. In this view, Plato was a lover of archaic simplicity in a time of virtuoso technique and, as it were, embarked upon a crusade against new-fangled methods for the simulation of appearance. Bernhard Schweitzer puts it as follows:

"... ein wesentliches Motiv für die veränderte Haltung Platons lag in der bildenden Kunst seiner Tage selbst. . . . Die Richtung der Kunst kennzeichnet sich am deutlichsten durch das Eindringen der Raumperspektive. Als zweites Moment trat bald die Darstellung von Körper- und Schlagschatten hinzu."<sup>8</sup>

The purpose of this essay is firstly to discredit this view of Plato as a lover of either a more primitive or of "classical" art and enemy of the technical devices developed by painters in his time. I hope to show that this conception of Plato as a bulwark of

---

some idea of the colors of the ethereal world of the blessed and *Plt.* 277c, a scornful passage, which argues (gratuitously) that graphic illustration is desirable only for those incapable of following the spoken or written word.

<sup>6</sup> In a sarcastic passage (769a-b) the Athenian likens legislators to painters who never desist from laboring over their product only to leave something faulty and perishable behind. When his interlocutor objects that he is unschooled in the art of painting, the Athenian says scornfully: "You haven't missed a thing" (*καὶ οὐδέν γε ἐβλάβης*).

<sup>7</sup> *Leg.* 668e-669b, where the Athenian sets up certain criteria for the judgment of art (but his basic concern is with music); *Plt.* 299e, which argues that the arts can thrive only in a climate of freedom; *Plt.* 306c-d, where (uniquely) painting is included among the arts which can convey characteristics (rather than appearances).

<sup>8</sup> *Platon* 83. Similarly Pfuhl, *JdI* 25 (1910) 20 n. 25; R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford 1938) 49; Schuhl, *Platon* 13; Steven, *CQ* 27 (1933) 149; Webster, *SymbOslo* 29 (1952) 8-23; Byvanck, *Mededelingen der Kon. Ned. Ak. van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde* 18 (1955) 31; Verdenius, op. cit. (*supra* n. 2) 20; R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *Antiquitas Graeco-Romana ac Tempora Nostra* (Prague 1966) 426-27.

conservatism against illusionistic innovations cannot stand the scrutiny of the historical background.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, I propose to point to another development, the impetus of which *can* be traced to the time of Plato's *floruit* and which does relate to the core of his thinking and that is a movement to incorporate painting on a scientific basis, i.e. using geometry and arithmetic as ancillary disciplines, into the realm of general education. This innovation constituted a departure from the customary artists' workshop methods in which techniques and skills were handed down from master to apprentice and probably often kept secret.<sup>10</sup> As we will see, this new approach to painting (no equivalent development in any of the other fine arts is known) probably originated with Democritus, the first great polymath in history,<sup>11</sup> and it was first institutionalized at the Sicyonian school where the art was taught in the context of general learning. It will here be argued that this educational trend, not technical innovation, was responsible for Plato's growing hostility against the art of painting.

\* \* \*

#### "ILLUSIONISTIC" TECHNIQUES IN PAINTING IN THE CLASSICAL AGE

Before exploring Plato's allusions to painting, we should establish anew what the literary and monumental sources tell us about the actual state of development of the art.

*Foreshortening.* The fundamental technical problem of painting is the representation of depth, i.e. perspective. Of the different types of perspective, foreshortening was the first to be mastered: it begins to appear in the sixth century and its principles were fully understood by the middle of the fifth.<sup>12</sup> That this difficult technique was the first to be developed, should probably be attributed to the fact that early drawing and painting concerned itself mostly with persons and animals to which

<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the notion of any preference in art on the part of Plato is incompatible with the metaphysical nature of the mimesis doctrine, as has been observed: Panofsky, "Perspektive" 287; Collingwood, *Mind* 34 (1925) 169.

<sup>10</sup> So Lepik, *Apelles* 2. In *Prt.* 311c Polycleitus and Phidias are said to instruct apprentices for pay.

<sup>11</sup> He was παντοδαγος (Diog. Laert. 9.43).

<sup>12</sup> Richter, *Perspective* 30-32.

foreshortening is primarily applied. (From this preoccupation, in fact, the art of painting derived its Greek name ζωγραφία.) No technical name for foreshortening is known either in Greek or in Latin.<sup>13</sup>

*Linear Perspective.* We now have the wall paintings from the Tomb of the Diver at Paestum, discovered in 1968 and datable at about 480 B.C. Although they are provincial Greek and may not represent a close chronological parallel to the art produced in the great Greek centers, yet they give some idea of how two-dimensional paintings from the early fifth century could be: there is no depth whatsoever, either in the representation of the persons or of the furniture.<sup>14</sup> Linear perspective was developed, naturally enough, in connection with the painting of backdrops for the theatre and from that origin always retained the name σκηνογραφία. (This term also kept its original meaning of "stage painting," or "painted prop" as e.g. in Plutarch *Aratus* 15.2.) Vitruvius reports that it was developed by the stagepainter Agatharchus for Aeschylus (7 *Praef.* 11).<sup>15</sup> As Aristotle (*Poet.* 4.1449a17) credits Sophocles with the introduction of σκηνογραφία into the theatre, it is generally assumed that Agatharchus worked for both tragedians, hence was active about 460 B.C.

An interesting and much debated question is whether the

<sup>13</sup> Pliny gives an awkward but unmistakable paraphrase of it: "Eam primus (sc. Pausias) invenit picturam, quam postea imitati sunt multi, aequavit nemo. Ante omnia cum longitudinem bovis ostendi vellet, adversum eum pinxit non transversum, et abunde intelligitur amplitudo" (*HN* 35.126).

Apparently neither Pliny nor his source knew of a technical term for it. (Pliny's attribution of the invention to Pausias, a Sicyonian painter of the late fourth century B.C., is obviously spurious.) Pottier, *REG* 11 (1898) 384, and Pollitt, *Gazette des Beaux Arts* (1964) 319, suggest the word *katagrapha* used by Pliny, 35.56, means "foreshortening." E. Sellers and K. Jex-Blake, *The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art* (London 1896) 101, take it to mean here "profile image" (cf. the note *ad* 35.56). The latter, quite clearly, is the meaning of *καταγραφή* in Plato, *Symp.* 193a.

<sup>14</sup> Mario Napolì, *La Tomba del Tuffatore* . . . (Bari 1970). Interestingly, the preliminary sketch of the North panel (fig. 91) shows the couches in rudimentary perspective.

<sup>15</sup> As Richter, *Perspective* 26-28, points out, vase painting reveals inklings of linear perspective well before the time of Agatharchus. For the literary evidence see *ibid.* 58-61.

ancients ever discovered the true principle of linear perspective, i.e. the single vanishing point of all parallel receding lines (Vitruvius' two definitions of the device, 7 *Praef.* 11 and 1,2,1 do not settle the controversy because they are ambiguous.)<sup>16</sup> We now have, however, the wall paintings of the Room of the Masks of the Palatine, excavated in 1961.<sup>17</sup> Here the perspective is more unified than in any of the Pompeian wall paintings and one wall, the East one, is even geometrically correct.<sup>18</sup> Miss Richter argues that this and other drawings with nearly correct perspective were produced by artists with a good eye but not with a theoretical understanding of the technique. Yet it seems improbable that the ancients could have been so preoccupied with perspective without ever discerning its fundamental principle.

What concerns us here more than the nature of the device developed by Agatharchus is the fact that it marked the beginning of the systematic study of the art of painting outside the artists' workshops. Vitruvius' statement that Agatharchus wrote a manual about his discovery is not surprising, as handbooks by practicing artists are attested as early as the sixth century B.C.<sup>19</sup> However, Vitruvius also credits Anaxagoras and Democritus with treatises on the subject (7 *Praef.* 11) and the theory of draughtsmanship had thus moved into the domain of general philosophy. Linear perspective, it should be noted, unlike foreshortening and other techniques in painting, is a scientific device: once its principle is understood, it can be applied mechanically even by the unskilled hand, at least for the purpose of rendering angular forms in three-dimensional ap-

<sup>16</sup> See Panofsky, "Perspektive" 303 and Richter, *Perspective* 60.

<sup>17</sup> Carettoni, *Bollettino d'Arte* 46 (1961) 189-99.

<sup>18</sup> The scheme of the perspective of the East wall is worked out in Richter, *Perspective*, fig. 218b. Of interest in this connection is a fragment of a fourth-century Gnathia bell-krater representing the *Stheneboia* of Euripides, in Würzburg. H. Bulle, *Eine Skenographie* (Berlin 1934); A. D. Trendall and T. B. L. Webster, *Illustrations of Greek Drama* (London 1971) III,3,43, p. 101. A reconstruction of the perspective in R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *Archeologia e Cultura* (Milan-Naples 1961) 163 and plate 5.

<sup>19</sup> J. J. Pollitt, *The Art of Greece, Sources and Documents* (Englewood Cliffs 1965) xvi and xvii.

pearance. This circumstance may in part account for the interest in the technique on the part of philosophers.

*Skiagraphia.* The next traceable illusionistic device in painting, this one known from literature only, is *skiagraphia*. We will elaborate on it because Plato refers to it ten times: *skiagraphia* holds the key to our present argument. Moreover, there has been confusion concerning the meaning of the term which we will attempt to clarify.

The technique is attributed to the Athenian Apollodorus, who flourished in the second half of the fifth century B.C. and who acquired from it the nickname *ὁ σκιαγράφος*.<sup>20</sup> Pliny's comment on Apollodorus, *primus species exprimere instituit* (HN 35.60), probably *does* mean "he was the first who taught how to render surfaces realistically" (so Steven, op. cit. [supra n.8] 149). However, that Pliny's information is accurate is improbable because *skiagraphia* was what may be termed an impressionistic style, in which light-and-shade effects were created with splotches of contrasting color. That this sophisticated process really preceded other techniques for getting away from outline drawing with flat color is not likely.

The following passage from the *Republic* stresses the color contrasts created by the *skiagraphia* method:

"Is it not also true of their pleasures that they are of necessity intermingled with pains? They are mere phantoms of the true pleasure, *skiagraphiai*, as it were, deriving their color from the juxtaposition of contrasts, whereby both (pleasures and pains) become intensified. . . ." 586b-c. In Latin the term was rendered as *lumen et umbrae*. Pliny the Elder mentions these as the first technical development in the use of colors:

"... ars . . . invenit lumen atque umbras, differentia colorum alterna vice sese excitante," HN 35.29. (cf. *ibid.* 33.160 and 35.131). That Pliny has Apollodorus in mind is likely, be-

<sup>20</sup> Pliny (35.60), dating Apollodorus in the 93rd Olympiad (408-405 B.C.), must refer to his later years, as the painter was clearly older than his disciple Zeuxis. For other references to Apollodorus see Overbeck nos. 1641-47 and RE s.v. no. 77. From the confused post-Hellenic references to *skiagraphia* it is not possible to determine its nature. The present analysis is based mainly on classical Greek sources.

cause in 35.60 the latter is called "the first luminary in his art."<sup>21</sup> Pliny's "alternation of contrasting colors" (which is essential to Plato's references to *skiagraphia*) explains why works in this technique, for best effect, had to be viewed from a distance. The latter is well attested by sources still fairly close in time to Apollodorus, namely Plato, *Tht.* 208e and *Prm.* 165c-d, and Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.12.5.

There is a clear allusion to the *skiagraphia* technique in the third chapter of Aristotle's *De sensu et sensibilibus*, even though here he does not use the technical name for it. Speculating on the origin of the many shades which the eye perceives, he argues that they are the result of a true "mixture" of colors; they are not produced either by the overlaying of different colors (*ἐπιπολή* or *ἐπιπόλασις*),<sup>22</sup> or by the intermingling of small dots of different colors (*ἡ παρ' ἄλληλα θέσις*):

.... ἀνάγκη μὴ γιννυμένων καὶ τὰς χροὰς μίγνυσθαι, δῆλον,  
καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ πολλὰς εἶναι χροαίας  
ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἐπιπόλασιν μηδὲ τὴν παρ' ἄλληλα θέσιν.  
(440b).

Aristotle derived the notion of *ἐπιπολή-ἐπιπόλασις* from the art of painting, as 440a makes clear:

.... τὸ φαίνεσθαι δι' ἄλλήλων, ὅσον ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφῆς  
ποιοῦσιν, [δταν] ἐτέραν χροάν ἐφ' ἐτέραν ἐναργεστέραν  
ἐπαλείφουσιν....

(The term *ἐπιπολή* is applied to the process in 440a 14 and 440b 23.) For *ἡ παρ' ἄλληλα θέσις* he gives no further explanation (perhaps because he considers the device familiar), but the similarity with the Platonic *skiagraphia* passages (of which more will be quoted below) makes it clear that he, indeed, has this method in mind. Here again, of course, the technique is only effective when viewed from a distance:

<sup>21</sup> In Quintilian 12.10.4 not Apollodorus but his successor Zeuxis (who is said by Pliny, 35.61 to "have walked through the gates which Apollodorus had opened") is credited with *lumen et umbrae*.

<sup>22</sup> On this passage and the technical meaning of *ἐπιπολή* see Lepik, *Apelles* 27 and eadem, *Die antike Malerei* (Berlin 1963) 69-70.



κάκεινως δ'οὐδὲν κωλύει φαίνεσθαι τινα χροῶν κοινὴν  
τοῖς πρόρωθεν, (ibid. 440a 29-30)

In the post-Hellenic age the meaning of *skiagraphia* was not clearly remembered. Pliny and Quintilian preserved a memory of its technical sense, but Greek authors used it loosely for any shadow effect. Hesychius and Photius (s.v.) confused it with *σκηνογραφία*: in the Philostrati (VA 1.2 and 2.8; *Imag.* 1.315) it means "to outline sketchily"; in Pollux 7.127 it stands for painting in general. Folk etymology derived from its literal meaning "shadow painting" the naive legend that painting began with the drawing of outlines around shadows.<sup>23</sup>

Similar confusion reigns among modern scholars, who view the technique either as a form of perspective or as some (vaguely defined) combination of perspective and light effect.<sup>24</sup> Authors who view *skiagraphia* as perspective base themselves in part on the confusion of the term with *σκηνογραφία* in Hesychius and Photius and partly on one or more of the aforementioned passages in Plato and Aristotle, which allude to *skiagraphia* as a device meant for viewing from a distance. The latter feature, however, is not characteristic of perspective but of the application of color spots, where the blurring effect of distance takes the place of the blending of colors.<sup>25</sup> The key passage from Aristotle's *De sensu* on the perception of colors, here (following Lepik-Kopaczyńska) adduced in the interpretation of *skiagraphia* is not exploited by these authors.

In reality, *σκηνογραφία* and *skiagraphia* represent two distinct developments, separated by some thirty years, but both substantially anterior to Plato's time. We shall see a significance

<sup>23</sup> Pliny *HN* 13.15 and Overbeck no. 381. See Pottier, *REG* 11 (1898) 355-88 for a speculation that Attic black-figure vase painting really did begin this way.

<sup>24</sup> Pfuhl, *JdI* 25 (1910) 12-28: "Perspektive"; idem, *JdI* 27 (1912) 230; "... Vereinigung der agatharchischen Perspektive mit der apollodorischen Beleuchtungslehre"; Schweitzer, *Platon* 85: "malerische Perspektive"; Rumpf, *JdI* 49 (1934) 6-23: "Schattengebung"; Steven, *CQ* 27 (1933) 150: "plastic use of shading"; Webster, *SymbOslo* 29 (1952) 10 and Pollitt, *Gazette des Beaux Arts* (1964) 319: "shading"; Bianchi Bandinelli, op. cit. (supra n. 8) 427: "Perspektive."

<sup>25</sup> The mixed hue which results is the *κοινή χροῶς* of Arist. *De sensu* 440a quoted above.

in the fact that Plato refers frequently to *skiagraphia* and never, or at the most obliquely, to *σκηνογραφία*.

*Optical Proportions in Statuary.* Plato alludes to sculpture less frequently than painting. However, as he mentions "optical proportions" in freestanding sculpture in a key passage (*Soph.* 235b ff.), we must consider them here along with illusionistic devices in painting. These "optical proportions" are adjustments to the normal proportions of the human body, to offset distortions caused by an abnormal angle of vision: they are applicable only to oversized statues or figures placed high above the level of sight. The head of a statue seen from below, e.g. appears too small in relation to the body unless it is enlarged out of proportion. In a sense the "optical proportions" are the opposite of perspective, as they offset optical illusions rather than create them.

Tradition associates Phidias with the development of optical proportions in statuary. A legend recorded in Tzetzes<sup>26</sup> tells of a context between Phidias and his pupil Alcamenes who each created a large statue of Athena. Phidias, who is called *ὀπτικὸς τελῶν καὶ γεωμέτρης* (359), created an image of artificial proportions and thereby won the prize from his rival, who was *ἄτεχνος . . . . καὶ ὀπτικῆς καὶ τῆς γεωμετρίας* (ibid. 344) and gave his creation natural dimensions. We have only this late source for the legend, but the intricate optical adjustments attested for the structural parts of the Parthenon make it likely that its chief sculptor, too, was imbued with an understanding of optical principles. The fact that Phidias was also a painter (Pliny *HN* 35.54, Overbeck 623) adds to the likelihood that he was aware of illusionistic devices.

It will already be clear that it is chronologically impossible to establish a correlation between the changes in Plato's outlook on the fine arts and the development of optically realistic styles: foreshortening was perfected during the first half of the fifth century B.C., linear perspective during the height of classical tragedy, optical proportions in sculpture belong to the age of the reconstruction of the Acropolis, *skiagraphia* had already been handed down from Apollodorus to Zeuxis by the time of Plato's youth.

<sup>26</sup> *Chil.* 8.353-69 (= Overbeck No. 772).

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## PLATO'S REFERENCES TO ARTISTS BY NAME

Of the artists associated with the techniques here discussed only Phidias and Zeuxis are mentioned by name in the dialogues. Phidias, the probable originator of the "optical proportions" in freestanding sculpture, is the recipient of the warmest accolade Plato gives to any artist:

... δὲ οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἡργάζετο, (*Meno* 91d)

He is also respectfully mentioned in *Prot.* 311c (together with Polycleitus).

If the youthful painter Zeuxippos of Heraclea of *Prot.* 318b is, indeed, as most scholars hold, Zeuxis, this gives us a broad chronology for that artist, as the dramatic date of the dialogue is about 430.<sup>27</sup> At any rate, Zeuxis, the second *skiagraphia* artist, is uncritically mentioned in *Grg.* 453c-d. We might add that there is also a kind reference to Polygnotus (*Ion* 532e), the earlier artist, who was later remembered as a "primitive" in style, whereas Zeuxis went down into legend as a byword for technical perfection.<sup>28</sup> Plato is clearly benevolently disposed towards these artists who represent such different styles; he does not, however, reveal which quality he admires in each. So he says of Phidias in the passage quoted above that his works were "beautiful" without hinting in which way they were superior to others. The scornful diatribes against art in the later dialogues remain diplomatically nameless. It is, therefore, not possible to reach any conclusions about Plato's tastes on the basis of his allusions to artists.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Alcibiades had just grown his first beard, 309a.

<sup>28</sup> Quint. 12.10.3. Pliny, *HN* 35.60 notes that "no picture older than those of Apollodorus merits our attention," thereby condemning those of Polygnotus, still on display in his time. On the antithesis of Zeuxis and Polygnotus in Aristotle's *Poetics* see Friedländer, *Platon*<sup>2</sup> I, 125 and Webster, *SymbOslo* 29 (1952) 22. Zeuxis' other legendary rival and contemporary Parrhasius, who did not adopt the *skiagraphia* method (Pliny 35.65, Quint. 12.10.4) is not named in the dialogues, although Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.10.1-5 recalls a visit of Socrates to that artist's workshop.

<sup>29</sup> It is difficult to see the foundation of Schweitzer's conclusion that "Unter den Malern ist für Platon die grösste Erscheinung Polygnotos von Thasos

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## PAINTING AS A METAPHOR FOR THE PHENOMENAL WORLD

Most of the allusions to painting generally cited to demonstrate Plato's supposed dislike of contemporary art are in reality purely metaphorical in nature: they are designed to bolster argument and develop doctrine, not to reveal taste or preference. So Plato in *Republic* 10 and in the *Sophist* declares the painter inferior to the craftsman because he merely "copies" the latter's product. In the reincarnation myth in the *Phaedrus* (248d), on the other hand, where the context is not metaphorical, the order is the reverse: here mimetic artists rank sixth in the degree of truth which their souls possess, i.e. *above* craftsmen. Surely the latter passage represents Plato's true opinion.

Plato's frequent recourse to the representational arts as a source of metaphor springs from his preoccupation with the sense of vision in general. Vision, rather than any of the other senses, is symbolic for man's sensory i.e. illusory activities. The reason is made clear in *Rep.* 507c-509b; vision is the only form of perception which requires, in addition to sense organ and object, a third agent, namely a source of light. It is, therefore, the only suitable metaphor for cognition which requires, in addition to mind and the Idea, the numinous presence of the Good. The sun is the mundane manifestation of the undefined (and undefinable) Good. "The sense of sight, in my opinion, is the source of the greatest benefit to us. (. . . from our visual impressions) we have derived all philosophy" (*Tim.* 47a). Accordingly, in the creation myth in that dialogue, vision is hailed as the noblest of the senses and the first one to be created (45b).

At the same time the "world of sight" is synonymous with corporeal existence and "vision" stands for the entire syndrome of mental activities concerned with the ephemeral phenomena of life:

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gewesen" (*Platon* 25): there is equally reverent mention of Zeuxis in the dialogues. Nor can I grasp how the praise of Phidias in *Meno* 91d shows that Plato "ist der erste Klassizist unter den Griechen" (ibid. 28). For that matter of fact, a preference for Polygnotus the primitive and "ethographos" and Phidias the idealist and technical perfectionist would make an odd combination, indeed.

"[The corporeal aspect of existence] should be considered oppressive, heavy, earthbound and as belonging to the domain of vision. The soul which clings to that element of vision is weighted down and dragged back to the world of sight by a fear of the invisible. . . ." (*Phaedo* 81c).

Plato's "paradox of vision" is only an apparent contradiction: his works are steeped in the wry admission that, although reality is solemn, man is doomed to spend his life playing with its feeble reflections. Even dialectic is a game (*Prm.* 137b).<sup>30</sup> True cognition is divorced from sensory perception (*Rep.* 507b), yet ultimately "philosophy" is derived from our senses and these tie us to corporeal existence. The tragic limitation of the human faculty is summed up in Plato's paradox of vision.

If vision stands for the world of sensory perception or illusion, the representational arts in turn stand for vision, as they are dedicated to the reproduction or mimesis of visual appearance. For this symbolic use the art of painting serves best and is therefore most frequently cited: it is by nature the most illusionistic in that it provides the greatest variation between the matter it uses and the illusion of matter it produces. A statue, at least, possesses approximations of the mass and dimensions of its model. In this metaphorical process, tastes, and preferences for individual styles and techniques have no role to play, hence Plato can, in the earlier dialogues, speak with equal respect of Polygnotus, the primitive, and Zeuxis, the technical virtuoso. Refinements in the art of painting whereby a greater degree of visual illusion is created are of interest to Plato only insofar as they themselves have metaphorical application, as I hope to prove in the discussion of references to *skiagraphia*.

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#### TECHNIQUES IN DRAWING AND PAINTING MENTIONED IN THE DIALOGUES

Of the technical advances in drawing and painting concerned with the simulation of visual appearance, the most basic ones, foreshortening and linear perspective, are not specifically alluded to in the dialogues. In this writer's view, the thesis of

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Schuhl, *Platon* 61-63.

Plato's distaste against "illusionistic techniques" in painting must fall by this token alone. In one passage in the *Republic*, Socrates mentions perspective in painting in simple lay terms:

τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ  
ἐσκιαγραφημένα; (523b)

The phrase τὰ πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα, "the things appearing from afar", obviously refers to forms represented in perspective, but it is impossible to determine which kind of perspective Socrates has in mind.<sup>31</sup>

The terms σκιαγραφία and its cognates σκιαγραφῶ and σκιαγράφημα occur in ten passages, five of them in the *Republic*, the others in the late dialogues. In most instances a derogatory connotation clings to the terms. Most analysts take this to indicate that Plato disliked the technique. Even Broos, who in general does not uphold the view of Plato as an opponent of contemporary art, argues that the philosopher criticizes the *skiagraphia* method, misunderstanding the purposes of metaphor.<sup>32</sup>

Only in two instances is a direct connection with the art of painting preserved. In the passage from the *Republic* just quoted (523b) τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα means simply "things painted in the *skiagraphia* technique." No approval or disapproval is implied. In *Cri.* 107c-d Socrates states that the "unclear and deceptive *skiagraphia*" is considered adequate for various kinds of landscapes and broad vistas (but not for the representation of bodies). All other references to the device are purely figurative.

The reason for Plato's predilection for the term is to be found in its rich metaphorical potential. In part Plato is playing a word game with it which Fraenkel (in connection with Plautus) has labeled "Eulenspiegelerei":<sup>33</sup> this is a type of pleasantry in which an author uses a word in an idiomatic or technical meaning but

<sup>31</sup> In *Rep.* 598a, the famous paradigm of the painted bed, the object is said to be represented "from an angle, frontally, or in any which way," possibly suggesting linear perspective.

<sup>32</sup> *Plato's Beschouwing van Kunst en Schoonheid* (Leiden 1948) 18. Broos strangely argues that Plato condemns *skiagraphia* because it fails to create close resemblance.

<sup>33</sup> *Plautinisches im Plautus*, Philologische Untersuchungen 28 (1922) 398.

plays on its literal or etymological sense. Such is the play on *skiagraphia* in those instances where Plato uses the word as a general symbol for "deceptive appearance" or "trickery" (*Rep.* 365c and 602d; cf. Arist. *Metaphys.* 1024b 24). The literal meaning of *σκιαγραφία* is "shadow painting" and no other technical term could better serve to dramatize what Plato thought about painting and the world of "appearances" for which it metaphorically stands.

In *Rep.* 365c Glaucon says that he will "cloak himself in the appearance of virtue": *πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμμαντόν, σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον*. The image is somewhat obscure: as Steven, op. cit. (supra n.8) 150, rightly points out, *πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα*, "facade and form," suggests scene-painting, but one can hardly "wrap a stage prop around oneself in a circle." The metaphorical meaning of *σκιαγραφία*, "false appearance," at any rate, is unmistakable.

In *Rep.* 602d *σκιαγραφία* is mentioned in one breath with *θαυματοποιία* καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί (*θαυματοποιία*, as is proven by the Allegory of the Cave, *Rep.* 514b, is what we would call a magic lantern).

There is, however, a more profound reason why Plato looks often to the term as a source of metaphor. In this technique dots of contrasting colors were used. Consequently, as we have already pointed out, it had to be viewed from a distance, as from nearby the colors did not blend and outlines could not be distinguished. This is the sole implication of the reference to the device in *Tht.* 208e, where Socrates says that "when he comes close to the argument as to a *σκιαγράφημα* he doesn't understand a thing." (Cf. *Prm.* 165c-d, where Parmenides likens the unreal "divisions" of being, which only appear to exist when viewed from close-up, to the dots in a *σκιαγράφημα*.)

More significantly, as Plato sees it, the color spots in a *σκιαγράφημα* derive their intensity or definition from their mutual contrast, and hence they provide a perfect metaphor for the relative values and subjective criteria of Plato's "world of appearances." The principle of "intensity through contrast of opposites" is especially applicable to Plato's theory of pleasure and pain. Plato repeatedly (e.g. *Grg.* 493d ff; *Phlb.* 42b) comes to grips with the view of pleasure as contingent upon antecedent

pain and the conception of life as a necessary chain of pains and pleasures, each deriving its intensity from its juxtaposition to the other. He contrasts this against the "real (spiritual) pleasure" which is absolute and not relative to pain. We have quoted before the key passage, *Rep.* 586b-c, where the "pleasures mixed with pains" are called the *εἰδωλα* of the "real pleasure" and *σκιαγραφήματα*, which derive their intensity from alternation (*ἢ παρ' ἄλληλα θέσις*). We can now understand why in *Rep.* 583b all pleasure "other than that of the wise one" is called "unclean and produced by *σκιαγραφία*": . . . . . οὐδὲ παναληθὲς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις.

A similar image is used in *Phd.* 69b where the "untrue virtue" is called a *σκιαγραφία* because it is "virtue without wisdom" and "produced by an exchange of [pleasures and fears]": χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή . . . . .

The notions of "the true view only from a distance" and of "definition through contrast of opposites" provide the clue to a difficult passage in the *Laws*, which is often misinterpreted and usually incomprehensible in translation:

σκοτοδινᾶν δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρῶμενον πᾶσιν τε ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ παρέχει, νομοθέτης εἰ μὴ δόξαν εἰς τὸνναντίον τούτου καταστήσει, τὸ σκότος ἀφελών, καὶ πείσει ἁμῶς γέ πως ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαλνοῖς καὶ λόγοις ὥς ἐ-σκιαγραφημένα τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἀδίκαια, τὰ μὲν ἀδίκαια τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκων καὶ κακοῦ ἐαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀηδέστατα, ἐκ δὲ δικαίου πάντα τὰναντία παντὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω. (663b-c)<sup>34</sup>

The problem at hand is how the lawgiver will find acceptance for laws imposing "justice," in view of the fact that, by most people's definition of pleasure, "doing justice" is not conducive to such, but rather to its opposite, pain. The lawgiver cannot admit that justice is painful, as this would be "most shameful"; moreover, the masses would never voluntarily adopt a course of action acknowledged as conducive to dis-

<sup>34</sup> In our interpretation, there is no need to change the mss. reading *ἐναντίως* to *ἐναντίω* as a number of editors have done.



pleasure. Instead the lawgiver will remove the citizens from the distant (true) perspective of which they are not capable (in the true perspective, it is implied, justice is pleasurable, but the masses cannot be expected to grasp that). He will give them *δόξα* (which always means "false belief" or "illusion" in Plato) by bringing them close to the *σκιαγράφημα* where justice and injustice and their resulting pleasures and pains *appear* as relative and subjective values. He will then persuade them to accept the subjective judgment of the "just" as having the greater authority. We would therefore render the passage as follows:

"As things viewed from afar cause dizziness as it were, to all but especially to children, the lawgiver will create an illusion to the opposite effect, taking away their confusion; he will somehow, by references to custom and by eulogies and speeches, convince them that justice and injustice are relative values (*ἔσκιαγραφημένα*), that injustice is defined through its contrast to justice and that, from the viewpoint of him who is unjust and evil himself, injustice appears pleasurable and justice most unpleasurable, whereas from the viewpoint of the just all is altogether the opposite in both respects."

What has put interpreters of this passage on the wrong track is not only their ignorance of the exact meaning of *skiagraphia* but also a faulty reading of the phrase *τὸ σκότος ἀφελών*. This clause, literally "taking away the darkness," might normally be expected to be equivalent to "revealing the truth"; here it means the opposite as the image is conditioned by the previous reference to *σκοτοδινία* "darkness whirl" or "giddiness." The distant, true view causes giddiness in the simpleminded; the lawgiver takes it away by moving them up to the nearer but illusionary view.

Likewise in the *σκιαγράφημα* image, the "true view" is that from a distance, where justice and injustice are absolutes. As the ordinary citizen is incapable of such objectivity, he is indulged in his "close-up" illusion that justice and injustice are relative values and persuaded to follow the subjective judgment of his betters. In other words, the Athenian is advocating yet another "noble lie." That this is, in fact, the impact of the passage, is also clear from the following lines, in which the

Athenian concludes that the lawgiver "must lie to the young for their own good," (*ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους* 663d).<sup>35</sup>

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#### PLATO'S REFERENCE TO OPTICAL PROPORTIONS IN SCULPTURE

In book 10 of the *Republic* painters and other mimetic artists are said to be "removed from truth in the third degree" because they imitate, not reality (*τὸ ὄν*) or truth (*ἀλήθεια*), but their visual appearance (their *εἶδωλα* or *φαντάσματα*) (598b). In 599a, the *products* of the artist rather than their models are called *φαντάσματα*: *φαντάσματα γὰρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν*.

In the *Sophist* (233ff.) representational art is further divided. Here the Stranger from Elea distinguishes between art which reproduces the actual dimensions (including depth) of its model (*εἰκαστική τέχνη*) and that which reproduces the dimensions, adjusted to the fallibility of human vision and *appearing* natural (*φανταστική τέχνη*). (The word *φάντασμα*, therefore, has a narrower meaning here than it has in the *Republic*.)<sup>36</sup> The oft-quoted passage represents the backbone of the argument that Plato opposed "illusionistic art." In reality, the division implies no judgment at all, but is made solely for the sake of the argument, namely in order to place the sophist in the same category as the artist of the *φαντάσματα*. A brief survey of the fundamental passages on mimesis in the dialogues will, I hope, make this clear.

In book 3 of the *Republic* we find mimesis presented in its

<sup>35</sup> Literature on the passage in Saunders, *BICS* 28 (1972) ad locum. A number of interpreters, so Apelt, Bury (in the Loeb edition), des Places (in the Budé edition) and Steven, *CQ* 27 (1933) 151, take the image of "moving the viewer close to the *σκιαγράφημα*" as signifying "making him see the truth." The relative values of justice and injustice, in this interpretation, are the viewer's own, of which he is cured. This reading, however, is belied by the symbolic application of *σκιαγραφία* in the other instances. Moreover, it does not yield an acceptable sense for the passage as a whole. If the viewer-citizen is being brought close to the truth, why must he still choose between judgments and why is the action called "lying for the good?"

<sup>36</sup> For the distinction between *εἰκαστική* and *φανταστική τέχνη* see Panofsky, *Idea* 3; Cassirer, "Eidos und Eidolon" 14.

original meaning, namely "mimicry of action through the combination of dance, music and words" (see especially Koller, *op. cit.* [supra n.2] 119-21 on this radical notion). The term is found in the sense of "imitation of action" in other dialogues, both earlier and later than the *Republic* (*Cra.* 423a-b; *Soph.* 267a; *Leg.* 655d-656a). In *Republic* 3 Plato applies this mimesis conception to Homer. In order to do so, he must distinguish between the "narrative" and the "mimetic" or as we would say "dramatic" portions of the epos, the mimesis theory being only applicable to the latter. This first extension of the notion of mimesis from action to the dramatic portions of the epos probably explains the curious circumstance that Plato sometimes refers to Homer as a "tragedian" (*Rep.* 595b, 598d and 607a; *Th.* 152e). In *Republic* 10 mimesis is still defined as "the imitation of action": "The mimetic art, we stated, is the imitation of people committing forcible or voluntary deeds . . ." (603c)

By implication, however, the doctrine is extended to the narrative and descriptive parts of poetry as well. It is only for this expanded view of the mimetic artist that the painter serves as a proper metaphor.<sup>37</sup> Homer is likened to "a painter who makes a shoemaker, or what appears to be one, himself having no knowledge of shoemaking, for the benefit only of those who have no knowledge of it either and look only to colors and outlines" (600e-601a). Throughout book 10 the art of painting serves as simile and byword for what we would call "the arts" in general, but the thrust of the argument is directed against poetry. The representational arts are not the principal target of this passage in the *Republic*: as Socrates states at the outset of the book, the purpose of the discussion at hand is to justify the rejection of poetry.

If in *Republic* 10 the representational artist stands for the poet, in the *Sophist* he stands for the sophist. The distinction between the artist who reproduces "true proportions"

<sup>37</sup> In *Republic* 3 the poet-painter comparison is not used. However, the extension of the mimesis theory to the static representation of visual appearance is already indicated in the earlier *Cra.* (424a) and also in *Republic* 2 (373b). It is first fully developed in *Republic* 10 and basic to the argument of the *Sophist*.

(ἀληθῆς συμμετρία) and he who reproduces "apparent proportions" (δόξουσα συμμετρία) is made, not for the sake of expressing preference in art, but solely in order to create a yet lower category of truth to place the sophist in.

It should be noted that, by Plato's own definition of εἰκαστική μίμησις or "representation of true proportions," it does not apply to painting because the definition includes depth (βάθος, 235d). Since painting can never reproduce depth but only simulate it, it can only be φανταστική τέχνη. The distinction between "true proportions" and "optical proportions" applies only to sculpture. This is undoubtedly the reason why Plato here draws on sculpture first as his primary source of metaphor: "This (namely the practice of reproducing proportions) is not true for such works of sculpture or painting that are of considerable size. For if artists were to reproduce the true proportions of their beautiful models, as you well know, the upper parts would appear too small and the lower parts too big, on account of the fact that we see the ones from afar and the others from nearby." (235e-236a)

With regards to sculpture, the comparison fits neatly. The art of painting, however, would not provide a close parallel, even if we hold that the corresponding device (namely the enlargement of remote parts in very large representations) existed, because one could not provide an εἰκαστική counterpart with true proportions including depth. We must presume that Plato added painting to the comparison, because the art is now a well-established and meaningful metaphor for the mimesis doctrine.

Moreover, in 234b, the graphic arts had already served as a scornful simile for the sophist "who makes children believe that he can make anything he wants to" (cf. *Rep.* 596c-e). Later on in the *Sophist* Plato falls back again on the simpler distinction made in *Republic* 10, namely that between the craftsman who makes the object (in this case a house) and the graphic artist who draws it and who is here said to produce "a human dream for the waking" (266c). However, in the final genealogy of the sophist (267d ff.), the reason for the distinction between φανταστική and εἰκαστική τέχνη is spelled out: the distinction serves to illustrate a parallel division between μετὰ δόξης μίμησις δοξομιμητική ("appearance-imitating mimesis based on opin-

ion") and μετ'ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικὴ μίμησις ("scientific mimesis based on knowledge" 267e). Transferred into the domain of words, the image separates "speakers who imitate the false appearance of truth" from "speakers who pronounce what they reason to be the truth." The former, of course, are the sophists.

As here viewed, the reference to "optical proportions" in the *Sophist* serves the purposes of comparison only and is devoid of art-critical content. If, however, one sees in it a condemnation of a particular type of art, it can only be that of Phidias, the sole sculptor whom extant tradition associates with such a device.<sup>38</sup> We would have to assume that Plato, who praised Phidias so warmly in *Meno* 91d, now has a distaste against this artist's work.

In fact, the case for an increasing hostility against the fine arts in the later dialogues cannot rest on the reference to optical proportions, any more than on the allusions to *skiagraphia*. The evidence for a change in attitude lies in the absence of kindly comments on artists, in the expressions of gratuitous scorn of the fine arts quoted above (notes 5 and 6) and in some later passages in which he argues the superiority of mathematical abstractions over products of human skill. The latter passages appear to indicate a tie between the Sicyonian school and the tendencies expressed in the later dialogues.

\* \* \*

#### THE SICYONIAN SCHOOL OF PAINTING

Most of our evidence for the Sicyonian school of painting comes from the Elder Pliny's problematic chapters on the fine arts (*HN* 34-36) which, as is well known, consist of an intricate patchwork of secondary, tertiary, and even remoter material. All or most sources are ultimately Greek, but the stage of transmission at which translation took place and the nature of

<sup>38</sup> Pliny records a boast by Lysippus, to the effect that he made men "as they appeared" (*HN* 34.65). Schuhl, *Platon* 9 and 31, interprets this statement as referring to "optical proportions" and suggests Plato might have had Lysippus in mind. This connection is chronologically tenuous: although Lysippus may have been active as early as 369 B.C. (see the notes on the Pelopidas inscription *JHS* 65, 82 and 67, 109) he must have been a very young man at that time.

the Greek-Latin equivalencies are uncertain. Generations of *Quellenforscher* have succeeded in creating a measure of order in the chaos, but their findings cannot even be summarized in this short context.<sup>39</sup> Suffice it to say that Pliny's source of information on the Sicyonian school can be isolated somewhat more readily than others, because he has outstanding characteristics, namely:

- a. unabashed Sicyonian chauvinism.
- b. a preoccupation with technical aspects of art, as distinct from other postclassical "art critical" sources in whom biographical and anecdotal information predominates.
- c. an evolutionary view of the history of art (often entailing a false chronology, Sellers, op. cit. [supra n. 13] xxi).

The Sicyonian system "peaks" in well-known Sicyonian artists of the late fourth century, namely Lysippus in sculpture and Apelles in painting. Within the limitations of these prejudices, Pliny's Sicyonian source is a useful one.

The first major figure of the school was Eupompus, who made it famous. It was his pupil, Pamphilus, who later became renowned as the teacher of Apelles, who was the key figure in establishing the extraordinary system of universal education at Sicyon:

"... primus in pictura omnibus litteris eruditus, praecipue arithmetica et geometria, sine quibus negabat artem perfici posse, docuit neminem talento minoris . . . quam mercedem Apelles et Melanthius dedere ei, huius auctoritate effectum est Sicyone primum, deinde in tota Graecia, ut pueri ingenui omisam ante graphicen . . . in buxo docerentur recipereturque ars ea in primum gradum liberalium." (HN 35.76-77)

Suidas (s.v.) reports that Pamphilus was nicknamed "Busybody" (*Φιλοπράγματος*), suggesting that some made fun of his catholic interests. Pamphilus is mentioned in the *Plutus* (385) of

<sup>39</sup> See Ed. Bertrand, *Etudes sur la peinture et la critique d'art dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1893) 78-86; Lepik, *Apelles* 12-19; L. Grasberger, *Erziehung und Unterricht im klassischen Altertum* (Würzburg 1869-81) II, 343-46; A. Kalkmann, *Die Quellen der Kunstgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin 1898) 81-86; E. Sellers and K. Jex-Blake, op. cit. (supra n. 13) xvi-xxvi; B. Schweitzer, "Xenokrates von Athen," *Abh. der Königsberger Gelehrtengeellschaft* 9, 1, (Halle 1932).

Aristophanes and was therefore an approximate contemporary of Plato.

His pupil Apelles was born in Ephesus and studied painting there under a master by the name of Ephoros (otherwise unknown) before seeking further instruction at the Sicyonian school,<sup>40</sup> as Plutarch put it "more to partake of its fame than of its art." As this author reports, the school was renowned for its "culture and *χρηστογραφία* which alone possessed imperishable beauty."<sup>41</sup> The fact that both Apelles and his contemporary Melanthios paid a talent tuition at the school of Pamphilus (Pliny *HN* 35.77; Plut. *Arat.* 13) gives some indication of its prestige. It should be noted that in spite of the interest in new techniques on the part of Pliny's Sicyonian source, not a single illusionistic innovation is attributed to the school of Pamphilus (with the exception of the obviously spurious attribution of foreshortening to Pausias, *supra* n. 13). The peculiarity of the school was the integration of painting into general education and its study on a scientific basis, applying especially arithmetic and geometry to the art, but probably also including the systematic study of artists and techniques of the past.<sup>42</sup>

The Sicyonian school declined rapidly after the conquests of Alexander the Great. Demetrius Poliorketes built a Stoa Poikile at Sicyon in imitation of that at Athens (Polemon Periegetes Fr. 14 Preller). However, as Plutarch's *Life of Aratus* shows, by the third century B.C. the school was remembered mainly by the fame of its past masters. Aratus had some paintings (portraits of

<sup>40</sup> Suidas s.v.; cf. Overbeck nos. 1827-31.

<sup>41</sup> *Arat.* 13 = Polemon Periegetes Fr. 7 (Preller.) The term *χρηστογραφία* may have been coined in analogy with *χρηστομαθία* and perhaps carried the same connotation of study by means of selected models from the past. Lepik, *Apelles* 13, renders it as "solide Malschulung." Webster, *SymbOslo* 29 (1952) 17, takes it as "painting compounded of good outlines and good composition" (on the basis of Pliny's remark that Pamphilus was "educated in arithmetic and geometry," *HN* 35, 76, a tenuous deduction.)

<sup>42</sup> The Sicyonian school was prolific of manuals and treatises. Suidas (s.v.) has preserved two titles of works on art by Pamphilus. Apelles published, as Pliny puts it, "volumes on his discipline" (*HN* 35.79). Apelles' fellow student at Sicyon, Melanthios, wrote a book "on painting" (Diog. Laert 4.18-Overbeck 1758) and perhaps also one "on symmetry" (Vitruv. 7, *Praef.* 14, if we there read "Melanthius" for "Melampus.")

tyrants) destroyed (ibid. 13.1) and sent others to the court at Alexandria (ibid. 12.5) where they graced the palaces of the Ptolemies for some time (Athen. 196e). Sicyon itself clearly was no longer, as Pliny called it "the fatherland of painting" (*HN* 35.127) and *χοηστογραφία* had already come to an end.

Pliny's statements that as a result of the influence of Pamphilus the art of drawing was added to the curriculum of schools, first in Sicyon and then in all of Greece, and "received into the front ranks of the liberal arts," probably represents another expression of the chauvinistic pride of his source. However, there is, indeed, scattered evidence that in the late classical and Hellenistic ages, drawing was in some places adopted as an element of basic education. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1337b) states that painting was added by some to the traditional *γραμματική*, *μουσική* and *γυμναστική* as a fourth basic discipline. Hellenistic inscriptions from Greek centers in Asia Minor, which list examinations given to schoolboys, include drawing among the topics.<sup>43</sup> In Greco-Roman times the practice apparently died out because, as Pliny says, in Rome the art was considered "unfit for gentlemanly hands" (*HN* 35.20). The Stoics rejected the study and practice of the fine arts in principle, as is abundantly clear from Seneca (see e.g. *Ep.* 88.18).

The educational trend which emanated from the Sicyonian school is, of course, nowhere mentioned by Plato nor are any of its artists. Its practices, however, and especially its exploitation of mathematics for the instruction in drawing, were bound to arouse Plato's antagonism. What is more, the trend to view painting as part of general culture and learning had been initiated by his older antagonist, Democritus.

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#### PLATO AND DEMOCRITUS ON THE FINE ARTS

Democritus wrote essays entitled *περὶ ζωγραφίας* and *περὶ*

<sup>43</sup> Teos: *CIG* 3088, *SIG<sup>3</sup>*, 960 n. 1; Magnesia on the Meander; *SIG<sup>3</sup>*, 960; Ephesus: Keil, *AnzWien* 88 (1951) 331-36. Cf. P. Gérard, *L'Education athénienne* . . . (Paris 1889) 221-24; M. P. Nilsson, *Die hellenistische Schule* (München 1955) 46; also Stob. *Flor.* 98.72, a quote from the philosopher Teles, who lists a painter (*ζωγράφος*) among elementary schoolmasters.



χρῶν (Diog. Laert. 9.46-48). Although we know little about these works, their titles, together with that of the treatise on perspective,<sup>44</sup> suffice to show that Democritus fostered the systematic study of painting and its techniques. Nothing in our sources connects the work of Democritus with the Sicyonian school, but Pamphilus may well have gotten some of his ideas about the systematic training in the art of painting from the philosopher.<sup>45</sup>

As the mention in *Plutus* 385 proves, Pamphilus had an established reputation in Athens, and Plato must have known of him. However, whether he took notice of the painter or his practices we cannot determine. In the case of Democritus no such doubts exist: the enmity of the two philosophers was legendary (Diog. Laert. 9.40), and it is well established that a number of arguments presented in the dialogues are actually polemics against Democritus' theories.<sup>46</sup>

We might here briefly note two controversies connected with the fine arts in which Plato can be shown to speak out against Democritus. The first is that over the *ἐνθουσιασμός* or "divine inspiration" of the poet. Democritus is widely associated with the theory according to which the artist, in addition to his skill, needs the breath of divine inspiration. As Horace puts it: "Democritus believes that poets who are not obsessed do not belong on Helicon" (*ArsP.* 296-97). Plato countered this view by carrying it *ad absurdum*, namely by representing the poet as literally possessed by an extraneous spirit (*θεία μανία*), of which he is merely a tool (*Meno* 99c-d; *Laws* 719c, but especially the *Ion*).<sup>47</sup> As Plato puts it in the latter dialogue, wry

<sup>44</sup> Probably identical with that entitled *Ἀκτινογραφία*, Diog. Laert. 9.48. So Rumpf, *Malerei und Zeichnung*, HAW 6,4 p. 180.

<sup>45</sup> Not so Schweitzer, op. cit. (supra n. 39), who holds Democritus' outlook on the arts did not spread beyond his own school.

<sup>46</sup> Plato rarely mentions living persons and never attacks them directly. On his practice of veiling his polemics see Ferguson, *Bucknell Review* 15 (1967) 49-58 and Thomas Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*, APA Mon. no. 25 (1967) 107-9. On the curious "praise of Isocrates" in *Phd.* 279 (actually an attack) Coulter, *GRBS* 8 (1967) 225-36.

<sup>47</sup> Not so in *Phd.* 245a and *Leg.* 682a. On the "madness controversy" between Plato and Democritus, Koller, op. cit. (supra n. 2) 145-51 and E. Havelock, *A Preface to Plato* (Cambridge 1963) 162 n. 28.

demonstration of this mechanical function of the artist is made by the gods in the person of the wretched poet Tychinnus, who composed just one good poem (*Ion* 534e). A second point of controversy between the two philosophers in the domain of the fine arts appears to be the notion that the "pleasure" afforded by a work of art is a criterion of its quality. To Democritus *ἐνθουσιασμός* or divine inspiration allows the artist to create works of beauty, in fact, human creations are a supreme source of beauty (Fr. B, 194 Diels). The contemplation of beauty provides the most desirable of pleasures (Fr. B, 207). Pleasure, in turn, is the ultimate criterion (Fr. B, 188).

In the *Laws* Plato shows familiarity, even a preoccupation with this doctrine, as he refers to "pleasure as a criterion" several times (658e; 667d-e; 700e; 802b). As these passages viewed together show, Plato (in keeping with the moderate tone of the dialogue) does not reject this notion but qualifies it:

"Insofar even I agree with the masses, that the fine arts should be judged by pleasure, but not, indeed, by that of any chance person: on the contrary, that Muse is the most beautiful who gives enjoyment to the best and the properly educated and especially that one who pleases the one person preeminent in virtue and culture." (658e)

Although the skimpy fragments of Democritus do not allow us to reconstruct his esthetics, they nevertheless let us perceive a syndrome of thought antagonistic to that of Plato.

We now return to our central concern, which is the notion that the understanding of the art of painting and its geometrical foundation is a part of general culture. As early as the *Protagoras*, Plato excludes the arts and crafts from the notion of *paideia*: "it is not the art of carpentering, forging or clay modelling which makes the citizen" (324e), but there is no specific mention made of painting here. In the *Theaetetus* (145a), on the other hand, we find what appears to be a sly stab at the notion that painting is part of *paideia*. Theodorus has remarked that Socrates and Theaetetus look alike. Socrates won't accept Theodorus' authority on this "because he is not versed in painting" (*οὐ ζωγραφικός*). He (Theodorus) *is*, however, versed in geometry, astronomy, calculation, *mousike* and "whatever partakes of *paideia*" (*ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται*). Painting

is thus by implication excluded from the concept of "culture." The relevance of this seemingly gratuitous banter about the speakers' appearance becomes clear later. Theaetetus, in his first attempt to define "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*), calls it "geometry . . . and cobbling and the skills of the other craftsmen" (146c-d). Eventually Socrates declares "knowledge of the just nature of god" the only wisdom; cleverness in politics is vulgar, cleverness in the arts (*τέχναι*) trivial or "banausic" (176c); (nothing more is here said about geometry).

We will neither stress nor document the obvious, namely the role of mathematics in Plato's scheme of education. Suffice it to say that in the *Republic*, training in mathematics is the foundation of the curriculum designed for the Guardians or elite, as both arithmetic (525c) and geometry (527a-b) prepare the mind for the cognition of the Truth, Being, and Knowledge. Geometry, in fact, brings "understanding" (*διάνοια* 527b) which is midway between "opinion" (*δόξα*) and "knowledge" (*νοῦς* 511d). Although Plato brings out that the study of mathematics fosters general comprehension (it is good "for all pursuits of learning," *πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις* 527c; cf. *Laws* 747b), he is emphatic that the discipline should not be "perverted" to practical purposes such as "gain" (525c), utilitarian aims (527a) or astronomy (529a). (Cf. *Phil.* 56d for the distinction between applied and abstract or "philosophical" mathematics.)

What concerns us here are references to mathematical principles applied to the fine arts. These occur only in the *Republic* and later dialogues. In the *Philebus* Socrates scoffs that works produced on mathematical basis can boast very little else: "If one were to remove from any of the arts the elements of arithmetic, proportion and weight, what would remain of them would be negligible indeed" (55e). In the *Republic* Socrates implies the superiority of the mathematical principles themselves over their application in art: "If someone well-versed in geometry would see (works of art . . . carefully wrought according to mathematical schemes), he would consider them of beautiful workmanship, but he would laugh at the idea of deriving from them any true understanding of equals or doubles or any other mathematical proportions" (529e). The last two pas-

sages quoted contain clear allusions to artistic skills reinforced by an understanding of geometrical and arithmetical principles. He is thinking of artists like Phidias, who are "skilled in the perfection of geometry and arithmetic," but who in addition, unlike Phidias, promoted their art as part of general *paideia*.

The clearest barb against the notion of mathematics placed in the service of art (and at the same time against Democritus' thesis of the beauty of man-made works) is contained in the passage in the *Philebus*, dear to the heart of modern abstractionists, in which Socrates maintains that "beauty resides, not in living creatures, nor in their painted representation as the majority maintain, but only in mathematical figures" (51c). The notion of the supreme beauty of mathematical figures is also expressed in *Timaeus* 53e. (The most perfect form of all is the globe, *ibid.* 33b.) There is in these passages a note of polemic against the "perversion" of mathematics to non-abstract purposes.

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*Conclusion.* No valid case can be made for a rejection by Plato of "illusionist devices" in painting (or sculpture). Insofar as he refers to such techniques at all, he does so for purely metaphorical purposes. In fact, the dialogues do not allow any conclusions as to specific tastes or preferences in the fine arts at all.

The characteristic of the art of painting in Plato's time was not technical innovation but the new role it was beginning to play in the domains of education and general culture or "philosophia." Our information on the Sicyonian school of painting was distorted by local chauvinism and by complicated transmission; our knowledge of Democritus' theories is scanty, and in the entire domain of our inquiries chronological data are imprecise. The proposed correlation between Democritus' views on art, the teaching practices at the school of Pamphilus, and the hardening of Plato's rejection of painting must therefore remain conjectural. Nevertheless, a new climate of opinion concerning the role of painters and their art in society is unmistakable in the first half of the fourth century B.C. and it cannot have failed to have some effect on the evolution of Plato's views.

## SPECIAL ABBREVIATIONS

- Cassirer, "Eidos und Eidolon": Ernst Cassirer, "Eidos und Eidolon, das Problem des Schönen und der Kunst in Platons Dialogen," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1922-1923) 1-27.
- Lepik, *Apelles*: Wilhelmina Lepik-Kopaczyńska, *Apelles, der berühmteste Maler der Antike* (Berlin 1962)
- Overbeck: J. Overbeck, *Die antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste bei den Griechen* (Leipzig 1868; reprint 1959)
- Panofsky, *Idea*: Erwin Panofsky, *Idea, Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte der älteren Kunsttheorie* (Berlin 1924)
- Panofsky, "Perspektive": Erwin Panofsky, "Die Perspektive als 'symbolische Form'", *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1924-1925) 258-330.
- Richter, *Perspective*: Gisela Richter, *Perspective in Greek and Roman Art* (London 1970)
- Schuhl, *Platon*: Pierre-Maxim Schuhl, *Platon et l'art de son temps (Arts plastiques)* (Paris 1933; second edition 1952)
- Schweitzer, *Platon*: Bernard Schweitzer, *Platon und die bildende Kunst der Griechen* (Tübingen 1953)

# SIMICHIDAS' MODESTY: THEOCRITUS, IDYLL 7.44

ὥς ἐφάμιαν ἐπίταδες· ὁ δ' αἰπόλος ἄδὼν γελάσσας,  
'τάν τοι', ἔφα, 'κορύναν δωρύττομαι, οὐνεκεν ἐσσί  
πάν ἐπ' ἀλαθείᾳ πεπλασμένον ἐκ Διὸς ἔργος. (Id. 7.42-44)

Of *Idyll* 7.44 Gow remarks, "The phrase has been suspected, and if taken at its face value is certainly odd. If allowance is made however for Lycidas' playful mood and the faded character of both metaphors, it does not seem improbable."<sup>1</sup> The particular phraseology, he suggests, is to be explained by the accompanying gift of the goatherd's crook: "It seems probable that Lycidas' choice of words is connected with his gift, and that he means *I give you my staff, a piece of wood as unblemished as yourself*." The phrase ἐπ' ἀλαθείᾳ could mean merely "really and truly," but more probably goes closely with πεπλασμένον, i.e. "formed for truth," and refers to "the candour with which Simichidas has admitted his inferiority to Asclepiades and Philetas."<sup>2</sup> So much may be regarded as fairly certain. The exact nature and function of Lycidas' "candour" remain to be clarified.

Puelma accepted Gow's interpretation of ἐπ' ἀλαθείᾳ and carried it further. According to Puelma the words carry the connotation, "formed for the true art," "'im Geist, in der Gesinnung der Wahrheit,' d.h. der 'wahren Kunst.'"<sup>3</sup> Lycidas thereby marks out Simichidas as being "'in ehrlicher Gesinnung geformt,'" "'ein edler Jünger der 'wahren Kunst.'"<sup>4</sup> This "wahre Kunst" is the λεπτότης of Asclepiades and Philetas whom Simichidas has just praised (39-41), in contrast to the Homeric, mountain-building poetry criticized in his next verses

<sup>1</sup> A. S. F. Gow, ed., *Theocritus*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1952) ad 7.44.

<sup>2</sup> Loc. cit. Earlier interpreters had been inclined to take ἐπ' ἀλαθείᾳ as "in truth," "really" (= ὡς ἀληθῶς); see C. Hartung, *Philologus* 34 (1876) 603; Th. Roeper, *Philologus* 18 (1862) 191.

<sup>3</sup> Mario Puelma, "Die Dichterbegegnung in Theokrits 'Thalysien,'" *MH* 17 (1960) 160, note 55.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 159, 160.

(45-48). Lycidas, then, is taking Callimachus' side in the famous literary quarrel with Apollonius of Rhodes. Theocritus thus is also pronouncing for Callimachus. Puelma's interpretation has one difficulty, namely that the scholion to the proem of the *Aitia* places Asclepiades (= Sicelidas) among the Telchines, i.e. among the detractors of Callimachus and his "lean" style.<sup>5</sup> And an epigram of Asclepiades attests to the fact that he did not share all of Callimachus' views on style (*A. P.* 9.63). Hence both Lohse and Cataudella have rejected Puelma's interpretation.<sup>6</sup> Lohse, however, grants that in line 44 Lycidas recognizes that his companion's last utterance "concerns very serious things which touch his entire artistic existence."<sup>7</sup>

There can be little doubt that lines 39-41 and 45-48 touch upon important literary questions of Theocritus' day. Yet line 44 may also have a more immediate and less exalted meaning than most scholars have seen, a meaning more directly related to the dramatic structure of the *Idyll* and the interplay of character. The strangeness of the language suggests that Lycidas is being ironical. Fritzsche-Hiller long ago observed the "playful expression."<sup>8</sup> In Theocritus playfulness need not exclude seriousness. The problem is what Lycidas is being playful about.

This playfulness, I suggest, lies in the alternation between modesty and boastfulness in the way in which Simichidas presents himself. The irony of Lycidas in 44 is directed against Simichidas' protestations of modesty in the face of the attitude which the preceding discourse has illustrated.

Crucial for understanding Lycidas' irony is the word *ἐπίταδες*, "on purpose," in 42. Why has Simichidas made his speech "on purpose," and what is the meaning of Lycidas' "sweet laughter" which introduces his reply (42)? For the first

<sup>5</sup> Schol. Flor. *ad Aitia* I, proem, vv. 1-12 (Pfeiffer, *Callimachus* [Oxford 1949] vol. 1, p. 3, line 4).

<sup>6</sup> G. Lohse, "Die Kunstauffassung im VII. Idyll Theokrits und das Programm des Kallimachos," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 413-25, especially 420-25 and p. 421, note 1; Q. Cataudella, "Lycidas," *Studi in onore di U. E. Paoli* (Florence 1959) 159-69, especially p. 167 with note 2.

<sup>7</sup> Lohse (preceding note) 421.

<sup>8</sup> A. T. H. Fritzsche and E. Hiller, eds., *Theokrits Gedichte*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig 1881) ad 44 ("ein scherzhafter Ausdruck").

question Gow's explanation is the most probable: Simichidas "seems to mean that his modesty was calculated to induce Lycidas to take part in the friendly exchange of songs suggested at 36."<sup>9</sup> This "modesty," which Gow accepts at face value,<sup>10</sup> is deceptive. It is, I think, the point of one of the sharpest ironies in the poem.

Simichidas' statements, in fact, indicate that he does not believe that he is as poor a singer as he says, that actually he considers himself quite superior to Lycidas. He makes an effort at politeness, however, hoping above all to encourage his friend to sing. Nevertheless his very attempt at politeness contains a trace of condescension and egotistical insensitivity. As F. Williams has observed, the word *ἐπίταδες* depicts a man "confident of his ability to manipulate the reactions of others."<sup>11</sup>

Nearly all interpreters have neglected a small, but crucial word in Simichidas' protestations of his inferiority to Sicelidas and Philetas, the adverb *πω* (39-41):

οὐ Δᾶν· οὐ γάρ πω κατ' ἐμὸν νόον οὔτε τὸν ἐσθλόν  
 Σικελίδαν νίκημι τὸν ἐκ Σάμῳ οὔτε Φιλίταν  
 αἰείδων . . .

Eduard Schwartz seems to be the only one who has taken any notice of the word at all, but his interpretation is unsatisfactory. He claimed that it does not mean "not yet," but rather "not at all," on the (quite dubious) analogy of Homeric phraseology.<sup>12</sup> Not only is the alleged Homeric meaning "not at all" uncertain, but there is also the occurrence of this same *οὔπω* thirty lines

<sup>9</sup> Gow (above, note 1) *ad* 42. See also J.-H. Kühn, "Die Thalysien Theokrits," *Hermes* 86 (1958) 70-71, who also notes the contradiction between 37-38 and 90-95, to be discussed *infra*.

<sup>10</sup> Gow (above, note 1) *ad* 47f.: "Lycidas commends the modesty with which Simichidas declines to compare himself with Sicelidas or Philetas . . ."

<sup>11</sup> F. Williams, "A Theophany in Theocritus," *CQ* N.S. 21 (1971) 142. If Williams is right about Lycidas being Apollo in disguise, then the idea of Simichidas boasting before the god of the lyre is even more amusing.

<sup>12</sup> Eduard Schwartz, "Theokrits Daphnis," *Nachr. Gött.* (1904) 299, note 1, citing the scholion to *Iliad* 14.143. Gow translates the phrase in 39 by "as yet." The meaning "not at all" (instead of "not yet") for *οὔπω* in Homer is far from certain: see Leaf *ad Il.* 14.143; West *ad Hesiod, Theogony*, 560; J. E. Fontenrose, *AJP* 62 (1941) 65-79; *contra*, W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemosyne*, ser. 4, vol. 24 (1971) 4, à propos of *Theog.* 560, with further bibliography.



earlier in the poem, where the meaning is unambiguously "not yet" (10): *κοῦπω τὰν μεσάταν ὁδὸν ἄννυμες* . . . Hence Simichidas qualifies even his statement of poetic inferiority: he does "not yet conquer" Sicelidas or Philetas.

Through the *οὐ* . . . *πω* of 39, the *ἐπίταδες* of 42, and other touches which will appear later, Theocritus shows his distance from his characters. He does not simply identify with Simichidas, but with an amused removal observes certain of his idiosyncrasies. Simichidas' "modesty" of 37-41 was a pose, assumed "on purpose" to entice Lycidas to sing. But his friend has a little surprise in store for him. He plays along and takes him up on his humility. When he calls him "a sprig formed from Zeus all for truth," he is in effect saying, "Yes, you are quite right: your reputation as the best of singers is, just as you say, undeserved. You are to be congratulated on your absolute (*πᾶν*) truthfulness." On this view *πᾶν* also gets its due. Simichidas did not intend to be taken literally at all. The "sweet laughter" (*ἁδὺν γελάσας*, 42) which precedes Lycidas' words prepares for the light touch of malice.<sup>13</sup>

The double edge of Lycidas' "truth" in *ἐπ' ἀλαθείᾳ πεπλασμένον* appears sharper if we remember that the verb *πλάττειν* commonly connotes falsehood or fiction (LSJ s.v., V). Plato uses *πεπλασμένος* and *ἀλήθεια* as *antithetical*, not complementary, terms: *μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος* (*Rep.* 6.485D); *μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ' ἀληθινὸν λόγον* (*Tim.* 26 E). Aeschylus uses the same antithesis in *Prometheus* 1030-33, where we may note the implicit equation of *πεπλασμένος* with a compound of *pseudos* (*ψευδογορεῖν*):

ὥς δδ' οὐ πεπλασμένος  
ὁ κόμπτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰρημένος·  
ψευδογορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιόταται στόμα  
τὸ Δῖον . . .

<sup>13</sup> H. Kynaston (formerly Snow), ed., *The Idylls and Epigrams of Theocritus*<sup>5</sup> (Oxford 1892) sees irony in 43-44, but understands the lines merely as a compliment to Simichidas. On line 42 he remarks, rather cryptically, "*ἐπίταδες*, 'purposely' depreciating my own talents. Lycidas was however not to be taken in; his gift of the crook and accompanying words are evidently ironical." It is hard to see what Lycidas is being ironical about, if he is merely complimenting his friend.

There is no good English equivalent to this double meaning, but we may convey something of the paradox and irony if we translate "fictioned for truth."

On the whole Lycidas is friendly, but a witty jibe at a foible is not inconsistent with the amiable character which Theocritus gives him. In stressing the antitheses between Lycidas and Simichidas, Ott has mistakenly made Lycidas out to be "ganz Wohlwollen und Freundlichkeit"<sup>14</sup> and his "sweet laughter" to be "ein freudiges Lachen."<sup>15</sup> For the possibility of a gentle mockery in this laughter, however, there is the parallel with the "sweet laughter" of Aphrodite in *Idyll* 1.95, which also has an ironical edge.<sup>16</sup> Giangrande and F. Williams have recently pointed out other traces of a teasing and playfully malicious character in Lycidas' speeches.<sup>17</sup>

Theocritus need only hint lightly at this aspect of Lycidas, for in the bucolic convention the meeting of two singers is regularly accompanied by an exchange of insults or jibes.<sup>18</sup> In *Idyll* 7, unlike *Idyll* 5, there is a free sharing of songs rather than a formal contest. Yet the eristic element, with its accompanying badinage, remains in the background.<sup>19</sup> It may be implicit in the verb *βουκολιασδώμεσθα* (36), which probably suggests competition.<sup>20</sup>

Two details prepare us for a more acrid discourse between the two figures: first, there is Lycidas' smell (16), which connects him with a goatherd as earthy and contentious as Comatas in

<sup>14</sup> Ulrich Ott, *Die Kunst des Gegensatzes in Theokrits Hirtengedichten*, Spudasmata 22 (Hildesheim 1969) 169.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. 169, note 463.

<sup>16</sup> For the interpretation of *Idyll* 1.95 see G. Zuntz, *CQ* N.S. 10 (1960) 37-40; R. Ogilvie, *JHS* 82 (1962) 107.

<sup>17</sup> Giuseppe Giangrande, "Théocrite, Simichidas, et les *Thalysies*," *AC* 37 (1968) 491-533, especially 503-8 on lines 24-25; Williams (above, note 11) p. 142 with note 1.

<sup>18</sup> See R. Merkelbach, "BOYKOΛΙΑΣΤΑΙ (Der Wettgesang der Hirten)," *RhM* 99 (1956) 110-22, especially 116; also G. Lawall, *Theocritus' Coan Pastorals: A Poetry Book* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) 54.

<sup>19</sup> A number of scholars have pointed out that *Idyll* 7 proceeds as if there will be an actual contest which, however, never develops: see Lohse (above, note 6) 422-23; Puelma (above, note 3) 154-55; Ott (above, note 14) 145.

<sup>20</sup> See Gow (above, note 1) *ad* 7.36 and 5.44; Schwartz (above, note 12) 302.

*Idyll* 5 (cf. 5.51-52). Second, there is a trace of amused surprise, verging on the rustic's condescension for the city-dweller, in Lycidas' comment on Simichidas' *passeggiata* in the noonday sun, when even (*καί*) the lizards and birds have sense enough to sleep (21-23; cf. *Id.* 12.8f.).

Once we recognize this ironical streak in Lycidas, we may wonder whether there may not be some irony toward his friend in his lines on Homerid mountain-building (45-48). A verbal link between the Homerid poets and Simichidas' report of his own exalted reputation leaves this possibility open: *Χῖον ἀοιδόν* (47); *ἀοιδὸν ἔχριστον* (38).

To these lofty, mountain-like structures (45-48) Lycidas abruptly (*ἀλλ' ἄγε*) opposes "herdman's song," *βουκολικὰ ἀοιδά* (49). For us "bucolic" has the romantic associations conferred upon it by centuries of literary tradition. "Bucolic" is itself a literary word in our vocabulary. But for Theocritus, who stands at the beginning of that tradition, the word evokes still the toil of the countryman and the smell of his beasts.<sup>21</sup> It stands out sharply against the Homeric and Pindaric echoes of lines 45-48 which immediately precede it. It deepens the distance between Simichidas and Lycidas and emphasizes the humility of Lycidas' song.

The humility is especially marked in the way Lycidas goes on to describe his own work. It is merely a little song (*μελύδριον*), which even so cost him much effort on his mountain (*πρᾶν ἐν ὄρει τὸ μελύδριον ἐξεπόνασα*, 51). Whereas Simichidas ended his speech with talk of "conquest" and "rivalling" (*νίκημι, ἐρίσω* 40, 41), Lycidas ends with amity (*φίλος*, 50), and concerns himself not with competing, but with "pleasing" his friend (*ὄρη, φίλος, εἴ τοι ἀρέσκει / τοῦθ' ὅτι . . . ἐξεπόνασα*, 50f.).

Within his first speech (27-41) Simichidas begins with a generous praise of Lycidas. Lycidas' supremacy as a piper (*συρικτᾶς*) warms Simichidas' heart (*τὸ δὴ μάλα θυμὸν ἱαίνει*

<sup>21</sup> Aside from the "Bucolic" mouth of the Nile in Hdt. 2.17 the adjective *βουκολικός* seems not to occur before Theocritus. The adjective would, of course, suggest the *boukolos*, or "cowherd," who, from Homer on, stands low on the social scale: cf. *βουκόλος δοῦλος* in Plato, *Ion* 540 c.

/ἀμέτερον, 29-30). Yet in his own opinion Simichidas believes that he can "equal" his friend (30-31). His verb here, *ἰσοφαρίζειν*, recalls the challenges of Homeric heroes in battle.<sup>22</sup> But it also may hint at Simichidas' ambition.

In this speech, nevertheless, Simichidas still balances his high claims with modesty. This balance is expressed in a repetition of phrases between 27-31 and 37-40:

*Λυκίδα φίλε, φαντί τυ πάντες*  
*ἤμεν συρικτὰν μέγ' ὑπείροχον . . .*  
*. . . καίτοι κατ' ἔμδν νόον ἰσοφαρίζειν*  
*ἔλπομαι.*  
*καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ Μοισᾶν καπυρὸν στόμα, κῆμὲ λέγοντι*  
*πάντες ἀοιδὸν ἄριστον· ἐγὼ δέ τις οὐ ταχυπειθής,*  
*οὐ Δᾶν· οὐ γάρ πω κατ' ἔμδν νόον οὔτε τὸν ἐσθλόν*  
*Σικελίδαν νίκημι . . . οὔτε Φιλίταν*  
*αἰίδων.*

In the first passage Simichidas asserted that, despite what "all say," he can "equal" the "best of pipers." In the second passage he asserts that, despite what "all say," he cannot (yet) defeat Asclepiades or Philetas. Initial boastfulness is checked by restraint at the end.

However, Simichidas still shows himself concerned with public opinion. Twice he reports what "all say" (*φαντί τυ πάντες*, 27; *λέγοντι πάντες*, 37-38). Though he speaks of mutual help or benefit (36), he still thinks in competitive terms. His verbs are *ἰσοφαρίζειν* (30), *νίκημι* (40), *ἐρίσδω* (41), and we may probably add *βουκολιασδώεσθα* in 36.<sup>23</sup> His last word is *ἐρίσδω*, and he does not speak again until line 91. This eristic tone stands out all the more sharply against Lycidas' indifference to such matters, his generosity in giving his staff, and his simple desire to "please" (*ἀρέσκει*, 50).

Simichidas' second speech (91-95) is clearly intended to recall the first, for it begins with the same address to "dear Lycidas" (*Λυκίδα φίλε*) in the same metrical position (27 and 91). The word *κῆμὲ* in the next line also recalls *κῆμὲ λέγοντι* in 37. Yet the disclaimer is now replaced by self-importance: the Nymphs

<sup>22</sup> E.g. *Iliad* 6.101, 21.194 and 411.

<sup>23</sup> See above, note 20.

have taught him, like Hesiod, on the mountains, and report has carried his songs to the throne of Zeus (92-93), which may refer to Ptolemy Philadelphus.<sup>24</sup> The claim is extraordinary in any case. "Zeus" in 93 also echoes Lycidas' "sprig of Zeus" in 44.

The parallels and contrasts continue further. In his opening compliment Simichidas had called his friend "by far the best" of pipers: μέγ' ὑπείροχον (28). He now repeats that phrase, in the same metrical position, but applies it to *his own song*: τόγ' ἐκ πάντων μέγ' ὑπείροχον (94). Whereas Lycidas was concerned with "pleasing" his friend (50), Simichidas will "honor" Lycidas (ὃς *τυ γεραίρειν* / ἄρξεῦμ', 94f.), a word which once more suggests the heroic gestures of epic figures.<sup>25</sup> Here again he reaches toward grandiosity where Lycidas was simple, and again we may wonder whether Lycidas' warnings about rivaling Homer (47f.) may not have had some relevance to Simichidas' character.

Simichidas concludes with a compliment to his friend: "Listen, for you are dear to the Muses" (95). Given the context, we may suspect that the phrase contains a trace of condescension.<sup>26</sup> Such a tone was present earlier in ἐπιταδεις of 42 and possibly also in the offer of "mutual benefit" in 36.

In Simichidas' first speech modesty and pretention strove against one another, but modesty won the upper hand (οὐ γάρ πω . . . νίκημι . . . , 39-41). Simichidas' second speech reverses the proportions. Now his true opinion of his merits breaks out. He had reason to restrain himself earlier, for he wished to encourage Lycidas to sing. Lycidas has sung his song, and Simichidas' second speech confirms the hints conveyed earlier.

<sup>24</sup> Most commentators accept the identification. R. J. Cholmeley, *The Idylls of Theocritus* (London 1919) ad loc. rejects it on rather uncertain chronological grounds. Recent interpreters have reservations for other reasons: e.g. Puelma (above, note 3) p. 153, note 29; Williams (above, note 11) p. 143, note 2.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Iliad* 7.321; *Odyssey* 14.437 and 441.

<sup>26</sup> Puelma (above, note 3) p. 152 with note 27 takes lines 91-95 differently. In his view Simichidas here recognizes the excellence of Lycidas' song and desires to reciprocate. The γέρας, therefore, reveals a mood of "galante Höflichkeit." Yet the differences between Lycidas' μελύδριον and Simichidas' ἐκ πάντων μέγ' ὑπείροχον remain, as Puelma realizes; and Simichidas' compliment still is self-centered. See also Williams (above, note 11) p. 143.

## ENNIAN EXPERIMENTS

Many features of Ennius' poetic technique have called forth comment from modern scholars because of their archaism or awkwardness; two in particular have aroused such wonder and scorn that some scholars deny the authenticity of the fragments exhibiting them. One of these is the apocope of words at the end of the hexameter, of which Ausonius has preserved three examples in his *Technopaegnia* (145, 159f).<sup>1</sup> They are the phrases *laetificum gau*, *altisonum cael* and *endo suam do* (574-76V).<sup>2</sup> The last of these is also a standard example of apocope in the Latin grammarians, cited without Ennius' name. The other irregularity is the nominal thesis of which Vahlen prints two examples, *saxo cere comminuit brum* (609) and *Massili portabant iuuenes ad litora tanas* (610). The first of these is cited with Ennius' name in the commentary on Donatus found in a ninth-century grammatical collection, and without his name by several grammarians, from Servius and Donatus on.<sup>3</sup> The second fragment is never cited with Ennius' name, and cannot be treated as genuine.<sup>4</sup>

Some scholars have taken advantage of the relatively late attestation of these fragments to deny their authenticity; Leo was only willing to accept *endo suam do* from Ausonius' poem, and did not accept even the better attested example of tmesis, and Norden approved Leo's verdict.<sup>5</sup> Steuart, following Hardie, denied the authenticity of all five quotations, suggesting that they were parodies by Lucilius or another, accepted as

<sup>1</sup> On the text of this passage of Ausonius see G. Jachmann, "Das Problem der Urvariante in der Antike und die Grundlagen der Ausonius-Kritik," *Concordia Decennalis* (Cologne 1941) 76f.

<sup>2</sup> I cite Ennius from Vahlen's second edition (Leipzig 1903-Amsterdam 1967).

<sup>3</sup> Testimonia may be found in Vahlen ad loc. On the codex Lavantinus, which names Ennius, cf. H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini* IV (Leipzig 1864) xlixf.

<sup>4</sup> Testimonia in Vahlen. The scansion is also impossible; cf. J. Wackernagel, *Kleine Schriften* 1338f.

<sup>5</sup> F. Leo, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (Berlin 1913) 182 n.2, 184 n.6: "... mit *laetificum gau* narrt uns Ausonius"; E. Norden, *Ennius und Vergilius* (Leipzig 1915) 78 n.2; So more recently, S. Timpanaro Jr., "Per una nuova edizione critica di Ennio," *SIFC* 22 (1947) 193-98.

genuine Ennius by later authorities.<sup>6</sup> But given the relative lateness of the surviving portions of the Latin grammatical tradition, date is not a good reason to deny the authenticity of the fragments. Four have Ennius' name, and must be accepted unless there is conclusive proof of their spuriousness. As for the argument that the lines are parody, that is likely to be a reflection of modern taste rather than ancient. And even if some of these lines were parody, that alone is proof that similar peculiarities were found in Ennius; the tmesis, at least, was imitated by Virgil.<sup>7</sup>

If the four examples—excluding, to eliminate dubious evidence, verse 610—are to be accepted as genuine, they must be explained. Two possible origins are advanced: one, that they are original experiments by Ennius with the crude Latin hexameter, showing ingenuity and a sense of style, but little refinement,<sup>8</sup> we may abandon forthwith. The other, more promising line of investigation is that they are in some way a reflection of Greek practice. That this is true of the apocope has been known for some time; the history of the tmesis of *cere-brum*, however, has not been fully elucidated.

There is no question that apocope of the type *endo suam do* is ultimately derived from Homer, where both  $\delta\tilde{\omega}$  for  $\delta\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$  and  $\kappa\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\iota}$  for  $\kappa\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\iota}\theta\tilde{\eta}$  are found several times. But it is by no means clear that Ennius is modelling his usage directly on Homer. Cordier, in 1940, suggested that Aristotle, through Neoptolemus of Parium, provided the model for Ennius' apocope: in the *Poetics* (1458a1-8) Aristotle cited as examples of acceptable poetic diction of this type not only the two Homeric words given above, but also the verse  $\mu\lambda\alpha\ \gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\nu\ \delta\psi$  which, although Aristotle did not say so, was written by Empedocles.<sup>9</sup> In fact, a

<sup>6</sup> W. R. Hardie, *Res Metrica* (Oxford 1920) 4n., E. M. Steuart (ed.), *The Annals of Quintus Ennius* (Cambridge 1925) 234.

<sup>7</sup> G. 3.381, *septem subiecta trioni*. Such tmesis in Lucilius is much milder; see the examples s.v. in Marx's index. A true parody is found in Varro, *Rust.* 3.4.1, "Sexaginta enim milia Fircelina excande me fecerunt cupiditate" (I owe this reference to W. N. Nichipor of the University of Minnesota).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. A. J. Bell, *The Latin Dual and Poetic Diction* (London 1923) 159, 338.

<sup>9</sup> A. Cordier, "Mots mutilés et sectionnés dans Ennius," *Mélanges A. Ernout* (Paris 1940) 89-96.

more likely explanation can be found in Skutsch's article in Pauly-Wissowa;<sup>10</sup> several Hellenistic poets, cited by Strabo (8.364) in discussing the name *Mέσση*, had used similar forms: Euphorion used *ἦλ* for *ἦλος*, Philetas *ἐρι* for *ἐριον* and Antimachus, as well as Empedocles, *δψ* for *δψις*.<sup>11</sup> Leo rejected Euphorion's *ἦλ* as of no use in explaining apocope in Ennius, but in fact it is quite helpful.<sup>12</sup> As in so much else, Ennius' knowledge and interpretation of Greek literature came to him through the Alexandrians, and just as they extended Homeric apocope to words where it was not suitable, so Ennius went even further in his experimentation than did the Alexandrians.<sup>13</sup>

No suitable explanation of this type, to my knowledge, has ever been advanced for the even stranger experiment of nominal tmesis, *cere comminuit brum*.<sup>14</sup> Homer used tmesis frequently, but in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* it is only the separation of verb and preverb that is found, and they were not at that time firmly joined to one another. Later poets generally observed the same limitations. The division of a unified noun, then, is even more striking, and no later Latin writer was as extreme as Ennius; Lucilius, indeed, was much less daring, even in parody.<sup>15</sup> But there is some evidence to show where Ennius found a justification for this experiment. In the *Iliad* (4.235) we find the verse:

οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ψευδέσσι πατήρ Ζεὺς ἔσσειτ' ἀρωγός.

Paul Maas has explained *ἐπιψευδέσσι* as a single word, and

<sup>10</sup> F. Skutsch, *RE* 5 (1905) 2624, drawing on C. Pascal, *RivFC* 26 (1898) 35-*Studi sugli scrittori latini* (Turin 1900) 45.

<sup>11</sup> Euphorion 153P; Philetas 19P; Antimachus 96W. Strabo also cited examples from Hesiod, Sophocles, Epicharmus and others. Other examples are collected by A. Meineke, *Analecta Alexandrina* (Berlin 1843-Hildesheim 1964) 130f.

<sup>12</sup> Leo, *op. cit.* 184 n.6.

<sup>13</sup> On Ennius' debt to Alexandria, cf. O. Skutsch, *The Annals of Quintus Ennius* (London 1953) 8f-*Studia Enniana* (London 1968) 6f.

<sup>14</sup> A. Grilli, *Studi Enniani* (Brescia 1966) 244, suggested that *cere-brum* was considered a compound word on the model of Homeric *ἐπὶ καὶ* or *κάρα* as opposed to *καρήνα*; that is possible, but does not explain the tmesis.

<sup>15</sup> See above, n.7.



is probably correct,<sup>16</sup> but not all ancient readers read it in that way. A scholium of the bT tradition on this verse offers the comment:

ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀρωγός.

That is to say, the scholiast thought that ἐπὶ and ἀρωγός were a single noun, separated by tmesis. One other piece of evidence suggests that this example of nominal tmesis was accepted in the Hellenistic period, and by no less a scholar than Callimachus. In the *Hecale* he wrote (246Pf.):

ἐκ δ' ἔχεεν κελέβην, μετὰ δ' αὖ κερὰς ἠφύσαι' ἄλλο.

Pfeiffer was not unwilling to see in μετὰ . . . κερὰς another example of nominal tmesis.<sup>17</sup>

*Cere-brum* is a far more extreme example of nominal tmesis than the Greek precedents that we have adduced, but there may have been others that do not survive; our knowledge of the Hellenistic examples of apocope is due largely to Strabo's excursus on one name, and there would be no reason for most of our sources to cite such examples of tmesis. Even without more Greek examples, however, it is quite likely that the pattern of apocope was repeated. Hellenistic poets generalized a limited Homeric usage, and Ennius elaborated on what they had done. The source of Ennius' experiments here, as elsewhere, is to be found in contemporary Greek practice rather than in his own modifications of Homer.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> P. Maas, "Zum griechischen Wortschatz," *Mélanges Emile Boisacq* II (Brussels 1938) 129f-Kleine Schriften (Munich 1973) 196f.

<sup>17</sup> R. Pfeiffer (ed.), *Callimachus* I (Oxford 1949) 240.

<sup>18</sup> I am grateful to Prof. W. V. Clausen and Prof. Otto Skutsch for criticizing an earlier draft of this note.

## A NEW FRAGMENT OF CICERO'S *DE REPUBLICA*

While collating the Vaticanus graecus 1298, a manuscript of the 11th century (= R, see p. x of volume II of Bruno Keil's edition of Aristides) for the new edition of Aristides, I found in folium 185<sup>rv</sup>,<sup>1</sup> which is a 15th century supplement and a palimpsest,<sup>2</sup> a new addition to the anonymous Byzantine treatise *Περὶ Πολιτικῆς Ἐπιστήμης*. This work, together with the other palimpsests of R, was detected by Angelo Mai, who with his reagents cleared off the overlying text of Aristides. Mai published a notice of the other works contained in the various palimpsests of R<sup>3</sup> and the text of the Byzantine treatise in *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio e Vaticanis Codicibus Edita, Tomus II* (1827) 571-609<sup>4</sup>. Mai evidently overlooked

<sup>1</sup> The materials used in this study are the photostats of folia 185, 292-99, 308, from the collection of Bruno Keil and Friedrich Walter Lenz. Unfortunately the photostats of R end with 330<sup>r</sup>. Much of the Byzantine treatise is found in the subsequent folia (331, 333, 334, 336, 343, 344, 346, 347, 349-52, 354 according to Mai's marginal notes in *Script. Vet. Nova Coll.*, II, 590-609). Most of my discussion depends on what I could collate for myself. Neither Keil nor Lenz, in their papers, give any indication either that they were aware of what this treatise was, or that they knew of the existence of the palimpsest in folium 185.

<sup>2</sup> From *ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων*: 185<sup>r</sup> contains of Volume II of Dindorf's edition, p. 320, 18 καὶ παντοῖα—p. 321, 24 ὡς αὐτῶν, and one scholium = volume III of Dindorf p. 693, 5-7; 185<sup>v</sup> volume II p. 321, 24 κρείττονι—p. 323, 3 ἡμάρτανον, and six scholia = volume III p. 693, 25-26; 26-28; 32-34; p. 694, 1-5; 6-8, 16-17. There are also a few interlinear glosses.

<sup>3</sup> Of course R was not yet numbered Vaticanus graecus 1298, and Mai only identifies it as a Vatican codex of Aristides. Among the other palimpsests of R—many of the supplements are not written on old parchment, but new paper—are parts of a 10th century manuscript, the oldest known, of Aristotle's *Politics*; cf. Mai, op. cit. p. 584; and G. Heylbut, *RhM*, n. f. 42 (1887) 102-110.

<sup>4</sup> Mai sought to identify the Byzantine treatise with the *Περὶ Πολιτικῆς Καταστάσεως* of Peter Patricius (or Magister). This is impossible on the basis of what we know of the latter work and has been rightly rejected, e.g. cf. K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, 2nd. ed. (1897) 239. Mai's identification of the work with the anonymous treatise discussed in Photius *Bibliotheca* 37 seems more probable, although it is called "not proven" by Ernest Barker, *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium* (1957) 65. The new fragment answers some of Barker's objections; cf. note 15.

folium 185<sup>5</sup>, for he neither mentioned it in his work nor did he subject it to chemical treatment. What remains fully legible of the original treatise in this folium are: in 185<sup>r</sup> a fraction of the first line and the last three lines (30-32); in 185<sup>v</sup> the first three lines and the last five lines (28-32). Some of the endings of the other lines also project beyond the overlying text of Aristides, but they are mostly without significance. The manuscript itself was written in the 10th century, in a neat hand which occasionally uses the iota adscript and breathings, but does not employ accents. Of the portion of the treatise published by Mai, much defies interpretation, because of illegibility in the manuscript and textual corruptions (there are many lacunae). Less detrimental to the interpretation of the text are the occasional inaccuracies of Mai's transcription.

The treatise, despite uncertainty as to authorship, was clearly written in or near the reign of Justinian. Not only does the author's professed familiarity with Latin works show this—he cites Cicero, Cato, Livy, and Juvenal—but also the anecdote related of the Sassanid king Perozes (Firuz, on the throne from A.D. 457 to 484), who is spoken of as a "king named Perozes," with the implication that this was no current event.<sup>6</sup>

The principal interest in this work for students of Cicero emanates from the table of contents to book 5. The eleventh and last heading reads in part: (p. 596, 3-4 Mai = R 297<sup>r</sup>, 16-18) *παράθεσις τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ Κικέρωνα πολιτείας*.<sup>7</sup> Here is an early Byzantine writer on political science who has read and employed Cicero's *De Republica*. The effect on the discoverer of the Vatican palimpsest of Cicero was predictable enough. Mai writes "pars graeca nunc reviviscens latinae amissae defectum aliquatenus fortasse reparat."<sup>8</sup> However, his attempts to find allusions and new fragments for Cicero's work

<sup>5</sup> R is now bound in two volumes, but volume II begins with folium 183.

<sup>6</sup> p. 594, 10-11 Mai = R 298<sup>v</sup>, 16. The Eunomius named on p. 596, 24 Mai = R 297<sup>v</sup>, 12 may be the Arian bishop of Cyzicus (ca. 360 A.D.).

<sup>7</sup> Mai has added numbers to these headings. Here 4. But they are absent in the manuscript; and his numeration is one short since he has conflated the first two headings under one number, while the spacing in the manuscript shows them to have been distinct.

<sup>8</sup> p. 594, n. 1.

did not meet with success. He could produce only common-places, which need not show any influence on the part of Cicero<sup>9</sup> and two citations under Cicero's name, which seem to come from other extant works.<sup>10</sup> We shall see that whatever familiarity the author of this treatise had with Latin literature, it is improbable that it was great enough to justify an assumption that we can find in his work offhand literary reminiscences.

Ironically what is indisputably a quotation from the *De Republica* is contained in the folium of which Mai was unaware. The passage begins with the concluding fragment of a remark by the principal of the two speakers of the dialogue, Menodorus. The quotation is in the reply of the other speaker, Thomasius:<sup>11</sup> (185<sup>r</sup>, 29) ἀνδρῶν | ἀρχόντων ἐπιλογὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων γιγνομένη πρὸς | τὴν δλην τῆς πολιτείας διοίκησιν. ταῦτα λέ. | γων, ὦ Μηνόδωρε, Κικέρωνι συμφήσεις, "δλην σχεδόν," λέγοντι, | (185<sup>v</sup>, 1) "τὴν βασιλικὴν φροντίδα περὶ δέκα ἐπιλογὴν ἀνδρῶν ἀ | ρίστων καταγίνεσθαι προσήκειν· οἱ καὶ ἐξαρκέσουσιν ἱκανοί | τε ὄντες καὶ ἄλλων ἀνδρῶν ἐπιλογὴν ποιήσασθαι . . . . . ." At this point the quotation, if it does not end at *προσήκειν*, becomes illegible because of the text of Aristides written upon it. The line endings from 4-27 are unhelpful and when the text again can be read from lines 28-32, the subject has changed.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Mai sought to identify p. 603, 8 "he (the king) being a father to the citizens, with much more forethought for them than their natural fathers" with *De Republica* 1.35, 55 (a better parallel would be 2.26, 47); p. 603, 22ff. "and each of the citizens would, like a lyre, harmoniously engage in his own business; and the state, moving to the tune of a general harmonious symphony, would become more just and stable" with *De Republica* 2.42, 69.

<sup>10</sup> Discussed below. The second, p. 608, 2ff., did for a time win a place in the "Librorum De Republica Incertorum Fragmenta" as number 15, e.g. in F. Osann's edition of 1847 and R. Klotz's of 1869. It was expelled by C. F. W. Mueller in his edition of 1878, who was followed by later editors, e.g. K. Ziegler in his last edition of 1969 (p. 137).

<sup>11</sup> By | I indicate the end of a line of the codex.

<sup>12</sup> Beginning at 185<sup>v</sup>, 27 τῆς | ἐκάστη φύσει καταλλήλου, πολὺ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τὸ χρῆσι | μον συνεισφέρειν ἂν ἐγένοντο ἱκανοὶ καὶ μάλιστα δὴ πε | ρὶ στρατείας καὶ γεωργίας. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῇ μὲν λερωσὶ | νη μόνους τοὺς ἀζίους εἰκὸς προσ | εῖναι τοὺς τε λερούς | οἰκους ἤττον βαρύνεσθαι δαπάναις καὶ σωμάτων ὅλης τῇ |

The folium evidently comes from the early part of the 5th book of the treatise. On p. 599, 32ff, Mai, Menodorus, in a summary of the laws which must be established for "kingship," lists: *τέταρτος* (sc. *νόμος θετέος*) *περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀρχῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν ὁμοίων ἀρχόντων ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἐπιλογῆς*. Mai rightly connects this summary with the notice in the table of contents (p. 595, 22-23 Mai = R 297<sup>r</sup>, 5-6) *τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς βασιλείας· καὶ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτῇ νόμων τε ἰδίων καὶ δογμάτων καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων*, which is the third section of the book.<sup>13</sup> The next three sections discuss the laws, ordinances, and practices. From one of these our fragment derives.

The distinction between the functions of "the best men" and those of the magistrates was of concern to the author of the treatise, and his initial attempts at a definition survive in a rather corrupt passage.<sup>14</sup> This section is important not only for the author's views, but because we can now see unfold the so-called "Dicaearchian" or mixed constitution (best men = aristocracy, magistrates = democracy) mentioned in Photius *Bibliotheca* 37, whose alleged absence in our treatise roused Barker's doubts as to the justification of connecting this work with that described in Photius.<sup>15</sup> It may not be amiss to see here traces of the argument of Cicero himself. The passage runs as follows. Thomasius is speaking: "The aforementioned rank in each case will not be conceded to be satisfactory by any<sup>16</sup> of those who really use good judgment. I think that many of the things which you have recounted would more appropriately be performed by the magistrates than by the best men; especially what relates to the more menial (*βανανσικότερων*) arts ought to be handled under the supervision of the magistrates, which even now we see to be the case. Otherwise there will be a danger of the magistrates being almost inactive and idle through the deprivation of their official functions, while the best men lose popular confidence in

<sup>13</sup> β' in Mai; cf. note 7.

<sup>14</sup> pp. 600, 3-601, 1 Mai. I have no photostats of this section, and I offer only a tentative translation of Mai's text. Barker, op. cit. 70-71, has come to a different and, I think, irrelevant conclusion on the content of this section, but he has admittedly not studied it much.

<sup>15</sup> cf. note 4 and Barker, op. cit. pp. 64-65.

<sup>16</sup> I read οὐδενὶ for οὐδὲν ἢ Mai.

truly urgent matters, since they have not devoted all their time to what is most urgent.' 'It seems that we two have not hit the same mark, Thomasius, but that each of us aims at a different one. For I would affirm that in my account the magistrates have been deprived of nothing of what they must do. Rather on the contrary,<sup>17</sup>-----not simply of action, but of successful action itself. For it seems to me that we portray him (the best man) by that to which he is similar, when, like those in the cities called market-inspectors and supervisors of merchandise, we have placed the best men in charge of the city and the ordinances of government. But I affirm that the best men ought to be as far as possible removed from this, or rather to be elevated to the highest level, in solitude pursuing an independent way of life among them (the magistrates),<sup>18</sup> in which position they would hold fast, to be their leaders and to provide a government<sup>19</sup> in a moderate way, prohibiting injustice at the hands of the stronger in just and lawful matters, so that all men may experience the kindness of the best men and stand in a permanent relationship to them and in the gravest times of government most readily obey their commands. If this should occur through the efforts of the best men, who on occasion are magistrates,<sup>20</sup> all would be more stable for them and moreover of necessity be done in a reasonable way. For changes of magistrates are liable to cause change and variation, but continuity of government and most especially of ways of life create stability (*ταυτότητα*)-----so the class of the best men set over the life of each man, and they would continually pursue an independent way of life-----and he says (Cicero ?), it will bring a worthwhile glory-----intending to administer the kingdom through the best men-----.' 'There is only one other passage which illuminates the position of the best men (p. 603, 19-21 Mai = R 295<sup>v</sup>, 6-10): "But he (the king) sends forth from himself in a scientific way, as if from a spring, to the other offices and ranks his political foresight and he

<sup>17</sup> There follow the unintelligible words *καὶ πλεονος δὲ δύο* and a passage of uncertain length which Mai found illegible.

<sup>18</sup> This seems to be the gist of a very corrupt passage. I read e.g. *κατατάξαντας* for *καταξίσταντας* Mai and *ἐν αὐτοῖς* for *ἐμαντοῦς* Mai.

<sup>19</sup> I add *τὴν τε . . . . (πολιτείαν)*.

<sup>20</sup> *καὶ θυτῶν . . . ἀρχόντων* Mai; perhaps *δυνάω*.

guides it in its course to each man through the efforts of the best men and the appropriate offices and ranks after them."<sup>21</sup>

Finally something must be said about the accuracy and the extent of the quotation in the new fragment. There are four Greek citations in the preserved portion of this work: one from Homer *Iliad* 12.243 (p. 604, 8 Mai), two from Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.6, 2 and 4.2, 11 (p. 608, 11-19 Mai = R 292<sup>r</sup>, 11-22), and one from Cleanthes, J. U. Powell *Collectanea Alexandrina* p. 229 (p. 607, 5-10 Mai = R 296<sup>r</sup>, 29-32, 296<sup>v</sup>, 1-3). Those from Homer and Xenophon are perfectly accurate, although in the Xenophon citation there are unimportant orthographical variations, some of which are not reproduced in Mai, and a serious lacuna, also overlooked by Mai, at the end of the second citation, which is clearly the fault of the scribe.<sup>22</sup> Cleanthes' prayer, however, is considerably different from the other versions which we have, and worse still, the author of this treatise attributes it to Socrates (τὸ ἐν λιταῖς Σωκράτους).<sup>23</sup> If we need to seek a cause for this lapse of memory, I would note that in Simplicius *Commentarius* (p. 137, 48ff. in F. Dübner's edition) on the 53rd chapter of Epictetus' *Manuale*, from which the author of our treatise may have learned this poem, the collateral saying of Socrates in the *Crito* (43 D) is cited. The similarity of the idea of resignation to the will of the gods may have caused the confusion.

However, the handling of the Latin quotations raises doubts about the author's precision. He seems quite ready to parade his

<sup>21</sup> The best men are mentioned in two other passages: p. 599, 28-29 Mai "a second law concerning the senate of the best men;" p. 605, 4-5 Mai "For what is expedient for the government would force the best men and the other citizens to this (apparently to retire at sixty)."

<sup>22</sup> The last two lines of the citation in the codex read: ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν βασι | λικῇ for ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὐτῇ καὶ καλεῖται βασιλικῇ. Mai prints Xenophon's text without comment. Other scribal errors are Γλανκον for Γλαύκων and Εὐθύδημε [με]. I omit Mai's other faulty transcriptions since they are trivial.

<sup>23</sup> I note the following faulty transcriptions of Mai: καὶ ὁ Θωμάσιε for οὐκοῦν κτλ.; υπολογεονον (μ s. l. add. corrector); ἀγεις Mai for ἀγοις; οὐδέ γ' ἦττον Mai for οὐδὲν ἦττον. In the versions cited in Powell we have Ἄγον δὲ μ' and Ἄγε δὴ μ' for Ἄγοις με of the codex; σὺ γ' ἦ, σὺ καὶ ἦ, and σὺ ἦ for σὺ γῶ of the codex; ποθ' for ποτ' ἂν of the codex; γ' ἄοκνος and κἂν ὀκνῶ for γε πρόθυμος of the codex; ἦν δέ γε μὴ, κἂν μὴ, and ἂν δὲ μὴ for ἦν δὲ μὴ of the codex.

knowledge of Latin literature. He cites, besides our fragment, Cicero twice, Juvenal, Cato, Livy, and the Etruscan Firminus. But Juvenal, Cato, and Livy appear only as names in very fragmentary portions of the work.<sup>24</sup> A long citation has been given from Firminus, but the name may be corrupt. While Mai saw in it Frontinus in the lost work *De Scientia Militari*, there is no reason to believe that Firminus did not write in Greek, and in any case we cannot compare the quotation with its source.<sup>25</sup>

Cicero remains. On p. 608, 6-7 Mai = R 292<sup>r</sup>, 3-6: *εὖ γὰρ ὀνομάζει Κικέρων Σωκράτη ἀρχηγόν, καὶ ἵνα ἐκῶν*<sup>26</sup> *ῥωμαῖω καὶ αὐτός, πρὶν γίγναι τῆς δόξης καὶ ἀληθοῦς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικαλῶν.* *De Oratore* 3.16, 60 may be meant: "quorum (i.e. sapientiae doctorum, ut Gorgiae, Thrasy Machi, Isocratis) princeps Socrates fuit, is qui-----eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam se cumque in partem dedisset, omnium fuit facile princeps, eis (que) qui haec-----docerent, cum nomine appellarentur uno, quod omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in eis exercitatio philosophia nominaretur, hoc commune nomen eripuit---." The connection exists, but it is most tenuous. For a time Mai's suggestion that the passage occurred (more appropriately written) in the *De Republica* was accepted.<sup>27</sup> But the citation may be another lapse of the author's. For in *De Republica* 2.11, 21 we read: "nam princeps ille" of Plato and just below *ibid.* 22: "ut facit apud Platonem Socrates."

<sup>24</sup> Juvenal, p. 604, 3 Mai; Cato, p. 604, 11 Mai; Livy, p. 604, 18 Mai.

<sup>25</sup> Firminus, p. 592, 20-23 Mai = R 293<sup>v</sup>, 2-6. The passage runs: "Having seen this (super ἰδὼν, add. αὐτὸν, ut vid., corrector), the Etruscan Firminus appears to me to have well named the infantry, when properly arrayed, a truly secure wall, a living wall, a moving wall, a thinking wall, an iron wall, a wall, not as is usual, of one city, but of an entire government." This metaphor has a long history, beginning with Alcaeus 35 a 10 Diehl, expanded e.g. by Demosthenes 18.299, and fully developed by Aristides 26.82-84. Of Mai's conjecture of Frontinus, little can be said. We might note that Vegetius *De Re Militari* 1.20 writes: "Unde enim apud antiquos murus dicebatur pedestris exercitus, nisi quod pilatae legiones praeter scuta etiam catafractis galeisque fulgebant? usque eo ut sagittarii sinistra brachia manicis munirentur; pedites autem scutati, praeter catafractas et galeas, etiam ferreas ocreas in dextris cruribus cogerentur accipere"; cf. also 2.17 and 3.14. The idea is quite different from our author's.

<sup>26</sup> ἐκῶν sic codex: πλέον Mai.

<sup>27</sup> see note 10.



On p. 593, 7-12 Mai = R 293<sup>v</sup>, 32, 298<sup>r</sup>, 1-8: οὐκ ἀνάξιον δέ, οἶμαι, ὦ Θωμάσιε, κἀκείνου μνησθῆναι δ Κικέρων ἱστορεῖ, τοῦ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις πεζικοῦ πέρι στρατοῦ. φησὶ γὰρ τὰ μὲν δπλα οὖτω<sup>28</sup> φέροντας ἀχωρίστως ἔχειν<sup>29</sup> ἀεὶ οἷόν τινα μέλη τοῦ σώματος οἰομένους· καὶ πρὸς γε τροφὴν σφίσι πέντε ἀποχρῶσαν ἡμέρας· ἀνάγκης τε ἀνευ τινός, καὶ εἰ παρεῖναι συμβαίνοι νατοφίρα ζῶα δ συνηθεία μακροῦ βεβαιωθὲν νόμος παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ὥς καὶ τιμωρίαν ἐπιχεῖσθαι εἰ τις παραβάλῃ. *Tusculanae Disputationes* 2.16, 37 runs: "ferre plus dimidiati mensis cibaria, ferre si quid ad usum velint, ferre vallum. nam scutum, gladium, galeam, in onere nostri milites non plus numerant, quam humeros, lacertos, manus. arma enim membra militis esse dicunt." Here we have a very rough paraphrase, in which the sequence of ideas has been reversed. The detail of a half-month's rations is changed to five days, unless we should read (δεκα)πέντε, a possibility in a text which has many lacunae. The enumeration of the various armaments has been omitted. Worse is the fact that the author does not indicate where the quotation from Cicero ends. ἀνάγκης τε κτλ., that is, the concluding clause about the pack animals and the penalty for transgressing military discipline, certainly reads as if it came from Cicero. Of course, the possibility must remain that this quotation, too, came not from the *Tusculanae* but from the *De Republica* (cf. Mai, p. 593, n. 2). But this may be begging the question.

Aside from stylistic peculiarities of the Greek translator,<sup>30</sup> the matter of ambiguity in the extent of a citation is significant, because it is not quite clear whether the quotation from Cicero in our new fragment ends with προσήκειν, or continues beyond that point. In Cicero were there only ten best men who stood as intermediaries between the rector and the magistrates, or were

<sup>28</sup> οὖτως Mai.

<sup>29</sup> σχεῖν Mai.

<sup>30</sup> e.g. in the phrase (φροντίδα) περὶ----(ἐπιλογὴν) καταγίγνεσθαι, we see a favorite usage of the author; cf. p. 598, 30-31 Mai; p. 599, 21 Mai. The original Latin might have run: rectorem oportet curam conferre in dilectum decem optumorum virorum.

there others selected by the original ten?<sup>31</sup> A certain answer cannot be given.

The new fragment, as well as the concept of the role of the best men in government, would seem to have occurred in the fifth book of Cicero's *De Republica*, where the "rector rei publicae" apparently first occurs. However, in the ruinous state of the last three books of Cicero's work, this is a hazardous conjecture. In any case, we do seem to have encountered a hitherto unattested concept in the political structure which was described in the *De Republica*, a concept which this Byzantine author not only quoted, but also employed himself.

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<sup>31</sup> For the significance of the number ten, cf. *De Republica* 2.33, 58, as well as the institution of the decemviri, 2.36, 61.

## SOME PROBLEMS IN PROPERTIUS 1.6.<sup>1</sup>

I            Non ego nunc Hadriae uereor mare noscere tecum,  
              Tulle, neque Aegaeo ducere uela salo            lines 1-2

Enk (ad loc.) interprets *ducere uela* (line 2) as *navigare*, declaring the phrase unparalleled. Rothstein (ad loc.) had already correctly equated *ducere uela* with *deducere uela*—hoist full sail. Camps (ad loc.) cites as a parallel Pliny *Natural History* 19.23 where *ducere uela* is used of drawing the awnings of an amphitheatre. The same phrase and context occur in:

populum Romanum a militibus classiariis qui uela ducebant, in amphitheatro interim praeeperat.

Lampridius *Vita Commodi* 15.6

The coincidence suggests that *ducere uela* was the regular term for this action. Propertius was not thinking of the theatre, but he uses the phrase to signify a similar action.

The phrase *Aegaeo salo* signifies at least dangerous waters if not stormy ones. The Aegaeon was traditionally a perilous sea<sup>2</sup> and the word *salum* refers to the open sea, away from the safety of ports and coasts. To hoist full sail in these conditions was courageous behaviour; and Propertius is trying to stress his affection for Tullus by emphasizing the courage it gives him.

An interesting parallel is provided by:

cum domina Libycas ausim perrumpere Syrtes  
              et dare non aequis uela ferenda Notis

Ovid *Amores* 2.16.21-22

Here the circumstances are the same: the poet envisages accompanying a loved one—although a mistress rather than a

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Dr. W. S. M. Nicoll for comments on § I - V and Dr. T. J. Cadoux for comments on § VI of this paper. Mr. C. W. Macleod some time ago provided illustrative material for §II.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *RE* s.v. *Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος*.

friend; he emphasizes that he would be courageous enough to cross the dangerous Syrtes and to hoist sail before the rough South Winds.

## II mutatoque graves saepe colore preces

line 6

Rothstein and Camps alone of modern commentators discuss the syntax of this line. They attach *saepe* to *graves preces*. Camps renders the line 'insistent prayers made more touching by wan cheeks'. This adjectival use of the adverb is paralleled in Propertius.<sup>3</sup> But the alternative—to treat *saepe* as a normal adverb and attach it to *mutato*—is easier grammatically. It also gives a sense 'earnest prayers and often changing colour' (J. S. Phillimore) which would have been more satisfactory to ancient readers.

Any strong emotion could have a polychromatic effect on ancient Greeks and Romans; and it seems—especially in view of example 3 below—that some succession of colours was involved rather than a synchronous manifestation. Some instances are:

1. ὁ δὲ Ἰπποθάλης ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς παντοδαπὰ ἠφίει χρώματα.<sup>4</sup>

Plato *Lysis* 222b

2. ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνεφλέχθη τε καὶ παντοδαπὰ χρώματα ἤκεν, οἷ' ἂν θυμούμενος ἀφείη.

Plato *Epistulae* 7.349a

3. ὑπ' ἀγωνίας παντοδαπὰς χροῶς ἐνήλλαττεν, ἐν ταύτῳ γινόμενος αἰμωπός, ὠχρός, πελιδνός.

Philo *Legatio ad Gaium* 266

Propertius was familiar with this concept: a paradoxical intensification of it occurs in:

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e.g. Prop. 1.3.44; 1.16.47.

<sup>4</sup> Imitated by Aristaenetus (*Epistles* 1.11)

quis te cogebat multos pallere colores  
et fletum invitis ducere luminibus

Propertius 1.15.39-40

There too love is the cause of multiple colours; and since pallor is itself a colour, *multos colores* stands as cognate accusative to *pallere*.

III illa meam mihi iam se denegat: illa minatur  
quae solet irato tristis amica viro  
irato O : ingrato ζ

lines 9-10

In modern texts editors have substituted the humanists' emendation *ingrato* in line 10 for the reading offered by all the MSS—*irato*. They presumably believe that Propertius has no cause to be 'angry' and that a corruption here is connected with or paralleled in Propertius 1.16.38, a corrupt line which also begins *quae solet irato*. At first sight the substitution seems sensible. But in fact it ruins Propertius' sense and also his delicate balance between *tristis* and *irato*.

*Ira* and its cognates, like other Latin emotional terms, can refer either to inner feelings alone or to the kind of actions which normally result from such feelings alone (or indeed to both the feelings and their consequences). In erotic contexts it appears that *ira* etc. sometimes refer not principally or at all to 'anger' but rather to 'refusal to make love.' Some examples are:

1. non feret adsiduas potiori te dare noctes,  
et quaeret iratus parem

Horace *Epodes* 15.13-14

Here Horace is threatening to 'break off' one love affair and look for another mistress who will reciprocate his affection.

2. hic iuveni detraxit opes, hic dicere iussit  
limen ad iratae uerba pudenda senem:

Tibullus 2.1.73-74

Here an old man is disgraced by having to make shaming pleas at the door of his 'unwilling' mistress.

3. quam pueri totiens arcum sentire medullis  
et nihil iratae posse negare tuae

Propertius 1.9.21-22

Here, as in example 2, the mistress' greed and her refusal of love are juxtaposed.

4. quamlibet accuses et sis irata licebit;  
irata liceat dum mihi posse frui.

Ovid *Epistulae* 20.72-73

Here in a neat point *ira* (anger) is distinguished from *ira* (refusal to make love).

The *iratus* of Propertius 1.6.10 is therefore simply a man who does not want to go on making love. We can see why *ira* and *tristitia* are juxtaposed there by examining the parallel situation in Propertius 3.6. In 3.6. Propertius' and Cynthia's affair has been broken off for reasons never specified in the elegy. Propertius' slave Lygdamus is sent by Propertius to report back to him on Cynthia's behaviour and attitudes to the situation. Lygdamus reports that he finds Cynthia *maesta* (line 13), her house *tristis* and slaves *tristes* (line 15). Cynthia protests to Lygdamus:

- 'Haec te teste mihi promissa est, Lygdame, merces?  
est poenae seruo rumpere teste fidem.  
ille potest nullo miseram me linquere facto,  
et qualem nolo dicere habere domi!'

Propertius 3.6.19-22

This shows that she believes Propertius has broken off their affair because he has taken another mistress. Propertius is overjoyed at this report. He sends Lygdamus back to correct Cynthia's impressions about the cause of their breach:

- et mea cum multis lacrimis mandata reporta,  
iram, non fraudes esse in amore meo,  
me quoque consimili impositum torquerier igni:  
iurabo bis sex integer esse dies.

lines 37-40

Propertius' first readers doubtless found the situation in 1.6 a little easier to understand than we do. They recognized

Cynthia's speeches and actions as a propemptic *schetliamos*.<sup>5</sup> This helped them to realize that Propertius is continuing a reference to a topos of the propemptikon begun in line 8. This is the commonplace in which the propemptic speaker accuses the parting traveller of breaking their compact of affection by wishing to depart.<sup>6</sup> So when Propertius tells Cynthia that he wishes to leave with Tullus, she believes that he wishes to break off their love affair—this is, that he is *iratus*. She then reacts by becoming *tristis*.<sup>7</sup>

#### IV an mihi sit tanti doctas cognoscere Athenas

atque Asiae veteres cernere divitias

lines 13-14

The tone of ancient poetry is always hard to recapture. But the accumulation of stock phrases and touristic terms in these two lines seems too great to be accidental. *Doctae Athenae* is a commonplace (*TLL* II s.v. *Athena* p. 1028, 16f) as are the riches of Asia (*TLL* II s.v. *Asia*, esp. pp. 782, 67ff, 783, 20ff). *Cognoscere* and *cernere* are both connected with tourism; for *cognoscere* see *TLL* II s.v. p. 1504, 38-45 and Shackleton Bailey's parallels.<sup>8</sup> For *cernere* = visit cf. e.g. Propertius 1.17.18; Statius *Silvae* 1.3.1; Claudian 24.156. I suggest that by accumulating these terms Propertius is hinting that Athens and Asia are hackneyed places of resort not really worth seeing anyhow.

<sup>5</sup> The assignment of Prop. 1.6 to the genre propemptikon is of long standing—e.g. F. Jacoby *RhM* 65(1910) 24 = *KI. Schr.* ii. 151—but such very brief statements did not carry conviction. (See e.g. F. Jäger *Das antike Propemptikon und das 17. Gedicht des Paulinus von Nola* p. 21.) I have therefore attempted a full exegesis of Prop. 1.6 as a propemptikon in *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* 1ff. Apart from Jäger's monograph (still the standard work on the genre) valuable discussion of the propemptikon can be found in R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard *A Commentary on Horace Odes Book I* 40ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. e.g. Prop. 1.6.19; 1.8.17; Verg. *Aen* 4.305ff.; Ov. *Am.* 2.117f.

<sup>7</sup> Cynthia's *minae* (1.9) may suggest the presence of the erotic sense of *tristis*—*iracunda ac difficilis, amori repugnans* (cf. R. Pichon *De sermone amatorio apud Latinos elegiarum scriptores* Index s.v. *tristis*)—as well as the meaning 'unhappy.' If so, the erotic sense is very much secondary.

<sup>8</sup> *Propertiana* p. 271.

V

osculaque opposito dicat sibi debita vento

line 17

Burman's interpretation 'and declare it is the adverse wind that she has to thank for my kisses' has been accepted by both Enk and Camps. It is certainly superior to its modern rival 'and should cry to the thwarting wind that I owe her kisses' (Rothstein, Butler and Barber); and the two parallels adduced in its favour (Ovid *Heroides* 7.43; Valerius Flaccus 2.407) carry some weight. But Burman's interpretation does involve problems. To begin with, in the Ovidian parallel the antithesis between the beloved and the elements is completely clear since both parts are explicitly stated—'what I would have preferred to owe to you let me owe to the storms.' In Valerius Flaccus the context supplies the missing first part of the antithesis. But in Propertius the hypothesized first part is supplied neither explicitly nor by the context. Secondly with Burman we must understand *mea* with *oscula*, which is not easy to do. Thirdly, the scene produced by this view is confused: the ship is launched and awaits a favourable wind; however Propertius is still not on board but is attempting to comfort Cynthia.

These difficulties are naturally less serious in a poet as cryptic and compressed as Propertius than they would be elsewhere. But they do induce us to re-examine a third explanation (Hertzberg ad loc.)—'and say that she owes (her) kisses to the wind which blows contrary to me.' This has, I believe, more advantages on the whole than the others. Hertzberg pointed out that, on this interpretation, which makes Cynthia pray for contrary winds to detain Propertius, 1.6.17 is parallel in sense to Propertius 1.8.11ff. There Propertius, in similar circumstances, prays that contrary seasons and winds will detain Cynthia. Hertzberg's observation gains more relevance from another fact—that elegies 1.6 and 1.8 are both propemptika. Two further arguments may be added: this interpretation does not involve understanding *mea* with *oscula* but rather the easy *sua*; and no confusing scene is created by it.

The background to the line is on this account the ancient custom whereby departing travellers and friends seeing them off prayed for good winds—often making these prayers to the



deified winds themselves.<sup>9</sup> Prayers for the voyage could accompany offerings to the winds and could include vows of offerings to be made on achievement of a safe voyage.<sup>10</sup> What we have here then is a typical Propertian sophistication. According to the conventions of the propemptikon Propertius, by wishing to go abroad, has broken the compact of love between himself and Cynthia; and he has shown, in Cynthia's view, that he no longer wishes her kisses. So Cynthia says that she owes these kisses *opposito vento*. This statement assumes the divine status of winds, and relies on the fact that kisses (either in the modern sense or else the throwing of kisses as part of proskynesis) were a standard mode of respect and worship in antiquity, payable to religious buildings and to statues or images of gods.<sup>11</sup> Propertius may be thinking simply of the offerings made to the winds at travellers' departures: Cynthia, at Propertius' departure, is giving kisses to the contrary wind because it is contrary rather than giving offerings to the favourable wind. Or Propertius may be thinking of Cynthia making a vow of kisses to the contrary wind, conditional on the wind remaining contrary. This would be paralleled by such a vow as:

*Τόν με παλαιστρίταν ὁμόσας θεὸν ἐπτάκις φιλήσειν*

Callimachus *Fr.* 554 (Pf.)

VI tu patruī meritas conare anteire secures,  
et vetera oblitis iura refer sociis;  
nam tua non aetas umquam cessavit amori,  
semper et armatae cura fuit patriae;

.....  
at tu seu mollis qua tendit Ionia seu qua  
Lydia Pactoli tingit arata liquor,  
seu pedibus terras seu pontum carpere remis  
ibis et accepti pars eris imperii,  
tum tibi si qua mei veniet non inmemor hora,  
vivere me duro sidere certus eris.

lines 19-22, 31-36

<sup>9</sup> Cf. D. Wachsmuth *ΠΟΜΠΙΜΟΣ Ο ΔΑΙΜΩΝ Untersuchungen zu den antiken Sakralhandlungen bei Seereisen* (Diss. Berlin 1967) 128 n. 210.

<sup>10</sup> Id. 127ff.

<sup>11</sup> For full documentation see *RE* art. *Kuss* (Suppl.-Bd. 5) 511-20 (W. Kroll).

The modern commentators on Propertius state that Tullus, addressee of Propertius 1.6, was the nephew of L. Volcaci<sup>1</sup>us Tullus, the consul of 33 B.C.; that L. Volcaci<sup>1</sup>us Tullus was proconsul of Asia in the year 30/29 B.C.; and that the younger Tullus' projected journey to Asia took place in 30/29 B.C.

But in 1958 K. M. T. Atkinson expressed different beliefs on the latter two points.<sup>12</sup> She declared that the date of L. Volcaci<sup>1</sup>us Tullus' proconsulship of Asia was probably 26/25 B.C. and that his nephew Tullus accompanied him to Asia in 26/25 B.C. These views, if acceptable, would upset the orthodox chronology of Propertius' poetry.

I believe them incorrect and wish to reaffirm the usual dating. I also wish to offer a new view of the younger Tullus' status in Asia. Atkinson has three arguments for her 26/25 B.C. dating of the elder Tullus' proconsulship of Asia:

- 1) The restoration of rights to the *socii* of Asia (line 20) is part of "restoring the Republic" in 27 B.C. and accords with various imperial measures concerned with Asia dateable to 26 and 25 B.C.
- 2) Under the *lex Pompeia* the elder Tullus ought not to have been proconsul before 27/26 B.C. and "it seems unlikely that Augustus would inaugurate the 'restoration of the Republic' with an appointment to a senatorial province which contravened the *lex Pompeia*."
- 3) The elder Tullus' proconsulship cannot be later than 26 B.C. because at the end of book 1 "Propertius alludes to the death of Cornelius Gallus as of recent occurrence" and this death took place in 26 B.C.

The first argument is weak: there is no reason why the restoration of rights to the allies should have had to await the 'restoration of the Republic.' The favourable measures known to have been taken by Augustus towards two Asian cities in 26 and 25 B.C., which are mentioned by Atkinson, are part of an imperial policy which began earlier.<sup>13</sup> Atkinson's second argument presumes that L. Volcaci<sup>1</sup>us Tullus was not proconsul before 27/26 B.C. But this is part of the point under discussion.

<sup>12</sup> *Historia* 7 (1958) 312-14.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. T. Rice Holmes *The Architect of the Roman Empire*, 171.

Her third argument is based on an error. Near the end of book 1 Propertius speaks of the death of a Gallus:

Gallum per medios ereptum Caesaris enses  
effugere ignotas non potuisse manus

1.21.7-8

The identification of some of the persons called Gallus mentioned by Propertius is problematic. But it is certain that the Gallus of Propertius 1.22 died at the siege of Perusia in 41/40 B.C. and has nothing to do with Cornelius Gallus (see Rothstein *ad loc.*). The only true reference to Cornelius Gallus' death in Propertius is at 2.32.91-92. Book 3 is dated between 25-20 B.C.<sup>14</sup>

The positive arguments in favour of a date of 30/29 B.C. for L. Volcacius Tullus' proconsulship are:

- 1) Propertius book 1 itself gives no indication of date. But book 2 does. A vague *terminus post quem* of after 27 B.C. is given by the reference to Augustus at 2.10.15. But a precise *terminus post quem* is offered by 2.31, an occasional poem celebrating the opening of the Palatine temple complex. This event can be dated to 9th October, 28 B.C. On the assumption that an occasional poem of this sort would be published in the first collection assembled after its composition, we can deduce that book 1 was *not* put out as a collection later than 9th October, 28 B.C.
- 2) *OGIS* (II) 458 = E.J. 98, 1.43 refers to L. Volcacius Tullus, consul of 33 B.C. as proconsul of Asia. In his proconsulship the Koinon of Asia offered a reward of a crown to the person proposing the greatest honour which they could pay to the Emperor. The most reasonable date for the province of Asia to be taking steps to honour the Emperor in this way is soon after the end of the Civil War. This suggests that L. Volcacius Tullus was the first governor of Asia after 30 B.C.
- 3) Propertius 1.6.19 suggests that the younger Tullus accompanied his uncle to Asia. The language Propertius uses of Tullus' career in lines 21-22 is also informative. It hints

<sup>14</sup> See *Introd.* to Camp's edition of Propertius bk. 3, 1.

that Tullus' forthcoming service in Asia was a continuation of military service. The most suitable date for this sentiment is just after the end of the Civil War.

- 4) The restoration of their ancient *iura* to the free cities of Asia—or propaganda to this effect—is likely to be connected with the end of the Civil Wars and of the plundering of the allies which accompanied the Civil Wars. It may well be linked with—or be a continuation of—Octavianus' activities in Asia after Actium<sup>15</sup> or more probably after the conquest of Egypt.<sup>16</sup> All these arguments point to 30/29 B.C. as the date of Volcacius' proconsulship.

I now pass on to the question of the younger Tullus' status in Asia. Atkinson argues that Tullus went out to Asia as one of the *comites* of his uncle with the prospect of later becoming *legatus proconsulis*. This view seems to derive from two parts of her paraphrase of Propertius:

"try to earn an even greater right to the 'axes' than your uncle's"

(line 19)

"if you are to have a share of the granted imperium"

(line 34)

It is the latter rendering in particular which suggests that Tullus goes in hope of greater things. But this rendering is based on a misunderstanding of the syntax of lines 31-36. On Atkinson's interpretation, a conditional force extends from the four occurrences of *seu* in lines 31-34 to the verb *eris* in line 34. This is incorrect: the force of *seu* does not extend to the clause *et accepti* etc. which is an addendum to *ibis*—'You will go *as* a member of the government.' In addition the conditional force of the repeated *seu* does not imply that Tullus' going is in doubt, only that he will vary his modes and places of travel. In grammatical terms *ibis* must be understood with each occurrence of *seu*. The sense is then 'whether you will go about in Ionia or in Lydia, by land or by sea.' A parallel usage may be seen in:

<sup>15</sup> Rice Holmes op. cit. 158ff.

<sup>16</sup> Id. 171, 173.

non nulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae  
sive parentum disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt  
viam.

Cicero *De Officiis* 1.118

Here all the persons mentioned have lived the good life; it is only the causes of their doing so which vary.

Tullus then is, from the beginning, *pars accepti imperii*. He has an official status when he goes to Asia; he does not merely go in hope. Atkinson's interpretation of *accepti imperii* as 'the granted *imperium*' is correct. Some previous commentators have however taken the word *accepti* to refer to the popularity of Roman rule among the ruled. This is contrary to the meaning of the Latin phrase *accipere imperium*. *TLL* I s.v. *accipere* shows that someone *accipit imperium* from a person or body with the legal right to grant *imperium*. Cf. e.g.:

Hannibal ab exercitu accepit imperium

Nepos *Hannibal* 3.3

a patre accepto imperio

Livy 1.39

cum ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiat

Gaius *Institutiones* 1.5

Marius unum consulatum accepit, ceteros rapuit

Seneca *Epistulae* 94.66

Tullus' official status has, I believe, a connection with a major problem in line 19—the significance of the verb *anteire*. Commentators dealing with this verb divide into two schools: some favour the interpretation 'surpass' (Paley, Shackleton Bailey); and others prefer 'precede' (Hertzberg, Butler and Barber, Camps). The latter scholars envisage one of two alternative kinds of 'preceding': either Tullus will precede his uncle to the province or he will precede him *within* the province as part of his retinue. The main objection to this view is, in the words of Shackleton Bailey, that it 'stultifies *conare*'.<sup>17</sup> The ingenious attempts of Camps to evade this objection by claiming

<sup>17</sup> Op. cit. p. 20.

that *conor* = 'be about to,' 'prepare to' etc., are not supported by the examples he quotes: in all of these *conari* has to some degree a sense of attempting or trying.

The other meaning—'surpass'—is rejected as 'grotesque' by Butler and Barber (ad loc.). Shackleton Bailey claims, correctly in my view, that this is only so if the line is read solemnly.<sup>18</sup> 'Surpass' would have in fact struck a contemporary as a playful compliment to both uncle and nephew rather than as 'grotesque.' This assessment is based on two considerations: first, Propertius' injunction seems to derive from a commonplace; and second, it is obviously paradoxical in that the elder Tullus was by virtue of his proconsulship undeniably superior as regards *secures* to his nephew. The commonplace is the one in which a father and son are said or wished to be equals in virtue, etc.<sup>19</sup> That this commonplace could be intensified so as to make the son superior is shown in:

καί ποτέ τις εἰποι 'πατρός γ' ὅδε πολλὸν ἀμείνων'

Homer *Iliad* 6.479

where Hector speaks of his son as surpassing him. Naturally this intensified form of the commonplace had its dangers; and where it was used, we would expect some palliative to prevent it from becoming invidious. This is the case in Propertius' application of the commonplace to uncle and nephew. The palliative can be discerned through the etymological word play<sup>20</sup> involved in Propertius' use of *anteire*. Propertian pentameters often elucidate their hexameters by reproducing the same or a similar concept in a clearer fashion. In the pentameter line 20, Tullus is told to give back their *iura* to the *socii*. Presumably this mission constituted his official duty. *Anteire* also alludes to this duty since *anteire* is synonymous with *praeire*, a verb known by Romans to be related to the noun *praetor* (old form *praitor*). Cf.:

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. Soph. *Aj.* 550; Accius *Arm. iudic. Fr.* 10; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.41; Ov. *Pont.* 4.13.27. Cf. also e.g. Verg. *Ecl.* 4.17; *Aen.* 12.435; Tib. 2.5.120. If, as Kamerbeek (on Soph. *Aj.* 550) suggests, the commonplace is rhetorical, it presumably found its place in the *εὐγένεια* or *εὐτεχνία* section of the encomium.

<sup>20</sup> For Roman poetic etymologies see e.g. J. S. T. Hanssen *Symb. Osl.* 26 (1946) 113ff. and the works there cited.

Regio imperio duo sunt, iique a praeuendo, iudicando,  
consulendo praetores, iudices, consules appellamino . . . .

Cicero *De Legibus* 3.3.8

A professional Roman etymologist's definition of *praetor* was:

Praetor dictus qui praeiret iure et exercitu, a quo id  
Lucilius:

Ergo praetorum est ante et praeire (1160 Marx)

Varro *De Lingua Latina* 5.80 (cf. 5.87)

The Lucilian quotation preserved by Varro shows that *anteire* as well as *praeire* could be consciously linked with etymologies of *praetor*. Varro himself shows that *iur* and *praetor* were linked in etymological contexts (see below).

I suggest therefore that *anteire* was meant by Propertius to allude—via the concept *praetor*—to the legal duties of Tullus' post, since the administration of law at Rome was linked primarily with the office of praetor. A further line of deduction naturally presents itself: that Tullus was either a praetor or an expraetor sent to the province Asia as a special commissioner to perform legal duties; or that, as his uncle's subordinate in the province, he had the title either of *legatus pro praetore* or of *quaestor pro praetore*.<sup>21</sup> Some such circumstances would explain more clearly why Propertius used this piece of allusive etymology; and the description of Tullus as *pars accepti imperii* does imply an official post of a seniority consonant with one of these ranks.

On the whole the theory of a special commission accords best with the known fact of Tullus' long residence in the province. Propertius 3.22, a kletikon which presumably marks Tullus' recall from Asia, is dateable to 25-20 B.C. and its first line is:

Frigida tam multos placuit tibi Cyzicus annos

Tullus therefore spent at least four years in Asia and probably more. A *legatus* could have his commission renewed, but it

<sup>21</sup> Cf. M. Helvius Geminus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup>, H 71) *legatus pro praetore* in Asia (under Claudius?); M. Julius Romulus *leg. pro pr. iterum prov. Asiae* under Claudius or Nero (*PIR*<sup>2</sup>, I 523); Servenius Cornutus *leg. pro pr. Asiae* under Augustus (*PIR*<sup>1</sup>, S. 165).

would be most unusual for renewals to extend over such a period. If Tullus was a special commissioner he could well have been a praetor or an ex-praetor. M. Ateius, a man of praetorian rank, was sent in A.D. 17 to supervise restoration work on Asian cities destroyed by earthquake.<sup>22</sup> We do not know Ateius' title but he had 5 lictors.<sup>23</sup> Julius Agricola was, during or after his praetorship in A.D. 61, sent on a special commission to Asia to supervise the restoration of temple treasures.<sup>24</sup> A plausible reason for appointing the nephew to a special commission in his uncle's proconsular province is indicated by Tacitus' reference in the case of Ateius to the possibilities of rivalry and conflict between proconsul and special commissioner.

Whatever the precise nature of Tullus' post, it is clear that as a senior sharer of *imperium*, he would, like his uncle, also have had lictors bearing rods and axes. Hence the point and paradox of line 19, with its compliment to two holders of *imperium* from one family in the same province.

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<sup>22</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 2.47.

<sup>23</sup> Dio 57.17.7.

<sup>24</sup> Tac. *Agr.* 6.



## REVIEWS

CHARLES W. FORNARA. *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. x + 98. \$5.75.

The idea of history, a disciple of Collingwood might say, was the invention of Herodotus. The question of how Herodotus came to write his *Histories* is therefore of special interest, and it is this question to which Fornara's thoughtful and well-reasoned essay is addressed. On the supposition that the *Histories*, like most substantial literary works, must have come into being piecemeal over a period of years, he argues the probability that the finished work shows signs of Herodotus' intellectual development, and the stages of that development are taken to represent his responses to changing circumstances.

While Fornara is fundamentally a separatist, he recognizes the use of the more recent unitarian approach as a corrective to excessive dissecting of the work. Its value, however, is only in drawing attention to how Herodotus unifies his material and to his motives for doing so. It is of no help in seeking to explain the origin of the various parts of the *Histories*.

An examination of the Egyptian *logos* reveals not only Herodotus at an early stage, but also, by comparison with the later and more mature Book 1, what he was not yet become. The Persian history is a second signpost of his development, being revolutionary in its conception, with a historical theme—the progressive domination by Persia first of Asia and then of part of Europe. This is causative history, but not, as is sometimes suggested, a study of imperialism. Discussion of the Persian War begins, appropriately, in Fornara's chapter on Herodotus and Athens. Whatever the details of Herodotus' life and journeys, it is likely that his stay in Athens stimulated him to write the history of the war, and that he was responding to contemporary ideas. It was after he found this new direction that he revised the Persian history and accommodated it to the final, and now main, part of the work. But if Athens provided the stimulus, that does not imply that admiration of the Periclean era or a desire to justify the Athenian empire were his motives. Once we recognize that Herodotus managed to be both involved and objective, something that perhaps only an exile could achieve, we are better prepared to appreciate his method.

Thucydides believed that Herodotus' perspective had been wrong, because he was writing for his contemporaries rather than for posterity, and, one might add, about the past rather than about the present. But to understand Herodotus one must take account of the audience for whom he wrote. This audience was living through events which he saw

as disastrous but inevitable. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, or even the danger of it, gave new significance to the Persian War.

Fornara's whole thesis is convincingly presented, but the most elusive and fundamental question remains. Why did Herodotus turn to history as a serious inquiry distinct from logography? He was persuaded of the need to impress upon his contemporaries the transience of greatness and the instability of human fortune. But this is not the complete answer, for most Greeks, like Aristotle, found history lacking in weight for such a purpose. The innovation of Herodotus cannot be overestimated. Interest in history is not basic to mankind and certainly was not native to the ancient Greeks; but Herodotus recognized that human history was relevant as a response to the political situation of the later 5th century, that the past had lessons for the present, and that he could revive the past and discover its lessons. In this respect he had no successors in antiquity.

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GIOVANNI VIANISINO. *Introduzione allo studio critico della letteratura latina*. Salerno, Libreria internazionale editrice, 1970. L. 6500.

The author states in the preface that his book is not a history of Latin literature and is not meant to be a substitute for the great handbooks on the subject or the bibliographical annuals. The author's intention has rather been to clear up once for all those problems that have occupied scholars and writers of the past twenty years. This announcement of the author's purpose opens an intriguing prospect to the student. For nothing could be more useful to university students of Latin literature (and this is the group for whom the book is apparently intended) than an expertly guided tour of the jungle of Latin studies. To this reviewer, however, it seems unfortunate that the author (whose learning and expertise are obvious), while placing students in the heart of the jungle right enough, has taken them from one dense thicket to another. In a word, instead of being, as the author's preface seems to promise, a review of recent scholarship from the point of view of the problems that have occupied the scholars, the book consists of twenty-eight short chapters, the first of which is a select bibliography and the rest compressed treatments of selected topics relating to twenty-seven Latin authors. The problems are treated but run the risk of being lost in a mass of detail. There is no synthesis or conclusion.

Following the section of general bibliographical information come the twenty-seven unnumbered chapters devoted to individual Latin writers. Those selected are Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Ennius, Plautus, Terence, Lucilius, Lucretius, Catullus, Cornelius Gallus and

the elegy, Tibullus, Propertius, Caesar, Nepos, Sallust, Livy, Cicero, Horace, Vergil, Ovid, Lucan, Persius, Juvenal, Seneca, Tacitus, Petronius, Apuleius, and Ammianus Marcellinus. The principle behind the order of the chapters seems at first to have been chronological, but with the chapter on Gallus there seems to have been a shift towards a treatment by genres. Thereafter there seems to have been no principle at all. But since the author in his preface warned us that he planned to consider only a selected list of writers, we should not quarrel with him over the order in which the writers are presented.

It is difficult for an American reviewer to make a fair appraisal of a work intended to meet the needs of Italian students. It may be that students in Italy have no need of just another history of Latin literature but wish to sample some undiluted philology. That they can certainly do in this book. A few excerpts (in what is meant to be a literal translation) will give some idea of the book's style. The chapter on Terence begins:

#### PUBLIUS TERENTIUS AFER

*Afer* means Berber (family of Africans transplanted in Carthage). We have at our disposal the commentary of Aelius Donatus (except for that on the *Hautontimoroumenos*), important for the parallels he establishes with Greek models (this information derived from the commentary of Aemilius Asper) and for the masterly annotations; and (we have) the commentary of Eugraphius (VI s. m.) whose primary concern is the rhetorical character of the text (certain observations valuable also for the understanding of the poet's art). Mention may be made also of the scholia added to the codex Bembinus and others in the VIs, derived in part from a tradition different from that of Donatus and Eugraphius . . .

It is not only the opening paragraphs of chapters that have the terse compact quality of a reallexikon but the book throughout is written with a most unitalic economy and compression of style. One comes upon occasional passages written in a more open and fluid style, but in general the book reads like a work of reference rather than an introduction to a subject.

But there are difficulties in the way of its use as a work of reference. The book is packed with learning, important points are made and it abounds with valuable recent bibliographical information. These riches, however, are available only to those with the fortitude to peruse the volume page-by-page and line-by-line. For there is no uniformity of procedure in the successive chapters, so that it is not easy to discover quickly whether a given topic of scholarly concern has been handled or not. Finally, if ever a book needed an analytical index, this one does—and there is no index at all.

E. J. KENNEY, ed. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, Book 3. Cambridge, Eng., University Press, 1971. Pp. viii + 225. £2.40; \$6.00 (U.S.A.). (*Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*)

Kenney in his edition of Lucretius' Book 3 (Preface, Introduction, Text with an uncluttered *apparatus criticus*, Commentary, Bibliography, and Index) has, as befits one of the General Editors of this new and promising series of Greek and Latin Classics, generously recognized our need. Why he chose Book 3, one of the "two central books . . . directed against fear of the afterlife" and protectively framed by Books 1-2 and 5-6, he explains (29-30): the problem which this book poses for mankind at all times, and the book's elegant structure.

The result, despite Kenney's unassuming "doubt and self-questioning," is excitingly successful. The editor has shown himself both *fortis* and *sapiens*. Somehow he has managed (for me at least) to talk about the important matters, to ask the right questions, to admit uncertainty, and to elucidate the purport of individual paragraphs and yet not to lose sight of their particular function within the Book as a whole. He succeeds, I suppose, from his taste and learning (the notes are, unpretentiously, a bibliographical treasury, built up from wide-ranging but discriminating reading of ancient and modern writers). Part, too, of his success must be attributed to his refreshing examination of tralatitian exegesis, as, for example: what is "archaic style" (21-23), or, what of that old bugaboo "l'Antilucrèce dans Lucrèce" (7), or, who was Memmius and what was Lucretius to him and what of Memmius vs. the general reader (*tu*; see 8-9, and e.g., notes on lines 206 and 213), or, what was Cicero's rôle in "publishing" the *D.R.N.* (7-8, and *G&R*, NS 19 [1972] 24)?

To give a fair notion of the editor's *general* approach and attitude, I now quote several of Kenney's statements. I hope he will forgive this arbitrary plundering.

1. "Lucretius' poem did not just *happen*, he planned it," (*G&R*, NS 19 [1972] 22).

2. "... the *D.R.N.* does not set out to present a complete account of the Epicurean system. Lucretius' ultimate aim is positive, to put his readers in the way of achieving happiness: . . . His immediate aim however, is negative: to destroy the barriers that obstruct man's path to self-fulfillment, the illusions that stand between him and enlightenment—fear of the gods, fear of the afterlife, fear of death." (9).

3. "... he was a poet who knew how human beings behave." (*G&R*, NS 19 [1972] 23).

4. "... in Lucretius both description and imagery, like all his other stylistic characteristics, are *functional*: . . ." (29).

5. "... textual and literary criticism are inseparable and bear on one another; . . ." (35).

The Introduction is not the usual cluster of dubious "facts" and unwarranted "conclusions," but rather, in an unprejudiced and business-like fashion, it examines hoary clichés and, by setting forth what we know or ought to know or may know, it moves us toward a better grasp of Lucretius' goals, methods, and his place in his social and literary milieu. It consists of six sections, on each of which I give only briefest comment, or quotations:

1. *The Doctrine*: "In the *D.R.N.* we are offered, not an account of the Epicurean system . . . but the personal testament of the poet." (3). ". . . the trouble with Epicureanism, and the main reason perhaps why it never enjoyed the general success of Stoicism, was not that it was too easy, but that it was too difficult, too austere, too unworldly." (4). "He was anything but a fool, and we are bound to assume that he was aware that his enlightened contemporaries did not require to be undeceived about Hades" (5).

2. *The Poet*: justified scepticism about the *Vita borgiana* (6, note 2).

3. *The Poem*: for its purpose, see above. As for the unfinished state of the poem, Kenney concludes from 5.155 (perhaps the repeated lines in the fourth proem point to the same conclusion, though one should not discount the possibility that an author—we think of Cicero—is himself careless in checking his own text) that had Lucretius lived longer he ". . . would have altered the version of his poem that has come down to us substantially though not radically" (13). How much change is "substantial" and how much "radical" Kenney shrewdly avoids saying. A prickly matter: we note that most of our Latin epics are "unfinished," and we know that a number of our English poets (understandably) were addicted to revision. Whatever a "literary executor" (Cicero? or a literate slave?) did by way of "preparing" (St. Jerome's *emendo*) the text for publication, it can, I agree with Kenney, have been "little more than proof-correcting in modern times." The ancients were pious toward "unfinished" texts of dead poets (8, and note on line 819).

4. *The Poetry*: Kenney stresses Lucretius' Hellenistic self-consciousness (14-15), and his functional "simplicity and clarity" of style (20). On Lucretius' general relation to Hellenistic literature—he ". . . did not live or write in a cultural vacuum, . . ." (15)—see Kenney's "Doctus Lucretius," *Mnemosyne* 23 (1970) 366-92. The sections "The Two Traditions and the Two Styles" and "Language and Metre" (14-29) are especially valuable, particularly the original stress laid upon Lucretius' use of the diatribe, for in his combination of the lowly diatribe with the "high" genre of didactic epos Lucretius furnished himself with powerful emotional armament in his "pathetic" passages (and also, as Kenney points out, established the foundations of what, odd as the term may seem, might be called "the high satiric form" which Juvenal brilliantly exploited).

5. *Book 3: Subject, Structure and Argument*: note the instructive contrast drawn between the "expository" style of the long Argument (*animus* and *anima*, and the proofs for the mortality of the soul) and the "pathetic" style of the relatively short Conclusion (practical philosophy) with its unsatisfying *consolatio*. What *would* follow if death really were disposed of, if Lucretius (or, more fairly, if Epicurus) *had* won his case? (31-34).

6. *The Text*: see below. Kenney has constituted his own text, relying "principally on Bailey's reports of the manuscripts" (p. viii).

The Commentary seems to me to face squarely the matters which call for interpretation—and that is an editor's first duty toward his text. Helpful summaries of paragraphs precede comment on individual lines, the argument and logic (and false logic: e.g. in lines 459-62) are dissected, parentheses are animadverted upon with their relevance to the main thread of the argumentation (I am glad that Kenney does not employ the degrading phrase "suspension of thought"), and Epicurean and non-Epicurean doctrines are explained as the need comes up. Comments on contemporary society and politics abound. They should, for Lucretius' experience (and so finally his resolve to write the *D.R.N.*) came straight out of this corrupted world of the upper classes in the late Republic. Attention in the notes is constantly paid to style, feeling, and imagination, via practical exposition of matters of syntax, metre, imagery (esp. recurrent imagery), and diction. One example (diction; satire): *insatiabiliter deflevimus aeternumque* (907)—"probably unique in serious Latin poetry: . . . ,"; "The effect on the Roman ear must have been grotesque."—"Insatiabiliter . . . is not necessarily an elevated word. Its only other use in Lucretius [6.978] is of swine rolling in filth."

Finally, I turn to Kenney's text.

The obelus, so far as I have noticed, has been employed four times: 444, 531, 658, and 962. No quarrel here at all. Rather, we might ask why Kenney did not introduce the obelus elsewhere, e.g. *suadet* in line 84, since, as Kenney says, the anaphoric *hunc . . . hunc . . . hunc* (tricolon) is connective, and the four infinitives must depend upon *obliti*, and therefore *suadet* is corrupt (I think it a gloss, a melancholy conclusion, since, if right, it would deprive us of the chance of a palaeographically acceptable emendation which would make sense, like Lambinus' *fundo* or Bailey's *sede*). Still, Kenney freely admits that "*fundo* is printed *exempli gratia*" (87) and I fully understand why an editor does not wish to plunge daggers into every *saudet* or *manare* (58).

*Lacunae* are admitted twice: after lines 97 and 823 (both called for). Kenney's casting-out of Ixion, and hence his rejection of a *lacuna* after 1002 or 1010 or 1011, is persuasive; Ixion has no business *here*.

As for transpositions, of which we need not be fearful—we do not have to approach the MSS. of Lucretius on all fours—Kenny has three

sets: 44-46 (imperative), 865 inserted after 857 (again, the only way out, so far as I can see), and 955 after 951 (again, necessary).

On orthography Kenney notes (on line 186) the normalization in late antiquity. So, we of today dare not say, despite epigraphical aid, that we can recapture the spelling of a Lucretius or Horace or Virgil. Further, elegant Latin poets, like less elegant but not illiterate "moderns," gave (I have no doubt) short shrift to consistency in such a humdrum business as spelling. Hence, all we can do now is to print an "old spelling" if the majority of "good" MSS. give it, and otherwise abide by the convention (unless we elect the orthographical *monstra* of Smith). Accordingly, Kenney prints *rutundis* in lines 186, 195 and 205. His *turis* (line 327) and not the vulgar *thuris* is securely supported. *Necessust* or even *necessumst* is tempting in place of the MSS.'s *necessesst* in line 806; but then we should only be falling into the trap that caught Smith.

The punctuation of a Latin text presents no few problems. Today's usual practice, whether in Germany or elsewhere, comports with modern syntax but not with ancient rhetoric. Kenney does us a service in reminding us that the Roman reader had before him an *unpunctuated* text. His ears, not his eyes, guided the Roman reader. Our modern phrasing (with its commas and semicolons) obscures or, more often, fights against the *total* phrasing which an ancient reader or listener would have waited to hear. I see no easy way out for an editor, save to excise commas whenever he can (as Munro did), and to warn the reader (in his notes, as does Kenney; see his comments on lines 75-77, 216-17, 288, and 894-95 where I have long punctuated for myself as Kenney now has done for all).

If there was no punctuation in early MSS, neither, we should recall, was there word division (writing being in *scriptura continua*). It may be handy to keep this fact in mind in editing and commenting on an ancient text, without having to take recourse in emendation. So Madvig, but perhaps not with his usual felicity, "changed" the *fugit*, at of line 1068 into *fugitat*.

I have been perhaps too lengthy on the text. So, I shall now single out (for approbation) three of Kenney's readings. In line 1, we should of course read *o* and not the "anaemic" and rather meaningless *e* (*o* with the MSS. *adiuvante Timpanaro*). In line 295 *in iram* (Bentley, for the MSS.'s *in ira*) is what is needed. In line 1018, *facti* and not the *factis* of the scribes (induced by the *factis* of line 1014) is surely right.

HENRY BARDON. Propositions sur Catulle. Bruxelles, Latomus, 1970.  
Pp. 160. 300 F. (*Collection Latomus*, 118)

Bardon announces his intention in the introduction: "Le monde de la poésie n'est pas un monde replié. Les processus de la création doivent permettre d'accéder à l'auteur, car c'est grâce à eux que l'auteur se situe dans sa vie véritable. En dehors de toute chronologie, nous avons à atteindre Catulle en son existence poétique: c'est-à-dire Catulle se faisant Catulle parce qu'il se fait poète" (8). This guiding principle animates the entire book, which is composed of twelve chapters and three parts.

Part 1, entitled "Les mots," contains four chapters, in the first of which, "Le matériel," Bardon investigates Catullus' use of Grecisms, archaisms, intensives, diminutives, daily speech, words of special import in revealing Catullus' "psychisme" (*dulcis*, *candidus*, *miser*, and *linquere* are a few), coordinating conjunctions, first and second person pronouns, enumerative series such as *dein* and *deinde* in 5.7-10, line-beginning and line-ending words, chiasmus, parallelism, and word-juxtaposition. Chapter 2, "Répétitions et composition," deals with rhythm and meter, sound patterns, rhyme, rhetorical figures, word repetition, and structural patterns. In chapter 3, "Les révélations de la syntaxe," Bardon argues for the linguistic unity of the three sections—polymetrics, "long poems," and elegiacs—of the Catullan corpus. He attempts to show that the language of both "high poetry" and daily speech is found in all three sections. In chapter 4, "Le monde des images," Bardon begins with his definition of images as "ce que Catulle voit: ce qu'il voit en réalité, ce sur quoi son regard se pose le plus volontiers, et, aussi bien, ce qu'il voit en l'imaginant" (50). He then proceeds to examine this double role of the visual in the poems. Catullus' employment of *videre* and *oculus*, his grouping of related images, and his most common images are briefly analyzed in relation to the poet's personality.

Part 2, "Le 'moi' et le 'tu'," moves from linguistic considerations to what might be called a study of Catullus in his environment. In chapter 5, "L'obscénité," Bardon examines Catullus' obscene and virulent poems. His conclusion is that Catullus, a sensitive victim of his violent age, refuses hypocrisy and employs obscenity as a means of expressing his essential purity and honesty, and as a testimony of his desire to live each day to the hilt. Chapter 6 is entitled "Le 'moi' et les autres." Bardon here deals with Catullus' sincerity in relation to the form of the poems, his lack of interest in politics, his homo- and heterosexual loves, his friendships, and his hatreds. Catullus emerges as one who sees his friends deceive him, his brother die, and his great love play him false—a man who "a tout donné, et qui n'a rien reçu" (87). Chapter 7, "Le 'moi' et le mythe," evolves the thesis that Catullus, disillusioned by his relations with others, seeks refuge in dream-land, best rep-



resented in his poetry by myth. From a series of analyses of individual poems or parts thereof, wherein myth is prominent, he discovers auto-allegory in the myths Catullus employs, and he concludes: "Le mythe est pour lui un moyen inconscient [*sic*] d'esquiver le réel" (104). The consideration of Catullus' relation to myth in this chapter leads Bardon to chapter 8, "Le 'moi', la morale et la religion," where, consistent with his principal theme, the author denies to Catullus any profound moral or religious partisanship apart from his own "psychologie." There are too many things in this chapter to be summarized briefly. Important, though, is his stress on Catullus' moral inconsistency. He takes strong issue with the theses of Marmorale (*L'ultimo Catullo*), who argues for a late conversion of Catullus to the Dionysiac cult, and of Granarolo (*L'oeuvre de Catulle*), who portrays Catullus as a man of exceptional religious sentiment, particularly devoted to the Dioscuri. He insists that Catullus appeals to the gods only when his love affairs are going badly. He concludes: "La morale de Catulle est une morale fabriquée avec la sincérité de l'aveuglement, une sublimation de ses instincts, une justification, et aussi bien, une manière inconsciente de revendiquer" (118).

Part 2's final chapter, 9, is entitled "La solitude." A poet who seeks refuge in dreams or projects himself into myth in order to avoid painful reality must, according to Bardon, be a poet of loneliness; and the poems reveal his despair of any permanent bond with lover, friend, brother, or god. Even where, as in 11 and 85, he is ostensibly addressing others, his poems are in reality a dialogue with himself. In many poems he addresses himself in the second (more emotional) or third (more objective) person. However much the form of his poetry may owe to literary ancestors—early Greek, Alexandrian, or Roman—"L'oeuvre de Catulle, à des degrés divers, mais tout entière, est imprégnée de Catulle" (128).

Part 3, "Le poétique et le vécu," opens with chapter 10, "La construction du 'moi' par la poésie." Bardon here elaborates his thesis that, even when Catullus borrows from his predecessors, the very choice of materials reveals the poet's personality. Even in 66, a translation, Catullus imposes himself, as he does in the figures of Laodamia in 68 and Ariadne in 64, poems in which he ignores many of the details found in earlier writers. His adaptations of Meleager and Anyte are charged with a personal sentiment foreign to those poetic practitioners. The heart of Bardon's argument in this chapter is found on p. 137: "Précisons: le travail d'art finit par façonner l'être qui n'y voit pas un jeu, mais qui le charge d'exprimer une vie. L'artisan du vers devient l'artisan de lui-même." Chapter 11, "La poétique et le projet," examines Catullus' view of his own art. He discusses Catullan *ars* in operation in various poems throughout the three parts of the *libellus*; but, for him, this *ars* is essentially inexplicable and unconscious: "Au-delà des écoles, au-delà des doctrines: une poésie qui, sous notre

regard, s'esquisse et parfois se formule" (152). Finally, in chapter 12, "'Odi et amo,'" Bardon plumbs Catullus' literary expression of his profoundest emotion, his love for Lesbia. He finds in all the Lesbia poems, even the "happy" ones such as 109, 68, 5, and 7, a "détour" which reveals Catullus' doubts about the permanence of his love. Catullus, he asserts, lives his love only in the past; the poet constantly senses the discrepancy between his ideal love and the love he actually possesses. Poem 109 expresses these sentiments clearly, the wish *ut liceat nobis* of line 5 implying an impossibility of obtaining his ideal, *aeternum hoc sanctae foedus amicitiae*.

Bardon does not paint his portrait of Catullus in splendid isolation. As his abundant footnotes and frequent polemics indicate, he is well abreast of Catullan scholarship; and he also displays a wide knowledge of contemporary French literature, especially of Sartre, who, I suspect, has strongly influenced his view of Catullus "creating himself" in his poetry. Is the portrait convincing? Bardon's general thesis would be more worthy of consideration did he not exhibit such surprising carelessness in matters of detail. His treatment of Catullan language in part I is far too cursory; he could have benefited from the conclusions reached in D. O. Ross's *Style and Tradition in Catullus*, which he cites, p. 40, but ignores. Again, the number of dubious or arbitrary statements bulks large. I cite but a few examples. Analysis of word-count rather than word-employment is defended on the grounds that "... le mot que l'écrivain élit alors qu'il ne s'engage pas l'engage d'autant plus qu'il n'en a pas conscience" (15). His examples of chiasmus (24) illustrate, instead, interlocking word order. The repeated *identidem* of 11 and 51 is "un inconscient avue" (33). Poem 49 is "contre Cicéron" (77); the arguments of Fordyce and others for the poem's sincerity are ignored. Poems 15 and 21 form part of the Juventius cycle (79). The *phaselus* of 4 "... est sa vie même" (90). Flight in 58b represents Catullus' subconscious desire to shake off the world's oppressions (93). The Attis poem reveals both Catullus' fear of being *pathicus* and his anxieties over his affair with Lesbia (94-96). In poem 64, Theseus issuing from the labyrinth is Catullus emerging from himself to enjoy a victory made possible by Lesbia-Ariadne. Catullus is also Theseus abandoning Ariadne, since this is his only way to save himself from Lesbia.

Many citations of both ancient and modern authors are inaccurate; *haec omnia praetereo*. Most disturbing, however, is the number of *errata* in the citations from Catullus' text. In the 160 pages of Bardon's book I have found 80 examples. It is difficult to believe that the book was proofread, even cursorily.

When, after repeated exposures to the "inconscient," the "rêve," the "psychisme," and the "hantise" of a Catullus who, willy-nilly, "se livre" in his poems, I read "Catulle . . . n'arrive jamais à la netteté d'une conception intellectualiste, parce que ses nerfs le régissent

tout entier" (116), I balk. Those who believe, with Bardon, that from the slim volume that is Catullus' *libellus* we can accurately deduce an inconsistent, emotion-ruled, obsessive, and lonely poet who creates himself in his poetry will enjoy this book; probably they will also, as I have done, derive enlightenment from many of the penetrating criticisms he offers on particular poems (for example, on his final page his comment on the relationship between *odi et amo* and *excrucior* in 85 is excellent). However, for those who suspect that the partnership of *mens* and *ars sibi conscia* plays a major role in Catullus' construction of his poems, as it does in the case of other poets, Bardon's book, despite its many virtues, must remain a curiosity.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS

RICHARD E. GRIMM

THOMAS E. KINSEY. *M. Tulli Ciceronis, Pro P. Quinctio oratio*. Edited with text, introduction and commentary. Sidney, Aus., Sydney University Press, 1971. Pp. vii + 229. \$15.00.

It is not surprising that commentators should have fought shy of Cicero's earliest extant speech. It offers little of general interest but abounds in legal intricacies to which the advocate, having a poor case, may be suspected of deliberately adding confusion. The last commentary, that of G. M. Long, is over a century old, and even in its day had little merit. The gap is solidly filled by this edition.

Departures from the text of A. C. Clark in the Oxford series are few but judicious, the editor's only personal contribution being a lacuna in par. 54 (justified). His apparatus takes account of Clark's separately published corrigenda, ignored in the Teubner edition. One formal feature is unusual and annoying; in order to relate a critical note to its text one often has to turn a page.

The introduction of eleven pages includes a summary of the case and a stylistic comparison with the *Pro Roscio Amerino*. It is followed by a select bibliography. The book ends with two short appendices on legal matters and an index. But its main value lies in the commentary, the work of a highly competent Latinist who has made a close study of Cicero's style. The notes on grammar and usage are exceptionally copious and sound. Those on subject matter leave on the whole a rather less satisfactory impression, though Kinsey is at pains to expose the weaknesses of Cicero's arguments and the possible rejoinders of his opponent. A fuller treatment in the introduction would have made the reader's task easier.

Some criticisms of detail: p. 2, Scaevola the Pontifex was not Scaevola the Augur's brother. P. 52 (*C. Aquili*): Cicero's remarks in

Att. 1.1.1 should not be taken literally. P. 66 (*in Galliam*): K., like others, seems to miss the point. *Gallia* includes Cisalpine Gaul. P. 84 (*amicos*): surely not "friends of the slaves." *amici*, summoned by the slaves, are distinguished from *necessarii*, particularly close friends whom Naevius fetched himself. P. 115 (*pudentem*): K.'s suspicions are misplaced. The word implies more than excellence of character, it implies sensitivity to other people's opinion of oneself which in turn calls forth forbearance on their side; cf. *Fam.* 5.1.1 *pudor ipsius*, 8.13.1 *pudore Tulliae*, both of which require better annotation than they have yet received. P. 123 (*quibus a me . . . satis det*): for "Alfenus" read "Naevius" in the last sentence of the note? P. 126 (*condicionem aequissimam*): the note is misguided. *condicionem* is the *condicio* referred to in par. 45. P. 129 (*is quicum . . . intercedebat*): I doubt if *Fam.* 12.29.1 ought to have been cited for *causa* as a synonym of *necessitudo*. P. 154 (*neque quemquam attinebat id recusare*): *id* (which anticipates *quod*) is mistranslated in the note. Pp. 172f. (*cur . . . convenerint*): I think the note is astray; surely the *sponsores* relate to debts actually outstanding. Pp. 199f. (*tantum modo superiorem fuisse*): this note is quite mistaken. The meaning of the text is clear from pars. 70f. P. 206, (*cordi . . . fuisse*): it is surprising to read that apart from this phrase classical Latin only uses *cor* in the physical sense; Krebs' remarks s.v. refer to "die bessere Prosa." In the text of par. 47 the traditional question mark after *dedat* seems wrong; and *uterer* needs a note (did Cicero write *uteretur?*), as does *etiam te iudice magis* in par. 92.

The text contains several trivial misprints and two repeated lines at par. 27 (with *nec illud* for *neque illud*). Publications of the Clarendon Press are described as emanating from London. Like a recent reviewer, K. omits to distinguish between R. G. and R. G. M. Nisbet. Occasionally more attention to English style would not have come amiss; e.g. p. 9: "It is important to know whether an expression is a cliché or not. The context sometimes suggests the reason for its choice but even its inexplicability may have its use if it enjoins caution in taking Cicero's vocabulary as in some way reflecting normal classical usage. Sometimes it may partly result from circumstances peculiar to the writer or quirks of memory."

I must add a caveat. In a prefatory acknowledgment to Professor W. A. J. Watson for help on notes concerned with legal matters K. writes: "I know he has doubts about some of the views expressed." My own favourable estimate of this work is that of a non-specialist in Roman Law.

P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Primus. With a Commentary by R. G. AUSTIN. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xxi + 239. £2.00.

The Oxford commentaries on single Books of the *Aeneid* are very useful. So far, Austin has dealt with Books 1, 2 (cf. my review in *Gnomon* 37 [1965] 51-55) and 4, while R. D. Williams has devoted himself to Books 3 and 5. This is the first important English commentary on *Aen.* 1 since R. S. Conway (reviewed in *AJP* 57 [1936] 341ff. by Cyril Bailey). It has all the qualities of the other volumes: solid facts, good taste, common sense.

Editions and commentaries are subject to changing styles and fashions, like almost everything else. Without attempting to define the 'Oxford style' in a few words, I should like to say that Austin is never as dry as Conington-Nettleship and never quite as gushy as old Heyne, always ready to exclaim *quam pulchre! quam venuste!* One realizes with amazement how much learning has accumulated around the text of Vergil since the days of Servius or La Cerda. It would be possible, today, without too much exertion, to write a little monograph on almost every line. Clearly, a commentator has to make a selection, which means in practical terms that he will say something on the text, the language, the style, the metre, on sources and imitations, on topography, history, religion, etc. The Oxford commentators are good at selecting and arranging their material. A commentary cannot be a work of art, and yet it should be possible to use it with a moderate sense of pleasure. "L'art d'être ennuyeux, c'est de tout dire."

The Index rerum (pp. 235-39) reflects Austin's judicious eclecticism. It includes references to the 'descriptive ablative for a compound epithet,' 'coinage (Carthaginian),' 'dogs, short names for,' 'vase paintings,' etc. In his notes on Book 2, Austin has much to say on Virgil's dramatic technique (e.g. on 2.519ff; 554ff.). This is less conspicuous here, and yet it seems that Virgil always works like a dramatic poet. *Tò θαυμάσιον* (cf. Conway on 1.52), *ἐκπληξίς*, *φόβος*, *ἔλεος* are the bones and sinews of his epic, even in the less exciting Books, 1, 3 or 5 (where humour, so rare in the *Aeneid*, supplies a welcome ingredient). The secret of Virgil's art lies not only in the architecture of the whole, the beauty of the style, the music of the line, but above all in the deep emotional appeal of his heroes, which is essentially a dramatic appeal.

To mention just a few of Austin's main concerns: 'archaisms and archaic style,' 'colloquialisms'; 'alliterations'; 'similes.' He carefully notes Virgil's debt to Homer, Apollonius of Rhodes, Naevius (who was almost certainly influenced by 'Hellenistic poetry and interests'; Austin's doubt comes as a surprise), Ennius and Lucretius. Thus the indexes provide a kind of blue-print for a book on Virgil's poetic diction, a modernized Heinze, still to be written.

A few remarks: Austin suggests two small changes in Mynors' Oxford text: 380 *Italiam quaero patriam et genus ab Iove summo* (no stop

after *patriam*, and *genus* as accusative, an extension after *patriam*); 636 *dei* for *dii* (but here, I think the true reading must be *die* = *diei*; cf. G. 1.208; Paulin. Nol. *Carm.* 5.72 = Auson. *Eph.* 4.72; p. 368, 1 P.; Thes. 5.1.1022, 16ff. Servius seems to explain an apocryphal reading *diu*). One of the longest notes in this volume is devoted to the question whether 286ff. *Caesar* is Augustus or his adoptive father. Like E. J. Kenney, Austin is inclined to assume a "deliberate Virgilian ambiguity." More could be said on Lucan's imitations of whole passages, e.g. the banquet scene 723-56 in *Phars.* 10.107-333. Lucan's elaboration of detail and his change of mood deserve close study.

I wonder why commentators have little or nothing to say on Virgilian lines of the type *sit mihi fas audita loqui*. They have a clear, unmistakable ring and almost always seem to emphasize an emotional high point, e.g. in 10; 380; 573, etc. Even Norden on Book 6<sup>3</sup>, p. 421, n. 1 has apparently missed this and put at least two examples into a wrong category. Lucan—always the clever disciple—uses this pattern frequently.

Austin cannot quite resist his urge (cf. *Gnomon*, loc. cit.) to discover all kinds of hidden meanings in certain metrical features. To him, the hypermetre in the description of the temple of Juno in Carthage, 448, seems "intended pictorially, perhaps to suggest the closeness of the plating." To Conway (ad loc.) it suggested the "projection of the architrave." These are idle guesses, entirely based on impressions.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

GEORG LUCK

GIANCARLO MAZZOLI. *Seneca e la poesia*. Milano, Ceschina, 1970. Pp. 320. L.3500. (*Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell' Università di Pavia. Istituto di letteratura latina*, 15)

The preface shows that this book is the work of a young scholar, encouraged by Enrica Malcovati and Luigi Alfonsi. Certainly it is the work of a competent young scholar, but one may ask whether the topic deserves a book, particularly of this length. The younger Seneca surely is not distinguished for his literary criticism.

Part one (9-108) treats Seneca's thought on art and poetry. Mazzoli portrays the author as rising above the cultural provincialism of his Spanish origin, shown in his father's prejudice against the liberal arts. For Seneca, culture is "a precious spiritual investment" (10), in that it consoles and gentles the spirit, and counteracts pain and passion. However, culture must not be only decorative, not merely literary, but above all philosophical (14). Both here and throughout the first two parts of the book, Mazzoli often uses De Lacy's "Stoic Views of Poetry" (*AJP* 69 [1948] 241-71). The severe limitation of the Stoic

view, particularly in the hands of a rhetorical moralist like Seneca, does not allow much of consequence to be added to De Lacy's basic and more comprehensive treatment.

Mazzoli goes on to construct Seneca's "Poetics." He demonstrates the fusion of aesthetic and ethical concepts in the system and, of course, cannot avoid the conclusions that for the Stoic Seneca the autonomy of *ars* is unthinkable, the arts are to be subjected to ethical philosophy, and moral philosophy is not sharply distinguished from the arts: *sapientia ars est*. Aesthetic experience is identical with contemplation of nature. God-nature is the artist par excellence. *Magnitudo animi* and *magnitudo ingenii* run together toward the supreme goal, the sublime in nature and therefore in man.

This synthesis of values, rooted in the Panaetian principle of the *πρέπον* (68-69), allows only a restricted commitment to poetry: Seneca's poetic ideal is the ethical *carmen* which "imitates" human and divine reality, Stoically defined. For this restriction Mazzoli obviously is not accountable, but one hundred pages are not needed to demonstrate this extreme example of the general failure of classical literary criticism to rise above rhetorical and moralistic analysis.

Here and elsewhere in the book, Mazzoli makes some valuable points showing Seneca's ideas about tragedy. There is an interesting passage connecting his conception of philosophical *praecepta* with the composition of the tragedies (107). Seneca is a partisan of a dramatic art capable of producing vigorous ethical effects; his tragedies were probably never presented to the coarse theater of his day (133-34). To him tragedy is foremost among dramatic forms for its grandiosity and severity (134-37).

Seneca as a critic (part two, 111-53) turns away from grammatical and philological study to the philosophical decoding of moral symbols and allegory. Mazzoli tries to argue that in the criticism of poetic genres Seneca does not merely follow tradition, as in his preference for tragedy, but shows an uneasiness and a "dramaticity" of spirit characteristic of modern criticism (121); this judgment seems more true of Seneca as a creative writer than as a critic. In any event, his attitude toward genres is conditioned by their capacity for moralizing: tragedy is preferred; he is attracted to the mime by its *sententiae*; epic is important as a storehouse of characters who fit Seneca's concerns, as a "guide of humanity toward the good," but his judgments on authors like Homer, Ennius, and Virgil have to do with their general poetic quality as he sees it, not with a distinctive genre (149-50).

The third part ("Seneca and the poets," 157-264) is valuable for assembling information, although it contains no surprises and too much extraneous literary history. The author arranges his material chronologically and discusses all the Senecan citations of Greek and Latin poetry that can be identified more or less surely. Greek poetry appears very sparsely, presumably because of Iberian and Roman prejudices against

the subtlety and theoretical nature of the Greek tradition (157-58). Even the citations of Homer seem to be a bow to tradition rather than the product of personal appreciation. Of the Greek poet-philosophers, Cleanthes alone receives serious attention. Interestingly, there are only vague indications of knowledge of the Greek tragedians (172).

On the Latin side, his judgments are those of a generation born at the waning of the early Imperial period, brought up on admiration of the great literary talents. Archaic poetry, of which Ennius is Seneca's model, did not satisfy the criterion of the *πρόπον* requiring that the morality of the *res* be seen through the clarity of the *verba*. The archaic style is older crudity supplanted by Imperial splendor. Apparently Seneca derived his fragments of the early poetry from their citation in Cicero (183-87). From the later Republic, Lucretius is the only one of whose work he shows direct knowledge; from this source, as from Epicurus, he is willing to accept fragments of wisdom, but of course no more than this (206-209).

Virgil and Ovid appear most frequently, and there are charts showing the distribution (231 and 240). Virgil is *maximus vates*; Seneca admires the *prudencia* of the entire *Aeneid*. Mazzoli quite properly makes much of Seneca's allegorizing use of his favorite: e.g. the last night of Troy symbolizes human life in the painful uncertainty of its own *casus* (226). In fact, Mazzoli believes that the discovery of Virgilian classicism is the richest result of Senecan literary criticism (232).

The subject is unrewarding for book-length study, but it is appropriate to congratulate Mazzoli for his careful interpretation of all the evidence.

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FRANK KOLB. *Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Cassius Dio, Herodian und der Historia Augusta*. Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1972. Pp. xii + 196. (*Antiquitas*, Reihe 4, Band 9)

Most scholars today, though by no means all, recognize that the plurality of authors known as the S(criptores) H(istoriae) A(ugustae) is some kind of a hoax. Since Dessau's famous article more and more have become convinced that the HA is a series of biographies from the late fourth or fifth century by one man who deliberately forged names and documents and sought to give an erroneous impression of exact knowledge. Though he undoubtedly consulted respectable sources, he was intent on writing something interesting or surprising, not on finding the truth. In fact, he sometimes is seen to be deliberately distorting the truth.



To see how he operates one must turn to the extant authors. In an excellent dissertation suggested by J. Straub and accepted by the experienced editor of *Antiquitas*, A. Alföldi, Frank Kolb turns away from the search for lost sources and concentrates on those passages where the HA reflects an account in Herodian or an account in Cassius Dio or in both, in which case it becomes equally important to analyze the relation of Herodian to Cassius Dio. Some denied that the HA drew on Dio at all, and the reviewer at least has now altered his opinion as to the method.

By examining many passages side by side and by analyzing them with varying degrees of cogency Kolb has proved, especially in the *Vita Iuliani*, that certain items of information are explainable only through direct or indirect use of Dio. Although the fragmentary character of Dio's text prevents assessment of the extent of this use, the text of Dio, though shortened, sometimes appears in an almost literal translation. The text of Herodian was used not just from the *Vita Macrini* but from the death of Marcus Aurelius on. Kolb infers that Cassius Dio was Herodian's most important source, that in striving for a colorful and dramatic presentation Herodian recast the material, padded the facts, transposed and even faked. And as for the HA, which often combines Dio and Herodian, its lies and jokes, its deformations and transformations, are emphasized again.

The author appears well informed on recent scholarship. He has produced a valuable work and equipped it with bibliography, index and list of passages cited. The book has been well printed and deserves the attention of students of Roman history.

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GREGORY MICHAEL SIFAKIS. *Parabasis and Animal Choruses: A Contribution to the History of Attic Comedy*. London, Athlone Press, 1971. Pp. xiii + 150; 8 plates. £4.00; \$13.00.

The first part of Mr. Sifakis' book examines the morphology of the parabasis on the basis of the traditional seven-part division into *kommation* (K), parabasis proper or "anapests" (P), *pnigos* or *makron* (Pn), *ode* (O), *epirrhema* (Ep), *antode* (AO), and *antepirrhema* (AE). He argues that the epirrhematic portions (O, Ep, AO, AE) are derived from the preceding agon, which they imitate in both content and form. To these were later added—after 486 B.C.—P and Pn, with the introductory K as a transition from the dramatic action. The parabasis proper is not a primitive element, as has commonly been supposed, but a distinctive and sophisticated device which originated in the competi-

tive spirit of the fifth-century dramatic festivals. The subject of P is the poet and his art; it is an advertisement for *this* poet as opposed to his competitors.

Sifakis argues against theories which locate the parabasis originally at the beginning or the end of primitive comic performances and which suppose that it was transplanted to its position in the middle of Aristophanes' plays. All such theories, according to Sifakis, are attempts to account for what their proponents view as an interruption of the unity of plot and action caused by the parabasis. He argues that the Greek comedians were uninterested in such unity; the plays were written as a series of self-contained scenes amenable to digressions. He therefore defines the parabasis not as an intrusion or an interruption, but "a digression of the chorus from its main business, a *parekbasis*, which concerns the poet and is marked by a movement of the chorus towards the audience" (66).

Readers will readily accept Sifakis' contention that Aristophanes' stage is different from ours, not as consistently devoted to the maintenance of dramatic fictions and continuous development of plot. Its paratactic style is episodic and digressive, frequently stopping to buttonhole the audience, to comment on the action, to make a point or enter a plea. It is an uncommonly intimate, practical, multi-purposed form of communication and entertainment. From the standpoint of our own categories it is a crazy patchwork of liturgy, farce, comedy, satire, oratory, and cajolery, and Sifakis offers an analysis which respects its special quality.

He damages his case, however, by insisting too strongly on the "basic premise" that Aristophanes' "dramatic pretense" differs radically from the "dramatic illusion" of modern realistic drama, asserting in chapter I that in realistic drama "the actor tries and often succeeds in temporarily persuading both himself . . . and the audience that he *is* character A or B." He underrates the contractual nature of dramatic illusion, especially in comedy, which of all the dramatic forms is the readiest to drop that illusion, to play with it, or to exploit it as the interests of the comedian demand. It is enough to say simply that Aristophanes allows his characters freely to drift in and out of character not only in the parabasis but throughout the play.

Sifakis' presentation is marred by an excess of technicalities, lists of categories, and unnecessary disputes. His "excursus of the Chorus of *Peace*" quarrels with Platnauer's explanation that the variously identified members of the chorus are "creatures of the imagination" and demands an explanation of where the non-Attic farmers come from, only to reveal that no such explanation is possible because the chorus has no "consistent and unalterable dramatic character."

The second part of the book, "Animal Choruses," sets the discussion of the parabasis into the context of Attic sixth-century theriomorphic choruses. There is not much new here. Sifakis surveys the ar-

chaeological evidence and its interpretations, providing useful illustrations of the most pertinent vase paintings. Sifakis believes on the basis of these paintings that the chorus made their entrance covered with heavy cloaks, and later threw them off to reveal their costumes and perform their dance. The originality of the animal costumes would be heightened by this special effect.

On the black-figure skyphos in the Boston Museum which represents a chorus of men on ostriches, Sifakis calls attention to a dwarfish old man who stands facing the chorus. This figure could be the ancestor of the character in Aristophanes who summons the chorus to the stage. Sifakis endorses T. B. L. Webster's suggestion that this character might be considered an "antagonist." If this is true, the Boston Skyphos provides an important link with Old Comedy, and possibly evidence that the old man in Aristophanes is an early feature of Old Comedy, perhaps the first dramatic character.

An Appendix surveys the occasions in Aristophanes in which the chorus take off their *himatia*. Sometimes this is "in order to dance freely," but in the parabasis of the *Acharnians* and the *Peace*, Sifakis joins van Leeuwen in doubting that the purpose was to facilitate dancing. Are these two instances evidence that the chorus removed their cloaks also for the parabasis? Sifakis concludes that no firm answer can be derived from the available evidence, but on the basis of his arguments in part I he disagrees with Zielinski and others that the stripping in the above two instances can be used to prove that the parabasis was originally either the prologue or the epilogue of comedy.

Sifakis' book is highly technical and minutely argued, and although he provides translations of Greek passages his book will be of limited interest to the nonspecialist. I am doubtful about his notion of dramatic illusion and his assumption of the Dionysiac origin of comedy, a problem which (in the light of Else's work on the origins of tragedy) should be approached with greater caution or better yet skirted entirely. But for anyone interested in the prehistory of Attic comedy, Sifakis' combination of the literary and archaeological evidence offers useful insights, and it should dispel the notion that the parabasis was transplanted from the beginning or the end of comic performances.

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DANIEL H. GARRISON

HARRY CAPLAN. *Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Rhetoric*. Edited and with an Introduction by Anne King and Helen North. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1970. Pp. xiii + 289. \$8.50.

The handsome *Festschrift* for Professor Caplan (*The Classical Tradition*, ed. L. Wallach [1966]) has now been followed by a volume of his *Kleine Schriften*. While *The Classical Tradition* was dominated by strictly classical contributions, though including as well entries on biblical, patristic, medieval, and renaissance topics, *Of Eloquence* demonstrates—which will surprise many classicists—how substantially Caplan's own scholarship has been entirely outside the classical age. In particular, medieval rhetoric and even more specifically medieval preaching have received his attention from his very earliest articles onward.

The ten articles in the volume comprise the bulk of Caplan's productivity in this medium and show by their titles, source of publication, and the general nature of their contents the kind of solid, expository scholarship that has always marked his work. The introduction to his Loeb Library edition of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (1954) opens the volume, and it is balanced at the end by "A Medieval Commentary on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*" (a talk given at the 1964 Philadelphia International Congress and previously unpublished). Other classical papers are "The Latin Panegyrics of the Empire" (1924), "The Decay of Eloquence at Rome in the First Century" (1944), and "Memoria: Treasure House of Eloquence" (Caplan's 1955 Presidential Address to the APA, expanded and first published here). But equally numerous are the medieval entries: "A Late Medieval Tractate on Preaching" (1925), "Rhetorical Invention in Some Medieval Tractates on Preaching" (1927), "The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Medieval Theory of Preaching" (1929), "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching" (1933; the most significant of the medieval papers), and "'Henry of Hesse' on the Art of Preaching" (1933). The journals in which these essays first appeared reflect the range of audience to which Caplan has addressed himself: *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, *PMLA*, *Speculum*, *CP*. Caplan's belief in the spoken word is indicated by the original oral character of half the volume; his long and welcome advocacy of skillful translations is similarly indicated by his own passages of translation in several of the papers. One misses a sampling of his more important reviews.

For a scholar whose productivity has not been mammoth and who has been more concerned to expound and clarify than to innovate, Caplan has engendered remarkable respect, as well as affection, among colleagues and students alike. An attractive explanation of his prestige emerges from the introduction to the volume. There Professors King and North portray Caplan as a true and broad humanist of a fine

university, devoting himself to every aspect of university life. And the picture of Caplan exerting his humane influence on all who entered his office is vivid indeed: "Less an office, in fact, than a way of life, there he resided and presided, from 11 A.M. to 11 P.M. every day for forty-five years." As one who has never studied with Harry Caplan but who has benefited from his advice and help, it is a privilege to record this volume of his scholarly papers.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

MARSH MCCALL

ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO. *The Development of Greek Biography; Four Lectures*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 127. \$8.00

These four lectures delivered by Arnaldo Momigliano of University College, London, give a chronological survey of Graeco-Roman biography and the literary problems it poses. The author states in the preface that he is mainly concerned with clarifying the relationship between biography and historiography. Such a clarification is needed, because historical works may dissolve into a series of monographs of individual rulers. This is not only true for kings; a private individual may also have a strong influence on his or her environment.

In order to solve the problem we have to ask two more general questions: what literary genre does biography represent? And are we justified to call it a literary genre, strictly speaking? The author tackles these problems with a great deal of tact and wisdom. Like most contemporary scholars he is influenced by F. Leo's important work (1901)—at least in his treatment of the formal aspects of biographical narrative. On the other hand, he almost completely abandons Leo's main thesis (which has been contested for a number of years) that the Peripatetics and the Alexandrians created and cultivated two important but essentially different types of biography. From his observations it would appear that ancient biography does not make use of distinctive stylistic features.

For earlier forms in the fifth century and in the archaic period, Momigliano refers to D. R. Stuart (1928) and H. Homeyer (1962). His suggestion of Eastern influences is especially important. In the Near East, the memory of powerful individuals had, from an early period on, left its mark. We can infer from the author's remarks that folk tales about Homer, Hesiod, Sappho and other poets or about the Seven Wise Men, have influenced Socratic dialogues and Peripatetic monographs.

The sections on the fourth and third centuries B.C. are, of course,

especially rewarding. At this time, well-documented biographies are flourishing. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, panegyric biographies, particularly those of Isocrates, as well as his apologetic autobiography in *Peri antidoseos* and the Apologies of Socrates all have one thing in common: they restrict themselves in certain episodes taken from the lives of their subjects and use them as material for character studies which are geared to a canon of virtues. The extent of individual characterization in the various forms of memoirs still remains to be clarified. A wide scale—from realistic portraiture to idealizing abstraction—spans the *Epidemiai* of Ion of Chios, still of the fifth century B.C., and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Historical reports are integrated in the biographies of statesmen and generals in no consistent manner.

A list of ancient biographers (Aristoxenus, Antigonus of Carystus, Hermippus, etc.), given by St. Jerome and clearly representing Hellenistic tradition preserved by Varro, is used by Momigliano to support his thesis that Aristoxenus was the only first generation Peripatetic who can be said to have written biographies. Opinions differ as to whether this list is valid evidence, and, above all, whether it is complete. At any rate, it seems certain that Dicaearchus whose way of thinking is close to that of Aristoxenus, treated the Seven Wise Men as representative of a particular way of life, the *bios praktikos* (frs. 25-31 W.) and chose for it a protreptic form. Aristoxenus did the same in his *Bios Pythagorou* (fr. 11b W.). This made it necessary to adopt a system in which the narrative is subordinated to an idea or a theme, as is the case in Isocrates and Xenophon. After all, as Momigliano points out very justly, *bios* means 'way of life,' not a chronological sequence.

I agree with Momigliano that the Peripatetics did not create a specific new form of biography. This is one of the main points of his book, and it is directed against F. Leo. The number of Peripatetics who wrote *bioi* is not relevant, and the evidence we have does not even guarantee the original titles. Individual differences cannot obscure the close relationship between the *Life of Euripides* by Satyrus (who was a Peripatetic) and the biographies written by Antigonus of Carystus (who did not belong to any philosophical school). Moreover, the systematic framework of most ancient biographies makes it difficult to separate them from literary portraits.

The short biographical sketches of ancient authors which can be regarded as introductions to editions of their works, occupy a place of their own. The author agrees with Leo in assuming, quite rightly, that they are of Alexandrian origin. But even here we are not dealing with a clearly defined genre, for many of these texts have literary ambitions and introduce, at a given point, stylized abstractions of the type of person which the subject is thought to represent. The results of scholarly research are often presented in an entertaining form which creates a certain confusion in the works of Hermippus, a Callimachean. These and other questions should be discussed in a work of wider scope which

will have to interpret all the material available. Its author will find Momigliano's book especially stimulating and valuable.

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EDGAR LOBEL, ed. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Volume 37. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1971. Pp. 111; 12 pls. £6.00. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 53)

Of the twenty-three fragments published here, all represent new literary texts in Greek and most are disappointingly scrappy. They range in date from the first century B.C. down to the third of our era, though most are assigned to the second.

In only three or four pieces do we find well preserved, continuous passages that can be read with satisfaction.

Some verses from Old Comedy (2806) proclaim: "Your wives will bear to all of you infants of five months, three months, a month, as many as they desire, males and females both. They will mature before they are two weeks old and grow beards within another two weeks." The implied bearded ladies are evidently the result of an oversight. It would be entertaining to know more about this fantasy, so characteristic of the genre. A lyric bit from the same play (?) urges persons unknown (the Athenians?) to "establish in your breasts a sanctuary, great and spacious" where, it seems, justice will prevail "in all deeds and in all words."—A commentator on a tragedy (2812) analyzes the tale which told how Poseidon and Apollo punished Laomedon when he cheated them of their wages for building Troy. Alcman is mentioned and there are quotations: *Iliad* 7.452-53, one Dionysius (a historian?), and some new hexameters, perhaps by Nicander.—An invocation to the Muses in hexameters (2816) imitates Hesiod in an archaizing style betrayed by the presence of a few words found elsewhere only in Hellenistic poetry.—A curiously incomplete pedigree (2821) begins presumably with the name of the Theoxena whom her husband Agathocles of Syracuse sent back to Egypt in 289 B.C. with her two small children (Justin 23.2.6), continues with the daughter, another Theoxena, who, we now learn, was banished to the Thebais by Ptolemy II when he caught her bringing him certain false accusations, and ends with a second Agathocles, son of the junior Theoxena. The purpose is far from clear.

The other items may be listed briefly.—2801: Lyric (Alcman?).—2802: Commentary on Alcman (or biography?), possibly discussing his floruit.—2803: Lyric (Stesichorus?). The title *Hipp-*

would be a new one for this poet. Marginalia mention the scholars Aristonicus and Theon (?).—2804: Sophocles (?): *Acrisius* (?).—2805: Tragedy or satyr play.—2807: Old Comedy (Cratinus or Aristophanes, *Hôrai*?).—2808: Comedy (with an allusion to Euripides, *Meleager*?).—2809-10: Old Comedy.—2811: A commentary (on an iambographer?), mentioning Archilochus and the scholars Ammonius and Chaeris.—2813: Commentary on Eupolis: *Prospaltioi* (cf. *PSI* 1213).—2814: Historical epic on a Graeco-Persian war, possibly mentioning Miltiades.—2815: Dionysius: Many fragments of the *Gigantias*.—2817: Hexameters (possibly on Arganthon, the heroine of a love story).—2818: Hexameters.—2819: Commentary on a hexameter poem (story of Io and Epaphus?), quoting *Iliad* 21.261. The writer says that the *nedteroi* used the word *Symplegas* in the singular (cf. one hand clapping).—2820: An obscure episode from Egyptian history.—2822: Hesiod (?): *Catalogus* (?).—2823: Callimachus (?): *Hecale* (?).

If there is little here for lovers of literature, there is much for puzzle-fanciers, though they will need to have faith in their luck if they expect to make convincing supplements, "joins," or identifications, because the distinguished editor seems, quite predictably, to have disposed already of the problems that can be solved by deliberate effort. Yet of the undaunted souls who search a few will possibly be rewarded, and of course new fragments will in time be published which will clarify some of these or be clarified by them.

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ROGER A. PACK

PHILIP DEANE. *Thucydides' Dates 465-431 B.C.* Don Mills, Ont., Canada, Longmans Canada Ltd., 1972. Pp. 139. \$5.50.

This provocative study argues for a set of dates for salient events between 465 and 431 B.C. which are for the most part radically different from those customarily accepted. The battles at the Eurymedon are dated, together with the siege of Naxos, to 465; the "opening of the so-called First Peloponnesian War with the Halieis-Kekryphaleia-Aigina-Megaris sequence of military engagements is later than 460, the first year of the Egyptian expedition, and probably as late as the summer of 456" (6); Tanagra is held to have been fought in 454. Less extreme is Deane's dating of the Thirty Years' Peace (March 445) and the battle at Potidea (Fall 432).

Few would argue against Deane's basic premise that "it is better to explain than to emend" Thucydides' text (5), and it is high time that the dogma was opposed that Thucydides' narrative of the *Pentecontaetia*



was invariably sequential, making emendation of the notorious "tenth year" in 1.103.1 mandatory. Deane follows the manuscript reading here (just as he accepts *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* in 2.2.1), and his conservatism is salutary. Both readings can be retained without violence done to anything more than the purely hypothetical reconstructions incited by emendation of the text. There is nothing problematical about a ten-year-long Messenian War and something very gratuitous in the notion that Thucydides *tacitly* adopted the principle of strict relative chronology in order to set the record, and Hellanicus, straight. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that Deane has offered persuasive reasons, though some exist, for rejecting the standard view of Thucydides' principles of composition.

Deane implies that the system of chronology he presents follows from his having kept Thucydides' text unaltered. In fact, less cogent assumptions underlie some of his more controversial dates. Because Artaxerxes came to power in December 465, that year is made without further ado to belong to the revolt of Naxos and the battle of the Eurymedon. For Thucydides' wording in 1.137.3 "does not suggest much delay between Themistokles' arrival at Ephesos, his trip inland and the letter he sent to Artaxerxes" (10). (Thucydides 1.138, where the historian seems to have tried to waste a little time for Themistocles, is not discussed.) But Thucydides' treatment of the circumstantial details in the episode is not above suspicion. One thinks of his credulity regarding Pausanias. Indeed, it is possibly nothing more than his belief in the authenticity of the letter quoted in 1.137.4 which inspired the inference that Themistocles came to the court of Artaxerxes (rather than Darius'), in which case the synchronism with Naxos may be utterly without value. However that may be, Deane, as is typical in the book, has dealt with this complex problem too summarily. His solution is no more compelling than his reason for setting Naxos and Eurymedon in the same campaign year: "More than one event can happen in one campaigning season" (11); but the "tendency, when dates are not known, to spread out the events, one per year" (11) is less arbitrary in this case than Deane implies. The reduction of a rebellious state and the prosecution of war against Persia are categorically different actions and nothing connects these episodes causally. There is consequently something unsettling in Deane's allusion to the campaign at Cyprus and Byzantium in 478 (1.94.2) as if it were a confirmatory analogy.

Comparable difficulties beset Deane's ascription of *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 929 (the Erechtheid death list in the "annus mirabilis") to, "probably," 456, and the battle of Tanagra to 454. 460 is ruled out for the first because "it seems improbable that the Athenians would start an offensive in Greece in the very same campaigning season in which they began their expedition to Egypt" (38); for Tanagra, the year 454 follows from the belief, by no means unassailable, that the Spartans would not have ventured into central Greece unless the Messenian revolt had ended

(47ff.) as well as from a forced interpretation of Herodotus 9.35 (50f.).

The chief objection, then, to the more controversial conclusions reached in this book is that they are far too weighty for the apparatus sustaining them. Deane is on firmer ground when justifying Thucydides' unaltered text at 1.103.1 and 2.2.1 than when seeking to use these data as levers for moving the traditional dates of loosely contingent events. Difficulties are glossed over with the result that the reader has no full appreciation of the motives prompting earlier scholars to fix upon the dates they have, and events have been shuffled about merely because of what in isolation seems to be "possible." Such a book is not for beginners. It will serve best as a useful reminder of the highly inferential basis of the "orthodox" chronological system.

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HANS HAUBEN. *Callicrates of Samos. A Contribution to the Study of the Ptolemaic Admiralty*. With a Samian inscription published in Appendix by Günter Dunst. Louvain, (University), 1970. Pp. 88; 1 plate. (*Studia Hellenistica* 18)

This dissertation seeks to define the career of Callicrates of Samos, nauarch of Ptolemy II, as a preliminary to a general study of the Ptolemaic admiralty. Since there are few literary texts for the early and mid-third century B.C., it becomes necessary to establish historical data by inscriptions. Hauben has been thoroughly schooled in the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* and is at his best handling the inscriptions and their *apparatus*.

A brief introduction sketches the origins of the term nauarch in the Greek world and postulates that under Ptolemy II the nauarchate came close to being a permanent office and implied the command of all sea forces indefinitely.<sup>1</sup> There are a few sweeping phrases here which are only marginally true.<sup>2</sup> Before a discussion of Callicrates himself (one section—37 pp.) there is a chapter concerning other known men of that name. Hauben considers at least three of them, all in the fourth or very early third century: an administrator of Alexander the Great (331/330); a man who received proxeny at Ephesus (306/294); and a general and

<sup>1</sup> Hauben (pp. 9-10) clearly disapproves of Tarn's ideas of the nauarchate as a ten-year *strategia* over the island world, but puts off a final decision until a later study. Indeed, he presents a lengthy annotated bibliography as a justification for a projected book which will study all known nauarchs.

<sup>2</sup> Not everyone will be content with "the Macedonians. . . who only acquired direct access to the sea under Philip II. . . ." (p. 5).

*philos* of Ptolemy I who campaigned on Cyprus in 310 and in the Aegean in 308.

The sources for the Samian are divided into those before and after the death of Arsinoe II (July 9, 270). The main lines of C.'s career have already been drawn tentatively.<sup>3</sup> A dedication of statues of Ptolemy II and Arsinoe II (279/274) at Olympia by Callicrates lacks the title "nauarch," suggesting his involvement with the royal house and especially Arsinoe even before his appointment. A Samian decree of perhaps 280/279 honors the king and queen as well as Callicrates.<sup>4</sup> On another inscription of the same period he appears as dedicator of a sanctuary at Canopus and is called nauarch, suggesting his appointment before the death of Arsinoe. C. later assumed a prominent place in the cult of Arsinoe-Aphrodite, protectress of the fleet. His command extended over the island world as well as Cyprus, where he was honored as nauarch in several inscriptions. At the outbreak of the Chremonidean War (264) he was honored at Olus on Crete, though in a position subordinate to Patroclus. Hauben sees Patroclus as general with special powers and C. continuing as nauarch. His opinion is a possible solution. About 262/261 the Samian is mentioned by Philadelphus in a letter to the Milesians. Hauben suggests that the loyalty of this city was shaken after the Battle of Cos and that the king was attempting to bolster the position of his son as titular representative and C. as nauarch there. After the subsequent revolt at Miletus the admiral went to Egypt (257) where we find his agent attempting to collect taxes for the fleet. Hauben thinks he was still nauarch and this seems to be further evidence of the complexities of his job. A few additional traces remain, mostly attestations of the name in villages and estates (Arsinoite nome), suggesting he may have held extensive property. The work ends with an attempt to establish a *stemma* from Boiscus, father of Callicrates (and including his brothers) to a Perigenes, nauarch of Philopator, and a possible nephew. Appended to the work is the publication of a Samian inscription by Günter Dunst associating Callicrates with the *Θεοὶ Σαυήρες*.

Callicrates rose to power about the time of Arsinoe's marriage to her brother and he is involved in her various cults. Hauben (following Tarn) believes that he was one of the great men of the age, perhaps because he associated himself with Arsinoe and remained devoted to her long after her death. This may explain his continued power even after the setbacks of the Chremonidean War. His nauarchate extended over the Aegean and Cyprus, yet he was outranked by Patroclus at a crucial point and we have no evidence of military engagements outside

<sup>3</sup> See Hauben p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Hauben implies (p. 40) that C. was nauarch at Samos on the basis of this inscription. But nauarch is only a restoration here (see *OGIS* 1.29), and deductions are problematical. Again the restoration is assumed on p. 63 where C. is regarded unequivocally as nauarch.

of his implied defense of Miletus. His career helps us to understand his office better, but still does not define it precisely. Though Hauben defends his ideas well, they remain possibilities because of our lack of evidence.

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W. V. HARRIS. *Rome in Etruria and Umbria*. Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xiii + 370, with two maps. \$21.00.

This book is an account of Rome's contacts with Etruria and Umbria, the extension of her influence and supremacy over them, their fortunes down to the Social War, their absorption into the Roman state, and their ultimate assimilation. The theme is obviously of the greatest interest and importance for every student of Roman history, and scholarly circles can only be grateful to Dr. Harris for undertaking a task that his predecessors ought to have discharged long ago. And he has performed the task well. His treatment is comprehensive, his command of the source material excellent, his industry unflagging, his judgment reasonable, and his English generally lucid. On the whole he is cautious and conservative, and he does not strain after a spurious originality by resorting to wild and fanciful conjecture. On the contrary, the book is a good, workmanlike, firmly based, and well documented study. Readers will not find the answer to each and every matter about which doubt and dispute are possible, in some instances perhaps because the author's own conclusions are not set forth with as much crispness as one would have liked (his remarks on *civitas sine suffragio* for Caere [45-47], on the suppression of the Bacchanalia [110], on the Umbrian *kvestur* [191], on Cicero's *Pro Caecina* [276f.] are somewhat lacking in incisiveness). But they will find all aspects of Rome's relations with Etruria and Umbria carefully examined.

Cavils are of course possible in the case of any book, and the reviewer raises the following points about the present one. In chapter I ("The Sources") Harris begins by saying that for Etruria "there is a particularly rich mine of local evidence" (1). This, however, hardly emerges from his own account. Actually he leaves the opposite impression, namely that only the sketchiest knowledge about the Etruscans is possible. Those modern scholars, such as Heurgon, who think that there was a real Etruscan literary tradition are probably mistaken (9). The *Tuscae historiae* and *fabulae Etruscae*, recorded by Varro (*Ling.* 5.55) and perhaps known to the emperor Claudius, did not amount to much and in any case do not seem to have been read by the surviving Greek and Roman historians (13-21). In fact, such writings as the Etruscans did produce were chiefly concerned with the *Etrusca discip-*

*lina* (5), but neither Roman nor Greek accounts of this are above suspicion (8, 15). Even what Dionysius of Halicarnassus has to say about the Etruscans, and he was obviously interested in them, is largely romance (31). What the Etruscans themselves said (in the form, for instance, of local *elogia* set up at Tarquinia) is hardly more reliable (28). Harris' rich mine of local evidence is thus reduced to the prophecy of Vegoia (about which he gives an enlightening account: (31-40). Unfortunately he entirely ignores Tages, the alleged source of the *Libri Haruspicini*, and his later reference to "Tagetic books" (182) is well calculated to baffle some readers. Incidentally his chapter on the sources takes no account whatever of Umbria (which also gets comparatively little treatment throughout). Admittedly the ancients have left us little on the subject of Umbria. But should not that little have been described in chapter 1 instead of being scattered casually (84 and elsewhere) throughout the rest of the book?

Chapter 2 ("The Wars of Conquest") well illustrates his conservative approach to the Roman annalistic tradition (see 60, for example). Whatever view one takes of his determination to avoid what he calls (50) "an excess of disbelief" (and not everyone will accept his account in its entirety), many readers will regret a lack of elaboration on certain matters: on 59 there is a tantalizing allusion to a "league of Etruscan states" and nothing further; Nequinum-Narnia is pronounced unequivocally Umbrian (on 61 and elsewhere), yet in a footnote on 65 it is described as "Sabine-Samnite"; there is no hint that the site of Arna (69) is doubtful; and there is no discussion of the Roman proverb about going to Sutrium (see Festus 406L.).

Chapter 3 ("The Roman 'Foedera'"), welcome though it is as a compilation of the available evidence, will strike some readers as naive on certain matters. Harris thinks that when Rome interfered in the local affairs of Etruscan and Umbrian communities, it was regularly at the invitation of the natives (109): moreover he is inclined to belittle the degree of such Roman interference (110f.). On this matter Badian seems to the present reviewer a much safer guide than Göhler. Even Harris admits (111) that "in 133 there was a significant change in the treatment of the allies," but unfortunately proposes to leave the details of this for some other occasion.

Chapter 4 ("The Alliance with the Etruscan 'Principes'") is perhaps the most original part of the book. Here Harris describes Etruscan social stratification, adducing all the evidence there is for the division into a dominant ruling class and a mass of serfs. By safeguarding the power and status of the *domini*, Rome could count on Etruscan loyalty. There is, of course, nothing new in the view that Rome exercised her supremacy in republican Italy through the local aristocracies, but Harris does put the case forcefully and lucidly: in Etruria the local *principes* did the job that *coloniae* did elsewhere (144). He may overstate his case a bit. Etruscan defectors to Hannibal, about whom he has

some judicious things to say on p. 139, may have included more of the *domini* than he is prepared to admit. Even if we reject the exaggerated picture drawn by Pfiffig, there must have been quite a few defectors in Etruria. It is significant that the Romans thought it necessary to order Cosa, the Latin colony in Etruria, to beware of enrolling any when it was recruiting new settlers after the Second Punic War (Livy 33.24.9).

Chapter 5 ("The Romanization of Etruria and Umbria") systematically shows how both regions became Roman, in outlook no less than in law. No one will quarrel with the statement (160) that here the *coloniae* played the most important role: as Fraccaro remarked long ago, the colonies were the real instrument in the romanization of Italy. Harris' view (186) that Umbria adopted Latin before Etruria is also plausible enough, despite the paucity of the evidence. Even so, his conclusions about the pace of romanization in Etruria are not wholly convincing. The evidence he himself adduces hardly confirms the statement (192) that the romanization of Etruria proceeded only slowly before the Social War; moreover one would expect Etruria to have been rather more romanized before 90 B.C. than this statement implies, since just one hundred years later it had completely discarded Etruscan (as Harris himself points out, p. 182). Incidentally he could have strengthened his own arguments for the disappearance of Etruscan in the last century B.C. by citing the inscription from Ferentium which indicates that the family from which the emperor Otho later came still used some Etruscan in 67 B.C. but was completely Latin-using by 23 B.C. (see A. Degraffi in *Rend Pont Acc.* 34 [1961] 74).

Chapter 6 ("The Social War") is a sensible account of the Etruscan and Umbrian roles in 91-89, although it is not true that three of the Gracchan terminal stones were found in Apulia (p. 205, n. 1): the stones referred to come from Rocca San Felice, and it is on Hirpinian territory, not Apulian. In chapter 7 ("The Enfranchisement of the Etruscan and Umbrian Communities") exception might be taken to the suggestion (248) that the Samnites and Hirpini had organized municipal centres before 89.

Chapter 8 ("The Sullan Settlement") is the least satisfactory. It is not true that the last serious resistance to Sulla was in Etruria (p. 256): it was further south, at Aesernia and Nola. The attempt (289f.) to show that Catiline's followers in Etruria were mainly those whom Sulla had dispossessed is not very convincing, nor is the belittling (297f.) of the support Caesar found in Umbria (Auximum, it is true, is not in Umbria, but it ought not to have been ignored in this context).

The concluding chapter 9 ("The Augustan Settlement") contains much valuable material, but the manner of its presentation is rather frustrating: to discover the degree of coincidence between Pliny and the *Libri Coloniarum* the reader has to make his own collation by laboriously working his way through a catalogue on pp. 306-313. (The reader's convenience is similarly ignored elsewhere in the book, where

there is too frequent recourse to the at times positively bewildering expressions art. cit. and op. cit. Surely a book priced as high as this one ought to provide clear references.) Staccioli's *La Lingua degli Etruschi* (Rome 1970) presumably appeared too late for inclusion in Harris' Bibliography. But his list should show the second (1969) rather than the first (1960) edition of Luisa Banti's *Il Mondo degli Etruschi*.

The foregoing remarks with their emphasis on points where the reviewer does not fully share the author's opinion do not by any means imply disapproval of the book. It has many merits, both in the overall picture it draws and in the many details it supplies (its identification of individual Etruscans and Umbrians who acquired the *civitas* before 91 B.C., to give but one example). It will undoubtedly be the very serviceable standard work on its subject until some scholar gives us that precise and careful account of non-Roman Italy under the Republic that Wilamowitz called for almost fifty years ago.

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P. A. BRUNT. *Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.-A.D. 14*. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1971. Pp. xxii + 750. £9.00.

"Modern demography is above all a highly refined technique of statistical analysis," as Professor Finley wrote in a notable review (*JRS* [1958] 158). What then of a study of ancient manpower when, in addition to the natural complexities of the subject, evidence is fragmentary, reliable statistics are few, ancient numbers as reported, especially those of military casualties, are often exaggerated and can at best only be approximate? This is one of the major problems behind the massive and important book here under review, the fruit of over ten years of study and reflection about the social and economic problems of ancient Italy from before the Hannibalic war to the end of the principate of Augustus. The search for material is wide and thorough, ranging from that unique and tantalizing source, the Roman census lists, to the data on the strength of the military forces. The Polybian report of the Roman survey of available manpower in 225 B.C. is the natural point of departure. No less wide is the range of factors that might have affected the populations of Italy. These are topics which are treated fully and analytically on the large canvas of this work, with the findings of modern demographic studies in mind. The whole is a monument of scholarship which will remain, regardless of points of uncertainty, agreement, or disagreement, a necessary work of reference.

The volume is divided into four parts, followed by twenty-nine appendices and a substantial list of addenda, with sixteen illustrative tables at various points in the text. The first part is concerned with the Roman census figures as they are reported in the various ancient sources, their basis (what groups compose the total), their reliability (both in textual tradition and as record), and their relation at various periods to the classes and conditions of the population of Italy: Roman, Italian, free, freedmen, or slave. It concludes with a comprehensive study of the factors affecting reproductivity. In this there is discussion of such interconnected factors as expectation of life, mortality, nuptiality, and limitation of families, with emphasis placed on those that might tend to limit increases in population. Of these perhaps the most striking were poverty (138f.), urban crowding (134f.), wars (134ff.), the chances against freedmen raising a family, or at least a sizable family, of freeborn citizens (143ff.), limitations of families by contraception, abortion, or infanticide, and the preference for rearing boys rather than girls with evidence for a resulting shortage of women (146ff.). The second part deals with the citizens overseas, emigrants, colonists, business men, or enfranchised provincials, before and after Caesar (about 150,000 in 49), with a special discussion of Cisalpine Gaul. The third is a series of special studies chiefly dealing with the land: devastation in the Hannibalic War, the Roman annexations after it, an outstanding chapter on land allotments (primarily to veterans), and the extent and nature of *Italiae solitudo*. But an additional chapter reviews the urban recipients of the dole, and the special pattern of mortality and fertility of the urban population. The fourth part, a valuable dissertation in itself, is devoted to the incidence of conscription (always in use, regardless of volunteering), numbers of legions recruited and their probable strength throughout the period up to Actium, important evidence for the probable strength of the total population.

The author's approach is a return, against Tenney Frank's conclusions, to the sceptical analysis of sources and many of the conclusions of Beloch in the relevant chapters of the *Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (1886), but with much more comprehensive discussion of the social and economic factors. One theme and one question are dominant. The theme: "The society and economy of ancient Italy were moulded by war, with its concomitants of conscription, confiscations, devastations and endemic violence. It was with the aim of linking the history of Italy with the consequences of war that I undertook to write this book" (p. vii). The question, posed earlier by Beloch, provides a focus for much of the discussion. What is the best explanation of the striking increases in the census figures from 463,000 and 910,000 in 86/85 and 70/69 B.C., respectively, to 4,063,000 in 28 B.C., and what order of magnitude in the resulting estimate of the total population is most consistent with the body of evidence as a whole?

Leaving aside the early census figures, which Beloch and Brunt



reject and Frank defended, following Pliny, *HN* 33.16 (in a book where Timaeus and Piso are merely possible sources), as including all *capita libera* and changing in general consistently with the trends indicated by the tradition and the apparent area of the *ager Romanus*, we find all three in agreement that in the middle and the late Republic before Augustus the total number of adult males, including *cives sine suffragio*, was the basis of enumeration, although much other information was collected, and that during much of the second century the margin of error, even when considerable, was not intolerable. Aberrations might be differently explained. For Frank the decrease from 270,713 in 234/233 to 137,108 in 209/208 was due to casualties in war, the defection of Capua, and omission of soldiers in service overseas, while Beloch and Brunt favor a simple textual emendation. Explanations of the decrease from 214,000 in 204/203, a year when special commissioners were sent overseas to register the soldiers, to 143,704 in 194/193 follow similar lines.

The crucial problem is the wide discrepancies in the numbers after the Italians attained citizenship in the Social war. For Beloch and Brunt it is necessary to assume that Augustus changed the basis of enumeration to include all *capita libera*, men, women, and children over one year. Yet in the *Res Gestae* (8) Augustus continues to use the formula of the earlier reports: *civium Romanorum censa sunt capita*, and it is surprising that such a departure from centuries of republican custom should go unattested in a relatively well documented period. For Tenney Frank the discrepancies were due to increasing carelessness about registration from the late second century on, failure to register new citizens after the social war (still quite incomplete in 70/69), the emigration of business men, and latterly of colonists, to the provinces, all factors more than compensated, he thought, by the more efficient system of local registration constituted by Caesar and used by Augustus in Italy and abroad, a large accession (perhaps as much as 1,000,000) through the enfranchisement of the Transpadanes in 49, and accretions to the citizen body through manumissions and natural increase. For Brunt the effect of these factors was either negligible or less than Frank supposed, while he emphasizes the strain that was imposed on Italian manpower and the evidence we possess on depopulation and social and economic misery from the Hannibalic through the Social and the Civil Wars, and holds that the record of legions and recruitment favors the lower estimates of the available manpower. Hence for Frank an estimate of the population of Italy in 28 B.C. including slaves might be as high as 14,000,000, for Brunt no more than 7,500,000 persons.

Did it remain necessary up to Caesar's time to register in Rome? Brunt believes not. On this question depends the allowance to be made for defective registration of Romans, and later (in 86/85 and 70/69) of Italians, as territory expanded and the cessation of the *tributum* made registration, still important for voting in the classes, unimportant for

taxation. As Brunt shows, a system of local registration would have been more reasonable, efficient, and convenient, and apparently municipal registers were available. However, Scipio's complaint (*ORF*<sup>2</sup> 126) and a passage in a letter to Atticus (1.18.8) indicate that registration in absence was not uncommon, and Wiseman has recently (in *JRS* [1969] 59ff.) drawn attention to the crowds that came *undique* to Rome in 70 for elections, games, and the census (*Verr.* 1.54). Provision for local registration is not attested until the Lex Iulia Municipalis but, as Frederiksen points out (*JRS* [1965] 183ff, esp. 193-95), this law contains clauses attested in earlier legislation. Brunt may well be right but it awaits proof.

The census of 86/85 is clearly incomplete. Interpretation of that of 70/69 depends on ease of registration, earlier estimates of citizen numbers, and especially of the relative rate of increase among the allies in the previous century. The Social War did strain available manpower, and, once mobilized, it seems the Romans and loyal allies were able to field superior forces. The rate of increase of the Italian population may well have slowed as burdens increased, tracts given over to grazing expanded, and large slave-worked estates and villas replaced free owners or tenants. The author attributes more of the decline to these factors than to the devastation caused by the Hannibalic war. But it is not easy to discredit Appian's statement, twice repeated, that the new citizens far outnumbered the old (*BC* 1.53 and 55) or Velleius' (2.20.2) on the fear of the old citizens *ne potentia eorum et multitudo veterum civium dignitatem frangeret plusque possent recepti in beneficium quam auctores beneficii* as at least representing the general situation if they were registered in all the tribes. If so, we may still consider that in spite of increasing difficulties in the second century and the disastrous conditions during the Sullan and the later civil wars a larger number subsisted than the author estimates. It may still not be enough to justify Frank's estimate, which Brunt shows to be inconsistent with increases reported between 28 B.C. and A.D. 14 (when much of the increase reported lived overseas), and the alarm contemporaries felt at the decline of population on the land.

Many of the numbers in ancient sources are rejected or reduced. Italians and Romans overseas were less numerous than has been supposed. Nor, unless *conubium* was granted, did the issue of marriages between Romans and provincials enter the citizen body. Yet in Spain a *πλήθος Ἰταλῶν* had been engaged in the mining business alone. Romanization advanced rapidly in the south and latterly local legions could be raised. The author rejects 80,000, the lower of the numbers given, as murdered in Asia at Mithridates' command. The account of Scaevola as proconsul suggests that the publicans already had large staffs there, and south Italians had been carrying on business a century or more. If, as Appian tells us, the victims included Romans and Italians (now entitled to wear the toga), women, children, freedmen,

and slaves of Italian birth, the total, though large, may not seem wholly fantastic. Pompey raised two legions there in 49-48. In Africa not only were legions raised but there were active and influential groups of Romans in both larger and smaller towns, and in Numidia, as at Zama, where Caesar sold the property of Romans who had borne arms *contra populum Romanum* (B.Afr. 97).

The question of estimating the numbers involved affects in some degree the whole treatment of land allotments and their effects, the size of veteran colonies (many of those of Caesar and Augustus overseas), and under Augustus the estimate is dependent on the supposed rate of discharge of veterans after Actium as Augustus proceeded to form his new army (332ff.) and on Caesar's settlements of members of the urban plebs. Suetonius and Appian are wrong in putting 20,000 such settlers on the Campanian land in 59, nor was that land all assigned as late as 50 B.C. (314ff.). Contrary to Frank, the sum in the *aerarium* in 49 gives no clue to additions to the citizen body through manumission (549ff.) as both the return on the 5% tax and the price of slaves is uncertain. But enfranchisements of provincials and slaves increased the total citizen body while concealing a diminution of free Italian stock (112-117f.). Moreover, if most manumissions were informal, as the author holds, these did not swell the citizen body at all (101-3), but, it seems, many who were informally freed managed to get themselves illegally on the grain dole, and their removal helps to explain the discrepancy between the number Caesar removed from the dole (170,000), and the number (70,000) it is estimated he sent to overseas colonies (257ff., 381ff.). Again, the strength of forces as given in ancient sources is frequently, and rightly, doubted as schematic, based simply on the number of legions assumed to be at or near full strength, with insufficient regard for incompleteness or wastage. This too affects not only the relation of size of armies to actual manpower, but estimates of numbers available for discharge and rewards. The general tendency of the whole treatment is to weaken the possibility of the higher estimates of the population of Italy.

What then of Cisalpine Gaul where Frank conjectures that 1 million adult males were added with the enfranchisement of Transpadana in 49, while Brunt's guess is 300,000? Polybius witnesses to its extraordinary fertility and prosperity, and Strabo to the same effect is the more convincing if his sources in part date from the second century. His *εὐανδρία*, when coupled with size of towns (5.1.12; cf. 1.2.40), should imply populous, even when referring also to Ligurian villages (5.1.11). It had been relatively peaceful since the conquest except for Alpine raids. Colonization and virthane assignments had provided a base for over a century of development and sources from which the good news of available land may have come not only to adjacent Etruria and Umbria but to the persons who were losing out in central Italy. But the claim that names found in Oscan connections become numerous in

Cisalpine Gaul has not been documented (*CJ* 19 [1934] 599-608). Whatever had been accomplished in pre-Roman times, drainage of marshes and reclamation of land had continued for more than two generations, and if some of the new land inured to large land-holders tenants may well have been wanted. The Cisalpina was Caesar's chief recruiting ground, and had not been his alone, and Forni (*Reclutamento* 139ff.) shows that a very high proportion (135 out of 207) of the soldiers of known origin from Augustus to Caligula came from there. In the first century Patavium was a rich and prosperous town (500 men of equestrian census under Augustus) and noted as a center, not for its sheep only, but for the manufacture of woollens, and other towns were like it. Brunt agrees that peace, prosperity, and reclamation of cultivable land from the forests and marshes of the Po valley could have raised his estimate of 300,000 to 500,000 adult males in the Cisalpina in 225 to over a million in 49 (198) but holds that these conditions were not met. Although the material cited above is no proof of Frank's estimate for 49 it may still suggest that a considerably higher one than Brunt's is possible.

Granting the continuance of conscription, the study of recruitment, wastage, and recurrent crises of manpower presents the strongest arguments in favor of the lower estimate of Italian manpower and hence of the otherwise unattested change of the basis of enumeration under Augustus. Where so many factors seem incapable of precise measurement and it is necessary to proceed by assumption and conjecture (may, possible, and perhaps, are frequently recurring words), one may still admit the possibility of still higher numbers, and maintain some reserve about conclusions reached by rejecting or limiting through explanation so many numbers in the ancient sources. One can only be grateful for so careful and comprehensive a work of great independent value for the social and economic history of ancient Italy.

The appendices are a valuable series of studies in themselves, especially those on Italian municipal autonomy before 90 B.C., Pliny on Africa and Spain, the survey of provincial colonies and *municipia*, malaria in ancient Italy, and the essay on *Dilectus*. Recent discovery and discussion brings some further support for the Marian veteran settlements in Africa which the author rejects (C. Poinssot, *CRAI* [1962] 55-76; G. Ch. Picard, *Karthago* 15 [1969] 3-12). The standard of production is excellent and a few misprints (e.g. Pliny, *NH* iii, 138 (not 38) on p. 168, n.5 and iii (not v) 36 on p. 590) are easily corrected.

EUGEN CIZEK. *L' Époque de Néron et ses controverses idéologiques.* (*Roma Aeterna* 4). Leiden, Brill, 1972. Pp. xxi + 440. Fl. 96.00.

The Neronian epoch, defined by Cizek as the twenty year period between Seneca's return from exile and Vespasian's accession, should be understood in terms of struggles between various aristocratic groups in Rome, struggles that arose out of more or less fixed positions in politics, philosophy, and aesthetics in conjunction. This, briefly expressed, is the major premise of this book, which amounts to a political and literary analysis of the age of Nero.

A brief introduction announces the intention of investigating these groups and their ideologies. The first chapter then offers a review of the literary sources available for the principate of Nero with indications of their attitudes, mostly hostile, towards the emperor. Much here is familiar and does not call for discussion. Yet one cannot maintain (24) that Suetonius alone of the main sources drew on a tradition favourable to Nero: certain items in the "good" section of the biography of Nero can be paralleled in Tacitus and Cassius Dio (e.g., private gifts to individuals, the reception of Tiridates, etc.) and must have been derived from a tradition which was generally available.

In the second chapter, after a sketch of political, economic, and social conditions before Nero's accession, Cizek propounds his main thesis: in a context of increasing autocracy ideological debate at Rome took place secretly in *circuli* of the type defined in Tac. *Ann.* 3.54.1. These groups were based on similarity of political and cultural interest between members, while differences in outlook between groups were reflected in the literary productions of the period. The most prominent group was that of the *Annaei*, divided into two subsidiary circles led respectively by Seneca and Annaeus Cornutus; its philosophical basis lay in Stoicism while politically it was representative of the new nobility. Also of particular importance were the *Calpurnii*, a group led by the Calpurnii Pisones, philosophically committed to Epicureanism and politically in favour of cooperation with the princeps. Altogether some ten such groups are postulated by Cizek for the whole period.

No one will reasonably doubt that groups of this nature did exist, but the type of evidence cited by the author to illustrate their membership is often unconvincing and elicits in the reader a considerable degree of scepticism as to the overall trustworthiness of his proposals. Thus, for instance, in the discussion of Seneca's circle (61f.), the reader is referred for certain members to a periodical item from 1910, not to any ancient testimony; "Toute une pléiade de jeunes gens brillants" (61) becomes in actuality no more than four men, for only one of whom a reference is given (Plut. *Galba* 23, which should read 20); and for "d'innombrables chevaliers, quelques affranchis, des provinciaux" (62) two names are given, again seemingly with a wrong reference (Tac. *Ann.* 15.43.4 = 15.49.4?). Not unnaturally Afranius Burrus is included

by Cizek in Seneca's circle, but the ancient evidence on Burrus concerns mainly his political role under Nero and provides no indication that Burrus held any philosophical or aesthetic views. So within Cizek's general schema one is entitled to ask whether political relationships automatically lead to cultural affinities. This would appear unlikely—as, indeed, Cizek seems occasionally to recognize (cf. 290 and see further below). There is, therefore, a certain arbitrariness about Cizek's work.

The next two chapters treat Neronian political history respectively from A.D. 54 to A.D. 61 and from A.D. 61 to A.D. 68. Three phases are basically distinguished: a period of despotism based on Stoic *clementia* with the *Annaei* in the political ascendent; a period of despotism with Senecan *clementia* displaced by Neronian *severitas*, A.D. 61 being an important turning point; and from c. A.D. 66 on, a period marked by Nero's wishes to develop Iranian theocratic tendencies in his rule and to divide the empire with Greece as a new imperial seat. As examples of how the author believes literature reflected political developments mention may be made of the *Apocolocyntosis*, written by Seneca in A.D. 55 as a vehicle of anti-Claudianism to counter the propaganda of Agrippina; Calp. *Eclog.* I, written in A.D. 54 and proof of an alliance between *Annaei* and *Calpurnii*; Lucan *Pharsal.* I-III, published by A.D. 63 as an expression of Italian traditionalism against the Hellenistic monarchy of Nero, and so on. On many points, for example Agrippina's "Claudianism," the decline in the importance of Seneca after A.D. 61, and the success of Tiridates' visit to Rome, Cizek has sound comments. However, a second major criticism emerges in the course of reading these chapters, namely, the attempt by Cizek to force events and pieces of literature into his framework of groups and ideologies with the result of rigidity and excessive schematization at the expense of total credibility. Thus, Nero's interest in art and sport is converted into a conscious motivating force—implausibly: "Même si l'engouement de Néron pour les arts et le sport était sincère et, au fond, indépendant de la situation sociale et politique, l'empereur ne s'efforçait pas moins de lui conférer un sens politique" (124). Discussion is often lacking on disputed composition dates of works of literature—no recognition, even of Toynbee's view (cf. *CQ* 36 [1942] 83ff.) that the *Apocolocyntosis* might belong to as late a date as c. A.D. 60—while in the descriptions of Seneca's prose works one feels often that the ideology of a whole group is being constructed from what is, after all, the expression of only one individual.

As regards Nero himself Cizek allows him too much independence in the post-accession part of the reign. Nero is supposed to have *selected* the *Annaei* over Agrippina at this time, yet surely in reality the struggle in A.D. 54-55 was not for Nero's favour but for control over him, involving with it the elimination of one faction by another. Again, Cizek is not the first to believe in the influence on Nero of Iranian

concepts, but he presents too one-sided a picture since the view that this sort of influence was minimal has been presented with equal force (see, e.g. A. Boethius: *The Golden House of Nero*, pp. 118ff. a work not cited by Cizek).

Chapter five discusses Nero's fall, which is consequent upon the rejection of Nero's own ideology, "le néronisme," by all elements in Roman society. The rebellion of Vindex represents the spread of discontent with Nero from Rome to the provinces, but it did not completely eradicate Neronism which was kept spluttering briefly as Otho and Vitellius made use of it in their own propaganda. Cizek contends that Neronism was ahead of its time, unsuited to the political realities of the day. One is struck in this section by the noticeable errors of fact in the writing. News of Vindex' uprising did *not* reach Nero at Naples "à la fin de mars" (232) but considerably earlier in the month (cf. Suet. *Nero* 40.4). Vindex did *not* throw his forces against the legions of Verginius Rufus (234)—not at least according to Dio 63.24.3. Nor is it probable that the building of the Golden House was completed by Otho (239; cf. W. L. MacDonald: *The Architecture of the Roman Empire* vol. I, p. 32). Such mistakes of detail only serve to increase dissatisfaction on the reader's part.

The second half of the book turns away from politics to concentrate on stylistic analyses of the literature of the age. Firstly, however, chapter six offers a sketch of prevailing trends in philosophy and religion. The predominance of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism is straightforward. But Cizek's views on gradations of Stoicism are more controversial. Thrasea Paetus and Musonius Rufus are said to have represented Stoic orthodoxy; Seneca, not uninfluenced by the Epicureans and the need to make orthodoxy more palatable, to have represented a more supple doctrine. Interest lies of course in the degree of Thrasea's commitment to Stoicism. In the main account of his activities, Tacitus' *Annals*, there is no occasion on which Thrasea is described as a Stoic. His concern is with *libertas*, which can have only a political connotation. On two occasions Thrasea is associated indirectly with philosophy: his followers are once described as "rigidi et tristes" (*Ann.* 16.22.3)—perhaps an allusion to a posture of pseudo-philosophic reproach against the princeps—while in his last hours Thrasea discourses with the Cynic Demetrius (*Ann.* 16.34). This surely is not enough evidence to allow Thrasea to become a champion of Stoic orthodoxy or to believe that his political defiance arose out of philosophical principle. His association with Persius does not prove this nor, as Cizek is inclined to believe, is there any evidence to show that Thrasea had any literary influence.

Chapter seven describes the appearance in the Julio-Claudian period of a new literary style which came to a peak of popularity under Nero. The style was characterized by *vigor*, *brevitas*, *color poeticus*, and *varietas*, and its chief devotees were the *Annaei*. During the predomi-

nance of the latter, A.D. 51-65, the style even gave rise to a fully-fledged literary movement (chapter eight). Other literary styles still retained adherents; the *Calpurnii*, for example, were classicists, while the Neronian aesthetic combined traditional and new elements after its development from a period of Senecan influence into a personal expression during the years A.D. 59-62 (chapter nine). Symbolic of the aesthetic rivalry of the age—colourfully described by the author as “une lutte acharnée” (271)—is the rift between Nero and Lucan, the result rather of literary than political reasons.

Again the general outline appears accurate enough here, the author seemingly influenced by Leeman's *Orationis Ratio*. But as in the first half of the book more examples of forcedness and speculation are in evidence. Cizek tries to put every Neronian writer into the straight jacket of an ideology despite the fact that on occasion he is well aware of the inflexibility of his system. Persius, he feels, is awkward to categorize according to the rubrics postulated, but nonetheless Persius *is* categorized as a classicist (381ff.). Vergilius Rufus is included in Nero's group on the basis of a single reference to the effect that he wrote some erotic verses (285 n.3; 393 n.2). And finally, from the few fragments of Nero's own verses is resurrected a “courant littéraire tout entier formé à la cour” (393).

Cizek's conclusions are summarized in chapter ten, and a brief Appendix gives notice of a few works published since this book was written which impinge upon its content. A Bibliography precedes an index of names and of anonymous works. Throughout the book misprints are superabundant, though they are not usually confusing. In spite of the length of the bibliography there are some significant omissions, a few of which have been indicated above. To the list of general works on Nero given on p. 2 should now be added B. H. Warmington: *Nero; Reality and Legend* (1969).

This review has emphasized apparent weaknesses in Cizek's book, but nonetheless the specialist in Neronian studies will find here much provocative reading. The book, however, cannot be consulted for hard and fast reliable information, and its terminology is often questionable. In the second half of the book terms such as “romantic,” “baroque,” even “rococo” appear frequently; one wonders exactly how relevant to Latin literature these epithets are. Again, Cizek never defines just what he means by “aristocratic,” yet surely this word will not do for all the people for whom membership in an ideological group is claimed. Lastly, just how *would* Seneca have written “ideology”?



C. P. JONES. *Plutarch and Rome*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xiii + 157. \$9.

Books and articles about Plutarch have become more frequent in recent years, and a good case can always be made for an essay that is written in more attractive style and form than that of the *Realencyclopædie*. But it cannot be denied that Konrat Ziegler's article in the *RE* has made the task of scholars much easier, by collecting an enormous amount of information that would otherwise have been difficult to track down. Jones, as might be expected, refers to it constantly in his footnotes, but he omits it from his bibliography, because he made it a rule not to mention *RE* articles; he could have made an exception for this article, which was published separately in 1949 as *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*. He takes full account of more recent scholarly literature, while expecting the reader to find earlier bibliography in Ziegler.

Jones' purpose in this book, which is adapted from his Harvard dissertation, is to show the attitude of Plutarch towards Rome and Roman rule. Very properly he devotes the first half of his book to an examination of Plutarch's public career, his family background, and his large circle of influential friends in official positions. He has done his work carefully, but seems unwilling to allow much argument to enter into his text. Remarks like "there is evidence for yet another early interest of his, to which he never confesses" (14), "Secundus appears to be of Gallic origin" (50), "Plutarch probably held the position (procurator of Greece) only in a nominal capacity" (34), are tantalizing, especially to a reader who may know enough of the Roman provincial system to wonder how anyone could be a procurator of Greece. Usually (though not always) Jones makes it clear that he has reasons for his opinion, giving a reference to an inscription or *PIR* or a modern prosopographical expert like Syme. But why not give the reader a little more solid meat? A book of this kind becomes more interesting, to all kinds of readers, when some indications are given of the way in which evidence is acquired and evaluated. Instead of being told that "evidence" or "an inscription" exists in support of some statement, it is more satisfactory to be shown what the inscription has to tell, or how or why some particular detail about some man or some appointment is usual or unusual. If a dozen words can explain something to a reader, why force him to climb to the fifth floor of the library in search of the explanation?

Plutarch has no wish to tell his readers all the details of his official career or how successful he was or how many important people he knew, nor is he concerned to reveal himself as a loyal servant of the Roman administration. Scholars have worried too much about his "purpose" in writing. A student cannot perhaps earn his doctorate by arguing that Plutarch wrote "for fun," but in ancient times as in

modern anyone who writes so voluminously and on such a wide variety of subjects as Plutarch is likely to have written mainly because he enjoyed writing. He had read widely and had many interests—literary, philosophical, religious, scientific, mathematical, historical—without being a professional expert in any subject (though perhaps more thoroughly trained in philosophy than in any other field). And like all such writers it is no surprise if he expresses quite a number of conventional, sometimes contradictory opinions.

Jones concludes that Plutarch's attitude towards Rome is in fact revealed by his predictable and conventional remarks on Roman life, manners, history, and politics—his praise of past glories, his complaints of the decadence of his own day, his criticisms of men like Sulla and Antony. Does it really follow that he was a conventional and perhaps not very intelligent man? There is no surer way to misunderstand the ancient world than to think Greek and Latin writers always meant exactly what they said and said all that they thought. Tacitus knew better. We need not believe every word he says in the opening chapters of the *Agricola*, but he makes it very plain that until the death of Domitian no writer could ever venture anything but a "safe" opinion and the fashion was not likely to change all of a sudden with the revival of confidence under Nerva and Trajan. Plutarch may have written more extensively in this later "happier" age, but he had written constantly since the time of Nero and he had survived. Not all of his friends were so fortunate. Does he express sadness or bitterness at their loss? Could he have done so without uselessly risking his own life? And why does he tell only one story about Arulenus Rusticus, the philosopher who was put to death by Domitian? Might one venture to say that it was a safe story to tell, or at least that he thought so?

Jones has written a good book, based on sound scholarship, and he gives an admirable account of the circles in which Plutarch moved and the opinions that he appears to have held. But does what Plutarch says about himself and his friends tell us any more than that he is a kindly cultured man, generous to his friends and devoted to traditional ideals? This is perhaps all we need to know if we are to enjoy Plutarch's writings, because it is Plutarch the literary artist who should command our respect; he is not asking us to admire him as a man or a Roman citizen. If we want to know (or rather to conjecture) what he really thought, we must go beyond the evidence and draw upon our imagination.

One expects that a book from the Clarendon Press will be beautifully produced and beautifully printed, and one is inclined to take it for granted that the printing is done in Oxford in Walton Street. But the fine printing in this book is the work of William Clowes and Son.

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## INTERACTION BETWEEN CHORUS AND CHARACTERS IN THE *ORESTEIA*

There are three passages in the *Oresteia* in which the interaction between Chorus and character, or characters, effects a substantial change of attitude in one or both of the elements concerned. The first is the long confrontation between Clytemnestra and the Chorus, after Clytemnestra's double murder (*Agamemnon* 1372-1577); the second is "the great *kommos*" which Orestes and Electra sing with the Chorus around the tomb of Agamemnon (*Choephoroi* 306-465); the third is the confrontation between Athena and the Chorus of Furies, after the acquittal of Orestes (*Eumenides* 778-1020). Each passage is essential to the expression of the theme of its play and each contributes, though to differing degrees, to its dramatic action.

Most of this material is in the form of *kommoi* (i.e. passages in which Chorus and actors sing in turn) or *epirrhematic kommoi* (in which an actor responds to the lyric stanzas of the Chorus in anapestic or iambic verse). Perhaps because *kommoi* were originally used purely for lamentations shared by Chorus and actors,<sup>1</sup> critics frequently fail to observe the high degree of dramatic progression which may take place within them. However, it is often the exploitation of this combination of lyric and dramatic elements (for even when singing a character does not lose his dramatic personality) which alone can bring about, at a given moment in the drama, the precise dramatic development or thematic illumination required.

How, then, does Aeschylus effect the dramatic progression in the passages mentioned and what, if any, similarities may be observed between them?

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Aristotle *Poetics* 1452b24-25. For a discussion of *epirrhematic kommoi*, which are more common in Aeschylus, see Haigh, *Tragic Drama of the Greeks* (Oxford 1896) 359-61. (In the third edition of this work, edited by Pickard-Cambridge [1907], this discussion is suppressed and the term *kommos* is restricted to lamentations expressed in musical duets between actors and Chorus; see p. 268, n. 1 and p. 316).

## I

The long epirrhematic *kommos* (1407-1577) shared between the Chorus and Clytemnestra, immediately after the murder of the King, recapitulates in a new form several themes which have recurred throughout the play. One of these is the old question of an individual's responsibility for a consciously chosen deed of violence which may also be seen as the fulfillment of the will of Zeus or of a family curse. Another is the reassertion, in more explicit form, of the parallel roles of Clytemnestra and Helen as priestesses of destruction (*Atê*) in the house of Atreus.

In the speech preceding the *kommos*, Clytemnestra has asserted in the strongest possible terms her responsibility for, and satisfaction in, the murder of her husband:

I stand now where I struck, as I stand by the deed I have  
accomplished. (1379)

ἔστηκα δ' ἐνθ' ἔπαισ' ἐπ' ἐξειργασμένοις. (1379)

So I acted and I'll not deny these deeds! (1380)

I struck him twice . . . and gave him a third blow where he had  
fallen . . . (1384-86).

No other speech in Greek Tragedy contains so many (ten in all) and such insistent references to the speaker's responsibility for a deed. Even the immediate motivation of the murder, vengeance for Iphigenia, takes second place to the physical satisfaction, the sheer glorying in personal and well-planned achievement. No hint of any supernatural *force majeure* is allowed to enter yet; indeed this same assertion, defiant and personal, receives still greater emphasis after the first brief outburst (1399-1400) from the Chorus.

I tell you, this is Agamemnon, my husband, now made a  
corpse by my right hand . . . (1404-5)

Yet after a hundred lines of *kommatic* exchanges with the Chorus, this same Clytemnestra is to say, indignantly:

You imagine this to be *my* deed: but don't think of me as the  
wife of Agamemnon (μηδ' ἐπιλεχθῆς<sup>2</sup> Ἀγαμεμνονίαν εἶναι  
μ' ἄλοχον (1498-99). Nay, manifesting himself as the wife of  
this dead man here, the ancient, bitter-avenging curse

(ἀλάστωρ) on Atreus, . . . has offered this man in payment, the lord sacrificed for the children—victims of times past. (1497-1504)

This is a striking change of attitude in the wife who, a few minutes earlier, was glorying so explicitly in the deed of husband-murder. Let us return to the beginning of the *kommos* (1407ff.) to see how it has come about.<sup>3</sup>

In the first part of the *kommos*, the Chorus sings brief lyric stanzas, mostly in dochmiacs, with Clytemnestra answering in iambic trimeters. The Chorus, aghast at the Queen's crime first threaten the hatred of the citizens, the people's curse (δημοθρόους τ' ἄρας, (1409): an ironic reminiscence of the warnings of the first stasimon where the people's curse was spoken of as directed against the Atreidae (456-57; cf. 450-51) for all the deaths at Troy. And it is back on Agamemnon that Clytemnestra now redirects these curses as she is goaded to her first justification of her crime: Agamemnon "who, caring no more for her death than for that of a beast, sacrificed his own daughter to charm the winds at Thrace" (1415-18).<sup>4</sup> But in this, her first

<sup>2</sup> μηδ' ἐπιλέχθης does, it must be admitted, provide difficulties though not, perhaps, as insuperable ones as Fraenkel suggests. The most serious of these, μηδ' following a positive clause, may be removed, without substantially changing the sense of the passage as a whole, by adopting Scaliger's suggestion, τῇδ' ἐπιλεχθείς . . . without a stop after the preceding verse ("You . . . thinking of it in this way, that I am the wife etc. . ."). Denniston and Page approve of this in their note.

<sup>3</sup> Critics often pass over this difference in perspective on the part of the Queen. Smythe, for example, speaks of Clytemnestra's "ferocious joy" at 1384ff., and then imagines her to "snatch joyfully" at the thought of being the evil *daimon* of the house, without making any distinctions between the attitudes expressed in the two passages. (See Herbert Weir Smythe, *Aeschylean Tragedy* [Berkeley 1924], 170.) Winnington-Ingram (*JHS* 48 [1968] 134-36) does recognize that Clytemnestra "changes her ground" here, though his analysis of the passage runs along somewhat different lines from the one to be suggested in the present paper. Cf. also J. M. Bremer, *Hamartia* (Amsterdam 1969) 127-28, who does speak of Clytemnestra moving, in this *kommos*, "to a diametrically opposed position," though he does not indicate how she reaches it.

<sup>4</sup> On vv. 1409-37 as a whole, cf. Froma I. Zeitlin, "The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*", *TAPA* 96 (1965) 474-78. She comments well on the ironic juxtaposition of "sacrifice" and "curses" in the Chorus' statement at 1409, which Clytemnestra exploits at 1413ff., by turning the people's curses back against Agamemnon for *his* sacrifice.





answer, the Queen still speaks as responsible to herself alone. It is her own deeds (*ἐμῶν ἔργων*, 1420-21) which she talks about as she warns the Chorus that it is the victor, either herself or the Chorus, who will call the tune (1421-25). The Chorus' answer, as they gaze upon Agamemnon's blood, is to threaten blow for blow (1428-30) and it is this stronger threat which leads Clytemnestra to mention for the first time her allies, supernatural (*Dikē*) and human (Aegisthus): references which are to lead, indirectly, to the gradual depersonalization of her deed.

By the avenging Justice due to my daughter  
 (μὰ τὴν τέλειον τῆς ἐμῆς παιδὸς Δίκην)  
 by *Atē* and *Erinus*, to all of whom I sacrificed this man,  
 Hope, for me, treads, not the halls of Fear as long as  
 Aegisthus lights the fires at my hearth. (1432-36)

In the first part of this sentence, while Clytemnestra still speaks of herself as the doer of the deed, the use of *τέλειος* with *Δίκη* already suggests that the Justice of Zeus, hardly an abstract force in this play, is at least a coadjutor in the murder. In the second part of her sentence, the Queen mentions Aegisthus, her human ally in murder and adultery, another lead that is to have interesting developments in our theme of responsibility. But for the moment, Clytemnestra's thoughts take another turn. Soon she is off on the track of Cassandra, the second outrage of the King which she daringly converts into gratification, as thoughts of the slain mistress become a fillip, in her savage imaginings, to her own adulterous bed:

. . . and she too, the lover of this man here, like a swan after singing her final death-song, lies there in death and so bestows on me a couch-relish to add to my luxurious delight (1444-47)

Both Aegisthus and the adultery motif which the Queen has introduced are to be used in the gradual withdrawal of the "King-murder" from the sphere of personally chosen action to the impersonal sequence of the past: a nice paradox, for both have also provided a part of Clytemnestra's personal motivation. Aegisthus, of course, is to provide a direct lead, through his father, to the curse on the house of Atreus. Adultery now

leads the Chorus to think of sister Helen, that other scourge of husbands, for now it sings:

. . . since, for a woman's sake [i.e. Helen's] our kindest guardian was subdued and suffered many woes. And by a woman's hand [i.e. Clytemnestra's] he lost his life. (1451-54)

Thus the Chorus now blames both Clytemnestra and, with increasing emphasis, Helen . . .

. . . mad Helen, . . . you who have bedecked yourself with this last crowning glory, through blood which cannot be washed away. Then indeed was there strife unconquerable upon the house (ἡ τις ἦν [Schütz] τοτ' ἐν δόμοις ἔρις ἐρίδματος), a scourge of husbands. (1455 . . . 1459-61)

The close relation between *eris* (Strife) and Helen which this last sentence implies recalls the earlier association of Helen with *eris* (698) and with *Erinus* (744-49); it anticipates also Clytemnestra's view of herself as the disguised embodiment of the *alastor* of Atreus' crime.<sup>5</sup> Looked at in one way, adulterous Helen is linked with adulterous Clytemnestra—and adultery (both Clytemnestra's and Agamemnon's) has at least lent strength to Clytemnestra's murderous blade. But looked at in another way, Helen becomes the instrument of Zeus' justice and the fulfillment of a curse or doom on Agamemnon as (earlier) on Paris and the Trojans. In this role, she has the effect of leading us, in our search for the cause of the present violence, back into the past—to the time before the war, before Iphigenia, before Aegisthus: i.e. before the personal motivations of Clytemnestra's deed existed.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Fraenkel's comparison, in his note on v. 749, of the identification of Helen and the *Erinus* (which he accepts) at 749 with Clytemnestra's vision of herself as the *alastor*, appearing in the figure of Agamemnon's wife. The identification of Helen and the *Erinus* at 744-49, has, nevertheless, been strongly assailed: see, for example, Denniston and Page ad loc. and my discussion in *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 278; cf. also Lloyd-Jones' more subtle argument against the identification in *HSCP* 73 (1969) 103. Lloyd-Jones' argument does not, however, exclude the close association of Helen and the Zeus-sent *Erinus* at 744-49 and that is, perhaps, all that needs to be understood for the present argument.

The "Helen Ode" (second stasimon), with its vivid image of the seductive charm of infatuation, occurred at a mid-point in the action of the play, just before Clytemnestra lured Agamemnon to tread the purple carpet. So, now, in the *kommos*, the Chorus' introduction of the "Helen-motif" is the turning point in Clytemnestra's journey from vehement insistence to vehement denial of her *personal* responsibility for the murder of Agamemnon. The importance of the moment is marked by a formal change as the Chorus embarks on a formal ode with anapaestic replies (between strophe and antistrophe) from Clytemnestra.

Turn not your wrath on Helen as the man-destroyer, as if  
she alone caused many Greeks to perish and worked the  
sharpest woe. (1464-67)

So Clytemnestra rebukes the Chorus; she means, of course, to turn the blame back on Agamemnon. The Chorus, however, accepting her rebuke, now switches its fury against the ancestral *daimon*, working on the twin strains of the blood of Tantalus (Agamemnon and Menelaus) through the twin-souled power of women (*κράτος* (τ') *ἰσοψυχον ἐκ γυναικῶν* i.e. Clytemnestra and Helen, 1470). This last expression for the *daimon*-driven women carries an eerie echo of that "twin-throned, twin-sceptred yoke-of-power from Zeus", which was the Chorus' opening description (43-44) of the Atreidae: an equipoise symbolizing, perhaps, the struggle between male and female which is to be resolved, on both divine and human levels, only in the final play of the trilogy.<sup>6</sup> Clytemnestra strongly endorses this blaming of "the thrice-gorged *daimon*", though in so doing she unconsciously proclaims her own destruction: "Ere the ancient woe shall cease, fresh blood<sup>7</sup> will flow!" (1479-80). The Chorus,

<sup>6</sup> In admitting the importance of the "male *versus* female" theme throughout the *Oresteia*, it is not necessary to find in it the socio-economic significance attributed to it by George Thomson. (See Thomson's Introduction to *Aeschylus, The Oresteia*, ed. Walter G. Headlam and George W. Thomson [Cambridge 1938] 7-8.) Nor is the struggle to be understood in the psychological terms in which Winnington-Ingram (*JHS* 48 [1968] 130-32) understands it, when he alleges Clytemnestra's jealousy of Agamemnon's male status as one of her motives.

<sup>7</sup> *ἰχῶρ*, 1480, is an extraordinary word for "blood," in the context. Perhaps it should be given the Hippocratic sense of "impure discharge, pus"; so Professor Lloyd-Jones in his translation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), and note to v. 1479.

in turn, push the causation one step further back, to Zeus himself:

*ὦν ὦν διαὶ Διὸς  
παναιτίου πανεργέτα* (1485-86)

Thus the Chorus has gradually switched from its original emphasis on Clytemnestra's guilt (1407-11, 1426-30) through an ever-receding sequence, to Zeus himself, the cause of all. However, once they return (in the beautiful refrain at 1489ff.) to their grief for Agamemnon, they return to the foul murder by Clytemnestra. But now the Queen, buoyed up by the sequence of the past strife which the Chorus has helped elaborate, is able to reply with her vehement denial of all personal responsibility:

You imagine this to be *my* deed. But don't think of me as the wife of Agamemnon. Nay, manifesting himself as the wife of this dead man here, the ancient, bitter-avenging curse on Atreus . . . (1497ff.)

There is not, of course, any absolute contradiction, particularly for a Greek audience, in this change of perspective which one notices in Clytemnestra. Nevertheless, the element of double determination so common in Aeschylean Tragedy appears in unusually striking form when the murderer herself expresses, within a hundred verses, first the personal and then the supernatural explanation of the deed, each in mutually exclusive terms.<sup>8</sup> It is by skillful exploitation of the epirrhematic *kommos*, an instrument capable of combining lyrical and argumentative effects, that the poet achieves this difficult transition.

After Clytemnestra's extreme statement at 1497ff., the pendulum begins its backward swing.

*ὥς μὲν ἀναίτιος εἶ (σὺ)  
τοῦδε φόνου τίς ὁ μαρτυρήσων;* (1505-6)

<sup>8</sup> Possibly the ambiguous treatment of Clytemnestra's guilt sheds some light on the celebrated question of Agamemnon's responsibility at Aulis. Cf., among many conflicting views on this question, the studies of H. Lloyd-Jones, "The Guilt of Agamemnon", *CQ* 12 (1962) 187-99 and A. Lesky, "Decision and Responsibility in Greek Tragedy," *JHS* 86 (1966) 78-85, especially 81-83. See also the following note.

"Who will say that you are innocent . . . ?" asks the Chorus and in the following exchanges both Chorus and Queen return to the present, the personal and the particular. Clytemnestra reasserts the personal guilt of Agamemnon<sup>9</sup> as her own reason for vengeance (1525ff.) and in her arrangements for the King's obsequies, the Queen's own personal venom is back at full strength: she who slew him will bury him, and she for whom he was slain will embrace him gladly, as is right (*ἀσπασίως . . . ὡς χρεή*, 1555-56), upon the shores of Acheron.

In the end, the Chorus and Clytemnestra do, surprisingly, reach a sort of bitter accommodation. The Chorus echoes the Queen's gnomic wisdom *ἄξια*<sup>10</sup> *δράσας, ἄξια πάσχων*, 1527) with similar sayings of its own (*φέρει φέροντ' . . .*, 1562; *παθεῖν τὸν ἐρξάντα*, 1564), and with its last statement, "the family is bound to Atē" (1566), Clytemnestra herself heartily concurs (1567-68). Indeed, the Queen's last speech in which she seeks to make a pact with the *daimon*, the evil genius of the Pleisthenids, is the one statement in all her utterances which comes close to compromise. But this uneasy truce between the Chorus and the Queen is abruptly broken by the entry of Aegisthus and the long, complex confrontation is over.

## II

The whole action of the *Choephoroi* concerns the deeds of vengeance, the necessary purification (itself polluting) which the returning exile Orestes must perform. Perhaps the most crucial part of this action is the summoning of the forces required for the execution, involving matricide, of so impossible an undertaking. Of these forces, the strongest lie beneath the earth: the sleeping power of the murdered Agamemnon residing in his avenging Furies and in the justice of "blow for blow" which it is theirs to execute. Clearly, the *kommos* at the tomb of the dead King will be central to the action of the play; however, there are one or two points in the preceding action which must be reviewed in order to set the *kommos* in its proper context.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Mazon, in his Introduction to *Agamemnon* (Budé edition, Paris 1968) 7-8, finds the chief significance of Clytemnestra's confrontation with the Chorus to lie in the two ways in which the murder of the King is viewed.

<sup>10</sup> Hermann's emendation of *ἀνάξια*.

The prologue, *parodos* and first episode (which includes the Recognition Scene between Orestes and Electra) have all directed their energies, lyric and dramatic, downwards, toward the subterranean powers. Orestes has sacrificed "a nurturing lock of hair" to the river Inachos, as well as a second "mourning lock" to his father—thus reminding us that the chthonic powers are givers of life as well as lords of the Dead. Clytemnestra, frightened by an inauspicious dream, has sent Electra and the Chorus to make propitiatory offerings at Agamemnon's tomb; Electra, tutored by the Chorus (whose role is thus marked from the first) converts her sacrificial prayers into prayers for the return of Orestes, "the light in the house" (131). Finally, the Chorus sings of the pernicious effect of murder in the power of "blood once drunk by nourishing earth" which "grows stiff and will not melt away" (66-67). These and similar passages in the early parts of the play prepare us for the function which the *kommos* is to play.

There are also a few significant points in the early speeches of Electra and Orestes which must be kept in mind as we consider the *kommos*. One is the diffidence of Electra, who must be schooled by the Chorus in how to "adapt" Clytemnestra's propitiatory offering; who, when she does, cannot bring herself actually to name Orestes as the longed-for avenger and who prays, *for herself*, that she may be more *sôphrôn* and more pious (*εὐσεβέστερον*) of hand than her mother (see vv. 138-44).

We must glance also at two utterances of Orestes himself. In his prayer to Zeus (246-63), Orestes mentions his, as it were, "selfish," reasons for the vengeance: the poverty which he and Electra suffer (249-51). In the second of these speeches (269ff.), on the other hand, Orestes expresses his complete belief both in the support of Apollo's command to avenge his father and in the penalties threatened if he fails to do so. Nevertheless, at the end of this speech (at vv. 298ff.), Orestes expressed his resolve, in accordance with his own wishes (*ἔμενοι*, 299) to take vengeance, *even if he lacked belief* (*καὶ μὴ πέποιθα*) *in the oracle* (298). (Since these wishes turn out to include compliance with the commands [*ἐπεταί*] of the god (300) we must conclude that the hypothetical disbelief in the oracle refers *only* to disbelief in the *threats* of Apollo with which most of the preceding lines of

the speech on the oracle have dealt). This speech, then, offers the clearest statement of the two aspects of Orestes' motivation, the supernatural and the human, and here for the first time, at the end of the speech, Orestes' purely personal reasons (grief for his father, poverty and the patriotic desire to rescue the conquerors of Troy) are, for the first time, explicitly spelt out. And it should be noted that, unlike some critics, Orestes does not regard these as something quite separate from the divine will in these matters.<sup>11</sup>

There have been over the years numerous conflicting interpretations of the meaning and dramatic purpose of the great *kommos* (306-465) of the *Choephoroi*. Recent studies (beginning, perhaps, with Reinhardt's excellent discussion of this *kommos*<sup>12</sup> and ending, for the moment, with Miss Lebeck's work on the *Oresteia*,<sup>13</sup> have for the most part corrected certain extreme arguments which tended to emphasize one feature or another of this passage to the exclusion of all else. Wilamowitz's view<sup>14</sup> that the main function of the *kommos* was to bring Orestes' inner struggle to the awful decision of matricide, has now been properly refuted in several studies. As we have seen even in our brief resumé of what precedes the *kommos* there is no doubt in the mind of Orestes or of the audience that he has decided, for

<sup>11</sup> On the interpretation and implications of *Choeph.* 298, cf. A. Rivier's interesting discussion in "Remarques sur le Nécessaire et la Nécessité chez Eschyle," *REG* 81 (1968) 25-27. Rivier argues that *πείρωθα* in v. 298 refers not to belief in the truth of the Oracle but to reliance on its support and rightly indicates that Orestes' *ἴμενοι* (v. 299) in the matter of vengeance are not to be considered in isolation from what he knows to be the divine will in the matter. However, here as elsewhere in his article, Rivier tends to deprecate the element of human choice whenever an element of divine constraint is present as well. More acceptable is Lloyd-Jones' formulation of the matter, that the will of Zeus (and, as Apollo tells us at *Eum.* 616-18, Zeus is behind all Apollo's mantic utterances) is generally presented in the Greek poets as working *through* the human will. (See H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* [Berkeley 1971] chap. 1, *passim* and chap. 4, 85ff.).

<sup>12</sup> Karl Reinhardt, *Aischylos als Regisseur und Theolog* (Bern 1949) 112-122.

<sup>13</sup> Anne Lebeck, *The Oresteia, A Study in Language and Structure* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) 93-95; 110-30.

<sup>14</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griechische Tragödie II, Orestie* (Berlin 1900) 143-44, 148; *Aischylos, Interpretationen* Berlin (1914) 205-10; cf. Reinhardt's discussion (above, note 12).

his own reasons as well as those imposed on him by Apollo, to fulfill the deeds of vengeance. Wilamowitz's extreme treatment of the *kommos* as a moral struggle for the decision of Orestes led to extreme reactions such as those of Schadewaldt who, despite his long and complex analysis, tended to subordinate everything in the *kommos* to its climax, the evocation of the powers of the dead to help in the implementation of Orestes' decision.<sup>15</sup> This view misses something of the real dramatic progression. However right it may be about the end result of the *kommos*, the uncomfortable fact remains that, as we shall see, much of the earlier part of it is not immediately concerned with calling on the spirit of Agamemnon for vengeance.

Albin Lesky<sup>16</sup> attempted a compromise between these two extreme positions. He rightly sees that the varied songs of the *kommos* are designated to affect now the spirit of the dead King and now the emotions of his living avenger. But more basic to his argument (and in the end less convincing) is his attempt to distinguish between Orestes' decision before the *kommos* as one forced on him by Apollo and his decision *as a result of the kommos* as one entirely integrated with his own will. What goes on outside the *kommos*, he suggests, is essentially what Aeschylus received from the tradition and is, indeed, all that is needed for the actual plot (*Handlung*) or action of the play. What is contained *within* the *kommos* provides the essential tragic material for this reason:

Ein Orestes, der blind dem Gebote des Gottes gehorcht, als sein Werkzeug die Tat vollbringt und dann von dem Gotte gegen ihre Folgen geschützt wird, kann nicht der Gegenstand tragischen Geschehens sein, am allerwenigsten in der Dichtung des Aischylos.<sup>17</sup>

The chief difficulty facing Lesky's view, that in the *kommos*

<sup>15</sup> W. Schadewaldt, "Der Kommos in Aischylos' Choephoren," *Hermes* 67 (1932) 312-54. For the emphasis suggested above, see especially pp. 113-15, 335-37. Cf. also H. Lloyd-Jones' note on this *kommos* in *The Libation Bearers of Aeschylus*, a translation with commentary (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970) p. 26.

<sup>16</sup> Albin Lesky, "Der Kommos der Choephoren," *SAWW* 221 (1943) 1-127. See especially pp. 118-21 for the conclusions here summarized.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 120.



alone is Orestes' human and personal desire for vengeance aroused, is provided, as Lesky himself sees, by the lines (297-305) immediately preceding it. Here, as we have seen, Orestes clearly states his own personal will to vengeance, in accordance with his own *himeroi*, even (as he tells us) if he did not believe in the threats of the Oracle. Lesky provides strenuous but not quite convincing arguments to discredit the authenticity of these lines; if we do still accept them, he suggests, the best we can do is to regard them as a sort of prelude to what is essentially the material of the *kommos*—surely rather a desperate effort to preserve the *kommos* as the only repository of the *human* aspect of Orestes' decision. Nor, in my opinion, is this aspect of the *kommos* as prominent as Lesky suggests.

More acceptable, because it is less categorical, is Reinhardt's insistence on "mourning becomes revenge" ("Klage wird zu Rache") as an observable process of the *kommos* which is central to its dramatic meaning. His view coincides with that of Schadewaldt in that he recognizes that the question how, not the question whether, the deed of vengeance is to be done remains the main emphasis of the *kommos*; however, he is subtler than Schadewaldt in his realization that the *kommos* is at first concerned with mourning which becomes a part of the deed of vengeance as the avengers gather power from one another and from the avenging spirits beneath the earth.<sup>18</sup> Miss Lebeck agrees with Reinhardt in her assessment of the *final* result of the *kommos* but she attributes to it more concern than would Reinhardt (or the present writer) with "the whole process of Orestes' decision," which she regards as being "acted out" in the *kommos*. (The fact that Orestes has already, before the *kommos*, expressed this decision, Miss Lebeck dismisses, in this context, on the somewhat dubious ground that such considerations of temporal priority are irrelevant to the discussion of lyric passages.)<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Reinhardt, op. cit. 114-15, 119.

<sup>19</sup> Lebeck, op. cit. 112-14, cf. 120. Miss Lebeck's argument (p. 112) that, on the basis of "the timeless quality of lyric," we may here disregard the prior decision of Orestes before the *kommos*, is interesting but does not, I think, quite stand up. It is easier to think of similar examples of this sort of sequence in Euripides than in Aeschylus, e.g. the "kommatic," followed by the "dramatic"

In one or another of these studies, the principal meaning of this *kommos* have no doubt been expressed. What we are chiefly concerned with in the present study is the process: the actual lyric-dramatic development of the *kommos* by which these meanings are expressed and the interaction between its elements which gradually fuses these meanings into a single climactic act.

After an opening series of anapaests (306-14), the form of the first part of the *kommos* (314-442) falls into four lyric triads, the first three of which are followed by a series of marching anapaests by the Chorus. The stanzas are sung in strict alternation: Orestes, Chorus, Electra, choral anapaests etc., till the fourth triad where there is no anapaestic conclusion. Throughout this part of the *kommos* the Chorus undoubtedly leads and even directs the thoughts and emotions of the other two singers, until near the end of it where, suddenly, it is the Chorus who loses confidence. In its opening anapaests, the chorus calls on the *Moirai* to accomplish Zeus' Justice<sup>20</sup> and intones the ancient story of slaughter for slaughter and *drasanti pathein*. The first two lamenting cries from Orestes and Electra (315ff., 332ff.) amount to little more than plaintive attempts to reach the shade of Agamemnon. To each cry, the Chorus' reply leads the singer firmly toward the business on hand. Orestes' contrast of the realm of light with the darkness of the tomb (319), is answered by the assurance (324) that even in death the mind lives on; to Orestes' remark that praise-laden lament is a grace to the house (320-22), the Chorus adds that lament leads to justice (330).<sup>21</sup> So, too, Electra's "tomb threnody" (334-35) is converted, in

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death of Alcestis at *Alc.* 244ff. and 280ff.; Helen's iambic complaints and threat of suicide at *Hel.* 255ff., followed by similar complaints and threats in a kommatic passage, at 330ff. However, I know of no other instances in Aeschylus or Euripides in which a series of kommatic exchanges is directed toward a decision which has already been clearly taken in the iambic scene preceding it.

<sup>20</sup> Here the *Moirai* are represented as on the side of Zeus' justice and of the old *lex talionis*. Later in the trilogy, the Chorus of the *Eumenides* is to associate the *Moirai* with themselves as *palaioi daimones* similarly mistreated by the younger gods. See *Eum.* 732-38; cf. *Eum.* 172.

<sup>21</sup> I read γόος ἐκ δίκης ματεύει (Murray's emendation of v. 330); however, the reading γόος ἐνδίκος ματεύει (M) could express a similar idea. Both Schadewaldt and Reinhardt put much emphasis on this verse in their interpretations.

the euphoric mind of the Chorus, into a victory paean (343) to sound throughout the royal halls. In each case, the poet's emphasis on the Chorus' dynamic redirection of Orestes' and Electra's utterance is made clear by the Chorus' exploitation of the words and images just used: Orestes' tentative offer, *σκότῳ φάος ἀντίμοιρον* (319) answered by *ἀναφαίνεται δ' ὁ βλέπων* (328); Orestes' *γόος εὐκλεῆς* (321) answered by *γόος ἐκ δίκαν ματεύει* (330); Electra's *ἐπιτύμβιος θοῖνος* (334-35) answered by *ἀντὶ δὲ θοῖνων ἐπιτυμβιδίων παιδὸν . . .* (342-43).

The avengers, responding but slowly to the Chorus' lead, express (each in turn) an "impossible wish": Orestes, that his father had been slain at Troy and left a glorious name (348-53); Electra, that not Agamemnon but his *slayers* had perished as he actually perished, that is, at the hands of their own *philoï*. Again, the Chorus converts these unpromising laments to something more positive. To Orestes' "impossible wish," they add: "(even so), illustrious (*ἐμπρέπων*, 355) would you now be among your friends who perished gloriously . . . for you were a King . . .": a reminder that, even murdered, the King is still a power beneath the earth.<sup>22</sup> So, too, the Chorus corrects Electra's wishful prayer:

Fine things you utter, for yours is the power [*δύνασαι γάρ*, which could imply "It's easy to wish!" or, possibly, "you can make the wish come true"]. For now, the blow of this double scourge on the earth reaches its mark. Even now are there helpers . . . 'neath the earth. . . . To the children belongs the vengeance.<sup>23</sup> (374-79, in part)

Thus does the Chorus seek to involve the avengers with the nether powers and to transform their wishful prayers to action.

"Like an arrow," the last admonition of the Chorus reaches Orestes' ear (380-81): from this point on, the increase in metaphors signals the quickening pace of the *kommos*. At last

<sup>22</sup> See Schadewaldt's justified rebuttal (op. cit. 325-26) of some editor's desire to emend *ἐμπρέπων* to *ἐμπρέπει* (335) and *ἐξῆς* to *ἐξη* (360). It is preferable (except for Wilamowitz's view of the *kommos*) to have the Chorus addressing the dead King directly here and this is what the manuscript reading gives us.

<sup>23</sup> I follow Dodds' emendation, *μέλον* for *μᾶλλον* (M), at v. 379, but admittedly we can only guess at the precise meaning of this corrupt line.

the avengers begin to catch the Chorus' fire. First Orestes (382ff.), then Electra (394ff.) calls on Zeus to send his vengeance. First Electra (394ff.) then Orestes (405ff.) calls on the powers of the underworld to aid in the righting of injustice. Still the Chorus remains a step ahead, leading the avengers on. When Orestes calls on Zeus to send a late-avenging *Atē*,<sup>24</sup> the Chorus already pictures itself as singing a victorious death-dirge over (specifically) "the man slain and the woman destroyed" (386-89). In the same passage, it is the relentless will of the Chorus which evokes the poet's strongest image: "Before the prow of my spirit blows the piercing wind of my resolve" (390-92).<sup>25</sup> And when Electra calls on Zeus, *Gē* and the chthonic powers for justice, the Chorus reminds her almost sharply (*ἀλλὰ νόμος μὲν* . . . 400 ff.) that "blood once shed . . . demands another deed of blood."

We have observed in the case of the Clytemnestra-*kommos* in the *Agamemnon* that towards its end the Queen has almost reversed the attitude to her murderous deed which she took at the beginning. We may note a similar, though less extreme and significant, shift in the position of the Chorus toward the end of the triadic part of the present *kommos*.<sup>26</sup> As the royal pair is gradually brought to more specific and aggressive prayers for vengeance, the Chorus betrays for the first time its apprehension. Its imagery flutters between despair ("My heart [*σπλάγχνα*] grows dark as I hear your words" 413-14) and hope ("then, in turn, hope uplifts me and sweeps away my sorrow, as it dawns brightly upon me" 415-17) as it ponders the dreadful action to come. Electra's song, on the other hand (a violent contrast to her gentle prayer at vv. 140-41), becomes more specifically threatening:

Fawning there may be but these woes are not to be sof-

<sup>24</sup> ὑστερόποιον ἔταν (383). Cf. Ag. 58-59, ὑστερόποιον . . . 'Ερινύν.

<sup>25</sup> Aeschylus regularly reserves his "wind imagery" for crucial turning points in the action or in the decisions of his characters. Cf. Ag. 187, 219ff., 1180ff.; *Choeph.* 775, 813-14, 821.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Thomson's musical analogy: he compares the thematic sequence of subjects, counter-subjects and restatements in the *kommos* as a whole with the composition of a fugue (Thomson, op. cit. 37-39).

tened. For savage is our spirit, like a wolf's, proof against the fawning of our mother.<sup>27</sup> (420-22)

With a sudden change of metre and theme, the Chorus bursts into a violent spate of lamentation in lyric iambics which anticipate the direct appeals to the dead King which are to come at the end of the *kommos*. The "clenched fists, blood-bespatterings and flailing arms" of this passage (423-28) suggest the violent movements of the accompanying choral dance. Electra, now that the dread word *μάτηρ* has been mentioned (422), can aim her accusations directly at her mother, as she and the Chorus in turn (429ff., 439ff.) describe the insulting burial and mutilation of Agamemnon. Orestes responds (434ff.) to this goad from Electra with his first clear promise, in the *kommos*, of vengeance by his own hands:

πατρός δ' ἀτίμωσιν ἄρα τέλει  
ἔκατι μὲν δαιμόνων  
ἔκατι δ' ἁμῶν χερῶν. (435-37)<sup>28</sup>

Electra and the Chorus, in turn, apply this goad of shameful mutilation to the spirit beneath the earth:

Hearing these woes of yours, father, write them on the tablets of your mind. (Electra, at v. 450)

Let this tale reach your ears [pondering it] with the soft tread of your mind . . . Now, with wrath unblunted, must you return. (Chorus, 451-52; 455)

<sup>27</sup> The precise meaning of these lines (420-22) has been disputed. Paley construes as I have, above; Lloyd-Jones (*The Libation Bearers by Aeschylus*, a translation with a commentary, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970) translates, "for, like a savage wolf, not to be cajoled by my mother is his wrath", while Sidgwick, Smythe, Lattimore and others take *ἐκ πατρός* as indicating the *origin* of the savage spirit of the speaker. (The word-order is surely against the last view.) Perhaps the ambiguity (between the first and second meanings) is intentional. In any case there does seem to be an ironic reminder of Electra's earlier prayer:

αὐτῇ τέ μοι ὁδὸς σωφρονεστέραν πολὺ  
μητρὸς γενέσθαι χεῖρά τ' εὐσεβεστέραν. (*Choeph.* 140-41)

<sup>28</sup> The significance of these lines is underlined by the fact that Wilamowitz, following Schütz, wished to transfer vv. 434-38 to follow 455. Left here (in their proper place), they interfere with his view that at this point Orestes was still struggling with his conscience over the mother-murder. See Wilamowitz, *Interpret.* 205-10; cf. Reinhardt, *op. cit.* 113.

Thus, with the Chorus still leading, each element in turn contributes to this common arousal (which finally includes the dead King himself) of vengeful emotion. The *kommos* ends with a highly dramatic sequence of iambic lines in which each makes a direct appeal to Agamemnon's shade. In the antistrophe (461ff.), Orestes, with his cry, Ἄρρη Ἄρρη ξυμβαλεῖ, Δίκη Δίκη illuminates the whole antithetical theme of the trilogy; Electra adds a prayer for justice from the gods and the Chorus emits a final shudder of horror (463-65) as it hears the prayers which it has itself aroused.

It is surely wrong to view this *kommos* either as, simply, an invocation of the spirit of Agamemnon or as, simply, an arousal of Orestes to the deed of vengeance. Certainly it is more the former than the latter, as its climax shows. Nevertheless, the dynamic quality of the *kommos* and the real dramatic progression which it manifests prevents us from taking any simple view of it. It has been argued that because Orestes has already, before the *kommos*, expressed his determination to take vengeance, no further encouragement is needed. But there is a difference between logical choice and the emotional impetus which the deed itself requires and a tragedy which is totally concerned with this awful matricidal vengeance quite properly presents each in dramatically different terms. Moreover, the working up of Orestes and of the spirit of Agamemnon to vengeance is all part of the same operation. "Klage wird zu Rache" ("Lament becomes Revenge") as Reinhardt has put it in a vivid phrase. This tripartite *kommos*, with its shifting pattern of lament and urgency, of horror and vengeful imprecation, and with its blend of lyric and dramatic elements, is an ideal instrument for this complex arousal of the living and the dead.

### III

Let us turn finally to a brief consideration of the exchanges between Athena and the Chorus of Furies in the *Eumenides*, after the newly-founded court of the Areopagus, with Athena's casting vote, has acquitted Orestes.

Earlier in the play, in the second *stasimon* (490-565), the Furies have given a vivid account of *to deinon* (that awesome

quality embodied in themselves)<sup>29</sup> as a necessary element in a just state. In the following episode, the speech in which Athena founds the Areopagus contains a passage strikingly reminiscent of the Furies' previous description of their major attribute:

I bid you not to cast out the fear of retribution (τὸ δεινόν) entirely from the state. For who that fears nothing at all is ever just? But if you justly reverence so august a body (τοιόνδε . . . σέβας) you would have a bulwark of the land and a safeguard of the city such as no man has . . . (698-702)

These two passages, though descriptive of two very different bodies (the Furies and the Areopagus), provide the dramatic preparation for the reversal at the end of the play. Indeed the "replacement" of the Furies by the Areopagus will appear less of a "replacement" if, as we listen to Athena's propitiation, we remember that the new Court itself embodies those qualities which, if Athena's plan succeeds, the reconciled Eumenides will help sustain.

After the acquittal of Orestes, there follows a furious (dochmiac) song and dance (778ff.) by the Chorus, interspersed by Athena's iambic deprecations of the Furies' curses. Athena's first appeal is met with a precise repetition of the opening strophe. Another indignant outburst, somewhat different in tone, follows Athena's second appeal, and this is again repeated, *verbatim*, after her third. Only after a fourth appeal from the goddess is there any real response, the sudden change in mood being marked by a switch to iambic dialogue. The drama of the passage lies in this modulation and ultimate

<sup>29</sup> I cannot agree with Professor Dover's view that the Furies are here singing not of themselves but of the newly-established Areopagus, when (517ff.) they celebrate the value of *to deinon* in society. (See K. J. Dover, "The Political Aspects of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*" *JHS* 77 [1957] 230-37.) Granted that the Furies accept the Areopagus (see their explicit trust in Athena at v. 435 and their warning about the possible overthrow of the new dispensation, νέων θεσμίων, at vv. 490-91), still, Athena has not yet described the new court in terms which would permit us to conclude that they are thinking of the Areopagus when they praise *to deinon*. Furthermore, just as the "men-watching maenads" (βροτοσκοπῶν μαινάδων, 499-500) whose wrath will be withdrawn if Orestes is acquitted must refer to the Furies, so, too, τὸ δεινόν . . . φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον (517-18), described as a necessary element in the just state, must also refer to them.

reversal of the Chorus' fury before the subtler onslaught of Athena's various appeals.

The Chorus' opening song (778-93) is its most lethal one, for it contains, after a furious indictment of the younger gods, the Furies' actual curses in the name of *Dikē*, against the crops and children of Attica (. . . *λιγὴν ἀφυλλος, ἄτεκνος*). Athena's first (ignored) appeal undergoes a subtle change in her second attempt. Mention of Zeus' will (797-99) is replaced by a casual reference to Zeus' thunderbolts (827-29); offers of caverns and altars at Athens (805-7), by the warmer invitation to share Athena's home and honours (*ὥς σεμνότιμος καὶ ξυνοικήτωρ ἐμοί*: 833). And the Furies' blighting curse is deprecated by an offer of "first fruits" (*ἀκροθίνια*, 834) on behalf of the children and of marriage rites. In the Chorus' second strophe, there is at least an oblique answer to Athena's plea ("oh that I should live in this land, a thing of scorn and hatred!" 838-39); there is as yet no sign of yielding but the Erinyes at least indicate that they have heard Athena's suggestion. Moreover, self-pity, not curses, now predominates in the Chorus' song.

In her third speech (848-69), Athena offers the Erinyes a seat in the Erechtheion, the most "national" of Athens' shrines. Correspondingly, her deprecations also take on a political and contemporary flavour as fears of civil war ("Apply not goads to bloodshed in my land!" 858-59) replace fears of natural blight and sterility. In her last plea (after the Chorus' repeated chant of bitter hatred) Athena's language becomes still more persuasive (" . . . soft inducements from my honeyed tongue . . ." 886)<sup>30</sup> . . . and more political. No one of these elder gods (she declares) can ever say that she was an exile (*ἀπόξενος*, 884) from Athens; each, if she wishes, may become a property holder (*γάμορος*, 890) justly honoured for all time.

The Furies' capitulation (892-900) is as complete as it is sudden. Is it Athena's promise of civic security that wins them over? One is tempted to think so: they continue to employ Athena's legalistic terminology as they ask for security (*ἐγγύη*,

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Thomson, *op. cit.* 65. After enumerating the baneful effects of *Peitho* earlier in the myth and in the trilogy, he remarks, "Now the same spirit embodied in Athena brings the sufferings of three generations to an end."



898) for the promise that no house may prosper without their aid. The Erinyes have become good burghers in the end.

Chief among the honours which Athena bestows on the Eumenides (as we must now call them) is that no house may flourish without their aid (895). In answer to the Chorus' question as to what blessings they should invoke upon the land, Athena ends the reconciliation scene with a splendid evocation (903-15) of the prosperity which Athens is to enjoy—in crops and heroes, and in the increase, prosperity and virtue of its citizens. The speech serves as a dramatic prologue to the blessings which the Eumenides themselves are to call down in their final chorus on the land which they had blasted with curses in the preceding ode.

This reversal of mood and function on the Chorus' part is answered by a similar though less emphatic change of tone on Athena's part as well.<sup>31</sup> Again the epirrhematic form is used to express the new positions, as Athena intervenes, amid the Chorus' lyrical showers of blessings, with anapaestic chants reminding all of the more sombre aspects of the Eumenides' role. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this curious blend.

In its first strophê, the Chorus undoes its former curses with prayers that the bright sun may cause teeming abundance to break forth from the earth (923-26). Athena follows this immediately with a reminder of a very different aspect of the Erinyes/Eumenides:

. . . Mighty and hard to please  
are the divinities I make to settle here . . .  
And he that encounters their anger  
does not know from where come the blows that assail his  
life;  
for crimes born from those of long ago  
hale him before them, and in silent destruction,  
loud though he boast,  
through their wrath and enmity grind him to nothing.  
(928-37, in part)<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Thomson, *ibid.* 65, who offers another musical analogy: "It is like a duet in which, after the bass has taken up the theme of the treble, the treble imitates the bass."

<sup>32</sup> This and the following two passages are from Professor Lloyd-Jones' translation.

Later, the Chorus, in their benevolent mood, seem almost to repudiate this reminder of their ancient punitive role as they pray:

. . . may the dust not drink the black blood of the citizens  
and through passion for revenge  
speed on the ruin to the city  
wrought by murder in return for murder!

(980-83)

Once again Athena follows with her warning of the price of this benevolence:

Have they [the citizens] a mind to find out  
the path of benediction?  
Then from these fearsome faces (*ἐκ τῶν φοβερῶν τῶνδε  
προσώπων*)

I see great good for these the citizens.  
For if, kind in return for kindness,  
you do them ever great honour, both land and city  
on the straight path of justice  
you shall keep, in every way preëminent.

(988-95)

Other critics have already commented on various reversals in the use of imagery (particularly in the Chorus' blessings) at the end of the *Oresteia*:<sup>33</sup> joyous "blossom images" where once (as at *Agamemnon* 659) such imagery was used with sinister corrupting irony; images of growth, vitality and light, were once "blood shed upon the ground" produced ever more bloodshed, with the chthonic powers sending further destruction rather than nourishment. But it is now Athena's role to remind us that the Eumenides still retain, in its most effective form, that great quality of *to deinon* by which, in the second stasimon, they claimed to maintain justice among men. In this, it would seem, they are to share the role which Athena has assigned to the Areopagus as "the ever-watchful guardian of the land."

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<sup>33</sup> See J. Peradotto, "Some Patterns of Nature Imagery in the *Oresteia*", *AJP* 85 (1964) 378-93. Cf. also Zeitlin, *op. cit.* 499-500.

SPARRING PARTNERS: A NOTE ON ARISTOPHANES,  
*ECCLESIAZUSAE* 964-965

One of the more drastic innovations wrought on society by the reform-minded Praxagora and her newly enfranchised colleagues is the requirement that the young and the beautiful may not sleep with one another until they have slept first with the old and ugly. Aristophanes shows us the farcical and chaotic results of this plan in an extended scene (877-1111) in which a young man and a young woman are frustrated in their mutual desires by three transcendently ugly hags who, after much struggling, finally manage to drag the young man off to their lair. During a brief moment of privacy the star-crossed couple sing an amoebean love duet which, as the late C. M. Bowra has shown,<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes intended as an earthy and sexually explicit parody of the more decorous and restrained love songs of, for example, Anacreon and Ibycus. One of the techniques Aristophanes uses to poke fun at this genre is the application of standard erotic images to highly undignified purposes.

Thus, at one point the young man sings (964-65),

ἀλλ' ἐν σῶ βούλομ' ἐγὼ κόλπῳ  
 πληκτίζεσθαι μετὰ σῆς πυγῆς.<sup>2</sup>

*πληκτίζεσθαι*, which properly means "to fistfight with" someone (e.g. *Il.* 21.499), can mean in an erotic sense "to toy with amorously,"<sup>3</sup> "to spar with amorously." Thus in an epigram of Strato (*A.P.* 12.209, 4) we hear of *πληκτισμοί, κνίσμα, φίλημα, λόγος*; in Herondas (5.29) *πρὸς Ἀμφυταίην ταῦτα, μὴ 'με πληκτίζεν*; in Dio Cassius (46.18, 4) *ἀνὴρ . . . πρὸς γυναιῖκα ἐβδομηκοντοῦτιν πληκτιζόμενος*, and 51.12 *ὁ οὖν Καῖσαρ συνίει μὲν αὐτῆς καὶ παθαινομένης καὶ πληκτιζομένης*; in Strabo (11.8,5) *πινόντων ἕμα καὶ πληκτιζομένων πρὸς ἄλλήλους ἕμα τε καὶ τὰς συμπινοῦσας γυναιῖκας*. Accordingly, the Aristophanic couplet has always been taken as merely a crude version

<sup>1</sup> "A Love-Duet," *AJP* 79 (1958) 376ff.

<sup>2</sup> I follow the Budé text of V. Coulon, *Aristophane* (Paris 1963) vol. V.

<sup>3</sup> So *LSJ* s.v. III.

of this much used image (that is, crude in its juxtaposition with *πυγή*: F. Blaydes glosses, <sup>4</sup> "pugilare, i.e. lascivire;" and H. van Daele<sup>5</sup> translates, "Mais je veux appuyé sur ton sein jouter avec ta croupe."<sup>6</sup> With the bizarre exception of Immanuel Bekker, who suggested an image from lyre-playing,<sup>7</sup> no one has questioned this interpretation.

But there are difficulties. As we have seen, the boxing image as it appears in ordinary erotic contexts refers either to flirtatious sparring or slapping,<sup>8</sup> or, more figuratively, to resistance to the onslaught of erotic passion. Moreover, it is always used with the dative, with the prepositions *πρός* or *εἰς*, or absolutely, constructions which express motion towards or against. In our passage, on the other hand, we are dealing not with flirtation or resistance but with the actual consummation of sexual desire; and instead of the usual constructions *πληκτίζεσθαι* appears (only here in Greek literature) with *μετά*, expressive of accompanying action or cooperation. It would seem that the Aristophanic *πληκτίζεσθαι μετά* cannot be *figurative*, to spar or flirt with, but must mean *literally* "to trade blows with the *πυγή*." How are we to imagine this image?

We must consider a secondary meaning of *κόλπος* other than the usual "bosom." It seems that *κόλπος* could also indicate the vagina, a meaning explicitly attested in later medical writers such as Rufus,<sup>9</sup> Soranus,<sup>10</sup> and Sextus Empiricus,<sup>11</sup> all of whom derived their terminology and definitions from much earlier writings; Pollux<sup>12</sup> identifies these earlier writings as those of

<sup>4</sup> *Aristophanis Comoediae* (Halle 1880) vol. III ad loc.

<sup>5</sup> See n. 2, above, ad loc.

<sup>6</sup> Translations of this passage have always been the same: e.g. that of R. Brunck, *Aristophanis Comoediae* (Strasbourg 1781) "in tuo sinu volo lascivire cum tuis natibus."

<sup>7</sup> In his commentary (London 1828) "ait se lasciva manu nates illius pulsare velle: metaphora ab aliis instrumentis quae plectro pulsantur."


<sup>8</sup> See the description in Timocles *Fr.* 22, 4-6K.

<sup>9</sup> *Onom.* 196 εἶτα τὸ κολῶμα τὸ ἐφεξῆς, γυναικεῖος κόλπος, καὶ αἰδοῖον τὸ σύμπαν σὺν τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν.

<sup>10</sup> 1.16 τὸ δὲ γυναικεῖον αἰδοῖον καὶ κόλπος ὠνόμασται γυναικεῖος.

<sup>11</sup> *Adv. Math.* 5.62 τοὺς γυναικεῖους κόλπους.

<sup>12</sup> 2.222, in his discussion of the term *μήτρα* in which he quotes all the Hippocratic terminology (cf., e.g., Hippoc. *Steril.* 222): οὐ στόμα ὁ πρῶτος πόρος, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς κολῶμα γυναικεῖος κόλπος.



Hippocrates himself. We may therefore presume a fifth-century use of *κόλπος* in this sense. Such a genital usage, like the more common meanings "bosom," "folds in a garment," or "gulf," derives from the word's root notion of any hollow place, and corresponds to its use to describe other bodily cavities as well: not only the womb,<sup>13</sup> but also the ventricles of the heart<sup>14</sup> and the abdominal cavities.<sup>15</sup>

The difficulties of *Eccl.* 964f. disappear if we understand *ἐν κόλπῳ* to be a double-entendre meaning "within the *cunnus*" (and by implication over against the *πυγῇ*): there will thus be a literal trading of blows between the young man's thrusting member and the girl's *πυγῇ*. Our common erotic metaphor will thus have been debased not merely by inclusion in a highly undignified context,<sup>16</sup> but by actual *literalization* as well. This literalization is accomplished, as we have observed, by clever, original, and unexpected variations in the usual terminology, namely the obscene sense of *κόλπος* and the use of *μετά* with *πληκτίζεσθαι*.

This use of a secondary meaning of *κόλπος* in *Eccl.* 964f. may incidentally help to clarify another Aristophanic passage which has caused difficulties. At *Lysistrata* 1169-70, in a passage full of geographical puns on the sexual organs, we find reference to

τὸν Μηλιᾶ  
κόλπον τὸν ὀπισθεν.

This "Melian Gulf, the one in the rear" must, as B. B. Rogers saw,<sup>17</sup> refer not to the bosom but to the *πρωκτός* (cf. *supra*, line 1148).<sup>18</sup> *Μηλιᾶ* would then indicate not only a specific geo-

<sup>13</sup> Pl.: *Ar. Birds* 694, *Eur. Hel.* 1145, *Call. Jov.* 15; sg.: *Id. Del.* 214.

<sup>14</sup> Pollux 2.216.

<sup>15</sup> *Arist. HA* 530<sup>b</sup>27.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Bowra, p. 387.

<sup>17</sup> *The Lysistrata of Aristophanes* (London 1911) ad loc.

<sup>18</sup> Rogers' deduction has not, unfortunately, put an end to the absurd idea that the bosom is meant: see, for example, Wilamowitz' commentary (Berlin 1927) ad loc.; the Budé *Aristophane* (Paris 1928) vol. III, p. 171 n. 5; and, most recently, J. Taillardat, *Les Images d' Aristophane* (Paris 1962) 69. The notion that τὸν ὀπισθεν has nothing to do with the double-entendre but is an actual geographical specification derives from the scholiast's foolish note, *λιμὴν ἐστὶν ὀπισθεν τοῦ Ἐχινούντος* (cf. line 1169). The same is true of the pun in *Μηλιᾶ* (see n. 19, below).

graphical location but also "apple-cheeked" buttocks to go with the κόλπος, an obscene variation on the usual metaphorical sense of μήλον.<sup>19</sup> As in the passage from *Ecclesiazusae* Aristophanes has debased standard erotic images by giving them unexpectedly explicit references: κόλπος, usually bosom, is made to indicate "the bodily cavity in the rear," and μήλα, usually cheeks or breasts, is made to refer to the buttocks.

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<sup>19</sup> For this common erotic *topos* see the citations in *LSJ* s.v. μήλον (B) II.2 and the lengthy discussion by Alphonse Willems in his excellent annotated translation of Aristophanes (Paris 1919) vol. I, pp. 403ff. Willems (who accepts the idea that κόλπος here = bosom) is the only scholar to have realized that a secondary meaning lurks behind Μηλιά, although he hesitates: "τὰ μήλα signifie aussi les joues. A cause de l' épithète τὸν δπισθεν, je serais tenté, je l' avoue, de soupçonner que le Μηλιεύς κόλπος se rapporte à d' autres joues que celles qu' on supposerait d' abord. Mais il faudrait qu' un texte vînt à l' appui de cette interprétation" (vol. II, p. 447 n. 2).

## THEOCRITUS' IDYLL 24.

Readers will recall the familiar episode with which Theocritus' *Idyll* 24 begins: Alcmena, after feeding and praying for their safety, rocks her ten-month old twins, Heracles and Iphicles, to sleep; during the night two deadly snakes sent by Hera enter the room and approach the children. At this moment a supernatural light illumines the scene, and while Iphicles screams and attempts to flee, Heracles quickly strangles the serpents. Meanwhile Alcmena has been awakened by the cries of Iphicles, and has roused Amphytrion; the household too is summoned to bring torches, for the miraculous light has now disappeared. Yet the crisis has already past: to his father Heracles joyfully shows the dead serpents, after which the family returns to sleep (1-63). The following morning Alcmena summons Teiresias: he foretells to her the future labors and deification of her son, and prescribes a ritual procedure for disposing of the dead snakes (64-102). The next section of the *Idyll* (103-40) catalogues the various princely activities in which during his boyhood Heracles was trained by the heroic tutors of his day. The final lines (141ff.), extant in meager scraps from the Antinoae papyrus, offer only a few readable words: they seem, however, to have contained a brief indication of the fulfillment of Teiresias' prophecy, and a reference to Heracles' marriage to Hebe. A marginal scholium in the papyrus also indicates that the *Idyll* ended with a prayer that the victorious Heracles grant victory to the poet over all his rivals.

Interpretive scholarship on this *Idyll* is meager, and has, for the most part, contented itself with two critical generalizations. The poem is thought, first, to be lacking in unity, and to have a structure which is, in the words of one critic, "loose and clumsy."<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the *Idyll* is agreed to be modelled on

<sup>1</sup> M. M. Crump, *The Epyllion from Theocritus to Ovid* (Oxford 1931) 66; cf. *The Idylls of Theocritus*, ed. R. J. Cholmeley (London 1901) ad 104; M. Sanchez-Wildberger, *Theokrit-Interpretationen* (diss. Zürich 1955) 20f. That the poem is felt to lack unity is indicated by the fact that most critics limit their discussion to its first part (1-63). The term "epyllion" is here avoided: see W.

Pindar's *Nemean* 1, and is universally felt to be an almost programmatic "keying down" of the heroic tone of that epinician ode: its tone is described as bourgeois, domestic, realistic, *lebenswahr*.<sup>2</sup>

Theocritus' primary purpose, it is thought, was to reduce the miraculous to a mundane, realistic level; to make us, as Couat stresses,<sup>3</sup> accept the extraordinary because it is in an ordinary setting. It is noted that whereas in *Nemean* 1 Heracles strangles the snakes on the day of his birth, in Theocritus he is a somewhat more probable ten months old;<sup>4</sup> that whereas in Pindar the doors through which the snakes enter appear to open miraculously, in Theocritus "ist jede Andeutung irgendeines Wunders vermieden;"<sup>5</sup> that whereas in Pindar it is the *Καδμείων ἀγού* who give assistance and the whole *σφαγός* to whom Teiresias directs his remarks the next morning, in Theocritus it is bustling slaves who come to the aid, and merely the concerned Alcmene to whom Teiresias foretells the future.<sup>6</sup> Particularly the scene with Alcmene awakening Amphitryon is thought to corroborate this view: the sluggish, phlegmatic father is finally aroused, gathers his weapons, and rushes off to give assistance; when he discovers that Heracles is safe he tucks him quickly back in bed and returns himself to sleep: "es ist ja Nacht!"<sup>7</sup> Indeed, to Alfred Körte the narrative is quite

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Allen, Jr., "The Epyllion: A Chapter in the History of Literary Criticism," *TAPA* 71 (1940) 1-26.

<sup>2</sup> Ph. E. Legrand, *Étude sur Théocrite* (Paris 1898) 185, 188; *Bucoliques Grecs* I, ed. Ph. E. Legrand (Paris 1953) 168f; A. Körte, *Hellenistic Poetry*, trans. J. Hammer and M. Hadas (New York 1929) 160; Crump (above, note 1) 56; H. Herter, "Ein neues Türwunder," *RhM* 89 (1940) 153; H. Hunger, "Zur realistischen Kunst Theokrits," *WS* 60 (1942) 26; A. S. F. Gow, "Theocritus, Idyll XXIV—Stars and Doors," *CQ* 36 (1942) 106.

<sup>3</sup> A. Couat, *Alexandrian Poetry under the First Three Ptolemies*, trans. J. Loeb (London 1931) 427.

<sup>4</sup> Herter (above, note 2) 153; Hunger (above, note 2) 23, n. 2; an improbable suggestion for explaining the ten months is offered by Gow (above, note 2) 107.

<sup>5</sup> Hunger (above, note 2) 24; Herter (above, note 2) 156; for an effort to reconcile the version of Theocritus with that of Pindar see J. G. Kapsomenos, "Zu Theokrits Herakliskos" *Philologus* 94 (1941) 234ff.

<sup>6</sup> Legrand, *Étude* (above, note 2) 185; *Theocritus*, ed. A. S. F. Gow (Cambridge 1952) II.415 and *ad* 52. Other borrowings from Pindar are noted by S. L. Radt, "Theocritea," *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971) 257-58.



simply a travesty, "as if the strangling of serpents were only a minor disturbance" which momentarily interrupted the parents' rest.<sup>8</sup>

There is, of course, some truth in this interpretive view: in the first part of the poem Theocritus' treatment surely is domestic and realistic; it shows a clear desire to make the incredible as verisimilar as possible. But the point must be taken in perspective. Even in Theocritus' austere models there are slight touches of domestic realism. In *Nemean* 1 mention is made of the terrified women servants, of Alcmena rushing off without her *peplos*, and of Amphitryon's confused pleasure at seeing his infant safe. In the recently published fragment of *Paean* 20 the same indications are noted: Alcmena again is ἀπεπλος; the servant women again flutter about in terror; and apparently the night assault is indicated by a babyish word, μορμόρύξις: bogey.<sup>9</sup> The touches are, of course, not as extensive as in Theocritus, but within the Pindaric corpus these scenes are among the most realistic to be found. They indicate at least that Theocritus' domestic treatment is not any programmatic scheme which he first imposed upon the narrative.

But it is of more importance to note that the domestic realism of Theocritus' version has been overemphasized by the critics, and that the overemphasis has caused an off-balance view of the total poem. Evidence for this realistic treatment is almost totally limited to the first part of the Idyll (1-63), and even there only to certain sections. It is not Theocritus, but his critics whose overview of this Idyll lacks unity: what these critics have chosen to emphasize is only part of what is going on in the whole poem. A fuller view will show that the Idyll does have a unity, and that it is concerned with doing much more than merely

<sup>7</sup> Hunger (above, note 2) 26; cf. *Bucoliques*, ed. Legrand (above, note 2) 169.

<sup>8</sup> Körte (above, note 2) 160.

<sup>9</sup> The word is not recorded elsewhere; "frightening apparition", which is offered by W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969), is too formal sounding. The connection to Mormo indicates the infantile tone, as the *loci* cited by Gow (above, note 6) *ad* 15.39 show: particularly Erinna and Callimachus, *Hymn* 3.70. Especially in an infant context there is no reason to doubt such a tone in Pindar. The text is *Pindari Carmina* II, ed. B. Snell (Leipzig 1964).

reducing the heroic version of Pindar to a domestic, ordinary level. For although this mundane side cannot be denied, we shall see that there are also in this Idyll indications of the truly heroic qualities of the deified Heracles. These will be sometimes explicit, as in the speech of Teiresias or the miraculous light which illumines the scene while Heracles strangles the snakes. But more importantly, as will be shown later, the heroic search for immortality will also be found latent even in those ordinary, homely details of setting which the critics have so one-sidedly stressed.

Lines 80-83 illustrate the double nature of Heracles: he is not only the mortal which will be consumed on the pyre at Trachis, but also the divine which will ascend to Heaven and be reconciled with Hera. And it is not merely the mortal and humanly ordinary, but also the divinely heroic side of Heracles which is treated in the Idyll. The whole poem may be seen as based upon such opposing pairs, on the juxtaposition of the human and the superhuman. This duality appears first in the two fathers of Heracles: the clumsy, phlegmatic Amphitryon is "said to be", *κεκλημένος* (104), his father, but it is the ever-watchful Zeus whose real fatherhood is indicated in line 21.<sup>10</sup> One father obviously implies the ordinary humanity, the other the superhuman divinity of Heracles. So also the extraordinary Heracles and his mortal brother Iphicles are nicely contrasted in lines 25-27: while the younger brother's feet are kicking the blankets in terror, the older brother's hands are strangling the snakes.<sup>11</sup> The same point can be made with regard to the female characters: on the purely human level we find the loving concern of Alcmene, who first awakens when her younger child screams, who takes in her lap not Heracles but the terrified

<sup>10</sup> O. Könnicke, "Zu Theokrit," *Philologus* 72, N.F. 26 (1913) 390; Sanchez-Wildberger (above, note 1) 18; but cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Textgeschichte der Griechischen Bukoliker* (Berlin 1906) 238: "Aber von der Vaterschaft des Zeus ist . . . keine Rede." Agreed; but the tradition was so well established that Theocritus could afford to be oblique rather than explicit; cf. Radt (above, note 6) 259.

<sup>11</sup> Hunger (above, note 2) 24; Sanchez-Wildberger (above, note 1) 19; the contrast between the brothers is also appreciated by U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Lese Früchte," *Hermes* 40 (1905) 139.

Iphicles, who is worried enough to call for Teiresias, and who finally takes responsibility for educating Heracles in all the princely arts. But there are also divine females who affect the life of Heracles: Hera's animosity stands in stark contrast to Alcmena's love. Presumably in the last fragmentary lines there is also a reference to Heracles' heavenly marriage to Hebe:<sup>12</sup> as Alcmena's human love was no match for the hostility of Hera, so Heracles' eventual deification depends not on his mother but on that divine female who appears to him at the end of his life. The realistic, semi-humorous parts of the *Idyll* are those concerned with Iphicles, Alcmena, and Amphitryon: but it is improper to overemphasize these scenes and forget the parts of the poem concerned with Hera, Zeus, Teiresias, and Hebe.

It is on this principle that the unifying structure of the whole

<sup>12</sup> Since this point is important for the structural thesis which is offered here, a discussion of the text of 141ff. is in order. Prior to the publication of *Two Theocritus Papyri*, ed. A. S. Hunt and J. Johnson (London 1930) the question whether *Idyll* 24 ended at line 140 was much disputed: the Antinoae papyrus, however, ended the debate, and corroborated the indications of incompleteness in the editions of Giunta and Callierges, for it presented the meager remains of about thirty more lines. What is to be read in these lines is only an occasional word, and even most of them are in doubt. In 142 Hunt printed *πόσον*, but considered *πόσιν* possible; the latter reading, together with *ἐν χορῇ* at 144, suggested to M. Pohlenz, *GGA* 193 (1931) 372, a continuation of the description in 140. From that point nothing from which much sense can be made is presented until 168, where *ὑμνον* suggested "Ὀλ] *ὑμνον* to Hunt; in 169 the probable reading is *ἐριώπιδα*, and in 170 *ἔταν ὁμοπατ[*. These three words led Hunt to the conclusion that the lines "appear to contain a reference to the apotheosis of Heracles and his union with Hebe" (24). The supposition was generally accepted, e.g. by Pohlenz (373), who stresses here the "Erfüllung von Teiresias' Weissagung;" F. A. Spencer, *CJ* 26 (1930-31) 711; E. A. Barber, "Hellenistic Poetry," *Fifty Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship*, ed. M. Platnauer (New York 1968) 269; and, although more hesitantly, Gow (above, note 6) ad loc: "in 169 *ἐριώπιδα*, if rightly read, may indicate a reference to Hebe, to whom *ὁμοπάτριον*, if that is what was written in 170, might also refer, for Zeus was father to both." In this paper the likelihood of these references will be accepted. The supplement of H. Fränkel in 171, *δυνωδεκάμοχθε*, referring to Heracles, is considered plausible by Pohlenz and Gow, although the discussion here does not depend on it. Finally, a difficult scholion opposite 171-72 indicates that in the final lines the poet called upon Heracles to grant victory to him over his rivals: presumably, therefore, "Theokrit hat dieses Enkomion auf Herakles für einen Agon gedichtet" (Pohlenz 374).

Idyll can be identified. The first part of the poem (1-63) concentrates primarily on the domestic and human side of Heracles, although indications of his divine status are found beneath the superficial realism; the second part of the Idyll (64-102) in the speech of Teiresias looks forward to the deified hero ascending to Olympus and becoming reconciled with the divinities. The third part (103-40) in describing the purely human training of the young hero reverts to the mundane concerns of the first part; whereas the final lines presumably have again as their theme Heracles' deification and marriage to Hebe. The structure of the Idyll depends upon this overriding alternation between the mundane and the divine; and it is, as we shall soon see, from the conjoining of the two that the thematic unity of the poem will eventually emerge.

We may now turn to the central theme of the Idyll: the identification of the various ways in which Heracles confronts death and hence achieves the immortality he is known to have won. In the speech of Teiresias and presumably also in the final fragmentary lines of the Idyll these facts are explicitly stated in their familiar, heroic form: Heracles wins immortality when his body is cremated on the top of Mt. Oeta and he receives Hebe as his bride in Olympus. Yet the heroic confrontation with death can exist not only on a superhuman level: it is also latent in the Idyll's mundane, domestic scenes. Even in that homely setting we shall discover that the struggle for immortality is implicit.

The first example is concerned with the simple notion of sleeping. Nothing could be more ordinary: a mother sings a lullaby, and her children fall asleep; a disturbance at night awakens them, and the parents arrive to soothe them, and get them back to bed so that they themselves can return to sleep. But built into this simple domestic scene are hints of a deeper import. The children, to begin with, sleep in the shield of the dead Pterelaus: the unexpected detail is an initial indication of the close relationship which sleep and death are to have in this poem. The point is more emphatically stressed in Alcmene's elegant and charming lullaby at lines 7-9. An old superstition is indicated: the prayer for sleep must be immediately offset by a prayer for awakening. To pray for children to sleep without also praying that they awaken is in essence to pray for an endless

sleep and hence for death.<sup>13</sup> Thus Alcmena adds that the sleep is to be *ἐγέρσιμον*, and that the children *ἄω ἰκοιοθε*: it is so that they may escape the sleep from which one does not awaken, *νήγρετον ὕπνον*. The sleep of Heracles and Iphicles is to be like that of Helen and Menelaus in Theocritus 18.55; it is not to be like the sleep supposedly experienced by Anchises, Endymion, and Odysseus:<sup>14</sup> the explanation is as simple as the genealogies given in Hesiod (*Theogony* 212) and Homer (*Iliad* 14.231) which make Sleep the brother of Death. The mere awakening of Heracles, even before he strangles the snakes, is confirmation of the prayer of Alcmena, and is already an initial escape from the *νήγρετον ὕπνον* of death.

The point is corroborated in line 59: *θανάτῳ κεκαρωμένα δεινὰ πέλωρα*. What the snakes meant for Heracles is instead inflicted upon them: they suffer the sleep of death, while Heracles, as Alcmena had prayed, reaches the dawn safely. Here is the explanation of a detail thought by the critics to be pedantic:<sup>15</sup> Teiresias the next morning prescribes an exact ritual for getting rid of the dead snakes. They are to be burned in dry shrubs, their ashes gathered and thrown beyond the boundaries by a servant who does not turn to look back. Although the specific description may appear needlessly "Callimachean," it is in fact vital to the thought process. It indicates, as Gow has shown, that the snakes have become scapegoats: the details in Teiresias' prescription are typical of *φαρμακός* rituals.<sup>16</sup> As *φαρμακοί* the snakes have taken upon themselves what was intended for Heracles: they assume his mortality, and when they are properly disposed of Heracles may be said to have escaped from the deadly sleep which they suffer. Thus a most

<sup>13</sup> E. Riess, "Studies in Superstition," *AJP* 24 (1903) 434f. Greek lullabies, however, are quite rare in extant literature and no other example of this particular *topos* can be found: cf. I. Waern, "Greek Lullabies," *Eranos* 58 (1960) 1-8. The only other pure example of a Greek lullaby is Simonides' Danae-fragment.

<sup>14</sup> *Homeric Hymn* 5.177; Theocritus 3.49; *Odyssey* 13.74; cf. Moschus 3.104. Sleep as a metaphor of death is as old as the myth of Gilgamesh.

<sup>15</sup> Legrand, *Étude* (above, note 2) 185; Crump (above, note 1) 57.

<sup>16</sup> (above, note 6) *ad* 91, 95, 96; see also H. Schweizer, *Aberglaube und Zauberei bei Theokrit* (Basel 1937) 50, n: 111.

ordinary and mundane episode of sleeping and awakening has become emblematic of the process by which Heracles achieves his immortality.

An identical point can be made with regard to yet another pervasive theme in the poem: fire. On the mundane, realistic level the fiery illumination of the scene is found in the torches which Amphitryon demands from the snoring servants, and which they provide at line 52; it is found also the next morning in the fumigation of the house with sulfur (96). But fire also functions on a more miraculous level: it appears as the mysterious *φάος* in line 22 which suddenly illumines the scene, and which is mentioned as an omen by Alcmena in lines 38-39. Only the disappearance of this *φάος* causes Amphitryon to summon the more realistic torchbearers. The critical judgment is that this strange light is some sort of kindly divine presence which is intended to show the danger to Heracles; it is thought to disappear quite simply because Heracles has finished his work and no longer needs it.<sup>17</sup> But this unexpected light can be identified more specifically: it is apparently the same as the *κακὸν πῦρ* which shines from the eyes of the snakes themselves in lines 18-19. The snakes are named from the function of their eyes: *ὀφίεσσι* (29) and *δράκοντας* (14).<sup>18</sup> The disappearance of the *φάος* which illumines the walls of the house indicates not merely that Heracles has completed his task, but more exactly that the *κακὸν πῦρ* which emanates from the snakes' eyes and is in fact their essence has been extinguished. The *φάος* and the *κακὸν πῦρ* are the same, and the disappearance of the light shows Heracles' victory over the fiery snakes.

What we have is quite simply the case of an infant threatened from a fiery source: it is a common motif in mythology, and in this case the mythic symbolism is explicit in Greek tradition. Dionysus was deified after a fiery confrontation at his birth;<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Legrand, *Étude* (above, note 2) 188; Könnicke (above, note 10) 389; Sanchez-Wildberger (above, note 1) 20; Hunger (above, note 2) 24. Gow (above, note 6) *ad* 46 merely comments: "It is not plain what point is marked by the fading of the miraculous light."

<sup>18</sup> Gow (above, note 6) *ad* 18.

<sup>19</sup> Euripides, *Bacchae* 242f., 288f.

the case of Asclepius as described in Pindar's *Pythian* 3.39f. appears to be similar, although the immortalizing function of the fire is not clearly stated. Perhaps best known is Demophoon in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (239f.): the child is dipped in fire by the goddess who explicitly intends to immortalize him by burning away his mortality. To the Alexandrian Age apparently an even more famous case is Achilles whose myth is alluded to by Lycophron (*Alexandra* 178) and told by Apollonius Rhodius (4.871): the infant at precisely midnight is dipped in fire by its mother, Thetis, and had not Peleus seen and interrupted her—as Metaneira interrupted Demeter—apparently the immortality would have been won.<sup>20</sup> In these mythic cases the attempt to achieve immortality is found in a childhood episode: it is the infants Asclepius, Demophoon, and Achilles who are confronted with a fire which threatens to destroy, but has also the potential to immortalize them. In the case of Heracles we are accustomed to think of the immortalizing fire as that which confronts him at his death on Mt. Oeta; and of this *πυρὰ Τραχίνιος* there is mention in the prophecy of Teiresias (83). But a new twist appears to have been added: the same fire which immortalizes him at the end of his life is also present shortly after his birth in the *κακὸν πῦρ* from the eyes of the snakes.<sup>21</sup> This *κακὸν πῦρ* Heracles endures and overcomes by himself; his parents do not arrive in time to rescue him from the supposed threat. In this critical way Heracles' experience differs from that of Asclepius, Demophoon, and Achilles: his immortality is symbolically achieved by his uninterrupted encounter with fire.

A bright light is also present at the infancy of Heracles in Theocritus' Pindaric models: the *φάος* of Theocritus is on the

<sup>20</sup> *ἄφρα πέλοιτο ἀθάνατος* (A. R. 4.871f.); the narrative is told with more details by Schol. Lycophron, *Lycophronis Alexandra*, ed. E. Scheer (Berlin 1958) II ad 178. It is the belief of Frazer and Rohde that this mythic pattern is related to the institution of the *ἀμφιδρόμια*, for which see *Suidae Lexicon*, ed. A. Adler (Stuttgart 1971) s.v. *ἀμφιδρόμια*: Apollodorus, *The Library*, ed. J. G. Frazer (London 1921) II.313; E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Leipzig 1894) 360, n. 1.

<sup>21</sup> The similarity of the fire at Achilles' birth and the fire at Heracles' death is appreciated by A. E. Housman, "Jests of Plautus, Cicero, and Trimalchio," *CR* 32 (1918) 163. The same implication may be present at Plautus, *Amphitryo* 1096: *aedes totae confulgebant*.

surface not unlike the *θητὰν ἀγλαν* of *Nemean* 1.35 and the *σέλας* of *Paean* 20.13.<sup>22</sup> But by identifying the *φάος* with the *κακὸν πῦρ* from the snakes' eyes Theocritus has introduced a distinctly new note: the light signals not merely the glory of the hero, but more specifically his confrontation with a fiery source which immortalizes.

Fire appears yet one further time in this Idyll in lines 88-91 where Teiresias directs that the bodies of the snakes be burned at midnight and their ashes thrown beyond the boundaries. Again the point which Gow has demonstrated becomes relevant: the details of this purification ritual indicate that the snakes are *φαρμακοί*. They had come at midnight with a threat of fire and of endless sleep. They instead suffer the sleep of death, and at precisely midnight they instead are consumed in flames: they are appropriate scapegoats to the extent that they take upon themselves the forms of death which were intended for another. The ritual description, supposedly otiose, is found to have a precise application to the main theme of the poem: how, not only many years later on Mt. Oeta, but at a moment of his infancy Heracles encounters and overcomes death in the form of chthonian snakes, fire, and sleep.

In reading the opening part of this Idyll we are first impressed by its ordinariness. The humane characterization of the parents, the sudden awakening of the children, the summoning of snoring servants to bring torches, the blunt return to bed—these indicate a superficial attempt at verisimilitude. But beneath the surface the language clearly indicates a more serious intent: it is represented by the fire from the snakes' eyes, the miraculous light which illumines the scene, and the serpents in a coma of death. Any attempt to overemphasize the realistic atmosphere will fail to appreciate the quality of this Idyll: it is precisely in the domestically mundane that the heroic struggle is latent.

One further example of the immortality theme, at lines 76-81, will illustrate this point. The immortality of Heracles is here described in explicitly heroic terms: he will ascend into starry

<sup>22</sup> For *σέλας ἐδίνασεν* see B. Forssman, *Untersuchungen zur Sprache Pindars* (Wiesbaden 1966) 61: "Glanz blitzte auf." Theocritus makes the fire come from the eyes of the snakes, whereas in Pindar and Apollodorus (2.4.9) the light comes from the eyes of Heracles himself.



heaven, a hero broad of chest; all men and beasts will be inferior to him as he accomplishes his twelve labors, and fulfills his destiny to dwell with Zeus. But Alcmene also is to be immortal; yet nothing could be more wistfully mundane, more ordinary than the immortality she will have; nothing could be more in contrast to the heroic ascension of Heracles. The women of Greece, says Teiresias, will sing of Alcmene in the evening as they rub the soft wool on their knees, and she will be a *σέβας* among the Argive women. The juxtaposition of these two forms of immortality—the heroic and the domestic—is the best demonstration of the two levels on which this Idyll functions. The songs of spinning women, the illumination of a house at night, the simple awakening of a child—these ordinary, seemingly inconsequential, events are deceptive: in them is latent the ascension of Heracles from Mt. Oeta and the marriage of the god-hero to Hebe in the home of Zeus.

That ominous significance is latent in the apparent trivialities of existence is demonstrated again at lines 50-51. Amphitryon has just shouted to the snoring servants to bring torches and open the heavy bolts on the doors. The action is at its climax, but suddenly the scene shifts: we are confronted from a completely different quarter by an outlandish "Phoenician woman whose bed was by the mill," who echoes the cry of Amphitryon. It is a bizarre and unexpected interruption of the action, a realistically trivial change of perspective. But the ordinary event is again deceptive, for the lines are, as Gow (ad loc.) notes, allusive, and in that allusion their import is hidden. We are being asked to remember another servant woman who also spent the night by the mill, and who also without warning shouted out words ominous to her master. The reference is to *Odyssey* 20.105ff.: in that scene the still disguised Odysseus has prayed to Zeus for an omen to confirm his success; and when Zeus responds with thunder a strangely unexpected maid-servant confirms the omen from the mill by praying that the thunder will show Zeus' resolve to destroy the suitors. The single line spoken by the woman at the mill in Theocritus is not an explicit omen: such, it seems, would too obviously have broken the tone of verisimilitude. But once the allusion is heard, the seemingly trivial becomes ominous: the lines appear to imply in the most simple and realistic way that there are extra

human powers at work here as there were in the scene from the *Odyssey*.

The third section of *Idyll* 24, lines 103-40, has caused greatest difficulty to the critics: it appears to be merely a digressive list, an "hellenistisch gelehrten und ausgeschmückten Aufzählung," of the tutors from whom Heracles learns the princely arts.<sup>23</sup> Yet it is possible to demonstrate the role which this section plays in the total *Idyll*: as was previously mentioned, it appears to balance the first part of the poem (1-63) in being primarily concerned with the mortal, earthly side of Heracles; as such it contrasts with the speech of Teiresias in the second part and presumably also with the final lines (168f.) in both of which the deification of the god-hero and his reconciliation with the divinities are of prime importance. Within this alternating pattern the catalogue of tutors shows exactly how far and with what limitations the education of Heracles can proceed on a purely human level. There is no significant contact with divinity in this section, although the tutors who are catalogued represent the epitome of human excellence.

The passage is framed by references to Alcmene in lines 103 and 134: it is, surprisingly, she, not Amphitryon, who chooses the tutors and the curriculum which Heracles is to follow. Throughout the poem Alcmene has represented the domestic and human side of Heracles, that side which was burned away by the *πυρὰ Τραχίνιος*: it was Alcmene who sang the lullaby, who first awoke and set out to the rescue; it was she who took Iphicles, the terrified mortal child, to herself, and the next day in motherly concern called for Teiresias. Her initiative is stressed throughout the poem, but it is an initiative on a human level: to achieve deification Heracles needs not only the earthly assistance of Alcmene, but also the animosity of Hera, the watchfulness of Zeus, and marriage to Hebe. The tutors whom Alcmene finds are like Alcmene herself: as excellent as possible, but nonetheless explicitly limited by their ordinary humanity.

Observe, for instance, the last tutor, Castor: in some ways

<sup>23</sup> Pohlenz (above, note 13) 373; Cholmeley (above, note 1) *ad* 104; Crump (above, note 1) 35. The list of tutors has interested commentators only in relation to the similar catalogue in Apollodorus (2.4.9).

like Heracles himself he was an exile from his native land and unparalleled among the warrior heroes. From him Heracles learned much: to wield the spear and endure the sword; to arrange his troops and command his knights. From this training Heracles became like his tutor outstanding among the heroes. But the emphatic detail emerges in line 133: Castor was limited by his mortality, by an old age which rubbed away his youth. In this regard Heracles, having learned from him what he needed, rises superior to him: like Alcmene Castor can take Heracles to the verge, but no further. The same is apparently true of Heracles' father, Amphitryon, from whom he learns how to drive the chariot (119f.). The point is more obliquely expressed: Amphitryon was a fit teacher because he had won many prizes in Argos, and his skill was indicated by the fact that he never wrecked his chariot in turning around the course. But the chariot did collapse, although not through any fault of Amphitryon: that would tend to deny his excellence. Rather it collapsed for precisely the reason that Castor did: time caused its thongs to slacken, *χρόνῳ διέλυσαν ἱμάντας* (124). It is a bizarre expression, and therefore the more emphatic. Impermanent excellence is the legacy of Amphitryon and Castor, and it is exactly in the permanence of his achievement that Heracles' superiority is implied.

The point is made less explicitly with regard to two other tutors: Theocritus relies rather on his reader's knowledge of mythological tradition. The impermanence, the human limitations of Linus and Eurytus are demonstrated by the simple fact that, after he had learned appropriate skills from each, Heracles is said to have killed both.<sup>24</sup> We receive at least from this catalogue of tutors the general impression of excellence which is limited by human mortality. The list shows the mortal side of Heracles being trained in preparation for his labors and the ascension to Olympus; but implicit in the catalogue is Heracles' superiority to his tutors. In the limitation of their achievements we recall the permanence of Heracles' deification.

In the context of *Idyll* 24 it seems possible that this

<sup>24</sup> See the *loci* cited in Gow (above, note 6) *ad* 105, 108. Eumolpus and Harpalycus are insufficiently attested to justify a similar interpretation.

stress on human *paideia* in preparation for immortality is Pindaric. In a poem whose narrative is borrowed from Pindar it is not unreasonable to find such a point of view: to discover that heroic excellence is defined as not only innate in the infant but also the result of hard training by experienced tutors.<sup>25</sup> It is merely another indication of the double level on which this Idyll functions throughout.

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<sup>25</sup> The interdependency of innate qualities and hard training is common in the Pindaric ethics: see C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 171ff. The third section of *Idyll* 24 is therefore comparable to the frequent mention of trainers in Pindar's epinicia.

## DIVA AUGUSTA MARCIANA

An entry in the Fasti of Ostia (Fragment 22) reads:<sup>1</sup>

39. *III K. Septembr.*  
40. [Marciana Aug]usta excessit diva(ue) cognominata  
41. [Mati]dia Augusta cognominata. III  
42. [Marc]iana Augusta funere censorio  
43. [elata est.]

The fragment was first published by G. Calza, in 1932, who hesitantly suggested completing line 41 with the addition of the words [eodem die? Mati]dia.<sup>2</sup> The subsequent editors somewhat rashly omitted the question mark, and historians, as their wont is, began to build their hypotheses on the foundation of a bracketed conjecture, as if the proposed reading were engraved on the marble slab found in Ostia. Thus, scholars now state as facts, that on August 29th, A.D. 122, the day of her death, Marciana, Trajan's sister, became a goddess, and that on the same day Matidia, her daughter, received the title of Augusta.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, the now accepted restoration of line 41 is by no means obvious. Other possible readings could be fitted into the seven-eight letters' space before the name of Matidia. For instance, J. Carcopino<sup>4</sup> conjectured [et eius filia) Mati]dia.

The following abbreviations should be noted: *BMC* = H. Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum* I-III (1930-1936); *ILS* = H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones latinae selectae*, I-III (1892-1916); Mommsen = Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* 3rd ed. (1887-1888).

<sup>1</sup> A. Degrassi, *Inscriptiones Italiae*, XIII, 1 (1947) 43; L. Vidman, *Fasti Ostienses*, in *Rozpravy of the Czechoslovak Academy* 67, 6 (1957) 64; E. M. Smallwood, *Documents illustrating the Principates of Nerva Trajan and Hadrian* (1966) 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Notizie degli Scavi di antichità*, 1932, p. 198.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. R. Hanslik, *RE*, Suppl. XI (1965) 1092.

<sup>4</sup> J. Carcopino, *C. R. Acad. Inscr.* (1932) 374. Carcopino restored *fil(ia)*, but the regular abbreviation in the Fasti is *filia*). Calza also thought of supplementing *in loco eius*, but *Augusta* was a title, and not a magistrature. The lacuna is best left unrestored.

On the other hand, line 40, the restoration of which is certain, "does not indicate a solemn *consecratio*."<sup>5</sup> What does the line say? At this point, a grammatical observation may be helpful. In contradistinction to the conjunction *et* that links concepts which appear different to the writer, the adjunctive particle *que* indicates that they are complementary. "The second member serves to complete or to extend the first."<sup>6</sup> Used between two sentences *que* denotes a consequence. Thus, the line in the Fasti says: "On August 29th, Marciana Augusta passed away, and therefore was surnamed *diva*." The text does not imply that the deification occurred on August 29th.

From the historian's point of view, the hypothesis that Marciana was consecrated on that same day when she died raises difficulties which appear insuperable. To begin with, until the burial the family of the deceased was *funesta*. Even the news of the death of a near relative incapacitated a magistrate as to his religious duties. As supreme pontiff Trajan was particularly exposed to ritual defilement; he was not permitted even to look at a corpse.<sup>7</sup>

Secondly, the state funeral of a member of the imperial family was preceded by official mourning which included the cessation of public business of the magistrates (*iustitium*).<sup>8</sup> Even the gladiatorial games, given by Trajan, were interrupted until the funeral of Marciana. Further, not only the circus, bath and shops, but the temples as well were closed until the bones of the deceased were buried and the duties to his *manes* fulfilled.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> J. H. Oliver, *HTHR* 42 (1949) p. 37 n. 8.

<sup>6</sup> B. L. Gildersleeve, G. Lodge, *Latin Grammar*, 3rd ed. (1963) No. 476. Cf. e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 97.1: *mors quoque eius . . . divinitasque post mortem*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Cic. *De leg.* 2.22.55; Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.64; 4.507; 6.229; 11.2. When the emperor delivered a funeral oration, a curtain separated him from the coffin, Sen. *ad Marciam* 15.3.

<sup>8</sup> Mommsen I, 264; W. Seston, *RD* 30 (1952) 159.

<sup>9</sup> *ILS*, 140, decree of Pisa, on the occasion of the death of C. Caesar, in A.D. 4: *ex qua die eius decessus nuntiatus esset usque ad diem qua ossa relata atque condita iustaque eius manibus perfecta essent, cunctos veste mutata, templisque deorum immortalium balneisque publicis et tabernis omnibus clausis, convictibus sese abstinere*. Cf. *Fasti Cupr. ap. Degraasi* (above n. 1) p. 245: after the death of C. Caesar [*Romae iustit*] *ium indictum est donec ossa eius in [ma] esol [aem] inlata sunt*]. Likewise, after the death of Germanicus it was

Thus during public mourning communion with the gods was interrupted. A poem on the death of Drusus, the stepson of Augustus, describes the religious situation throughout the duration of a *iustitium*:<sup>10</sup>

*Dique latent templis neque iniqua ad funera vultus  
Praebent nec poscunt tura ferenda rogo.  
Obscuros delubra tenent, pudet ora colentum  
Aspicere invidiae, quam meruere, metu.*

It is difficult to see how Trajan could and why he should violate the sacred law, offend public opinion and brave the anger of the gods by insisting on the deification of his sister at the time when the gods were unapproachable. Would they receive Marciana among them as long as their temples were closed, not even incense offered, and they themselves "hidden" (*obscuri*) in their *cellae*? The funeral of Marciana took place a few days after her death, perhaps on 3rd September.<sup>11</sup> Could not Trajan wait until this day? And why should he call a special sitting of the Senate on August 29th when a *senatus legitimus* met anyway on September 1st?

As a matter of fact, consecration always followed, not preceded, the public funeral. As Tertullian says:<sup>12</sup> *quos ante paucos dies luctu publico humatos mortuos sunt confessi in deos consecrant*. Even Caligula who, shattered by the loss of his beloved sister, ran away to his villa at Alba Longa, neglected the funeral rites and missed the burial, deified Drusilla some time after the cremation of her body.<sup>13</sup> From Pliny's *Panegyric* we know that Trajan first bewailed Nerva, then deified him. Hadrian's funeral laudation at the cremation of Matidia, in 119,

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ordered *uti [q(ue) quo die cautum est ut ossa Germanici] Caesaris in tumultum inferrentur templa deo(rum) clauderentur*. See the *Tabula Hebana* ap. J. H. Oliver, *AJP* 75 (1954) 225.

<sup>10</sup> *Consol. ad Liviam*, 187-90 in Ovidius, *Halieutica*, ed. F. W. Lenz.

<sup>11</sup> According to Degraffi's conjectural restoration.

<sup>12</sup> Tert. *Apol.* 10. On the known dates of consecration cf. G. W. Clarke, *Historia* 15 (1966) 318.

<sup>13</sup> Sen. *ad Polyb.* 17.4; Suet. *Calig.* 24. Drusilla died on June 12th (Fasti of Ostia) and was deified, probably, on Sept. 23. G. Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* (1874) p. xlvi.

preceded her apotheosis.<sup>14</sup> Last but not least: line 42 of the entry in the Fasti states that Marciana Augusta, and not Diva Augusta Marciana, was carried to the funeral pyre.<sup>15</sup> When all this is added up we may conclude, it seems, that in default of indications to the contrary, it will be safe to assume that Trajan could not and did not force the consecration of his sister on the same day on which she expired.

We can now turn to the account in the Fasti. In order to understand the notice about Marciana and Matidia we have to recall to mind the simple fact that the Ancients wrote not for our enlightenment but for their own readers. Engraved on marble tables, the Chronicle of Ostia was compiled for the man in the street of Ostia, and the latter was mainly interested in *panem et circenses*. Thus the Chronicler speaks abundantly about the circus and distribution of largesses to the people. Sensational public executions, fires and funerals were also shows. There are in the Fasti seven lines about the execution of Seianus and his family in A.D. 31, and again three lines about the carrying out of the death sentence upon his accomplices in A.D. 33, but the Chronicler makes no mention of Domitian's literary and artistic contests which appeared so important to the *litterati* of his time.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, the Chronicler noted the funeral of Tiberius, the assassination of Domitian and the proclamation of Nerva as Emperor, but the peaceful accessions of Tiberius, Caligula and Trajan found no place in the Fasti.

Now, the notice concerning Marciana and Matidia is sandwiched between two parts of the entry about the gladiatorial combats given by Trajan, which were interrupted by the death of Marciana. The suspension of the greatest show on earth would be alone a sound reason for recording the dates of Marciana's death and burial. But her demise was memorable for two more reasons. First, she was the first *diva* of the new age.

<sup>14</sup> Plin. *Pan.* 11.1: *quem tu lacrimis primum . . . mox templo honestasti*. Hadrian's funerary oration: CIL XIV, 3579 = F. Vollmer, *Laudationum funebrum . . . editio, Supplem. Jahrb. für class. Philologie* 18 (1891) 516 = Smallwood (above, n. 1) 14. Cf. H. Bardon, *Les Empereurs et les lettres latines* (1940) 402.

<sup>15</sup> Carcopino (above, n. 4) p. 374 n. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. e.g. Teuffel's *History of Roman Literature* II (1892) 110; Bardon op. cit., 327.



The cult of the *divae* of the Julian dynasty, even the state cult of Livia, was abolished by Vespasian in A.D. 70, and the worship of two Flavian *divae* was obviously abandoned after the end of the dynasty, in A.D. 96.<sup>17</sup> Further, though Trajan's wife and his sister received the title of Augusta between A.D. 100 and 105 no coinage advertised their elevation to this rank.<sup>18</sup> Plotina and Marciana had to wait until 112 to be honored with coins bearing their likeness and names.<sup>19</sup> But after the death of Marciana, the mint in Rome, in all the three metals, gold, silver and bronze, trumpeted the glory of *Matidia Aug(usta) Divae Marcianae filia*) and announced her *Pietas Aug(ustae)*.<sup>20</sup> After the death of her mother, the widowed Matidia took her place at the court

<sup>17</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 4.40. Cf. Henzen (above n. 13) 69; 104; 187. Similarly the cult of St. Napoléon, a saint invented for the sake of the First Consul, ceased after the fall of the Emperor, though the saint is still listed in the official register of Catholic saints. Cf. H. Delehay, *Mélanges offerts à H. Pirenne* I (1926) 81. Suet. *Claud.* 45 says that Nero abolished the cult of *divus Claudius* and Vespasian restored it. The Arval acts prove that Suetonius was mistaken. See e.g. the Acts of Jan. 3, 69 in M. McCrum, A. G. Woodhead, *Select Documents of the Principates of the Flavian Emperors* (1961) 2.

<sup>18</sup> See M. Durry's note in his edition of Pliny's *Paneg.* 84.5. Cf. *ILS*, 106.

<sup>19</sup> An issue minted in 112 but before the death of Marciana, honored the living members of Trajan's family with graded homages. To his wife, Plotina Augusta, was accorded the dignity of a coin for herself. *Marciana Aug(usta) soror imperatoris Traiani* appeared on obverse, and *Matidia Aug(ustae) filia*) with her two children was portrayed on the reverse of the same coin. *BMC*, pp. 106; 108; P. L. Strack, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts* I (1931) nos. 108-83. A denarius of the same series is described in *BMC* III, p. 108 no. 531 as offering the legend *Matidia Aug(usta)*. But Mr. R. A. C. Carson in his letter of Febr. 8, 1968, kindly informs me that "there are remains of the letter F at the end of the inscription in exergue." Thus, the legend on the coin is the same as the reading of the other pieces of the same issue. The city of Lyttus (Crete) in a decree of 107/8 prematurely bestowed on Matidia the title of Augusta. M. Guarducci, *Inscr. Creticae* I, p. 104, no. 20. In September-October of 112, the same city honored Trajan, Plotina, "Marciana Augusta, goddess", and "Matidia Augusta, daughter of the goddess Marciana". Guarducci, *ib.* 22-26.

<sup>20</sup> *BMC* II, p. 231 no. 658. The altar represented on obverse of this coin, probably, indicates that Matidia became the priestess of the cult of her mother. Cf. J. Liegle, *ZfN* 42 (1932) 67. On the other coins honoring *Matidia Augusta* she is represented holding hands over the heads of her two daughters. *Pietas Aug(ustae)* here refers to her care for her children, who alone continued the dynasty of Trajan. One of them, Sabina, became Hadrian's wife.

along with Plotina, Trajan's wife. After the death of Trajan, Matidia, mother-in-law of Hadrian and thus his link with his predecessor, eclipsed both Plotina and Sabina, Hadrian's wife.<sup>21</sup> The spouses disliked one another. Sabina boasted that she had succeeded in avoiding having children,<sup>22</sup> Hadrian was interested in his minions. Sabina obtained the title of *Augusta* not before A.D. 128.<sup>23</sup> Hadrian probably made this present to Sabina to keep her quiet during his infatuation with Antinous.

The block recording the events of 108-113 was inscribed some years later, but before the death of Matidia in 119.<sup>24</sup> Thus, having mentioned the death of Marciana, a fact which by itself was no longer of great interest at the time of publication, the compiler added two bits of information which were still timely: Marciana was named *diva*, the only *diva* in the imperial pantheon at this date, and her daughter received the title of *Augusta*. In the same way the entry on the great fire in Rome on November 1st, A.D. 36 attracts the notice that Tiberius spent one hundred millions to help the victims of the disaster. As Tiberius at that time was staying at Capri, he obviously did not intervene on the day of the fire, and the enormous amount mentioned in the *Fasti* was paid weeks and months later after the evaluation of damages by a special committee.<sup>25</sup>

It is the simultaneity of events, the gladiatorial show, the death of Marciana, her deification and the sudden elevation of Matidia to the dignity of *Augusta*, that explains the mention of Marciana's apotheosis in the *Fasti*, displayed publicly in Ostia. As a matter of fact, as far as the extant evidence goes, the *Fasti* of Ostia do not record any other deification, not even that of Augustus. The same kind of popular newspaper sensationalism moved a later Chronicler to record for eternity that Faustina

<sup>21</sup> Between 119 and 123, a group of statues was dedicated to Hadrian and his family by the city of Perga in Pamphylia. The group includes the deified Nerva, Trajan, Marciana, and Matidia, and, on the other hand, Hadrian and Plotina, but no statue of Sabina has been found. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. Epigr. REG.* 1958, 496. On the lavish funeral of Matidia cf. S.H.A. *Hadr.* 19.5.

<sup>22</sup> *Epit. de Caes.* 14.8.

<sup>23</sup> Strack (above n. 19) II (1933) p. 23.

<sup>24</sup> Ch. Huelsen, *RhM* 82 (1933) 399; Vidman (above n. 1) 83.

<sup>25</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 6.45; Dio Cass. 58.26.5.

Junior received the title of *Augusta* the day after the birth of her first child and that Marcus Aurelius, her husband, on the same occasion received his first tribunician power. But he still remained only *Caesar*, while Faustina was *Augusta*. This entry of December 1, A.D. 147 in the Chronicle vividly illustrates the observation of Marcus Aurelius, at the time when he already ruled the world, that he could not divorce Faustina without returning her dowry—the Empire.<sup>26</sup>

Let us now try to understand the exact meaning of the statement that Marciana was “surnamed” *diva*, and Matidia “surnamed” *Augusta*. The vocabulary of the Chronicler is precise. For instance, he distinguishes between a magistrate who is *creatus* and one who is *pronunciatus*.<sup>27</sup> He reports that Nerva was *imperator appellatus*, while Faustina Junior was *Augusta cognominata*. Saying that Marciana was “surnamed” *diva*, the Chronicler does not intend to downgrade her divinity. She became a goddess in Roman cult, and the Roman army continued to offer her sacrifices for more than a century after her death.<sup>28</sup> But the terminology depends on the point of view of the writer. Stating that the Son of God was “surnamed” Jesus Christ, Tertullian does not try to diminish the role of the Savior.<sup>29</sup> But Tertullian here answers an author who, identifying the Father and the Son, asserted that God himself was Jesus Christ. When the Chronicler of Ostia says that Marciana was “surnamed” *diva*, instead of saying that she was “enrolled among the gods,” “received celestial honors,” etc.,<sup>30</sup> he neglects the sacral aspects of the apotheosis as irrelevant for his readers. In the world that counted “three hundred thousand deities,” it was no news that the Senate had recognized another

<sup>26</sup> S.H.A. *M. Aur.* 19.9.

<sup>27</sup> Fasti of Ostia of the year 30. Cf. Vidman's note ad loc.

<sup>28</sup> R. O. Fink, A. S. Hoey, W. F. Snyder, “The Feriale Duranum,” in *YCS* 7 (1940) 154. Cf. C. B. Welles, in *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Final Report V*, 1 (1959) 54.

<sup>29</sup> Tertull. *adv. Praxeam*, 2: *hominem et deum, filium hominis et filium dei, et cognominatum Jesum Christum*.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. e.g. the calendar entry on Sept. 17: *divo Augusto honores caelestes a Senatu decreti*. Degrassi, *Inscr. Italiae* XIII, 2 (1963).

goddess.<sup>31</sup> Of importance was the distinction bestowed on Marciana. The language of the Chronicler shows that for him the term *diva* was a title just like *Augusta*.

As the title of *Augusta* was without any substance of power, it was treated as a surname. Pliny says of Plotina and Marciana: *obtulerat illis Senatus cognomen Augustarum*.<sup>32</sup> The apotheosis of a lady of the imperial family was regarded as another, and the highest, reward of the lady's merits. Hadrian, in the funeral laudation of Matidia, a daughter of Marciana, says that she was daughter of an *Augusta*, and even of a *diva*: *Augustae filiam et divae*.<sup>33</sup> But the supreme homage of deification bestowed on a princess, who neither led armies to victory nor governed the *res publica*, probably appeared to the public as fortuitous. Even of Livia a flatterer could only say that she was mother of princes and a wife worthy of her princely husband. As Tacitus says of Poppaea: *fortunae munera pro virtutibus*.<sup>34</sup> And if under Trajan the sacrificial ritual was already the same as later under the Severi, the distinction between the *divi* and the *divae* was obvious to the common man. The *divae* received offerings of wine and incense, but the *divi* received each an ox as sacrifice, and that gave a chance to the man in the street to get a free meal.<sup>35</sup> In this sense, the deified princesses were a kind of second class deity.<sup>36</sup>

The wording of coin legends illustrates the point. The divinized emperor is *divus Nerva Augustus*, *divus Antoninus Augustus*, and so on. Only the Flavii are an exception. The *auctoritas et quasi maiestas quaedam* which the plebeian Ves-

<sup>31</sup> Prudentius, *Apoth.* 453, says of the Emperor Julian: *amans ter centum milia divum*. (I owe the knowledge of this passage to a lecture of Prof. K. Thraede at the 1972 *Entretiens* of the *Fondation Hardt*.) The apologist exaggerates. Hesiod (*Op.* 251) counted only 30,000 gods.

<sup>32</sup> Plin. *Pan.* 84.6; Mommsen II, 821. Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 15.13.

<sup>33</sup> See above n. 14.

<sup>34</sup> *Cons. ad Liviam* (above n. 10) 343: *principibus natis, principe digna viro*; Tac. *Ann.* 16.6.

<sup>35</sup> Feriale Duranum (above n. 28) 193. Under the Julian-Claudian dynasty, goddesses, including the *divae*, received animal sacrifices from the Arval brothers.

<sup>36</sup> G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, 2nd ed. (1912) 344.

pasian lacked at his accession was never acquired by the upstart dynasty.<sup>37</sup> Thus the deified Flavii were put in the wake of *divus Augustus*. Vespasian became *divus Augustus Vespasianus*. The deified Titus was *divus Augustus Titus* or *Titus divus Augustus*, but was never styled "*divus Titus Augustus*."<sup>38</sup>

As to the deified princesses, the term *diva* in the first century preceded the name. Livia as goddess was *diva Augusta*. No coins honored the deified Drusilla, Poppaea and her baby Diva Claudia Virgo. Under the Flavii, the mint paid homage to *diva Domitilla Augusta* and to *diva Julia Augusta*. But in the second century the style had changed. Coins now honored *diva Augusta Marciana*, *diva Augusta Faustina*, and so on. Plotina, to whom Hadrian owed the throne, became, however, *diva Plotina Augusta*.<sup>39</sup> The consequent differentiation in sense was hardly fortuitous. On the other hand, it is remarkable and to me, at least, unaccountable that in inscriptions inversion of the order of names is rare. On stones, the official title of *Augusta*, as it should, follows the proper name. Thus *diva Marciana Augusta* on the arch of Ancona, *sacerdos divae Marcianae Augustae*, etc.<sup>40</sup> The same, normal, word order occasionally appears on coins. For instance, on gold coins of the issue which announces the deification of Faustina, she is styled now *diva Augusta Faustina*, and now *diva Faustina Augusta*. This unconcern of mint officials again shows that the term *diva* was felt to be just a higher title conferred upon a deceased princess. Thus it did not matter whether it stood before or after her name.

My next topic which I touch with some reluctance is the use of the Marciana item in the current discussion of Roman apotheosis. But the matter is of sufficient importance to justify further discussion. For the reader's convenience, we shall first give a brief summary of the problem.

<sup>37</sup> Suet. *Vesp.* 7.1.

<sup>38</sup> *BMC* II, p. xc.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. the gold coins of Hadrian with Trajan's bust on reverse and the legend: *divo Traiano patri Augusto*. *BMC* III, p. 244, nos. 44-46. Cf. also the observations of R. Syme, *Historia* 7 (1958) 172 on the place of the title *imperator* in Roman titulature.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. e.g. *ILS* 298 (dedication of the arch of Ancona): *divae Marcianae Augustae* *sorori Augusti*. *ILS* 6658: *sacerdos divae Marcianae Aug.*

The ritual of consecration is well known from literary, numismatic and archaeological sources.<sup>41</sup> At first, from Augustus to Nero and probably under the Flavii, after the cremation of the body in the Campus Martius, a witness appearing before the Senate attested that he had with his own eyes seen the ascension of the deceased prince to heaven. This miracle (and the services rendered by the emperor to the gods and men) justified the inclusion of a new *divus* among the gods of Rome. In the second and third centuries, however, after the solemn burial (cremation or inhumation) of the corpse, public mourning began, followed by state funeral of a wax likeness of the deceased ruler. The effigy was placed on the top of the multi-storied funeral pyre in the Campus Martius and solemnly burned up. Afterward, the deceased emperor received worship as a *divus*.

A hypothesis which has attracted wide acceptance among scholars<sup>42</sup> postulates that in the latter procedure of deification the *senatus-consultum* which established the cult of a new *divus* occurred before the ritual burning of the wax image in the Campus Martius. This opinion is contrary to the *ius divinum* and disagrees with the sources. Its sole prop is the mistaken impression that the Fasti of Ostia attest the divinization of Marciana before the state funeral. This prop having been removed, the hypothesis can be judged on its own merits.

The line of reasoning goes as follows. The funeral of the wax image was carefully stage-managed to produce the miracle of translation. For instance, an eagle released from the funeral pyre soared off manifesting ascension of the new *divus*. Therefore, the argument goes, the decree of deification must have been passed before the ceremony in the Campus Martius.

Here premise is sound but conclusion is erroneous. The error arises because in the argumentation no distinction has been made between the intention and its enactment. The premise deals with a decision, but the inference with its legalization. Thus the

<sup>41</sup> See my essay in the 1972 *Entretiens* of the Fondation Hardt.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. my essay in "Le culte des souverains dans l'empire romain," *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, Fondation Hardt, 1973, pp. 3-25. My interpretation of the first coinage of Hadrian has been independently confirmed by Ph. V. Hill, *The Undated Coins of Rome* (1970), pp. 48-50.

argument fails because of a formal fallacy known as *quaternio terminorum*.

The author who first propounded this argument needed only to observe the facts before his eyes to avoid violating the elementary rules of formal logic. On February 27th, 1933, Hitler set the Reichstag building on fire, in order to outlaw the Communist party. But the law implementing his intention was, and could be, enacted only after the fire which was imputed to the Communists. In Rome, religion was often manipulated for political purposes. "The immortal gods, by means of auspices, have often restrained unjustified desires of the people."<sup>43</sup> Thus the proceedings in a popular assembly could be stopped on pretext that an unfavorable omen, for instance a flash of lightning, had been observed by a presiding magistrate or reported to him. Obviously, reporting or observation of a portent preceded (and not followed) the disbanding of an assembly, the invalidation of an election, etc., on the ground of the said portent. A pious fraud which follows its desired result is a contradiction in terms. The same observation applies to the apotheosis. The deification was motivated by political considerations. "The Romans have a practice of deifying these emperors who at their death leave sons to succeed them."<sup>44</sup> But the consecration presupposes that "the real self"<sup>45</sup> of the deceased prince was with the gods in heaven. In the second and third centuries the imperial art displayed the new *divus* flying heavenward or received up in glory.<sup>46</sup> Pagans and Christians drew parallels

<sup>43</sup> Cic. *De leg.* 3.12.27: *saepe enim populi impetum iniustum auspiciis dii immortales represserunt*. Cf. Mommsen I, 89; 106; III, i, 365; J. Bayet in *Hommages à Georges Dumézil* (1960) 37.

<sup>44</sup> Herodianus 4.2.1 ed. K. Stavenhagen. (In my translation I used that of E. C. Echols). Cf. Min. Fel. 21.9: *qui consecrantur non ad fidem numinis sed ad honorem emeritae potestatis*. In a letter of Gordian III (K. T. Erism, J. Reynolds, *JRS* 59 [1969] 56) the formula *τῶν ἐν θεοῖς τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων* means "legitimate rulers."

<sup>45</sup> I borrow this expression from A. D. Nock's admirable account of Roman apotheosis in *CAH* X (1934) 488.

<sup>46</sup> Beside the consecration coins cf. the panels in the Palazzo dei Conservatori and in the Vatican Museum displaying the translations of Sabina and Antoninus Pius respectively. See e.g. R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *Rome: the Center of Power* (1970) pp. 320-21. Further cf. an ivory diptych in the British Museum ap. E.

between Christ's Ascension and that of the *divi*.<sup>47</sup> Pagan and Christian tales about men who sought to contrive the illusion of rising to heaven without death again illustrate the requirement of bodily translation which warranted the *senatus-consultum* that decreed the enrollment of the new *divus* among the gods worshipped by the Roman people. Let us quote Gregory of Nazianzus.<sup>48</sup> He ascribes to the dying Julian the intention of making his corpse vanish, in order that he might be thought a god. The apostate emperor knew that many before him, who by some contrivance disappeared from among men, therefore were accounted gods.

Thus consecration proceeded in three stages. First, having decided to deify his predecessor or some member of his own family, the emperor intimated his wish to the Senate. It could happen that the Senate balked. Antoninus obtained the agreement of the reluctant Senate to deify Hadrian only by a threat of abdication, and for this reason received the surname of *Pius*.<sup>49</sup>

The informal *consensus senatus* allowed the preparation of the miracle of translation.<sup>50</sup> The third, and the last, stage followed. A formal *relatio* was submitted, and the translation was believed on the authority of a reliable witness (or witnesses). In principle, a prodigy or an omen reported to the Senate (or a magistrate) could be doubted or its veracity denied.<sup>51</sup> A

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Strong, *Apotheosis and After Life* (1916) pl. 31 = R. Delbrueck, *Die Consular-diptychen* (1929) no. 59, and the Bucharest cameo ap. W. Gramatopol, *Latomus* 24 (1965) pl. 52.

<sup>47</sup> Justin. I. *Apol.* 21; Orig. c. *Cels.* 2.68.

<sup>48</sup> Greg. Nazian. *Or.* 5.14 (*P.G.* XXXV, 681): Julian, πολλοὺς δὲ εἰδὼς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ δόξης ἡξιωμένων, ὡς ἂν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων νομισθεῖεν, τέχναις τισὶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀφανισθέντας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεοὺς νομισθέντας. Cf. Gibbon, ch. 44, n. 75: Tribonianus flattered Justinian by affecting "a pious fear that Justinian, like Elijah or Romulus, would be snatched into air and translated alive to the mansions of celestial glory." The Deists often paralleled the ascensions of Christ and of Romulus. See e.g. Diderot, *Pensées philosophiques*, no. 49 in Diderot's *Oeuvres Philosophiques*, ed. F. Vernier I, p. 40.

<sup>49</sup> S. H. A. *Hadr.* 24.5; *Ant. Pius* 2.5. Cf. J. Beaujeu, *La Religion romaine à l'apogée de l'empire* I (1955) 287.

<sup>50</sup> Tac. *Ann.* 13.26. Cf. Mommsen III, 2, 950. The public funeral was voted by the Senate. Mommsen III, 2, 1189.

<sup>51</sup> Mommsen III, 2, 1060. Cf. A. Alföldi, *Early Rome and the Latins* (1963) 219.



Christian legend, already known to Tertullian writing in A.D. 197, tells that Pilatus wrote to Tiberius about Jesus' resurrection and the consequent miracles, and that the Emperor on the ground of this information proposed the consecration of Jesus. But the Senate rejected the motion on the ground that the report of Pilatus had not been submitted to it in advance for verification.<sup>52</sup> As a matter of fact, the courtesy, or fiction, was observed that the Senate might disbelieve the miracle of ascension of an emperor and refuse the apotheosis. Marcus Aurelius thanked the Senate for approval of his motion to deify Lucius Verus.<sup>53</sup>

A passage in Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* seems to imply that in A.D. 37, in the first "democratic" days of Caligula's reign, the Senate did refuse the consecration of Tiberius. Seneca feigns to report the 'Pumpkinification' of Claudius on the authority (*auetor*) of the curator of the Appian way, *qua scis et divum Augustum et Tiberium Caesarem ad deos isse*. The term *auetor* designated one who lent to the report of a portent the support of his authority. As a prodigy to be operative had to be observed on public land it was the overseer of the Appian way, a senator of praetorian rank, who had reported the translation of Augustus. Seneca's joke implies that the deification of Tiberius was considered by the Senate. As a matter of fact, Dio Cassius reports that Caligula proposed to render to Tiberius all the posthumous honors which had been bestowed on Augustus, but that the Senate shelved the matter. The historian records the fact before dealing with Tiberius' funeral, but on this point his narrative is arranged topically. Anyway, numismatists believe the first gold and silver coins of Caligula, issued at Lugudunum, hinted at the coming consecration of Tiberius.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Tert. *Apol.* 5.1; Eus. *H.E.* 2.2.1; Oros. 8.4.5. Cf. E. Volterra; in *Scritti in onore di Contardo Ferrini* (1946) 1. Modern scholars confuse the (now lost) story of Pilatus' letter to Tiberius and the Acts of Pilatus which exist in different versions.

<sup>53</sup> S.H.A. *M. Aur.* 20.1.

<sup>54</sup> Sen. *Apoc.* f; Dio 59.3; C. H. V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy* (1951) 107. On reporting of prodigies cf. Aug. *de doctr. chr.* 2.24: *nulla ista signa sunt nisi consensus observanti accedat*; Liv. 22.1.14; Th. Mommsen, *Ges. Schriften* VII (1909) 168. On *curatores* of roads cf. Mommsen II, 2, 1048.

The "canonization" of an emperor was initiated by his successor.<sup>55</sup> But the parliamentary procedure made possible the anticipation of the official motion by the Senate. That happened after the death of Pertinax.

Dio Cassius, senator himself, tells that "we" sentenced Didius Iulianus to death, hailed Septimius Severus as emperor and rendered "heroic" honors to Pertinax.<sup>56</sup> In the language of Dio Cassius, who opposes ruler worship, "heroic honors" means the homage paid to the divinized emperor. Yet some pages later, the same Dio Cassius describes the funeral of Pertinax's effigy in the Campus Martius, after the arrival of Septimius Severus in Rome, a ceremony witnessed by the historian, and adds: "In this way Pertinax was divinized."

It is obvious that Pertinax could not be deified twice, first on or about June 1st, 193, and again a couple of weeks later.<sup>57</sup> The *Historia Augusta* allows us to explain the apparent duplication.<sup>58</sup> After the fall of Didius Iulianus, *per Senatum et populum Pertinax in deos relatus est. Sub Severo autem imperatore cum senatus ingens testimonium habuisset Pertinax, funus imaginarium et censorium dictum est.* And again some pages later, we read of Septimius Severus: *funus deinole censorium Pertinacis imagini duxit eumque inter deos sacravit, addito flamine et sodalibus Helvianis.*

Thus our sources speak not of a double deification, but of two phases of the same proceedings. After the fall of Didius Iulianus, the Senate declared *desiderium universorum*, to use the words of Pliny the Younger speaking of a similar formulation of a wish of the Senate of his own time.<sup>59</sup> This resolution which was written down, without assuming the form of a *senatus-consultum*, became a warrant, *ingens testimonium*, for Pertinax's deifica-

<sup>55</sup> Mommsen II, 2, 886; III, 2, 1049.

<sup>56</sup> Dio Cass. 74.17.4: τῷ τε Περτίναξὶ ἡρωικὰς τιμὰς ἀπεδώκαμεν. 75.5.5: καὶ ὁ μὲν Περτίναξ οὕτως ἠθανατίσθη. On Dio's attitude to ruler worship cf. D. Pippidi, *Autour de Tibère* (1944) 133.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Feriale Duranum* (above n. 28) 100, 129, 140.

<sup>58</sup> S.H.A. *Pert.* 14.10; *S. Sev.* 7.8. Cf. S. Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 20.1: *Septimius . . . Helvium senatus consulto inter deos refert.*

<sup>59</sup> Plin. *Ep.* 67.19.3. Cf. A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny* (1966) 376; 498.

tion by Septimius Severus. But only after the miracle in the Campus Martius, which occurred in the presence of the Senate, a *relatio* proposing the consecration of Pertinax was made, and the appropriate *senatus-consultum* voted.<sup>60</sup> The Senate could not make gods. The lordly assembly only recognized the self-manifestation of a new *divus* in a single miraculous act.

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<sup>60</sup> Tertull. *Apol.* 5.1: Pilatus informed Tiberius about the miracles of Jesus *quae veritatem ipsius divinitatis revelaverunt*.

## ECCE ITERUM CRISPINUS

It is an unrealized tribute to Juvenal's gift for vivid presentation that prosopographers are still seeking a niche in the gallery of Imperial officialdom in which to place the figure of Crispinus the Egyptian. He has been variously identified as *praefectus praetorio*, Imperial secretary, *praefectus annonae*, and *praefectus Aegypti*.<sup>1</sup> These titles, however, are not recorded in histories or inscriptions, which maintain total silence about Crispinus. They have been inferred from four literary texts which do not actually name any post at all: Martial 7.99 and 8.48, and Juvenal's first and fourth satires. But if we put out of mind the theories and attend only to the poems, Martial and Juvenal do not give us the least reason to suppose that they had in view an official of any kind.

The Crispinus of Juvenal is an equestrian parvenu given to profligate spending.<sup>2</sup> The most obtrusive trait in the portrayal of him is his dandyism. It keynotes his first appearance in satire one (lines 26-29):

. . . cum verna Canopi  
Crispinus Tyrias umero revocante lacernas  
ventilet aestivum digitis sudantibus aurum  
nec sufferre queat maioris pondera gemmae.

The same theme identifies him again when he returns to take a seat in Domitian's council (4.108-9):

et matutino sudans Crispinus amomo  
quantum vix redolent duo funera . . .

<sup>1</sup> Crispinus is registered in *RE* 4 (1901) 1720-21, Crispinus 5, and in *PIR*<sup>2</sup> C 1586; both articles were written by Stein and take the position that Crispinus was probably *praefectus praetorio*. The suggestion that he was "Sekretär oder Studienrath" was made by O. Hirschfeld, *Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der römischen Verwaltungsgeschichte* (Berlin 1877) 223; that he was *praefectus annonae*, by R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958) 636; that he was *praefectus Aegypti*, by J. G. Griffith, *Greece and Rome* 16 (1969) 145-46.

<sup>2</sup> For his class, see 4.32; for his wealth, 4.5-7; 15; 29-31.

Consider also the characterization "purpureus magni . . . scurra Palati" in line 31. No matter how much sarcasm has been distilled in this phrase, it must contain at least the minimum truth that Crispinus acted or tried to act the part of a wit at Domitian's court. This is not decisive against the possibility of an official role, but in the absence of positive evidence for one, it is at least incongruous.

Finally, the description in 4.2-4:

. . . monstrum nulla virtute redemptum  
a vitiis, aegrae solaeque libidine fortes  
deliciae, viduas tantum aspernatus adulter.

*Deliciae* usually describes some object which rouses the sensation of delight. But the Romans associated the word as much with the idea of pure sensation as with any particular delight; it sometimes comes to mean an addiction to the exquisitely sensual. This is the sense it has in Seneca's epigrammatic remark (*Epist.* 86.7) "eo deliciarum pervenimus ut nisi gemmas calcare nolumus," and in Juvenal's sarcastic exclamation (6.46) about a man who hopes to marry a chaste wife, "delicias hominis!" In the passage just quoted from satire four, however, the word is transferred from the quest of sensations to the addict of them: "a decrepit sensualist, robust only in his lust."<sup>3</sup> To the picture of a wit and a dandy, Juvenal here adds that of a worn-out voluptuary.<sup>4</sup> These three aspects of his character are consistent with one another, but difficult to reconcile with the qualities of a high equestrian officer, especially under Domitian, who subjected his functionaries to a demanding code of accountability.<sup>5</sup> A *praefectus praetorio* (vel *annonae* vel *Aegypti*) would nor-

<sup>3</sup> The new *Oxford Latin Dictionary* cites one other example of this use, from Pliny *HN* 22.99: "ipsae suis manibus deliciae preparant hunc cibum (mushrooms) solum et cogitatione ante pascuntur."

<sup>4</sup> Perhaps Juvenal intended his readers to catch a reference to Crispinus' illness and old age in 1.29 "nec sufferre queat maioris pondera gemmae," and in the macabre simile of 4.108-9 "sudans Crispinus anomo / quantum vix redolent duo funera."

<sup>5</sup> According to Suetonius in his life of Domitian, 8.2 and 9.2. This stern supervision helped to bring about his assassination: the most energetic of the conspirators was a freedman procurator under indictment for embezzlement (Suetonius *V. Dom.* 17).

mally have reached his post only after years of diligent and effective service in lower employments. Could Juvenal's Crispinus have kept up the pace?

The portrait of the *Satires*, which one might otherwise have dismissed as malicious invention, finds remarkable corroboration in two well-intentioned epigrams written by Martial. 8.48 is addressed to a thief who has purloined Crispinus' purple cloak:<sup>6</sup>

Nescit cui dederit Tyriam Crispinus abollam,  
 dum mutat cultus induiturque togam.  
 quisquis habes, umeris sua munera redde, precamur:  
 non hoc Crispinus te sed abolla rogat.  
 non quicumque capit saturatas murice vestes  
 nec nisi deliciis convenit iste color.  
 si te praeda iuvat foedique insania lucri,  
 qua possis melius fallere, sume togam.

The crescendo builds in the second last couplet: Martial obviously sensed that Crispinus' conceit of his own elegance offered the front most vulnerable to flattery. This poem, according to the book-dates of Friedlaender, would have been written about the year 93, at least six or seven years after the time of which Juvenal was speaking in satire four. At both times the Egyptian left the same impression, registered in the word *deliciae* by the one poet as by the other: the impression of a man devoted to fastidious luxury.

The other epigram (7.99) antedates the first by about a year. It probably introduced a brochure of poems which Martial sent to Crispinus:

Sic placidum videas semper, Crispine, Tonantem  
 nec te Roma minus quam tua Memphis amet:  
 carmina Parrhasia si nostra legentur in aula,  
 —namque solent sacra Caesaris aure frui—  
 dicere de nobis ut lector candidus aude:  
 'Temporibus praestat non nihil iste tuis,  
 nec Marso nimium minor est doctoque Catullo.'  
 hoc satis est: ipsi cetera mando deo.

<sup>6</sup> Rare audacity indeed, if Crispinus were a high official with soldiers on his staff.

According to lines 3-5, Crispinus enjoys ready access to the emperor. But the relation between them is not that which obtains between a sovereign and one of his administrators or chiefs. Crispinus does not approach until business has given way to leisure pastimes: "carmina Parrhasia si nostra legentur in aula." Martial conceives of him as a courtier, which is not far different from his characterization as a *scurra* by Juvenal.<sup>7</sup>

The one consideration which has caused scholars to ignore the inglorious light in which Crispinus appears is his presence at the council meeting of Juvenal's fourth satire. When first propounding the view that he was Praetorian Prefect, Borghesi<sup>8</sup> observed that the other councillors attending Juvenal's conclave comprise several senators and the Praetorian Prefect Cornelius Fuscus. Crispinus would have had no reason to take part unless he too were either a senator (which as an Egyptian he could not have been), or an official on a par with Fuscus. Although later scholars for the most part discounted the other arguments by which Borghesi sought to establish that Crispinus was Praetorian Prefect,<sup>9</sup> they have held fast to the conviction that he must have had some position of responsibility in order to participate in Domitian's council of state.

<sup>7</sup> Hirschfeld (supra n. 1), though he believed that Crispinus was an Imperial secretary at the dramatic date of Juvenal four, concluded from this epigram of Martial that he had ceased to be an official by the year 92: "die Art, wie Martial dem Crispinus sein Buch für den Kaiser empfiehlt, scheint mehr auf eine Günstlingstellung, als auf eine officiële Position zu deuten."

<sup>8</sup> *Oeuvres* 5.514-16 = 10.28-33.

<sup>9</sup> One other part of Borghesi's case is occasionally reasserted: that Juvenal 4.32 styles Crispinus *princeps equitum*, and since similar language is used of Praetorian Prefects elsewhere, we must recognize in this appellation a kind of title attached to that office. But of the three parallels adduced by Borghesi, Herodian 5.7 does not involve the expression *princeps equitum* at all, nor contain any text which warrants the misleading paraphrase that Elagabalus "prepose all'ordine equestre uno scenico". Velleius Paterculus (2.127) does apply the expression to the father of Sejanus, who had been Commander of the Guard: "Ti. Caesar Seianum Aelium, principe equestris ordinis patre natum, materno vero genere clarissimas veteresque et insignes honoribus complexum familias . . . singularem . . . adiutorem habuit atque habet". But although the prefecture of Seius Strabo undoubtedly accounts for the eminence here ascribed to him, the context shows that Velleius is not thinking primarily of his official position. He is simply trying to give to the paternal side of Sejanus' family a

The argument is not cogent. To begin with, one cannot assert that Fuscus and Crispinus are the only non-senators at the council of Juvenal four without proclaiming more than is known. The identity of Montanus in line 107 and of Pompeius in line 110 has not yet been established, and so their standing must remain conjectural. In fact, we have every reason to assume that at any ordinary *consilium*, both senators and knights would have been present. Since the *consilium principis* to a large extent retained the character of the *consilium amicorum* from which it evolved, the individuals consulted might as easily be drawn from the *ordo equester* as from the Senate. And more important, it was an unofficial body, inclusion in which did not presuppose, for either senator or knight, the tenure of any official post.<sup>10</sup> Of the ordinary practice, there is a pertinent illustration. An epigraphically attested conclave which took place, like the council of Juvenal four, in Domitian's Alban palace, and in about the same year as the dramatic date of the satire, included *splendidi viri utriusque ordinis*.<sup>11</sup>

A knowledge of how the emperor's *consilium* was ordinarily composed, however, may help very little to appreciate what transpires in the council of Juvenal four. That conclave was a fiction and a farce. Juvenal's poem parodies an epic by Statius on Domitian's war against the Germans, or more precisely, it parodies a *consilium* described in this epic.<sup>12</sup> The poet's treat-

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social distinction equal to that on the maternal side. Social class is just as plainly at issue in the passage from Fronto's third letter to Antoninus Pius (van den Hout p. 157), concerning the Prefect Q. Marcius Turbo: "[Censorius Niger] Turboni Marcio et Erucio Claro erat familiarissimus, qui duo egregi viri alter equestris alter senatori ordinis primari fuerunt". *Princeps equitum*, then, cannot be said to be a title, official or semi-official, attached to the office of Praetorian Prefect.

<sup>10</sup> The composition of the council is well described by J. Crook, *Consilium Principis* (Cambridge 1955) 23-26; to which add the comments of A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny: A Historical And Social Commentary* (Oxford 1966) 391-92. It is peculiar that Crook, having argued in the early pages of his book that view of the *consilium* which I have summarized, should have agreed in his discussion of Juvenal four with the traditional view that all the participants except Fuscus and Crispinus were senators.

<sup>11</sup> *CIL* IX 5420.

<sup>12</sup> See G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford 1954) p. 256, n. 1.



ment of his material in general, and of Crispinus in particular, ought to be judged primarily from a literary standpoint, rather than from a historical one. If Juvenal's characters consist mainly of eminent Flavian senators,<sup>13</sup> this is because, first, he is following his Statian model (we know that he transplanted at least three of Statius' councillors into his own poem),<sup>14</sup> and secondly, because by contrasting the dignity of his characters with the meanness of their employment he sees a way to dramatize the circumstances of life under a tyranny. Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that what Juvenal sets before us is not a real council debating an issue of war or policy, but an imaginary council about a fish. He is likely to have introduced any of the emperor's cronies who had gained notoriety for prodigal gourmandise, simply because they suited his subject matter. Montanus, the connoisseur of Neronian carouses, who receives more attention in the poem than anyone else, may be one such character. And Crispinus, whose extravagance in the fish-market took up lines 1-36, might reasonably be considered another.

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<sup>13</sup> The word *proceres* in lines 73 and 144, however, must not be thought to specify senatorial rank or official position. This word does not bear any kind of political connotation, and is in fact avoided in the language of ordinary political life. Caesar never uses it, and in all of Cicero's writings, it occurs only once, in the mock-epic context of *ad Fam.* 13.15.1. The poets, on the other hand, employ it often, Ovid for example seventeen times, and Statius eighteen times; Juvenal has surely taken it over from the poem he burlesques. *Proceres* is a more poetic way of saying *principes civitatis*, which is the definition of it given by Varro (on the evidence of Servius, on *Aeneid* 1.740) and Festus (290.21 Lindsay). In Juvenal's terms it can be ironically but appropriately extended to Crispinus, who in virtue of his wealth was named *princeps* among the knights at line 32.

<sup>14</sup> The four lines of Statius' poem which were preserved by Valla's Probus commentary (P. Wessner, *Scholia in Juvenalem* pp. 61-62) enumerate the names of Vibius Crispus, Fabricius Veiento, and Acilius Glabrio.

## AN UNUSUAL ANNALISTIC SOURCE USED BY DIO CASSIUS

The remains of Dio Cassius' treatment of the early history of Rome are for the most part preserved in the works of Byzantine excerptors, chiefly in the remains of the great *Excerpta Constantiniana*, and in the Epitome of the twelfth-century Byzantine monk, John Zonaras, who used Dio as his basic source for this period.<sup>1</sup> The earliest part of Dio's history has received little attention or systematic study by twentieth-century scholars. This neglect is very largely the result of the low esteem in which Dio's earliest history was held during the heyday of German source criticism in the late nineteenth century. Although some earlier scholars had believed that Dio relied directly on Fabius Pictor for his early history of Rome,<sup>2</sup> by the latter part of that century the prevailing view was that Dio's earliest history was little more than a conflation of Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and consequently of almost no value for the historical tradition about the period.<sup>3</sup>

A more balanced view was introduced by E. Schwartz in his article on Dio in Pauly-Wissowa, which demonstrated that in numerous instances Dio deviated from both Livy and Dionysius and in other cases preferred accounts given only as variants by these authors.<sup>4</sup> Another major step toward rectifying the nineteenth-century view of Dio's sources was taken by A. Klotz in his analysis of Dio's sources for the Second Punic War, in

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller discussion of the transmission of the remains of Dio's history, see the preface to Vol. I of U. P. Boissevain's edition of Dio (Rpt. Berlin 1955) i-lxx.

<sup>2</sup> Most notably Niebuhr and Schwegler. For a full survey of the older scholarship on Dio's treatment of early Rome, see H. Haupt, "Dio Cassius. Erster Artikel. Quellenuntersuchungen," *Philologus* 39 (1880) 541-48.

<sup>3</sup> First promulgated by W. A. Schmidt, "Über die Quellen des Zonaras," *Zeitschrift für die Altertumswissenschaft* 30-36 (1839) 238-85. Rpt. in L. Dindorf's edition of Zonaras Vol. 6 (Leipzig 1875) iii-lx. Cf. also T. Mommsen, *Römische Forschungen*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1879) 116, n. 10; 206. A. Baumgartner, *Über die Quellen des Cassius Dio für die ältere römische Geschichte* (Tübingen 1880).

<sup>4</sup> E. Schwartz, "Cassius 40" *RE* 3 (1899) 1692-93.

which he convincingly argues that Dio's narrative was based on Coelius Antipater supplemented by Valerius Antias and owed nothing to Livy.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the efforts of modern scholars to provide a more sophisticated source criticism for the remains of Dio's early history, the old theory that Dio's basic sources were Livy and Dionysius has remained current and has evidently re-surfaced in certain otherwise excellent works of recent scholarship.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of this mistaken undervaluation and neglect of Dio insufficient attention has been paid to the numerous interesting variants within the annalistic tradition of early Roman history that are preserved by him. One of the most interesting aspects of Dio's earliest history is that it apparently was a good deal more violent and melodramatic than the other surviving accounts. The Roman people themselves are also often portrayed in an unfavorable light. Some of these violent elements are no more than embellishments on conventional late annalistic accounts, but in other cases they are unique and not found elsewhere in our surviving authors. The following examination of the evidence will show that Dio probably found these elements in a single, highly unusual historical source and that Dio deviated markedly from Livy and Dionysius in many respects.

The first of the unusual elements of Dio's history to be considered is found in Zonaras' account of the deposition of Tarquinius Collatinus from the consulship by L. Junius Brutus at the very beginning of the Republic (Zonaras 7.12). The

<sup>5</sup> A. Klotz, "Über die Stellung des Cassius Dio unter den Quellen zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges," *Rh.M.*, N.F. 85 (1936) 68-116.

<sup>6</sup> E. g. R. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5* (Oxford 1965) 457. E. T. Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* (Cambridge 1967) 244, n.2. F. Cornelius (*Untersuchungen zur frühen römischen Geschichte* [Munich 1940] 11, 31) introduces a variant of the older theories by suggesting that Dio's basic source was Dionysius, supplemented by a source used in Dio's constitutional digressions and a third source, which was also used for the Capitoline Fasti. Although Dio may have used Dionysius, it is hard to see how, in view of the discrepancies cited by Schwartz (cf. n. 4), Dionysius could be considered Dio's "Hauptquelle." Also, there is no particular reason for supposing that Dio's constitutional digressions came from a specific historical source. They could just as easily be his own independent compositions. See F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford 1964) 181-82.

peculiar part of Dio's version of this event is that Zonaras alone among our sources says that Collatinus was almost killed: "Brutus so aroused the people against Collatinus that they came close to killing him with their own hands. However, they did not do this, but they compelled him to resign his office" (Zonaras 7.12). This is completely contrary to Livy (2.2). In Livy's version Collatinus resigns as the result of peaceful persuasion on the part of his colleague, and there is no hint of any violence. Nor does violence characterize the account of Plutarch, who says that Collatinus, perceiving his unpopularity because of his connection with the Tarquins, "willingly resigned the office and departed from the city" (*Publicola* 7.6). Dionysius' account is the closest to Dio's in that both have Brutus harangue the people to force Collatinus from office, and Dionysius does say that Collatinus' defence (not Brutus' denunciation, as in Dio-Zonaras) greatly exasperated the crowd: χαλεπώτερον ἐποίει τὸν δῆμον καὶ δεινοὺς ἤγειρεν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς λεγομένοις θορύβους (D. H. 5.11.1), but this hardly compares with Zonaras' ὡς μικροῦ καὶ αὐτοχειρὶ αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν, and at no point does Dionysius indicate that Collatinus' life was in danger from the crowd. In Dionysius' version both parties are calmed by a conciliatory speech by Sp. Lucretius, and Collatinus resigns on fairly good terms with Brutus and goes into exile consoled by a gift of twenty-five talents from Brutus and the people (D. H. 5.11.2—12.3). Thus Dio's account is clearly the most violent, for in no other source is there any indication that Collatinus' life was threatened by the people.

Dio's account of the story of P. Valerius Publicola and the people (fr. 13.2) is also the most violent one extant. All the versions of the story, as in Livy (2.7.5-12), Dionysius (5.19), and Plutarch (*Publicola* 10), are basically similar: after the death of Brutus his colleague, P. Valerius, was suspected by the people of aspiring to be king because he was ruling alone without having chosen a successor to Brutus and because he was building a house in a position suitable for a fortress on the Velian hill. On learning of these charges Valerius won the favor of the people by destroying the house he was building and by lowering the fasces before the people in the assembly. He then arranged for the election of a successor.

Dio's account seems to have agreed with the major details of this tradition. He does not mention Valerius' house, but this may be due to the fragmentary state of his narrative. Again, however, his account is unusually violent, for in this version Valerius is nearly murdered by the people: *Οὐαλέριον... δμῶς αὐτοεντίλα μικροῦ ὁ δμιλος κατεχρήσατο*. In fact, it was only the quick action of Valerius in lowering the fasces that saved him: *καὶ ἐφόνευσαν ἄν εἰ μὴ σφας διὰ ταχέων φθάσας ἐθώπευσεν*. There is not the slightest hint in the other accounts that Valerius' life was at any point in danger from the people or that Publicola was threatened with any sort of violence arising from the resentment of the people.

The next fragment of Dio (fr. 13.3-4) on the dedication of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus also contains an interesting variant. The basic story, as found in Livy (2.8), Plutarch (*Publicola* 14), and Dio, is that Marcus Horatius obtained the right to dedicate the newly completed temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. An attempt was made to prevent the consecration by Horatius by announcing to him that his son was dead, so that Publicola could have the honor of dedicating the temple, but Horatius ignored the false tidings and proceeded to dedicate the temple. In Dionysius (5.35.3), Plutarch, and Livy, Publicola is off campaigning and is not present at the dedication. In Livy the "necessarii" of Valerius, after various other attempts at preventing Horatius from dedicating the temple, send Horatius a false message about his son's death as he is actually dedicating the temple, and in Plutarch (*Publicola* 14.6) it is the brother of Publicola, Marcus Valerius, who makes the announcement.

In Dio, however, there is a drastic difference. Publicola is not patriotically absent fighting his country's wars. He is present at the dedication, and it is he who makes the base attempt to trick Horatius so that he could have the honor of dedicating the temple for himself. This is a far cry from the virtuous Publicola of the conventional tradition, and we may be sure that this is one instance where Dio was not following Valerius Antias.

Dio's account of the agitation at Rome by the debtor class in 495 B.C. (Dio fr. 17.1-3; Zonaras 7.14.1-2) also contains unusual details, once again characterized by violence. They are not found in Livy (2.23-24) or Dionysius (6.22-29). It is true that in

the latter two authors there are indications of violence. In his description of the demonstrations by the debtors Livy says, "Magno cum periculo suo qui forte patrum in foro erant in eam turbam inciderunt" (2.23.9), and he goes on to state that public business could not be transacted because so many senators had absented themselves from the senate-house and forum through fear of the rioters (2.23.12-13). Dionysius' account is more violent, for he says that the debtors tore in pieces anyone who opposed them and that the consul Appius Claudius fled the mob, a feature not found in Livy, while his colleague Servilius calmed the mob by grovelling at their feet (D. H. 6.26).

In Dio-Zonaras, however, this violence takes on an even more spectacular form. Instead of merely rioting in the forum, the people actually attack and almost storm the senate and come close to killing all the senators (*ὥστε καὶ εἰς τὸ συνέδριον συνδραμεῖν καὶ πάντες ἄν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσπεσόντων ἐν αὐτῷ διεφθάρησαν*—Zonaras 7.14.1). This account is clearly different, for neither in Livy nor in Dionysius is there any indication that the debtors made any sort of attack on the senate-house or attempted to murder the senators.

There are also indications in Dio that the first secession of the *plebs* in 494 B.C. was accompanied by violence. This is contrary to Livy (2.32.4), Dionysius (6.47.2), and Plutarch (*Coriolanus* 6.1), who all speak of the secession as being completely without violence. Dio, however, states that the seceding plebeians "seized provisions from the countryside as though it were enemy territory and from this they showed that the laws were weaker than their weapons and justice was weaker than their madness" (fr. 17.9).

Dio's observations on the condemnation of Spurius Cassius (fr. 19) are also unfavorable to the Romans, for Dio clearly regards Spurius Cassius as an innocent benefactor of the Roman people who was most unjustly put to death by them (*ζηλοτυπηθεῖς ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀδικήσας τι ἀπώλετο*). This version, which portrays the Roman people as ingrates who killed a harmless benefactor out of envy, is contrary to Dionysius, who clearly states that Sp. Cassius was guilty of trying to establish a monarchy at Rome (D. H. 8.69.3-4; 8.78.3). Diodorus Siculus' brief mention of the end of Sp. Cassius (11.37.7) also implies

that he was guilty: *δόξας ἐπιθέσθαι τυραννίδι καὶ καταγνωσθείς, ἀνηρέθη*. Livy's account (2.41) is somewhat closer to Dio's in that it neither explicitly affirms nor denies Sp. Cassius' guilt. It does imply that the hostility against him was the result of the charges of his political enemies. This, however, is rather different from Dio's assertion that Cassius' end was due to the ingratitude that people often feel toward their erstwhile benefactors.

One of the strangest and most unique parts of Dio's entire treatment of the early Republic deals with a secret campaign conducted by the patricians to terrorize the plebeians (Dio fr. 22.1-2; Zonaras 7.17.7), in the course of which nine tribunes were burned alive by the people. These events are supposed to have taken place some time between the year 471 B.C. and the dictatorship of Cincinnatus in 458. The campaign of terror, in which the patricians secretly murdered "many of the boldest" plebeian leaders, perhaps in revenge for the suicide of Appius Claudius and the reforms of 471, is unique in our tradition and has no parallels in our other sources. The only comparable occurrence might be the mysterious death of T. Genucius (Livy 2.54; D. H. 9.38), but this took place before the reforms of 471 and the death of Appius Claudius in the following year. In Zonaras the murders clearly follow these events.

As Dio tells the story, at some point in this period nine tribunes were burned. This tradition is not found in Livy or Dionysius. The version closest to Dio's is found in Valerius Maximus (6.3.2), who says that P. Mucius as tribune had his nine colleagues burned alive because they were conspiring with Sp. Cassius to subvert the state by preventing elections from being held. Dio's account is quite different from this version, for it is obviously not connected with Sp. Cassius. Dio's statement, *ἐννέα γάρ ποτε δήμαρχοι πυρὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐδόθησαν*, suggests that perhaps it was some kind of lynching rather than a formal execution by order of a magistrate, as in Valerius Maximus. A formal execution by burning would be quite surprising, for in the Twelve Tables this penalty seems to have been limited to cases of arson (Gaius, *ap. Dig.* 47.9.9). It is possible that in Dio's source the *clientes* of the patrician houses were the ones who burned the tribunes.

Diodorus Siculus also echoes something of this tradition about the tribunes, for in his account of the reforms after the overthrow of the decemvirate (12.25.3) he says that, if the tribunes failed to see that they were succeeded by an equal number of tribunes after their year in office they should be burned alive. Diodorus' familiarity with this tradition indicates that it must probably antedate the latest stratum of annalistic composition represented by Antias, Macer, and Tubero.

There is also a badly mutilated passage in Festus (180 L.), presumably entitled "Novem", which may have some relevance to this tradition. On the basis of the scanty remains of this entry it is usually held that the "novem" mentioned here were *tribuni militum* who were cremated at public expense after having fallen in battle against the Volsci in 486 B.C.<sup>7</sup> Mommsen believed that the various stories about tribunes arose from a place in the forum marked by a white stone and known as the "bustum novem tribunorum" without specifying whether they were *tribuni militum* or *tribuni plebis* or whether they were burned alive or dead. He also held that the version of Festus was a later, rationalistic correction of the version of Valerius Maximus.<sup>8</sup> Ogilvie, however, takes the opposite view and believes that the tradition found in Valerius Maximus and Dio came from an inscription, admittedly a later restoration, commemorating the *tribuni militum* as the result of an imaginative historian's using it to reconstruct a "melodramatic" end for Sp. Cassius.<sup>9</sup>

Since none of our sources agree closely, the most probable conclusion is that a variety of stories existed about tribunes being burned at some time in the early Republic. Perhaps the stories originated in attempts to explain the name of a place in the forum. These stories later found widely diverging expressions in the traditions of Diodorus, Valerius Maximus, Festus, and Dio. Dio's version is not closely connected to any other account, and his words *ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐδόθησαν* suggest mob

<sup>7</sup> Mommsen, *R.F.*<sup>2</sup>, 168-70; K. J. Beloch, *Römische Geschichte* (Berlin and Leipzig 1926), 324-26; Ogilvie, 339.

<sup>8</sup> Mommsen, *R.F.*<sup>2</sup>, 170-72. Beloch (*R.G.*, 324) also upheld this view.

<sup>9</sup> Ogilvie, 339.



violence. If so, this is the most violent and dramatic account of the end of the tribunes.

Still another tradition about the early Republic found only in Dio is Zonaras' statement that after the Valerio-Horatian legislation of 449 B.C. the patricians gave the tribunes the right *οἰωνοσκοπία ἐν συλλόγοις χρῆσθαι* (Zonaras 7.19.1-2). Presumably Zonaras means that the tribunes were given the right of *spectio de caelo cum nuntiatione*.<sup>10</sup> In other words, they could dismiss such assemblies as the *concilium plebis* and the various *comitia* through the *obnuntiatio* of unfavorable omens.

The significance of this passage for this study is that once again it presents the Romans in an unfavorable light. Instead of being regarded as a measure to increase the powers of the tribunate, the right of *spectio* is portrayed as an underhanded blow (*ἔργον δὲ κώλυμα ἦν*) devised by the crafty patricians against the tribunes. It is possible that the controversies over the Aelian and the Fufian laws during the tribunate of Clodius influenced Dio or his source to put an unfavorable construction on the measure. If historical, it may well have marked a step forward in the plebeian struggle for equality at the time it was promulgated.

Dio's account of the end of M. Manlius Capitolinus in 384 B.C. also diverges widely from all other surviving accounts.<sup>11</sup> Among the most striking discrepancies between Dio's version and the more common tradition found in Livy (6.18-20) and Plutarch (*Camillus* 36) is that Dio records that Capitolinus and his followers seized the Capitol (Dio, fr. 26.2; Zonaras 7.24.10). This is not a feature of the other narratives although Diodorus' few words on the subject (*Μάρκος Μάνλιος ἐπιβαλόμενος τυραννίδι καὶ κρατηθεὶς ἀνηρέθη* 15.35.3) may also imply that he was killed while attempting an open revolt. The statement in Zonaras that Camillus was appointed dictator to deal with the

<sup>10</sup> I. M. J. Valeton, "De Iure Obnuntiandi Comitibus et Conciliis," *Mnemosyne* N.S. 21 (1891) 90-92.

<sup>11</sup> See the discussions by Mommsen, *R.F.* 2, 189, and A. W. Lintott, "The Tradition of Violence in the Annals of the early Roman Republic," *Historia* 19 (1970) 23.

crisis is also peculiar to Dio. Zonaras' statement that this was the fourth time that he was appointed dictator (7.24.10) conflicts with the Capitoline Fasti and all other sources,<sup>12</sup> for the Fasti state that the fourth dictatorship of Camillus was in A.U.C. 386 (368 B.C.).<sup>13</sup> The story that Capitolinus was captured through an ambush prepared by a slave who was pretending to negotiate with him about an uprising of the slaves is also found only in Dio (Zonaras 7.24.10), and there is no indication in the other sources that slaves were supposed to form part of Capitolinus' following.

The blood-and-thunder aspects of Dio's account of the end of Capitolinus, such as the seizure of the Capitol, the dreadful possibility of a slave revolt, and the use of a treacherous ruse to capture Capitolinus, all indicate that Dio was following a more violent and melodramatic source than the other surviving authors.

From the above examples it becomes apparent that Dio's account of early Roman history was unusually violent and unflattering to the Romans. Thus, in Dio alone the Romans almost kill Tarquinius Collatinus (Zonaras 7.12) and Valerius Publicola (fr. 13.2), nearly wipe out the senate (Zonaras 7.14.1), and burn nine tribunes alive (fr. 22.1-2; Zonaras 7.17.7). While the plebeians often appear as a murderous mob, the patricians are scarcely better. They appear as secret assassins (fr. 22.1-2; Zonaras 7.17.7) and devious plotters (Zonaras 7.19.1-2). The noble Publicola's character is besmirched (fr. 13.3-4), and the shady Spurius Cassius appears as an innocent martyr (fr. 19). These aspects of Dio's history are all the more surprising since they are so contrary to the tendency of Republican annalistic composition to present a glorified and idealized picture of early Roman history.

How then did Dio come to give such an unusually violent account of early Roman history? It seems highly improbable that all these details are inventions of Dio himself, for it is unlikely that Dio would invent so many unusual details at such a

<sup>12</sup> Mommsen, *R.F.* 3, 189, n. 76.

<sup>13</sup> *Fasti Capitolini*, ed. A. Degraffi (Turin 1954) 40-41.

late date in Roman historical composition without the authority of some earlier source.<sup>14</sup> It is also possible that the violent and unflattering elements in Dio's history come from a variety of sources and were pieced together by him in an eclectic manner. However, we should not expect to find many such details in most later annalists since they do not appear in Livy or Dionysius. It would also be rather strange for Dio to have used such a method of composition.

The violence in Dio's early history is such a recurrent theme and it is so often coupled with obscure and unusual traditions that the most probable conclusion appears to be that Dio found these elements in a single source, who evidently took a perverse delight in presenting as unfavorable and unflattering an account of the earliest history of Rome as possible. At times this author would evidently do little more than rewrite conventional late annalistic accounts. The stories about Publicola or the deposition of Collatinus as found in Dio would be examples of this type of composition. Dio's source may also have invented some details, such as the attack on the senate in 495 B.C. In other cases this historian was evidently preserving obscure traditions, such as the burning of the nine tribunes. At other times he differed drastically from other late annalistic accounts, as in his version of the end of M. Manlius Capitolinus. His influence is always identifiable by an extraordinary preoccupation with bloodshed and violence and a marked lack of sympathy for the entire Roman people.

If the above hypothesis is correct, it means that at some time there existed a historian who obviously set himself at cross purposes with all the patriotic, moralizing tendencies of the annalistic tradition.

It would probably be futile to attempt a positive identification of this remarkable annalist. His emphasis on bloodshed and violence makes it probable that he lived in an era characterized by such civil strife, perhaps either the Sullan or the Caesarian

<sup>14</sup> Most of the deliberate inventions in Dio appear to be for the purpose of introducing lengthy rhetorical compositions, e.g. the famous conference between Octavian, Agrippa, and Maecenas (52.1-40) and the dialogue between Cicero and Philiscus (38.18-29). See also Millar, 49-51, on the latter passage.

epochs. However, he cannot have been one of the most important annalists of the later period—Valerius Antias, Licinius Macer, or Aelius Tubero, for these authors were the major sources for Livy and Dionysius, whose accounts do not show the same violent elements found in Dio's account.

In fact there are a good many historians who dealt with the early history of Rome about whose works we know little, and some of these historians are little more than names to us. In the latter category are such names as Vennonius, the mysterious Paulus Clodius, Sulpicius Blitho, Annius Fetialis, Fabius Vestalis, Procilius, and the antiquarian Saufei, any one of whom might have been Dio's source. We also have few fragments from some better-known historians, such as Sempronius Tuditanus, Cn. Gellius, T. Pomponius Atticus, and Fenestella, and one of these may also have been Dio's source. The similarities between some of the violent stories in Dio and more conventional accounts make it likely that his source was at least contemporaneous with the very latest stratum of annalistic inventions.

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## REVIEWS

PAOLO VIVANTE. *The Homeric Imagination, A Study of Homer's Poetic Perception of Reality*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 215. \$7.50.

Vivante has written a curious book, almost an anachronistic one, dedicated to the proposition that the poet of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was a distinct individual whose style and intent were very much his own and that we (or Vivante rather) can recover in some detail the mind of this first Greek poet. Since we have no evidence save the texts of the two poems the arguments tend to be circular. "The Homeric question has exhausted itself; we are driven to look at the poems themselves insofar as they appeal directly to our feelings and understandings (vii)." Vivante categorizes three approaches (210f.): 1) that of Snell, Dodds, Fränkel, et al. who use the poems as documentary evidence for essentially anthropological research into antiquity; 2) that of Bassett, Schadewaldt, Whitman, et al. who create "works of literary criticism and history" but "seem to disregard the individual poet;" and 3) that of von Scheliha, Weil, Bernal, et al. whose methods Vivante prefers as representing "a purely speculative point of view, as if we were reading him [Homer] for the first time . . ." For his own method he says "the method of approach is here more important than the scientific inquiry . . ." Vivante continues by saying "Any principle which is thereby upheld stands or falls according to whether it makes sense or not; it cannot be proved or disproved on the basis of external data." This approach invites a certain vagueness in ideas and language.

There is nothing new in Vivante's telling us (as he does in his first chapter) that the poet never imposes himself, that everything in the narrative is developed from within, that the poet has freed himself from the richly detailed myth and saga tradition to insist upon only that which is relevant to his story, that his characters are stripped of essentials and become symbols rather than persons. Vivante has only changed the import of these ideas by ascribing them all to the peculiar poetic vision of a historical Homer. But is that enough? Vivante does not mention traditional poetry, oral technique, or formulaic language, scene and character which are the stuff of current Homeric criticism. What we have are certain observable phenomena, and to assign their cause is an act of faith.

Auerbach has said (in "Odysseus' Scar," reprinted in *Mimesis*) ". . . the Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no secret second meaning. Homer can be analyzed . . . but he cannot be interpreted." While Vivante does look at the surface of

Homeric narrative (for which sort of criticism Bassett's *Poetry of Homer* remains the superlative paradigm) he is ever willing to plunge for other meanings. His use of words such as simile, myth, metaphor, etc. is imprecise. What, for instance, does "image" mean when he says (155) "All the Homeric characters are first presented as images. That is to say, their presence is immediately transparent, suggesting what they are, what they do."

Sometimes Vivante talks of the poem's characters as though they had lives of their own; he enters the poem instead of looking at it; see his discussion of Achilles' emotions (57ff.). One can discuss the poetic techniques of showing Achilles' emotions, but one cannot fully reveal the nature or range of these emotions. In the same way speculating what a character would do or what he would be like under different circumstances (cf. e.g. 163) as though he were a real person is dangerous.

Maybe it is true, as M. W. Pope observed ("The Parry-Lord Theory of Homeric Composition," *Proceedings of the Classical Association of South Africa* 6 [1964]) that the theory of oral versemaking as applied to Homer is simply the new orthodoxy but there is a curious silence to one's remarks if the orthodoxy is ignored or avoided. When Vivante talks of the poet deliberately ignoring the specifics of locales (pp. 72ff.) or self-consciously creating exactly repeated action (pp. 132-33) he seems to oversimplify, often rather boldly in the face of well-settled convention. For these precise issues one thinks, for instance, of C. M. Bowra's chapter "The Realistic Background" in his *Heroic Poetry* (London 1952) 132ff., A. B. Lord's "The Theme" in his *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge 1960) 68ff., and J. B. Hainsworth's "Composition with Formulae" in his *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford 1968) 1ff.

He finds himself surprised at the peculiar separateness and completeness of each act (126f.) and can say "we may wonder, now, at this isolation of the action (128). But the reader may wonder at his indifference to the common critical position of the effect of paratactic style on narration (for an early statement of it see B. E. Perry, "The Early Greek Capacity for Viewing Things Separately," *TAPA* 68 [1937] 103-27). The poet has a point of view, and partly it is his own way of seeing things, but he has also been conditioned.

Vivante is not always accurate: of the verbs *πορφύρω*, *δρμαίνω* and *δοσομαι* he says "they have an ambivalent meaning that can refer to man and to the sea." What is more to the point, *πορφύρω* and *δρμαίνω* seem originally to be connected with liquid, with ideas of flowing; the transference to things human and psychic is perhaps still a live metaphor in Homer, in which event there would be no ambivalence. In any case, the watery sense of *δρμαίνω* is emphasized by the preceding simile. *δοσομαι*, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the sea. The word has fundamentally to do with eyes, perhaps translated "eyeing,"

and its use here is brilliant, for the sea is described as momentarily calm in its swell just when the wind comes about to break and the sense of the sea uneasily or forebodingly *eyeing* the swift onrush of the winds elicits the exact mood.

Having offered so much adverse criticism I should remark that Vivante has some good ideas. He strives to define the Homeric vision. His fundamental position is stated at page 91: "This wide-ranging unity was, of course, grounded in the sense of a single animating principle . . . In the Greek world of the ninth century, neither religion nor philosophy conditioned the poet's mind to any clear-cut categories." A truism, granted, but it does get Vivante into seeing how strongly nature, the nature world animates this poem. In talking of similes and nature (80ff.) Vivante is at his best if hardly his most original, but elsewhere important observations derive from this viewpoint: "All men and women in Homer seem to have a full capacity for whatever they happen to do, they cannot help being what they are (62)." "[The] communion of gods and men is at once tragic and wonderful. Magnificent in its ideal significance, it offers no bulwark against fate (68)." "As for the Achaeans, they do not really strive for any cause (it cannot be the revenge on Paris which is not treated as a fundamental motive) . . . It is important, in this respect, that the reasons of the war should be so paltry . . . this leaves the individual quite to himself (124)." "These mythical beings [Cyclops, etc.] are eternally bound up with the places which are their abodes, untouched by any searching experience, until on a certain day Odysseus arrives and they feel all the friction of human life. Love, hatred, stir them from their divine state. A spell appears to be broken, the human moment is vindicated. (139-40)." These statements and many more like them are provocative in the very best sense. Notice for instance the excellent account (46-47) of the gods' absence from the narration of Odysseus' wanderings which gives real meaning to Calhoun's treatment ("The Divine Entourage in Homer," *AJP* 61 [1940] 257-77).

Vivante seems to have tried to fill a book whereas an essay would have been sufficient. One wonders for whom Vivante and the publishers intended this work. It seems too diffuse for the general reader and too dogmatic or too obvious for the scholar.

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M. L. WEST, ed. *Iambi et Elegi Graeci Ante Alexandrum Cantati*, Vol. II. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. x + 246. £4.00.

"Is your edition really necessary? That is the first question" (M. L. West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique* [Stuttgart 1973] 61). In this case the answer is clearly yes, because the material has never been presented with such care and accuracy. To say that the text marks a gigantic advance on Edmonds' *Elegy and Iambus* (1931) is not to praise it. In a sense, it goes beyond Adrados' *Líricos Griegos: Elegiacos y Yambógrafos Arcaicos* (Barcelona 1959) and includes material from the 4th century. What it does not have is the translation West may have made in preparing his texts.

Vol. I included Archilochus, Hipponax, and the Theognidea. The reader of Vol. II will want to turn back to West's treatment of the MSS of Athenaeus and Stobaeus in Vol. I. Vol. II contains more than fifty poets: *hic balit grex cetera*—Mimnermus, Semonides, Simonides, Solon, Tyrtaeus, Xenophanes—and a valuable index to the language of the collection as a whole. The collection of iambic and elegiac poems ranging well over three centuries is an old habit, but nonetheless a strange one. Elegy and iambus are strange bedfellows. They find themselves together simply because they have been excluded from the major 'genres' of Greek literature and so have come to form an artificial and minor 'genre' themselves. Epigrams are excluded for the reason given in the *Prologus*. Yet, irresistibly, they slip in to the collection (Simonides, nos. 6, 12, 16, 17; Sophocles, no. 4) which is none the worse for them. There are other windfalls for the owner of Vol. II. It includes the *Margites* and its two iambic lines, Susarion, and the complete works of Socrates, including the one hexameter line of his hexameter hymn to Apollo (πεποιημένον ἐν τόνῳ ἑξαμέτρῳ, Themistius, *Or.* 2.27c).

The edition offers another example of West's great editorial skills and another proof of his far ranging acquaintance with Greek literature. In a sense it is a companion to and illustration of his *Editorial Technique*. Where possible, the poetry is preceded and followed by ancient testimony. Texts are elegantly distinguished by a larger font of Greek type. The apparatus is clear and economical. It records the modern history of the recovery of dialect and meter and is one of the liveliest since A. E. Housman. Many are the conjectures which glitter to distraction at the foot of the page where *possis* is a more common notation than *scripsi*. We learn that Mimnermus could not have seen a full eclipse of the sun between 648 and 585 (no. 20); that Solon should have had the taste to imitate Homer, but did not (no. 20.56); that in one line West likes neither Solon's syntax nor Bergk's emendation (no. 14.2). Among the *Adespota Iambica* two lines preserving only eight letters between them are the inspiration for a 'rumbling mouse' (no. 9.1-2). Outside of the apparatus proper we learn that Solon was not responsible for the myth of Atlantis but Eudoxus, who discovered the inspiration for it in some Egyptian tale (p. 145).



One of West's many merits is that he has kept the MS readings which have been 'emended' because they have not been understood. Mimermus 11.1; Semonides 1.17; Solon 13.11 are examples of his allusive defense of the MSS. For Critias 2.9 he preserves the fascinating *γράμματ' ἀλεξιλογία* without such a justification. His own conjectures are at worst unnecessary—as in Tyrtaeus 11.16 and 34. In Solon's hymn to the Muses, West prints an emendation he had proposed earlier: *ἀρχῆς δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης* for *ἀρχῇ δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου* in line 14 (*Philologus* 110 [1966] 152). What seems difficult is the rapid shift of subjects in lines 13-15 (*πλοῦτος / ἀρχῇ / ἄτη*). The problem is not the rapid movement of Solon's thought, but the representation of *ἄτη* as *φλαύρη τὸ πρῶτον* (consider the verbs of lines 13 and 68). This is not resolved by emendation. For other passages in Solon, West is more cautious. He daggers *ωιδὴν* in 1.2—which is over-fastidious, since the word serves to contrast song with what could have been Solon's means to persuasion—*ἀγορή*. He also daggers *ἤβης δ' ἐφάνει* in 27.4 (Anat.<sup>m</sup> preserves the correct reading), although the aorist (*ἐφάνη*) should cause no problem in statements such as this (cf. Censorinus' loose version *pubem apparere* for the sense, p. 26.1 Hultsch). At 4c.3 the suggestion of Keil and Wilamowitz—*ἐν μέτροισι* for *ἐν μετρίοις*—is not printed in their text of the 'Aθ. Πολ., but seems right since it continues the movement of *ἡλάσατε* (Postgate, cf. Tyr. 11.10).

For the fullness, accuracy and clarity with which West has presented his materials, and the judgement with which he has used them, he deserves the praise for which I can find no better language than his own (cf. *Editorial Technique*, p. 61).

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ANNE PIPPIN BURNETT: *Catastrophe Survived: Euripides' Plays of Mixed Reversal*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. viii + 234. £3.50.

Dr. Burnett's idea was sparked off by recent work on story-patterns in Greek tragedy. She offers, however, an interesting departure from such work, an idea for making better structural sense of seven plays of Euripides which may be described as having an unorthodox form. The plays are the *Alcestis*, *I.T.*, *Helen*, *Ion*, *Andromache*, *H.F.*, and *Orestes*, and they are treated in that order. The idea is that "it is possible to deduce from surviving tragedy the general outlines of six favorite hypothetical plots" (16), each involving a swing or overturn, and that the action of each "deviant" play is a combination of two or more of these, sometimes interrupted or distorted but arranged so as to give, at the end, a feeling of "catastrophe survived." The implicit schema for the six plots is:

1. Negative passive: punishment, divine or secular, of a principal.
2. Negative active: vengeance, by a principal.
3. Negative middle: willing sacrifice, of a principal.
4. Positive passive: suppliant(s) raised.
5. Positive active: rescue.
6. Positive middle: return.

Each of the chosen plays is shown to have a "mixed" action, that is, a combination of negative and positive elements.

"Catastrophe survived" need not be, as might appear at first blush, merely a concocted phrase to obviate the triteness of talk about "happy-ending plays." All these plays are full of tragic events or near-events and a formula which speaks of the principals surviving can embrace more plays than one that conceives them happy, as well as showing more respect for the realities of life. The quasi-grammatical classification of unit plots, however, is a shade too neat. "Middle" is Dr. Burnett's own term, which I have elicited from the index, and it is conveniently vague: in the body of the book she speaks of the principal, in these cases, as one who "acted upon himself" (16). But self-sacrifice and return are an awkward pair to bracket under either of these designations. Whereas a self-sacrifice is fully reflexive, a return is more of a simple action. Besides, a return in the sense of a *nostos* is hardly on a level with the other five themes, since only the beginning or end of it can be shown. In any case, would a *nostos* have any point in terms of *tragoidia* if it did not include at least one of the other themes? As for the remaining pairs of counterparts, they correspond to each other more nearly but not exactly. Nor do the terms "negative" and "positive" seem optimally chosen, since in the case of self-sacrifice, "its final effect is paradoxically one of revival" (26), and surely the same often holds also of tragic punishment or vengeance. Moreover the scheme is not as self-contained as it seems: we have only to try to add suicide, for example, and its neat rectilinearity will go askew.

Do the categories in the schema fit the phenomena? In the main they do. The *Alcestitis* is well seen as a self-sacrifice followed by rescue and return, though the principal makes her return in total silence. The more elaborate *I.T.* seems to work out as a sequence of rescue, vengeance, self-sacrifice, vengeance, rescue, and return, in which all elements except the last are tantalizingly interrupted before reaching their envisaged end. In the *Helen* we have an amalgam of rescue, self-sacrifice, and return, whilst in the *Ion* interrupted vengeance, rescue, and return develop simultaneously and manage to frame also an effective suppliant tableau. The *Andromache* falls more visibly apart into suppliant and rescue actions followed by a subterranean divine punishment. The *Orestes* shows how successive unit plots are all made to fail while leading up to a common holocaust whose failure in turn is managed by Apollo *ex machina*.

Most of this is acceptable, though there are bumpy passages, as when Thoas in the *I.T.* is said to be "rescued" from his barbarity and

when the *Bacchae*, in a side-glance, is said to involve technically a "rescue" of the Theban women. The most awkward analysis, however, is that of the *H.F.*, where frankness would surely have pointed to a "return" of Heracles and "punishment" of or "vengeance" on Lycus. Dr. Burnett is misled by her desire to over-integrate the total action of the play and to justify, for the nonce, the way of the gods to men. She bypasses both the above possibilities and then proceeds to argue by anfractuious special pleading, that what follows the suppliant action is a "divine punishment" of Megara for the sin of faithlessness in quitting sanctuary. That is to say, it is because of her active unfaith that she and her children are massacred. Surely the gods had better have been left unjustified.

Does the method lead to new insights? We naturally wish to know whether Euripides himself thought in terms of Dr. Burnett's categories. To this the answer is apparently no. "Their combinations and variations [were] mixing in unconscious potentiality in his creating mind and dictating and censoring his play during its composition" (p. viii). This said, it must be agreed that the majority of the plays treated—the *Alcestis*, *I.T.*, *Helen*, and *Ion*—gain both in sense and in shape by Dr. Burnett's examination. She has gifts of observation and of pointed expression. On Creusa, for example: "The suppliant is herself the source of the blasphemous error that almost costs her her life, while the pursuer is the victim of a deception that his own existence ought to contradict" (121). She takes note of many satyresque elements in the plays; of *philia*, not love in the romantic or modern sense, as the essence of Alcestis' relation to Admetus; and of the latter's reception of Heracles in a proper perspective with his earlier reception of Apollo and his later reluctant but still kind—and salvific—reception of his unknown returning wife. But the most strenuous efforts of the critic can little ameliorate what we already know and feel of the *Orestes* and *Andromache*.

At *H.F.* 1318-19, Theseus, to rally Heracles, mentions divine adulteries and fetherings of fathers by sons, and points out that *the gods do wrong, yet bear it*. Bear what? "Theseus . . . had hoped to show that the existence of suffering among the gods makes it hubris in man to try to do anything but suffer himself" (173-74). What suffering? "As examples of divine suffering he mentioned . . . adultery and the chaining of parents by sons, thinking evidently of the anguish of Hephaestus over Aphrodite's infidelity, of the impatience of Hera on her magic throne, and of Cronus' experience at the hands of Zeus" (174). This is quite wrong. Theseus is not thinking of the feelings of Hephaestus, Hera, and Cronus. He is not thinking of adultery and chaining as examples of wrongdoing. What he says the gods have to bear, and do bear, is the *consciousness of the wrong they have done*. And because they bear it, Heracles should bear his own overpowering sense of having done wrong. Theseus comes as near as Greek tragedy

ever comes to saying that, as the gods forgive themselves, so should man forgive himself. Heracles' famous reply (1340ff.) that the gods do not crave forbidden beds etc. (which, by the way, Dr. Burnett perversely insists on taking strictly of *marriages*) is not primarily an "attempt to rid the concept of the divine of apparent flaws in power, while maintaining the doctrine of polytheism" (176). It is primarily a declaration that no god can *feel* what he, Heracles, feels: they do not bear, as he is encouraged to, the pain of having done wrong, because they never incur it. They do wrong, but do not agonize on this account.

Dr. Burnett's two most general conclusions link together Euripides' dramaturgy in this group of plays as a whole, and his emergent view of the human predicament. His dramaturgy is one of "ceaseless formal experimentation but a steady poetic purpose" (14). We may concede the experimentation, and need not deny a purpose, though "steady" becomes a little suspect when, as here, the plays are taken out of their probable chronological order. The purpose to which our attention is actually directed is: "Each play shows human exertion to be blind and ineffective at best, sordid sometimes, and occasionally contemptible and cruel. And each play meanwhile depicts a divine pity and purpose that can, when it is ready, turn disaster into bliss" (14). But to obtain a blissful ending for the somber *H.F.* the authoress has to appeal (182) to elements, such as Hebe, which are outside the play. This will not do, nor can we agree that Heracles' final action *within* the play is blind and ineffective.

The impact of the book is somewhat lessened by a number of small delusions about language: *soteiria* (three times), "presumptuous," "personnage," "imaginery," "cooly," "loathesome," "imposter," and others. Yet the fact remains that we have here a constructive, even a creative critic, and a reviewer should never forget that it is far less easy to create than to mortify by acupuncture. Whether the lead given by Dr. Burnett provokes ripostes about the Euripidean *Weltanschauung*, or whether—a result which is both more probable and more likely to be useful—it encourages new and better analyses of structure and psychological effect in Greek drama generally, she has certainly started something.

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A. S. Gow, tr. *The Greek Bucolic Poets*. Pp. xxvii + 156. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1972. \$6.00

Gow's translation of his *Bucolici Graeci* (*Bibliotheca Classica Oxoniensis*, 1952) was originally published by the Cambridge University Press (1953). It contains with a few corrections the translations printed in the author's *Theocritus* (Cambridge 1950) which has incorporated these corrections in a subsequent edition (1952). The work consists of a brief introductory essay on the origins and nature of the Greek bucolic and on the lives and works of Theocritus, Bion and Moschus. Each translation is provided with a short preface which summarizes the contents and adds information relating to questions of authenticity (e.g. T.8, 9, 23, 25), historical background (e.g. T.11, 16, 17), or style (e.g. T.18, 22). Explanatory notes are supplied sparingly.

Gow's purpose as stated in the Preface is to provide translations which will be of use not only to the Greek and student of Greek but also to the Greekless reader. Open to criticism are the all too frequent attempts at a literal rendering which reduces both the Greek and the English to such infelicitous turns of phrase as "of men of old and of those the imprint of whose steps still warm the trodden dust holds beneath the foot, Ptolemy . . ." (T.17.121f.), and "I learnt the truth of late when I bethought me didst thou love me, and the smack caused not the love-in-absence to cling, but idly it shrivelled on my smooth forearm." (T.3.28-30). The last example is also instructive of Gow's English idiom which is often more reminiscent of the *King James Version* than Lang's prose translation of 1880. An attempt to render Theocritus' artificial language in an artificial English language dialect along the lines of Matthew Arnold's principles is unsuccessful in the year 1972 and questionable as a method of prose translation, since a modern analogy does not exist.

Where the Greek is simple and descriptive Gow succeeds in supplying an English version which is always adequate and often excellent. Some examples: "and it [the dog] looks to the sea and barks, and the fair waves mirror it as it runs on the gently murmuring strand" (T.6.9-12); "No foe by land crosses the teeming Nile to raise the cry of battle in villages not his own; none springs from his swift ship upon the shore to harry with armed violence the herds of Egypt." (T.17.98-101—[very close to Lang's translation]); "Fair, Lady Night, in the face that rising Dawn discloses or radiant spring when winter ends." (T.18.26f.); "Next cows in countless thousands, advancing herd on herd, showed like rain-charged clouds that roll onward across the sky driven by the force of the south wind, or of the north from Thrace" (T.25.86-91).

Several errors and questionable interpretations appear in the book. The *Megara* was not joined to the other poems of Moschus by F. Orsini as stated on p. xxv but rather by Stephanus thirteen years earlier (see Breitenstein, *Recherches sur le Poème Mégara*, [Copenhagen 1966]

But the identification of Herodas' dialect as "basically the Eastern Ionic of Hipponax" (p. 14 still) leads C. to uncharacteristic excess. In his text he opts for wholesale psilosis, printing *ὑμέων* and *ἐκάστης* at 7.62, for example, whereas previous editors generally (with the notable exception of R. Meister) were content to print *ὑμέων* and *ἐκάστης*. C. even goes so far as to banish the rough breathing associated with initial *ρ*. Thus *ράψας* and *ράπαντα* (6.43 and 47) are not misprints.

What of the vexed question of how the *Mimiambi* were first brought before the public? C. takes a middle position between those who contend that they were actually staged by acting troupes and those who see them as *Buchpoesie*. He argues for recitation of all speaking parts by a single reader, who could even have been the poet himself (pp. 15f.; cf. G. C. Richards, *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature* (edd. J. U. Powell and E. A. Barber [Oxford 1921] p. 114 ad fin., curiously nowhere acknowledged by C.).

C.'s commentary on individual pieces and individual passages contains a good deal that is controversial. He disputes the suggestion of P. Groeneboom (whose edition of *Mimn.* 1-6 (Groningen 1922) he holds in high regard) that the very present Metriche and equally absent Mandris of *Mim.* 1 are newlyweds. That Metriche was an *ἐταῖρα* seems to him more likely, as also to P. Quillard and R. Herzog. But C.'s own arguments are not very convincing; he may have been too quick to dismiss what he calls "the unfounded theory of M[etriche]'s virtue."

Though he acknowledges such material as a possible source, C. disagrees with certain scholars that *Mim.* 2 "is a parody of Attic court speeches" (so H. and K.: see their introduction, pp. xxxvii and xxxviii and the former's article s.v. "Herondas" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; cf. Richards, op. cit., 116). The poet, as C. sees it, was primarily interested in character-portrayal.

C. assigns the speaking parts for *Mim.* 4 in accordance with a scheme already worked out at *CQ*, N.S. 16 (1966) 118-21. Building on a foundation laid by A. Palmer, W. Schulze, and J. Sitzler, all of whom understood *Φάλη* rather than *φάλη* at lines 27, 39, and 72, C. affixes this alleged name to speeches (or in some instances to segments of speeches) assigned by H. and K. to Kokkale. He does not very adequately explain away the seeming carelessness of the author in having this very character, if Phile be her name, address her interlocutrix as *φάλη Κυρνοῖ* at line 20.

In his "Herodas 6 and 7," *CQ*, N.S. 14 (1964) 32-35, C. avers (1) "that 7 is a sequel to 6" and (2) "that its true topic is to some extent concealed." C.'s assumption of a purposeful relationship between the two adjacent *Mimiambi* is maintained, as is his suspicion that certain remarks, particularly of Kerdon the shoemaker (and supplier of dildoes to ladies), mask erotic or obscene allusions. But is C. right in surmising that the outrageous prices which Kerdon quotes, ostensibly for shoes, are really the prices of his other and less respectable line of merchandise?

To his task of editing and annotating C. brings much energy and insight. In contrast to H., however, C. considers Herodas "not an author of outstanding importance or a poet of the first rank" (introduction, p. 17 ad init.).

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WILLIAM F. WYATT, JR. *The Greek Prothetic Vowel*. Cleveland, Published for the American Philological Association by the Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972. Pp. xvii + 124. \$10.00. (*Philological Monographs*, 31)

The prothetic vowel, which occurs in many Greek forms, often in contrast with related forms not showing prothesis in other languages—for example, ἀλέξω: Skt. *raksati* 'protects'—has been the subject of attempts at explanation by a number of scholars, some of whose views are outlined and criticized in the first chapter. Several, though not all, of these attempted explanations have taken the prothetic vowel to be a reflex of an Indo-European laryngeal standing in initial position before a resonant or semivowel.

The author, who has been known at least since "Structural Linguistics and the Laryngeal Theory" (*Language* 40 [1964] 138-52) as an opponent of the laryngeal theory, here elaborates a new and carefully reasoned explanation, which is presented on p. 9, in advance of the argument which is to follow: "a (prothetic) vowel of undetermined timbre (we may assume [ə]) arises only (but not always) before /l m n w/ when /l m n w/ are followed by a short vowel in a syllable closed either by a resonant or semivowel plus consonant, or by a consonant plus resonant or semivowel. We may symbolize this rule provisionally as follows:

RVRC— → ə RVRC—  
RVCR— → ə RVCR—."

In the subsequent chapters Wyatt is obliged to deal with a number of problems, which include the color of the prothetic vowel (o-color usually results when the root contains *ι*), differences conditioned by the identity of the resonant before which the prothetic vowel is expected to develop (for the almost universal appearance of a prothetic vowel before inherited *r-* is a striking peculiarity of Greek, while developments when the initial was *y-* are quite otherwise), the failure of prothesis to occur when the rule seems to call for it, and its occasional occurrence when the rule seems not to call for it. The instances of prothesis taken as resting on the most secure foundation are those

listed by Schwyzer, *Gr. Gramm.*, 411-12, and Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque*<sup>2</sup>, 127-29, 148; of around thirty word-families examined twenty-six are found to be valid cases and are used to formulate the rule for the appearance of prothesis before /l m n w/: if an initial /m n w/ was followed by a non-rounded vowel (ε, α, ι), which in turn was followed by a sequence of non-nasal resonant plus consonant or of consonant plus (non-nasal) resonant, then a prothetic vowel will appear. The formulation is given symbolically on pp. 18 (for l), 27 (for m), and as a provisional statement for l, m, n on p. 37. Before w the possibilities for prothesis are more restricted; after several instances, including *ἔεδνα*, have been eliminated the valid instances are found to be limited to those in which a front vowel follows the w and the syllable is closed by i, l, or r.

The next chapter discusses a number of forms in which prothesis appears to be possible but less probable. Some are rejected as being of uncertain etymology or as containing initial vowels of privative or other value. The real importance of the chapter lies in the fact that the instances which have a good chance of being genuine (e.g. *ἐλεύσομαι*, *ὀλιβρόν*, *ὀλισθάνω*, *ἀμέργω*, *ἄεθλος*, *αἰίδω*, *ἄρδω*) serve as a test for the validity of the rules set up in the previous chapter. Three minor modifications are here proposed: (1) the time at which prothesis developed must have been after \*/sl/— had already passed to \*/hl/— and then lost its aspiration through the dissimilating effect of the dental aspirate in *\*leidh-/lihd-*; (2) in order to make *ἄνευ* fit the rules, pause must be given the same status as C; (3) nasals need no longer be excluded from R, as was implied among the formulas on p. 44 where R<sub>2</sub> was illustrated by instances of /y w r l/ but not /m n/. Wyatt's third rule, just now formulated, is applicable especially to *ἐνεγκεῖν* but had been anticipated in the discussion of *ἐλέγχω*, p. 46. On pp. 50, 56 the explanation might have been slightly improved by writing R<sub>2</sub> (as on 44), for it is important to note that it was not initial n which had been excluded in the original formulation of the rule, but n after the root vowel and before C. At the same time it is worth noticing that the material examined in this chapter has not made it necessary to discard any essential feature of the rules; *ὀλισθάνω* and its related forms provide possible evidence for the chronology of prothesis, unless we prefer the plausible assumption offered on p. 47 that Greek had here inherited an s-less variant of a set of forms with movable s-. Rules 2 and 3 are really extensions of the earlier rules to situations not previously covered. At the same time Wyatt has taken good care not to overwork the evidence, for he has rejected for various reasons a number of forms (e.g. *ἀλινδέω*, *Ἀμάλθεια*, *ἀνάγκη*, *ἐνείκαι*) which purely on grounds of formal structure would have tended to support his rules.

About fifteen forms at first glance show prothesis which cannot be accounted for by the rules, and these make up the material of the next chapter. In at least two of them, *ἀλαπάξω* and *ἀλαστος*, the *ἀ*-seems



very probably to be privative, and most of the others are explained away by various means until only *ἐλελίζω*, *ἄημι*, *ἄλω* and *οἶομαι* remain as apparently genuine cases showing prothesis not admissible under the rules. The solution then lies through the discovery of related forms which fit the formula  $\text{ReR}_2\text{C} \rightarrow \text{əReR}_2\text{C}$ . This is easiest in the case of *ἄημι* (*ἄFημι*, cf. Skt. *vāti*, Lat. *Ventus*, Goth. *winds*), for although 3 pl. *\*wentī*, pres. pcpl. *\*wents* etc. are not attested, they would be normal and easily predictable conjugational forms. For *ἐλελίζω* it is necessary to reconstruct present and first aorist forms with the root-forms *\*leig-*, with Attic reduplication developing after prothesis had appeared. The other two are more troublesome, for, among other things, both require us to assume a root-form *\*weis-*; in the case of *ἄλω* this receives a slight degree of support from *ἄειε*, Hes., *Works and Days*, 213, *ἀειόντεσσι*, *Odyssey*, 1.352, neither of which however rests on a secure textual foundation (cf. p. 62); in the case of *οἶομαι* there is no direct evidence for a *\*weis-* form, but the color of the prothetic vowel *o* by Wyatt's rules gives some ground for believing that  $\text{R}_2 = i$ .

Exceptions of the opposite type, in which prothesis is predictable by the rules but fails to appear, are dealt with in the next chapter. Three principle types of case are sorted out: loan-words of non-Greek or non-Indo-European origin, not existing in Greek at the time when prothesis developed, and accounting for a high proportion of the forms with *a*-vocalism examined on pp. 80-84; forms not existing in Greek in a shape subject to prothesis at the time when prothesis developed; and verbal forms which did possess a prothetic vowel misinterpreted as augment (for example, *ἔειπε*, *ἐείσατο*, *ἐεργεν* etc., p. 74). Toward the end of the chapter several refinements of the rule become possible as a result of the examination of etymological material: prothesis will not develop if the syllable following the resonant is closed by /s/, nor if the syllable is closed by /tr/, /ts/, or /kr/; nor may the -CR- or -RC- closing the syllable consist of two resonants (RR) or two obstruents (CC); in other words the classes -R- and -C- are mutually exclusive.

The final chapter deals in more general terms with the reasons for prothesis. Because of the large number of formulas, expressed through cover symbols and often with multiple sound-changes arranged in chronological order, the argument is not always easy to follow. It is made clear, however, (p. 90) that prothesis was an anticipation or underlining of voicing in initial resonants, necessitated by the need to maintain contrast with initial resonants which had become voiceless and had merged with aspirated resonants of the type seen especially in *hr-* < *sr-*, *wr-*. Thus R- became əR- but *Ṙ-* and *hR-* remained as *hR-*. But another factor must be taken into account: prothesis can be expected if the C in -CR- or -RC- is a voiced stop or a voiceless aspirated stop but not if it is an unaspirated voiceless stop. Where the aspirate is concerned the argument is essentially an application of Grassmann's law, for the aspirate caused loss of aspiration and consequently appearance of voicing and development of prothesis (cf. *Glotta* 46 [1968] 229-37,

where Wyatt used a similar line of reasoning to explain the twofold treatment in Greek of initial *y*-, leading to *z*- under deaspirating conditions and to *h*- under aspirating conditions).

The reason for prothesis when the C in -CR- or -RC- was a voiced stop is less clear. It is suggested (pp. 70-71) that forms like μέτρον, νεχρός escaped prothesis because they contained a cluster which in later times did not close the syllable. The very lateness of this prosodic feature ("correptio Attica"), however, seems to me a flaw in the argument, so that it may be preferable simply to assume a regressive assimilation rendering the initial R- voiced (and hence subject to prothesis) or voiceless according as the C is voiced or (non-aspirate) voiceless. It is regrettable that a more convincing reason is not given why *r*- alone among the resonants developed prothesis with almost no exceptions. The very few possible exceptions, e.g. ῥέζω 'dye; Skt. *rājyati* 'sich färben,' are discussed on pp. 95-96, and on p. 100 it is suggested that those forms with original initial *r*- which did not develop prothesis had developed initial aspiration, thus falling in line with forms containing *hr*- from *sr*- or *wr*-. It is well, however, to remember G. M. Messing's remark (*HSCP* 56-57 [1947] 191) on the absence of initial *r*- in Hittite, Luwian, Mitanni, Lydian, Lycian, and modern Turkish and its possible implications regarding substratal influence. For the merger of *r*- with *hr*- and the non-appearance of prothesis Wyatt, p. 100, holds the presence of a back vowel *a o u* to be a conditioning factor, an idea fully in line with his doctrine, presented at many points in formulaic fashion, that *e* and *i* (but also *a*) in the root were favorable to the appearance of prothesis. In the last footnote of the book he suggests a connection between this conditioning effect of vowel quality and the general significance of palatalization for certain developments within the Greek consonantal system. In this way, as well as in his rules regarding the diverse influences of voiceless, voiced, and aspirated stops, he has imparted a certain measure of phonetic plausibility to rules inductively formulated, and he is thus perhaps unduly humble when he apologizes, p. 120, for not being able to provide a phonetic accounting. Making allowance for the complexity of his formulations and the frequent need to resort to analogy in order to explain forms which conflict with his rules, I believe that his explanation of prothesis is essentially correct. Certainly the number of forms which could be explained by alpha-privative or other prefixes is extremely small, and explanations through laryngeals often are produced *ad hoc*. Whether one accepts the laryngeal hypothesis or not, the reconstruction of a laryngeal in many of the forms which appear in Greek with a prothetic vowel rests on no satisfactory support.

ῥλειφα, cited on p. 12, should be ῥλειψα (the actual form in *Iliad*, 18.350, is ῥλειψαν). The work cited as Wackernagel 1953 on pp. 51, 52 (where 1953 rather than 1955 must have been intended), and 74 was omitted from the bibliography but is the *Kleine Schriften*.

Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (Scholia Vetera), recensuit HARTMUT ERBSE. Vol. II: Scholia ad Libros E-I. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971. Pp. xxxiii + 550; 4 pls. Bound DM 248.

The reader may consult my review in *AJP* 91 (1970) 476-79 for the format, content, and value of Erbse's first volume of *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*. I am glad to report that the second volume of Erbse's *Scholia* maintains the excellence of the first.

After a short introduction (p. V), in which Erbse announces that he intends to offer at the end of the whole work a *supplementum testimoniorum*, there follows the *Argumentum voluminis secundi* which comprises: (a) *Compendia* (= 1. *Auctores* [only ancient authors] pp. IX-XIX; 2. *Tituli librorum* [ancient as well as modern] pp. XIX-XXIX; 3. *Abbreviationes ceterae minus usitatae* [such as *abiud.* = *abiudicavit*, etc.] p. XXX; 4. *Sigla librorum manuscriptorum* (including *codd.* and *pap.*) pp. XXXI-XXXII; 5. *Nomina virorum doctorum selecta* [a list of the names which appear in the *app. crit.*] p. XXXIII [items 1-5 with slight modifications are repeated from the *Compendia* of vol. I]); (b) The text of the *scholia* of books E-I (from *codd.* and *pap.*—the text of *pap.*, whenever such *pap.* exist preceding the text of the *codd.*) with its corresponding *testimonia* and *app. crit.* recorded below the text on each page (pp. 1-545). Next come the *Addenda et corrigenda* [but only few errors are corrected] to the first and second volumes (pp. 547-50); and the volume ends with four photographs of exceptionally well printed papyrus fragments ranging from A.D. I-III cent.

In the second volume there are fewer typographical errors than in the first. Thus, for example, in the text of the *scholia* pertaining to Θ (= pp. 297-391, a section that represents a little more than one sixth of the *scholia* in vol. II) I found only about ten errors which are easy to correct, e.g. p. 303.48 ξξ (read ἐξ); p. 360.66 ζῶων (read ζῶον [cf. p. 361.77, 80, 85, 87]).

There are also some minor inconsistencies. Thus, for example, while on p. 338.16-17 we read πᾶσαι <...> πύλαι [= (Θ 58) = πᾶσαι δ' ὠἰγνυντο πύλαι] on p. 323.30 we read ἢ θέμις <ἐστίν>, ἀναξ. Again while on p. 309.72 Erbse's text presents the lemma \*Ἰδὲν δ' ἔκλεπεν <... / Γάρφαρον> (i.e. the words after ἔκλεπεν to the end of the verse [= Θ 47] are represented by three dots), on p. 327.59 we find the lemma ὅστερον αὐτε καὶ ἡμῖν <— / δώσει>.

Of a more serious nature is the following inconsistency, noticed in my review of the first volume. Although Erbse constantly modifies *lemmata* and, further, introduces into the text a large number of *addenda*, thus transcending considerably the Byzantine archetype c and *Ap. H.* he nevertheless keeps in the text many cruxes that would be lifted if an earlier stage of the text's transmission than that represented by c and *Ap. H.* were to be allowed here too. Of such *cruces* I shall cite only two typical examples. On p. 322.11-12 Erbse's text gives (= χ 290-91) τοῦτό τοι ἀντὶ ποδὸς ξεινήιον, δν ποτ' ἔδωκας / ἀντιθέω

+ὀδύσσηϊ +. What can be more certain than the correction of +ὀδύσσηϊ + to 'Ὀδύσσηϊ (guaranteed above all by the very Homeric text [= χ 290-91])? The standard prose spelling of this proper name is with σσ and therefore it is easy to assume that someone ignorant (or careless) of the meter changed the metrical 'Ὀδύσσηϊ into the unmetrical 'Ὀδύσσηι. On p. 303.39 Erbse's text reads (=P 452) δφρα καὶ + αὐτῷ μοι σάώσετον ἐκ πολέμου. What, again, can be more probable than the correction of +αὐτῷ μοι to Αὐτομέδοντα (guaranteed by the Homeric text and the *ductus litterarum*)? According to P. Maas (whom Erbse on p. LXXVIII of his vol. I calls "vir artis criticae omnium peritissimus") and also common practice, *crucēs* should be used for "irremediable corruptions (where these can be localized)" (P. Maas, *Textual Criticism*, transl. by Barbara Flower [Oxford 1963] p. 22) and not for corruptions which can easily be remedied.

I hope that Erbse will carry to completion this important project with the degree of excellence achieved in the first two volumes, and that at the end of the whole work he will not omit to append detailed *indices* of technical terms and of various kinds of *notabilia*.

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HAROLD C. GOTOFF. *The Transmission of the Text of Lucan in the Ninth Century*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 209. \$8.50. (*Loeb Classical Monographs*)

According to the *Conspectus Siglorum* at least nine important 9th century MSS of Lucan are preserved (Q = Paris. Bibl. Publ. 7900 A could be 10th century). Gotoff is mainly interested in five of these: M Z A B R. Hosius and Housman have used M and Z, but A B R have not, so far, received sufficient attention (20, 29), though B was adequately known to Hosius when he produced his 1892 edition (30), and R was mentioned by Beck in 1900. Gotoff here gives lists of readings originating in A (137ff.), B (179ff.), R (193ff.); he also studies the fairly close relationship (often in error) between F (= Paris. Bibl. Publ. 10403, saec. IX) and M Z.

Each of these MSS, Gotoff asserts, represents a source of independent information, and every one is contaminated. This does, perhaps, not come as a surprise, and yet it has to be said. Lucan was widely read and copied in the 5th and 6th centuries, along with Virgil, Terence, Juvenal, Persius. The ancient texts, according to Gotoff (4), contained already variants and corrections and passed them on to the medieval copies: "... in antiquity . . . contamination brought about 'normal' or vulgate texts" (p. 24, n. 16).

Housman's statement that no manuscript has any more intrinsic

value than any other is an oversimplification, Gotoff thinks (6f.). He believes that omitted lines, among other criteria, help to divide the MSS in certain ways, and he deals with a number of such cases. Unfortunately, the book has no index of any kind, and the reader has to compile his own list of passages; I will just mention 3.211 (30, 34, 59, 84); 4.171 (p. 36 and n. 11); 2.677ff. (pp. 8f. and n. 11). No reference is made to my discussion of the whole evidence in *RhM* 112 (1969) 254-84, nor does Gotoff have much to say on the possibility of author's variants.

It appears that Q G U V P (all 10th century, with the possible exception of Q) have a more comprehensible text, while the 9th century MSS (R perhaps excepted) preserve the evidence more faithfully; but of course they, too, are contaminated. Q seems to be the earliest extant manuscript which is completely independent of Z (19); P is the second oldest member of the group mentioned above (cf. p. 21).

After 1.482 and before 9.85 M and Z are closely related, but it is Z which emerges as the "formal antecedent for A B R" (59). At the same time, R has been influenced by a type of manuscript, "formally different" from M Z, one which contained scholia (9). At least some of these scholia apparently had the form of interlinear notes (17).

Z is "the production of a large number of scribes," probably eight or more (11f.). This codex was corrected several times (Gotoff ascribes all corrections to Z<sup>2</sup>; cf. pp. 111ff.), before it was, around the middle of the 9th century, copied by the scribe of A. "It is convenient to think of the collation of Z<sup>2</sup> . . . as the reconstruction of single lost manuscript." B depends on Z, after corrections.

Gotoff (31) disagrees with Lejay and Bischoff who think that A is older than Z or M. On the whole he seems to accept Beck's thesis that Z is the ancestor of both A and B (35), but his reasoning is not always clear to me, and I find pp. 31-58 very hard going. A stemma (58) seeks to define the relationship between four extant MSS (M Z P F) by means of six hypothetical ones; this stemma, expanded to an elegant esoteric structure on p. 97, might be said to represent the quintessence of the book.

Once we admit the fact of contamination, not only in Carolingian MSS, but in their ancient *exemplaria*, it becomes virtually impossible to establish simple linear relationships. Housman's verdict (cf. p. vii) still holds true: "the line of division is between the variants themselves, not between the manuscripts which offer them." Gotoff's book, impressive as it is, cannot overcome this hurdle, but he has shown the extent of (largely inherited) Carolingian contamination. This, I think, is the most important part of his work.

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HAROLD ARTHUR HARRIS. *Sport in Greece and Rome*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 288; 83 illus., 13 text figs. \$11.50. (*Aspects of Greek and Roman Life*)

The organization of this useful book is tripartite: (1) athletics (i.e. field sports); (2) ball games and fringe activities; (3) chariot racing. The treatment of Greek athletics is brief, since the author has already dealt with it magisterially in his *Greek Athletes and Athletics* (1964). He begins with the first Olympics (776 B.C.), listing and describing the events: wrestling, boxing, pankration, running (including an up-to-date discussion of starting-gates) and the pentathlon. He next treats Greek athletics in the Roman world: the evidence from Etruscan tomb-paintings, Augustus' Actian Games, Domitian's stadium (Piazza Navona); he stresses the absence of any tradition of field sports in Rome, and the Roman spectator's fondness for violence.

Nausicaa and Trimalchio—an ill-assorted pair—appear as players of ball games. We are treated to a long and inconclusive discussion of whether the ancients played football. (Probably not.)

Among swimmers we have Theseus, Odysseus, Leander, Julius Caesar, old Cato's son (taught by his father), Semele (she swam the breast-stroke), and Agrippina the Younger (who swam for her life). For boat-racing: Catullus' yacht; *Aeneid* 5; the Phaeacians. There is even a short chapter on hoop-rolling, and another on weight-lifting: Bubon's 143 kilos at Olympia is possible, Eumastus' 480 at Thera not.

The longest section (86 pages) is devoted to chariot racing, beginning with the funeral games for Patroclus. Greek hippodromes and Roman circuses are described, with special emphasis on the starting-gates; we learn much of the circus "factions," especially the Blues and the Greens; of champion charioteers like the Portuguese Diocles (1,462 firsts); of Nero's private track on the Vatican Hill. Ovid is quoted on how to pick up girls at the Circus, Tertullian and Cassiodorus on the evils of the sport; the section ends with a description of fanaticism at the Byzantine races: 30,000 killed in a single riot.

The book's merits are threefold. (1) The author is that *rara avis*, a competent classicist who knows and loves sports—preferably amateur. (2) He presents us with a gold-mine of little-known facts; e.g. for over a millennium no year is without its record of an Olympic home-town victor. Philo is the greatest user of athletic metaphors; bishops are surprisingly knowledgeable; so are Statius and Manilius. Polo was played in antiquity: the mallet resembled a lacrosse stick. Pausanias believed that in order to dive a girl must be *virgo intacta*. Alexander never learned to swim. The ancients used cork or bamboo supports in lieu of water-wings. The Latin word for "foul" is *facinus*. Pliny the Elder recommends a dose of boar's dung dissolved in vinegar as good for sprains. The superstition of lead tablets cursing charioteer rivals is matched in modern Kenya, where 95 percent of the football

clubs employ witch doctors. Not only horses, but dogs and camels drew racing chariots. One devotee telegraphed home the race results by means of home-farm swallows, their legs painted the winning color. The only tidbits I miss are Caligula's alleged nomination of his prize race horse, Incitatus, as consul; and a reference to the mosaic of the Circus Maximus in Rome in the anteroom to the baths at the Piazza Armerina villa. Finally, the sources quoted provide a remarkable anthology of *recherché* authors, not only those already mentioned, but Nonnus, Oppian, Oribasius, Quintus Smyrnaeus, Rutilius Namatianus, Sidonius Apollinaris, Valerius Flaccus, and a choice garland of Oxyrhynchus papyri and out-of-the-way inscriptions.

Eighty-three halftones and thirteen plans illuminate the text; the index is useful. As one who has had his knuckles rapped by Professor Harris (in the preface to *Greek Athletes*), I rejoice to see what distinguished company I keep: on p. 106, A. E. Housman is described as "erratic"!

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V. R. d'A. DESBOROUGH: *The Greek Dark Ages*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 388; 39 fig.; 60 plates; 5 maps. \$14.95.

Over the past twenty years Desborough has written three books on much the same topic, an archaeologically-based picture of Greece on either side of 1000 B.C., and has skillfully managed to present each work as standing by itself. Their titles seem to suggest a steady increase of emphasis on a historical approach (*Protogeometric Pottery*; *The Last Mycenaean and Their Successors*; *An Archaeological Survey c. 1200-c. 1000 B.C.*; and the present work). In this book, covering roughly 1050-900 B.C., the physical evidence is considered first chronologically and geographically and then is summarized in topics such as settlements, tombs, metals, etc.

Factually the major enlargement here comes from the valuable evidence of Lefkandi. Theoretically the chief embellishment is the elaboration of a view only briefly suggested in *The Last Mycenaean* (28, 258) that Cypriote influence accounts for the shift from Sub-Mycenaean to Protogeometric. Careful analysis of his argument in the present work (49-55) will show that the theory is far from compelling. If a Cypriote duckvase and Attic tripod bowls both have circular vertical handles, the cause is surely functional. Desborough continues to believe firmly in a wave of invaders to produce the Sub-Mycenaean style itself.

The author writes clearly, in good humor, and provides adequate illustrations. One may disagree on matters of interpretation, but a

general criticism must be stressed for it strikes to the heart of scholarly discussion. Unlike his previous works, this volume has almost no footnotes, even to identify a work discussed in the text, much less to advise the reader of contrasting views. Desborough does note on occasion the opinions of Snodgrass; but he does not, for example, even discuss Styrenius' argument that the Sub-Mycenaean expanded from the Argolid to Athens (a view which I would not myself accept, but one worthy of attention). Nor does he either mention or seek to refute Styrenius' critique of his hypothetical northern invasion connected with the Sub-Mycenaean. The site index at the end of the work is not adequate compensation; there is no real bibliography.

Let me comment more generally on a theme which has long been one of my concerns, for it can be illustrated from Desborough's book. While many assume that the writing of history is really very easy, I have generally observed that the nurturing of true historical judgment and the application of solid historical principles are difficult matters indeed.

As a survey of the physical evidence *The Greek Dark Ages* is very valuable and judicious. The book could not have been written thirty years ago, but now it forms only one item in a considerable body of analysis on the formative period of Greek civilization. The Dark Ages are still extremely dim, and we shall never have enough evidence entirely to remove the obscurity;<sup>1</sup> still, one can at least advance reasonable hypotheses on major aspects of the great developments in the era. Desborough discusses the oral tradition briefly, in terms which I would completely accept; for the historian must always seek to work from contemporary evidence. Our ability to do so today is partly based on syntheses such as Desborough's, but the basic credit must go to the many patient archaeologists and their supporters, above all *honoris causa* Gustav Oberländer and the German excavators at the Kerameikos.

In a quite different area which I am presently investigating the fundamental excavations are still largely to be made, let alone receive reasoned interpretations; and so I feel the more keenly how solid and essentially interwoven (if sadly limited in many ways) our physical evidence for the Greek Dark Ages actually is. Perhaps humility would be desirable on this point; for after all it was the Greeks themselves who fashioned the basically continuous, and comprehensible, line of development which we today can follow.

Desborough, though, seems to suggest by his title and introduction that he has prepared a primarily historical account. If we look at the

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps it should be stressed that the evidence *never* will be adequate to resolve major theoretical disagreements. I noted with interest in the closing paragraph of Platon's *Zakro* the familiar, hopeless hope of archaeologists: "Naturally new questions have been raised, and further investigation and study will be required to find their answer."



book in this light, rather than as a survey of physical evidence, it exhibits serious limitations of the sort which a man of historical temperament often finds in modern work by learned scholars who are not primarily historians. These pages would scarcely be understandable, or open to criticism, by any one who is not steeped in archaeological terminology and the excavation reports; and the history of the age is still to be made when one has read it. For Desborough's picture is ill-focussed and even historically inconsistent; he speaks all too truly at one point of "a haze of hesitancy and supposition." Elsewhere there is a description of a "peaceful and freely flourishing" era in which interconnections took place easily, though Desborough himself suggests that the population dropped by nine-tenths in about a century and speaks quite sensibly on pp. 342, 352-53 about the unsettled conditions.

Important terms, moreover, are used in a somewhat imprecise fashion. Athens and other centers appear as "cities," a concept not lightly to be employed in ancient analyses; the word Sub-Mycenaean in two pages means a pottery style, a particular people, and an era. The archaeological tendency to explain major developments in term of population movements recurs here (though Snodgrass and Styrenius, to name no others, think otherwise), yet the Protogeometric outburst is suddenly the product of a single genius and somehow expresses an Attic character. In sum, this work is not fundamentally historical in its approach, even though the evidence it marshals is a base on which the historian must build.

If I speak directly, this is not to deny the merits of *The Greek Dark Ages*, nor would it be proper to claim that the writing of history is properly the preserve of people who have had a particular form of training. Ever more I have felt that the historical temperament is something given, and not mechanically acquired. The point rather is that one cannot lightly embark on historical pursuits, and that much which is labelled history lacks a truly historical attitude.

The physical remains of the period, to repeat, are of decisive importance for any historian seeking to understand the Dark Ages, and these remains are sufficiently abundant and varied to permit a potentially true reconstruction of one of the most important advances in Western civilization. Our knowledge of no other periods of human history has changed and expanded in recent generations so much on the *factual* level as has that of what we termed "ancient" and "prehistoric" times. This is not the place to pursue the serious question whether our conceptual schemes have altered and developed as much as the evidence has, but at the least an ancient historian devotes himself to an intellectual profession almost without equal in its challenge. Occasionally the pursuit may be maddening in its obscurities, but always it stimulates the mind and deepens the historian's sympathetic appreciation of the achievements—and disasters—of the human race.

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E. S. STAVELEY. *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 271. \$9.50. (*Aspects of Greek and Roman Life*)

This is a book of exceptional merit. It may be the most successful volume in the outstanding series, *Aspects of Greek and Roman Life*, edited by H. H. Scullard. In E. S. Staveley the editor certainly found the best man for the job. Staveley has few peers in his command of constitutional history in the early Roman Republic—where most of the difficult questions lie. And this work shows him fully conversant with the issues and literature on Greek matters pertinent to his subject. But it is not the scholarship alone that calls for commendation. Staveley ranges broadly—from Homeric times to the early Principate. The book will have a wide readership. At the same time he avoids popularization. Staveley confronts the ambiguities, the problems, the controversies; he offers his own solutions, usually sane and plausible, sometimes bold and imaginative. The alternatives are always discussed and systematically controverted. Staveley has examined the data on voting and elections with care and intelligence. Reading is sometimes laborious, but never tedious.

A brief review cannot single out all the items that deserve praise. A select few will give some idea of the scope of this work. Staveley offers a remarkably lucid exposition of the allotment procedure in Athens, based largely on the classic article of Sterling Dow (61-72). And he is quite right to insist that sortition was designed not for mediocrity but to prevent the emergence of an identifiable governing class (54-55)—though one may doubt the success of that aim; cf. M. I. Finley, *Past and Present* (1962); S. Perlman, *Athenaeum* (1963). Equally valuable is Staveley's careful description of voting processes in the Athenian courts: a plausible picture emerges (95-100). The complex question of successive or simultaneous voting in the Roman assemblies receives an intelligent analysis (169-74). Manipulation and fraud in Roman elections has been much discussed; but Staveley's treatment of the same subject on the Greek side is fresh and important (101-17). And mention should be made of his diligent effort to estimate even the time element in Roman voting procedure (186-90).

Several cherished theories undergo assessment. Staveley rightly debunks the notion that the Spartan ephorate and *gerousia* were normally at odds (76). He is right too to point out that group voting in Rome was imbedded in the early structure of Roman society and not a device created by the governing class (133-35). And he insists, with justice, that fraudulent electoral practices in Rome should be recognized as exceptional rather than characteristic (215-16). The author makes a strong case for acceptance of Plutarch's account of ostracism (90-92). Illuminating hypotheses are offered for the institution of the *centuria praerogativa* (155) and for the role of the first voter in legislative assemblies (165-67). Very little escapes Staveley's gaze. He calls attention to the peculiar absence of information on the checking of

voters' credentials in Rome and suggests a reasonable reconstruction (162-64). He provides a clear demonstration of the manner in which a candidate could secure election even without carrying the largest number of voting units (179-80). And one could go on.

Of course, it is possible to find fault. Staveley takes forthright stands on even the most controversial issues, thereby inviting dissent. But that is his strength, not his weakness. The proposals are generally accompanied by forceful argumentation. It will not be out of place, therefore, to issue some objections. Staveley's discussion of the Spartan Great Rhetra is unsatisfactory. He rejects the implications of the Rhetra on the early powers of the *apella* (19-21, 74-75). But those implications are not refuted by the passages he cites (Aristotle *Pol.* 1272A11; 1273A12). Even if Aristotle's comments are correctly interpreted by Staveley, they apply to Aristotle's own day and bear no relevance to the period of the Rhetra. Staveley also denies that the *apella* ever elected ephors and conjectures, without evidence, that the *gerousia* performed that function (21, 31-32). But this again presses an Aristotelian text (*Pol.* 1294B30) and lands Staveley in the dilemma of believing that Spartan citizens could elect but not become *gerontes*, while they could become but not elect ephors, a most unlikely hypothesis.

Additional questions can be raised about the treatment of Athenian constitutional history. Staveley credits Solon with a measure permitting the assembly to elect magistrates (24-25). Yet it is difficult to scout the explicit statement of Aristotle that elective magistracies preceded Solon and that he did not alter that principle (*Pol.* 1273B35-1274A4). Staveley follows Aristotle in believing that Solon instituted sortition to appoint archons from candidates previously chosen by the tribes (*Ath. Pol.* 8.1; cf. also Isoc. 7.22 and Dem. 20.90, not cited by Staveley), but abandons him when asserting that the lot was suspended under the tyranny (34-37). Aristotle's statement is that archons were selected by lot in 487 for the first time after the tyranny (*Ath. Pol.* 22.5). The text does not imply that the tyrants repressed sortition; rather the reverse. On the *strategia* Staveley adopts the standard view "which there is little reason to question": the reform of 501 permitted generals to be elected by the whole citizen body and no longer by individual tribes (41). Once again, however, that assertion is neither supported nor even suggested by Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.2). See now C. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (Wiesbaden 1969) 1-10—apparently unknown to Staveley. The author offers a subtle and ingenious theory to explain double tribal representation in the *strategia* of the late 5th century (42-46). But the theory is unnecessarily complicated and without basis in the evidence (cf. Fornara, *op. cit.*, 22, n. 36). Staveley's general conclusion that the Athenian electorate had "a keen eye for intrinsic merit" is excessively optimistic (105). Since there was no financial compensation for elective office, only men of means were, in practice, eligible. Does that reflect "intrinsic merit"? One final point

on the Greek section: it is confined exclusively to Athens and Sparta. Staveley discusses no other cities, says nothing about voting in the federal leagues, and stops short of the Hellenistic period. All regrettable omissions.

Space does not permit detailed disputation on Roman matters. It might be noted, however, that not all the bibliographical citations are fully up to date. On the *curiae* and on the early voting assemblies (122-32) reference should now be made to R. E. A. Palmer, *The Archaic Community of the Romans* (Cambridge 1970). The supposed new tribes created by the *lex Julia* of 89 (139) have recently been discussed by R. G. Lewis, *Athenaeum* (1968). Staveley does not register the important article of J. Linderski, *Mélanges Michalowski* (1966) on candidacies in *absentia* and that of A. W. Lintott, *CQ* (1965) on the *trinum nundinum* (146-48). And for joint canvassing (205-6) note should be made of the analysis in Ch. Meier, *Res Publica Amissa* (Wiesbaden 1966) 197-200. A few other minor disappointments. Kunkel's doubts about *provocatio* and the capital jurisdiction of the assembly are dismissed without discussion (128-29 and n. 227). Staveley prefers the views of Mommsen, recently (but unpersuasively) revived by A. H. M. Jones, *The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate* (Oxford 1972). The distinction between the *concilium plebis* and the tribal assembly, that thorniest of problems, is left obscure (130-32). Staveley is too positive in denying that the censors ever re-registered rural immigrants into urban tribes (136-37); cf. now P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower* (Oxford 1971) 104-6. And he accepts too readily the schematic thesis that the 3rd century senate consisted of two warring camps divided over foreign policy (191-92). A slip on p. 143 puts the *lex Junia* in 56 B.C.; it was passed in 62 B.C. Finally it may be presumptuous to affirm that the laws against *divisores* and *sodalicia* were not rigidly enforced (204). Cicero's speeches suggest rather that they were difficult to interpret, not that they were unenforced.

So much for quibbles. Staveley's book easily withstands reviewers' criticisms. It is a work of consummate skill and diligence, and it will be an invaluable guide for scholars and students on voting and elections in the ancient world.

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CHARLES W. FORNARA. *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404*. Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1971. Pp. 84. DM 28.00 (*Historia. Einzelschriften*, 16)

The main thesis of this book is that after the reforms of Ephialtes Athenian generals were elected at large and not according to the principle of *ἐνα ἑξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς*. This theory, it seems to me, may actually be correct, but the procedure used to substantiate it fails to overthrow the orthodox view that each tribe was entitled to only one general except on those occasions when the Athenians chose someone *στρατηγὸς ἑξ ἀπάντων*.

Fornara assembles case after case of two generals chosen from the same tribe in the same year, including four years when *two* tribes each had double (or even triple) representation (summary on p. 71). However, many of his examples depend on unsubstantiated conjectures in prosopography. For instance, the only evidence that the general Pythodoros of the First Sicilian Expedition belongs to the tribe Kekropis is the appearance of one Pythodoros of Phlya as epistates ca. 450 (*IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 335). It is equally baseless to say that the Kallias Kalliadou of the Poteidaia campaign is a demesman of Aixone. To be sure, we do know of a man of this name from Aixone a hundred years later, but we also know of men called Kallias Kalliadou in the demes of Plotheia and Paiania (*IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 780; *SEG* XVIII, 36A, lines 253-54). In fact, this combination of names must have been used in many families. There are simply too many Athenian leaders still unknown to us to permit easy acceptance of the demotics which Fornara adopts for various generals.

A second class of double representation involves Phormion and a member of Paiania as colleagues. Since Pausanias (1.23.10) says that Phormion, fallen into debt, withdrew to live in Paiania, Fornara and others conclude that this was the general's deme. Recently, however, P. J. Bicknell (*Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy*, 60-61) has cited several instances of Athenian leaders who were registered in one deme while holding ancestral properties in another. If Phormion were one of them, that would leave only those instances of double representation involving Perikles and a colleague from Akamantis. It is this very phenomenon which suggested the prevailing theory that from time to time a general could be chosen *ἐξ ἀπάντων* without reference to his tribe.

Yet we are not exactly back where we started. We can document this last class of double representation because we happen to know about Perikles' fifteen consecutive terms as general and because we also know his deme. If we knew the names of more of the generals or even the demotics of the generals we already know, we might have more than enough cases to establish Fornara's thesis.

Actually, the current view rests on a rather simplistic interpretation of *Ath. Pol.*, 61.1, *χειροτονοῦσι . . . στρατηγοὺς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν*

ἀφ' (ἐκάστης) φυλῆς ἓνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων. Many suppose that νῦν implies a change shortly before Aristotle wrote, while Fornara wants to push it back to the middle of the fifth century. We need a study of similar *πρότερον/ νῦν* comparisons in the *Ath. Pol.* Generally we cannot determine exactly when the changes Aristotle specifies took place, but to take an example, the boule probably lost the right of disqualifying incoming archons and bouleutai in the fifth century (45.3; 55.2). Since Aristotle does not mention these important developments in the historical section of his work, there is no compelling reason why he should have noted any change in electing generals there.

Fornara makes some other important points: the polemarch originally selected the tribal generals, but in 502/501 the demos began to elect them (his interpretation of *Ath. Pol.*, 22.2). At no time was there a single *στατηγός ἐξ ἀπάντων*, but the generals all had equal powers. As he explains it, the power of the demos was constantly increasing, and it feared a strong leader.

Finally, Fornara includes a list of generals which must be used with great caution. Naturally there are minor errors of commission (*Ολνεύς* used as a demotic on pp. 58-59) and omission (p. 70: *Lys.*, 28.1 is the source of Archestratos' demotic). But the really serious and inexcusable thing is printing such names as *Εὐκράτης Μελιτεύς* and *Ἀρχέστρατος Λυκομήδους Φλυεύς* when the demotic should be bracketed.

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DENNIS PROCTOR. *Hannibal's March in History*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xii + 229, 2 Maps. £4.00.

The subject, well-worn to say the least, is the chronology and geography of the march of Hannibal's army from Spain to Italy. Proctor's lengthy analysis leads him to the following conclusions, none of them claimed as original: (1) The army left New Carthage about mid-June, and reached the plain of the Po in mid-November. His departure date is slightly too late for *ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας* (Polybius 5.1.3), and he has missed some of the recent literature (notably G. V. Sumner, "The Chronology of the Outbreak of the Second Punic War," *Proceedings of the African Classical Association* 9 [1966] 5-30); but he shows convincingly that some of the best-known chronologies (De Sanctis, Walbank, etc.) are incorrect. (2) Wherever Hannibal began the Alpine crossing, it brought him down initially into the territory of the Taurini. (3) His army crossed the Rhone very near to

Beaucaire, not, as many scholars have said, further upstream. (4) The 'Island' on the Rhone at which the events described in Polybius 3.49.5-13 and Livy 21.31.4-9 took place, was at the Rhone's confluence with the Aygues (otherwise Eygues). In Polyb. 3.49.6 read ἡ δὲ Σκάρας, not ἡ δ' Ἰσάρας, and in Liv. 21.31.4 read 'Ibi Iscara [vel sim.] Rhodanusque . . . ' (5) The army advanced up the Rhone to the confluence with the Isère, then along the Isère, coming eventually to the site of Grenoble. This is surely probable, whether (2), (3), and (4) are correct or not. (6) Livy's references to the River Druentia in 21.31.9 and 32.6 do not mean that Hannibal somehow came back southward to the Durance after advancing up the Isère, for in chapter 31 Livy draws successively on three sources without realizing that they were each describing the same stage of the march. (7) The Col du Clapier is likely, but not certain, to have been Hannibal's pass: it fits reasonably well with the distances given by Polybius, it is one of the higher passes among those that are eligible (thus snow remained from the previous year), it has the required camping space, and it provides the allegedly required view of the plain. Second choice is the Col de la Traversette.

Proctor's great merit is his first-hand knowledge of the topography. Historians who ought to have known better have imagined that they could give judgement on these problems without such knowledge. Equally indispensable, however, is a thorough discussion of the inter-relationship of ancient accounts of the march, and in this Proctor is defective. He makes some suggestions about Livy's use of his sources, e.g. point (6) above, but his argumentation about the source problems—though better than De Beer's—is extremely sketchy.

The identification of Hannibal's pass seems already to have been disputed in the second century B.C. On the one hand, the Polybian evidence is held by Proctor and most others to exclude the Little St. Bernard; Polybius had crossed the western Alps himself (apparently he meant to claim that he had crossed by Hannibal's pass, *pace* Proctor, p. 215). In any case Liv. 21.38.6 strongly suggests that there were early sources that excluded the St. Bernard passes. On the other hand Coelius Antipater, whom Proctor does not discuss, surely believed that the Little St. Bernard was Hannibal's pass (Liv. 21.38.7); Coelius used Silenus (Cic. *de div.* 1.49), an eyewitness (cf. Nepos *Hann.* 13), so he must be taken seriously. In these circumstances no identification of the pass can come near to conclusiveness.

Two mistakes which have some effect on Proctor's arguments should be mentioned: p. 16 misrepresents both LSJ and the facts on the meaning of temporal ὑπό + accusative. Pp. 85, 213: it is wrongly supposed that Polyb. 34.10.18 is known to us from a 'digest' of Polybius and not only from MSS of Strabo.

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OTTO GEUDTNER. *Die Seelenlehre der chaldäischen Orakel*. Meisenheim am Glan, A. Hain, 1971. Pp. viii + 78. DM 16,80. (*Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie*, Band 35)

The title *Chaldaean Oracles* is applied to a cryptic poem (or group of poems) written, or taken down under divine inspiration, apparently in the age of Marcus Aurelius, by a certain Julianus, known as "the Chaldaean," or his son Julianus, called "the theurgist." The document (or documents) survives only in scattered fragments, quotations from pagan and Christian works of the Neoplatonic period. "The oracles" were apparently not used by Plotinus, and for this reason largely neglected until recent times, though they were very important to Plotinus' successors, who were generally less devoted than he to Platonic rationalism and more attracted to "theurgy." (Whatever the term originally implied, it is more closely akin to ritualistic magic than to pure contemplation.) For Proclus, the *Oracles* stood beside Plato's *Timaeus* as one of the two most important books in the world. Thus they represent a significant aspect of "pre-Neoplatonism," and deserve the increased attention that has been paid them in recent years, in writings by Lewy, Dodds, and others, and notably in des Places' impressive Budé edition of 1971.

The "Chaldaean" philosophical or religious system reveals elements of Persian fire-cults, of Chaldaean astronomy, and doctrines of Plato (especially the *Timaeus*). A supreme god, the Father, is the first and heavenly fire, completely withdrawn from the sensible world, with which he has contact only through a subsidiary deity, a "second intellect." Man's soul has fallen from the divine empyrean to the material world, but it can reverse this process and ascend again to the Father.

Obviously, in such a system, the soul is centrally important, and Geudtner has done a workmanlike job of surveying its nature and vicissitudes, mainly through study of the terminology applied to it. The longest and most important chapter (2) is devoted to "the fall of the soul." Here he classifies the various kinds of "descent" (the soul strays or falls or is sent, etc.), and points out various other distinctions (the soul is despatched as on a mission or as a punishment, etc.). Special features are noticed in the "Chaldaeans'" treatment of various aspects of the soul's peregrination, notably in relation to its "vehicle" or "astral body" (*ὄχημα*), and a number of the results that follow from its involvement with matter (drunkenness, forgetfulness, slavery and bondage, subjection to fate). It is interesting that in common with Plotinus but unlike Plato and the later Neoplatonists, they rejected the transmigration of souls from human into animal bodies.

Eros is an important element of the Chaldaic universe: he holds it together. He is apparently aided in this by the peculiar *inynges* (the word means "wry-neck," a kind of woodpecker, but also gets applied to the "magic wheel," as in Theocritus 2). These in some way are thoughts of



the Father, but at the same time do some thinking of their own, and perform a cosmic function as subsidiary *erotes*. The soul arms itself with a three-pronged weapon (*ἀλκή*) whose nature is that of a light which effectuates the liberation of the soul from the corporeal. There are also certain "conduits" or "channels" between God and earth (*ὁχετοί*) which facilitate their connection, and whose basic nature also seems to be, or to involve, light.

The third chapter discusses various aspects of the escape of the blessed soul from the trammels of matter and life on earth, and its return ascent to the region of divine fire.

Geudtner shows that in spite of its confusingly fragmentary transmission and an obscurity which must have been characteristic of the original poem, the document presented a consistent or at least coherent *Mythos* of the fall and return of the soul. Though most of the leading thoughts are Platonic, Oriental ideas are part of the amalgam, and this combination is part of what made the *Chaldaean Oracles* particularly suitable as a sacred text to be cited in the late days of ancient heathenism.

It is too bad that Geudtner has not been able to cite by des Places' numbers; citation by Kroll's pages is unsatisfactory, since a page (of his *De Oraculis Chaldaicis*, 1894, 1962) so often has more than one fragment. There is no index. The table of contents is detailed but not typographically perspicuous; and in fact one subheading found in the text is omitted from it (p. 14).

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